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I AM DELIGHTED to have the opportunity to introduce a collection of 
papers reprinted here in one place for the first time. They represent a sub-
stantial part of a long and multifaceted polemic that contributed to the 
emergence of analytic philosophy in Britain at the turn of the last century. 
As such, I trust that this collection will act as a resource to historians and 
philosophers alike. Before we get into some of the details concerning the 
controversy, allow me to make a few remarks about its context and sig-
nificance.
Critical engagement with the history of analytic philosophy has in 
recent years led to a growing and veritable enterprise within academia. 
With its own journal, society, conferences, handbooks, and book series, 
the study of the history of analytic philosophy is reshaping how we un-
derstand not only the appearance of a specific tradition in philosophy, but 
also the intellectual climate of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.2 
And despite some recent relapses into teleological and anachronistic nar-
ratives of its history, there has been a growing appreciation for contextu-
alized studies that go beyond rehearsing the supposedly linear progress of 
the standard train of heroes. 3 Although finding intricate ways to include 
1 I would like to thank Matthew Soteriou and the Aristotelian Society for their invita-
tion to guest this Virtual Issue. And I would like to show my gratitude to the editorial 
staff, but especially to Mark Cortes Favis for his hard work in helping to put this issue 
together.
2 See the superb contributions by M. Beaney in the “Introduction” section of The Oxford 
Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy, ed. M. Beaney, Oxford, 2013, pp. 
3-224.
3 In recent years few have contributed as prolifically to the teleological brand of histori-
cal narrative than Scott Soames; see his Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, 
Volumes 1 and 2, Princeton University Press, 2003. There have been many valuable cri-
tiques of Soames’ naïve historiography, but see Michael Kremer, “What is the Good of 
Philosophical History?” The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy, edited by Erich H. 
Reck, 2013, pp. 294-325. I would add that Soames’ story of “progress” in philosophy 
should be regarded as pedagogical—as he himself urges—rather than as an historical 
work, precisely in the same way many historians of science regard the potted histories 
of heroes found in introductions to science textbooks written by scientists for science 
students. Foucault explained that such text-book histories are important for internally 
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some, while excluding many others on this train might still be interest-
ing to a few, nuanced historical embedding of philosophers like Frege, 
Russell, and Carnap has only enriched and widened the scope of relevant 
historical actors. This has had the refreshing effect of putting them back 
into conversation with forgotten historical trajectories, and, perhaps more 
poignantly, with neglected persons and ideas, problems and arguments 
contemporaneous to them. In this there are benefits for both philosophy 
and history, because in widening the historical scope of a given period, 
more resources for accurate interpretation of arguments, problems, and 
positions become available.
Among other things, it is essential to identify such overlapping things 
as institutions, societies, and persons contemporary to a philosopher of 
historical interest. There are different ways to embed a philosopher into 
these and other surrounding features of his or her historical period. But 
if it can be shown that a philosopher was involved with particular con-
temporary networks or audiences, it might not only cast new light on the 
relevance of these to the history of analytic philosophy, but might also 
speak, for instance, to the motivations involved in a philosopher’s choice 
of problems or articulation of solutions. From choosing which premises to 
highlight, to the suitability and selection of terminology, and which venues 
and strategies to employ in communicating problems and their solution, 
such choices often depended on the audience(s) being addressed by a phi-
losopher. Appreciating the nature of these audiences and their philosophi-
cal concerns may thus be paramount in understanding a philosopher’s 
views, and their reception by contemporaries.
It is precisely this kind of exercise that I attempted in my Bertrand 
Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers: Constructing the World (2008). 
There I was interested in Russell’s attempts to directly apply methodologi-
cal tools he had developed earlier, while working on specific esoteric prob-
lems in the philosophy of mathematics, to much broader traditional prob-
lems of philosophy. In particular, I was interested in detailing what made 
Russell’s methodological proposals with regard to the problem of the ex-
ternal world—especially as he dealt with them between 1911-1916—as 
unique and original as he was branding them to be. Doing so provided 
information about the decisive roles played by Russell’s “logical-analytic 
method,” and the technique of logical construction in the early develop-
ment of analytic philosophy. 
What I soon realized, however, was that I had first to recognize who 
Russell was trying to convince when he made enthusiastic claims about 
his novel method and technique. In search for answers to this question 
consolidating academic disciplines, especially the formal sciences. It is thus no surprise 
that Soames appeals to the history of logic as his model (Michel Foucault, The Archaeol-
ogy of Knowledge, Routledge, 2002, p. 209). 
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I uncovered for the first time an extensive polemic that raged for nearly 
two decades, and chose to flamboyantly label it, for the purposes of the 
book, the controversy. This long and sustained debate was primarily con-
cerned with the problem of the external world, more generally, and a host 
of related sub-problems, like, for instance, the nature of the distinctions 
between reality and appearance, matter and mind, representation and pre-
sentation, data and inference or construction. What became apparent was 
that what counted as the traditional problem of the external world itself 
was up for grabs thanks to the ways in which those in the controversy 
managed to reframe it in light of recent intellectual, cultural and insti-
tutional developments in psychology, physics, and philosophy. In other 
words, the problem of the external world was recast at the turn of the last 
century in ways that did not simply match up with what one might find 
in Locke, Hume or even Mill.4 It was in relation to this very controversy, 
then, that Russell’s contemporary forays into the same problem have to 
be understood, including—but not limited to—his papers: “Knowledge by 
Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” (read on March 6, 1911; 
T. P. Nunn was Chair of session), “Analytic Realism” (1911), and his 
books, Problems of Philosophy (1912), and Our Knowledge of the Exter-
nal World (1914).5 I argued that notions as central to Russell—if not to 
analytic philosophy—as sense-data, acquaintance, and logical construc-
tion (of space, time and matter), when interpreted in light of the contro-
versy, have to be understood in much fuller ways than they standardly 
had been. And far from simply reducing or dispersing Russell’s novelty 
to others, this historical work enabled me to detail what made Russell’s 
philosophical approach so unique and compelling, especially in relation to 
those around him who were entangled in similar problems. 
Continuity with respect to the issues, persons, terminology, examples, 
4 Indeed, how could the problems be the same after the radical changes in both the sci-
entific understanding of perception, and everyday sensual experiences of the world? Nu-
merous authoritative historical studies have described how the experience on trains, for 
instance, artificial lighting, photography, film, and the personal equation altered modes 
of perception in the nineteenth century; entire scientific treatments, in fact, recognized 
these changes and studied them (e.g., studies in attention, fatigue, stress and so on). The 
attentive reader will find significant clues as to how these shaped the work of Russell, 
who, for example, employed examples such as photography and painting. In the case of 
the latter, and like Stout (who also centered his psychology on the study of attention), 
the claim was that painters are better at recognizing things like patches of color in their 
experience of the world, rather than discrete things like tables. In addition, one of the 
problems for realists like Moore and Russell—and recognized as such—was the temporal 
delay, discovered by the physiologists and astronomers, in the sense-experience of the 
world; cf. H. W. Carr, F. B. Jevons, et. al., “Symposium: The Time Difficulty in Realist 
Theories of Perception,” PAS, NS, vol. 12, (1911 - 1912), pp. 124-187.   
5 Let us not forget Russell’s six articles taken from his unpublished manuscript, Theory 
of Knowledge (written in the spring of 1913), and published in The Monist in 1914 and 
1915. In these Russell directly engages the psychological work of Stout, among others.
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and even metaphors used in the controversy is astounding. It was com-
prised of a close-knit community of thinkers in Britain, who rarely agreed 
with one another’s overall conclusions or methods, but who, neverthe-
less, shared a surprising amount of common ground—not to mention that 
they quite enjoyed a good conversation. This chemistry resulted in at least 
two commingled features of the controversy and some participants that 
should be kept in mind. The first is that though many of the contributions 
are directly addressing issues raised by others in the controversy, it is not 
always made explicit. So on the one hand, one finds a subtle, fine-tuned, 
jargon-filled, and sometimes convoluted quality to many of the contribu-
tions, which, when taken in the context of the controversy as a whole, 
often gives away the fact that their moves were governed by the dialectical 
confines established by previous contributions. But one also finds a ten-
dency to begin again, as it were, as if a reset button were pushed so that 
the fundamentals might again be considered. As to the second related fea-
ture, it has to do with the fact that since the controversy was an on-going 
and advanced dialectic about a definite set of issues, many, such as G. F. 
Stout and G. E. Moore, used it as an opportunity to develop and refine 
their own positions. A number of contributions might thus be regarded 
as trial runs, dropped as nets into the turbulent waters of the controversy, 
so that proposals might return with weaknesses exposed or strengths ac-
centuated. One thus finds a productive, two-way give-and-take among 
those involved. And whether it was G. Dawes Hicks or Russell, few left 
the controversy as they had entered it.             
In order to make sense of the above two features of the controversy 
we must appreciate something that is easily overlooked but which cannot 
be stressed enough: though much of the controversy is made up of printed 
materials, there is a prominent culture of unprinted conversation (mostly 
face-to-face discussions in seminar rooms, corridors, or private homes, 
and by way of personal correspondence) that underlies the whole tex-
ture of the controversy. It is no wonder that explicit references were often 
deemed unnecessary in contributions, for many had a pretty good sense 
of who or what was being addressed. After all, the majority of contribu-
tions were first verbally presented at seminars or symposia and discussed 
in person or by way of letters before they were published. But what were 
the venues that made this kind of discussion not only possible but also 
sustained and encouraged it?    
One of the things that made this underlying culture of conversation 
possible was the Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philoso-
phy, where the controversy first began and where it continued until its 
end over a decade and half later. The Society was formed in 1880 as a 
platform for philosophical discussion in London, open to scientists, civil 
servants, businessman, philosophers without official university posts, and 
ladies. In contrast to the University of London, one of the only places 
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where philosophy was academically taught in the city, the Society was an 
avowedly non-academic space where the young and the old alike could 
regularly gather to engage philosophy not so much as a discipline but as 
a life or human interest. And as with so many other discussion circles or 
societies formed during this period, the Aristotelian Society was initiated 
in response to major social, cultural, and intellectual upheavals of the fin 
de siècle. In particular, it was formed in reaction to an acute disorientation 
of the place of philosophy due to its professionalization and to the blows 
dealt to its cultural status by the successes of the natural sciences. It is thus 
little surprise that the very first meeting of the newly formed Aristotelian 
Society on Monday May 3rd, 1880 (a fortnight after its constitution) had 
for its discussion “What is Philosophy?” opened by a district police sur-
geon, medical officer with the Post Office, and “a brilliant dialectician” 
with Hegelian leanings, Dr. J. Burns-Gibson.6 
It was the same doctor who three years later would lead a coup against 
the Society’s first president, the philosopher Shadworth Hodgson. Apart 
from having to move to a new location (from Bloomsbury to Albemarle 
Street near Piccadilly), the rebellion had an interesting effect on the Society. 
Its remaining members began to recruit university professors, contribut-
ing thereby to the shift from meetings having the character of a “student’s 
seminar to that of a society for original philosophical research.” However, 
its non-academic character remained strong and was even “turned to ad-
vantage,” so that “work done in the universities could now be discussed 
in the open forum.”7 This is no place for a detailed history of the Aristo-
telian Society, but the point to bear in mind is that right from the start the 
Society provided an open space for philosophical speculation and discus-
sion, even on the nature and methods of philosophy itself. Considering 
the diversity of individuals and methods embroiled in the controversy, it 
must have been such institutionalized traits of the Society that were most 
conducive to the controversy. For at bottom, it was an arena for a num-
ber of different philosophical methods, and the Society, which eschewed 
propagating specific doctrines and taking sides, offered a suitable setting 
and audience for the introduction and assessment of methods. 
An early episode in the post-coup era of the Society nicely highlights 
many of these facets of the Society’s character. The episode is also an im-
portant component to our controversy’s pre-history. In an early attempt to 
open up its membership and attract academics working at universities, the 
Society held one of its first meetings outside of London at Jesus College, 
Oxford on November 16, 1891. It was a “symposium” (an innovation of 
the Society) on the “The Origin of the Perception of the External World.” 
Samuel Alexander chaired the session, and it was the Society’s president, 
6 See H. Wildon Carr, “The Fiftieth Session: A Retrospect,” PAS, NS, vol. 29 (1928-
1929), pp. 359-386.
7 Carr, “The Fiftieth Session: A Retrospect,” pp. 372, 380.
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Shadworth Hodgson, who read the leading paper.8 Two replies followed, 
one by the idealist Bernard Bosanquet, and another by David G. Ritiche. 
Despite the fact that all those who had read papers had spent time at Ox-
ford in some capacity or other; and despite the engagement of the Oxford 
realist philosopher, Thomas Case—author of the immensely suggestive 
Physical Realism being an Analytic Philosophy From the Physical Objects 
of Science to the Physical Data of Sense (1888)—the discussion that fol-
lowed must have been awkward. In his retrospective, H. Wildon Carr, a 
long-time member of the Society, recalled that the Oxford meeting was 
a “failure” (380), and that “the meeting really proved the impossibility 
of carrying the atmosphere of Albemarle Street into the seat of learning” 
(381). 
The point of view from Oxford might be gleaned from a satirical re-
port on the meeting in The Oxford Magazine, called, “The External World 
on the Aristotelian Society.”9 In it, David Ritiche is parodied as urging, 
against Hodgson’s contrasts of German experience of the world with the 
“English experience” of it, that “the plain man was a box within a box, 
and his self-consciousness was located in his digestive apparatus, but the 
metaphysical kitten and baby on the other hand gradually identified them-
selves respectively with their tail and toes.” Case, as one of the Oxford 
hosts, hesitated “whether to call the Aristotelian Society or their hosts the 
external world, for the one was an extraneous body, the other purely exo-
teric, but he welcomed the visitors to the last home of Aristotle.” It took 
Carr nearly forty years to get the joke, writing that, “the thought [now] 
comes to me that after all the Aristotelian Society must have appeared 
to the Oxford mind as an external world.”10 The magazine’s report ends 
with a quip indicative of the confusion and unease that must have pre-
vailed that evening: at some point “the External World, feeling aggrieved 
and seeing that the attention of the meeting was concentrated on other 
unconsidered trifles, slipped out unobserved, and (as Mr. Bosanquet had 
predicted) was never missed” (106).      
In addition to gaining us an insight into the Society as a place where 
broad problems might be discussed in a fashion not so conducive to the 
university’s academic setting, the symposium is significant for understand-
ing the pre-history of the controversy. There are at least two reasons for 
this. On the one hand, some core participants of the impending contro-
versy either read papers at the Oxford symposium or, though not present 
8 This was certainly one of the opportunities Hodgson took, as he says he often did in 
the context of the society, to develop his ideas on the problem of the external world that 
would later appear in a section of his The Metaphysic of Experience (1898). Let us also 
bear in mind that Hodgson continued to attend and actively contribute to the meetings 
of the Society until his death in 1912.
9 The Oxford Magazine, 10:6, Wednesday, Nov. 25, 1891, pp. 105-106.
10 Carr, “The Fiftieth Session: A Retrospect,” p. 381.
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in person, were present in spirit and explicitly referred to in the course 
of presentation and discussion. In the case of the former, Alexander and 
Bosanquet are particularly important, who twenty years later would be 
pitted against one another within the context of the controversy. In the 
case of the latter, it is Stout who looms large in the background as provid-
ing, at least in the English-speaking world, one of the most sophisticated 
psychological solutions to the problem of the external world. On the other 
hand, a number of key themes, terms, and techniques are made promi-
nent at the Oxford meeting that would ten years later form elements of 
the controversy’s framework. These are: (1) attempts to strictly separate 
the psychological problem of the external world from the philosophical 
one; (2) an exploration of which—the psychological, physiological, or 
philosophical—is more fundamental to the other; (3) the significance of 
the “plain man’s” experience of the external world to the problem; (4) 
vigilance in not surreptitiously introducing assumptions or postulations 
into any solution that actually presuppose a solution—in other words, 
determining the order of the inquiry itself was a part of the problem; (5) 
the challenges posed in distinguishing between self and “not-self”, exter-
nal and internal, and mental and extra-mental; and (6) the relevance of, 
in Hodgson’s words, the “fog-making Germans” (28) like Kant or Hegel 
in understanding the problem of the external world. How these issues de-
veloped and carried over to the controversy are important questions, but 
ones that cannot be addressed here. What is clear, however, is that these 
issues gave particular shape to the problem of the external world for many 
participants of the controversy that was to follow, including Russell and 
Moore (both had been elected members of the Society in 1896).  
Now, I do not want to suggest that the Aristotelian Society was the 
only game in town. There were other venues where the controversy un-
folded, like the journal Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and 
Philosophy (est. 1876), the Mind Association (est. 1900), the British 
Academy (est. 1902), and workshops which took place in newly formed 
philosophy chairs all over Britain. However, it is also true that the contro-
versy was first initiated at meetings of the Society, and abruptly came to a 
close within them as well. And in between its start and close, the major-
ity of contributions, including the many core papers of the controversy, 
were tailored for the Society’s fortnightly meetings, discussed there, and 
published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (est. 1888). At the 
same time, let us not forget that between 1897-1900 many of the papers 
that were presented to the Society were actually printed in the annals of 
Mind. There are a number of reasons for this, but for our purposes it is 
important to highlight one: that a renowned member of the Aristotelian 
Society was also the chief-editor of Mind. This was no other than George 
Frederick Stout—one of the influential teachers of both Russell and Moore 
at Cambridge—elected to the Society in 1887. And as president of the So-
19
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ciety between 1899-1904, he also acted as a conduit between the Society 
and Oxford, where he was residing.
Due to limits on space, I cannot get into the many personalities and 
positions that were involved in the controversy. But it is worthwhile to say 
a few brief words about a few of them, including Stout—after all, it was 
he who had sparked the controversy and kept its flame going in a number 
of invaluable rejoinders. Although Stout had already tackled the problem 
of the external world as early as 1890,11 and again in his two great works, 
Analytic Psychology (1896) and Manual of Psychology (1898), these ven-
tures into the problem were psychological in outlook and method. Stout, 
to be sure, had himself made it abundantly clear that the problem of the 
external world had at least two faces that had to be distinguished and 
treated separately: the psychological and philosophical (epistemological 
or metaphysical). He also held that the psychological components of the 
problem had to be suitably established before one treated it as a philo-
sophical problem (Hodgson, in contrast, had stated the reverse method-
ological policy at the Oxford symposium).12 It was thus after Stout took 
up the first Wilde readership in mental philosophy at the University of Ox-
ford in 1898 that he, armed with data, findings, and techniques acquired 
in the course of his extensive psychological studies, began to confront 
philosophical problems.13 
11 G. F. Stout, “The Genesis of the Cognition of Physical Reality,” Mind, Vol. 15, 1890, 
pp. 22-45. It is this that participants of the Oxford symposium had in mind when refer-
ring to Stout. It is also this paper that ignited a “hostile” response from the Hungarian 
statistician, jurist and experimental psychologist Julius Pikler in his, “The Genesis of 
Cognition of Physical Reality,” Mind, Vol. 15, 1890, pp. 394-400. Stout’s Reply to Pikler 
is, “Dr. Pikler on the Cognition of Physical Reality,” Mind, 15, 1890, pp. 545-550. Rel-
evant is also Pikler’s, The Psychology of the Belief in Objective Existence, London, 1890.
12 See the invaluable contribution made by Maria van der Schaar, G. F. Stout and the 
Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy, 2013. There she argues that when Stout’s 
analytic psychology is properly understood and distinguished from genetic psychology—
as no doubt Stout did, being inspired by Brentano’s descriptive psychology—the charge 
of psychologism does not apply. Though sympathetic to this view, I believe more needs to 
be said to accommodate the empirical technique of introspection so important to Stout’s 
analytic psychology.
13 Another important strand of the controversy must be highlighted, and that is the reac-
tion to Stout’s approach to epistemology in so far as it should be grounded in psychology. 
Reactions came mainly from the students of John Cook Wilson, the Oxford Realists H. 
W. B. Joseph and H. A. Prichard. It begins with Prichard’s “A Criticism of the Psycholo-
gists’ Treatment of Knowledge,” Mind, NS, vol. 16 (1907), pp. 27-53; Stout responds in 
his “Mr. Prichard’s Criticism of Psychology,” Mind, NS, vol. 16 (1907), pp. 236-243. A 
few years later comes Joseph’s three-part onslaught in his “The Psychological Explana-
tion of the Development of the Perception of External Objects,” (I), Mind, NS, vol. 19 
(1910), pp. 305-321; (II) in Mind, NS, vol. 19 (1910), pp. 457-469; ending with a reply 
to Stout in in Mind, NS, vol. 20 (1911), pp. 161-180. Stout’s response to Joseph is in 
Mind, NS, vol. 20 (1911), pp. 1-14. It should also be noted that Russell was much closer 
to Stout than to Pritchard or Joseph. 
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While at Oxford, besides challenging F. H. Bradley and John Cook 
Wilson in conversation and in print, Stout composed what might be re-
garded as the first paper in the controversy: a presidential address to the 
Aristotelian Society with the title, “The Common-Sense Conception of a 
Material Thing” (read November 5, 1900). Stout’s presidential address 
laid down a set of challenges that were to echo well into the first decades 
of the twentieth century. These included an attempt to evaluate an epis-
temology that was psychologically informed by how well it explained the 
“plain man’s” view of the persistence and change of material things in 
the world, for instance. Notwithstanding this paper’s importance, it was 
another one delivered to the Society years later that directly ignited the 
controversy. This was his “Primary and Secondary Qualities” (read to the 
Society on June 6, 1904), a paper that continued his interests in method-
ology, but applied to a specific problem formulated by Thomas Reid: “Is 
there anything common to the primary which belongs not to the second-
ary [qualities]?” 
Without getting into the details, let me simply mention that among the 
important themes developed by Stout in 1904, and which reoccur through-
out the controversy, surround the apparent conflict between the world 
of physics (and physiology) and psychology; the related conflict of “real 
space” with the space of the sensations; and the problem of how to con-
nect what is immediately “given” in sense-experience with what is not. As 
these filter through the controversy, all, at some point or other, find their 
way into Russell’s work. It is in Stout’s 1904 paper, moreover, that one 
finds operational, at least in the background (but made more and more 
explicit as the controversy unfolds), his important notion of presentation. 
This is a notion that Stout, in his Analytic Psychology, distinguished from 
James Ward’s notion, and is one that, as I’ve argued elsewhere, was a 
crucial component in the development of Moore and Russell’s notions of 
“sense-data.”14 Presentations are understood as what are immediately pre-
sented to a subject when perceiving or sensing. As a matter of fact, Stout, 
inspired by the work of Franz Brentano, had, independently of Kazimi-
erz Twardowski, developed a tripartite distinction between a mental act, 
content, and object—where presentations are equivalent to content. Pre-
sentations are mental, according to Stout, and should not be understood 
14 When Moore first introduced the term “sense-data” he did it explicitly in relation to 
Stout’s “sense-presentations”; see Moore, “The Subject-Matter of Psychology,” PAS, NS, 
vol. 10 (1909-1910) pp. 36-62, p. 57. Before this, Moore had referred to “sense-con-
tent.” It has been noted on a number of occasions, however, that Royce, Bradley, Case, 
James, Fraser, and even Venn had long before employed the term “sense-data” (or some 
form of it like “data of sense”). The trap we must not fall into is to simply presume that 
they all meant the same thing. By embedding the term within a particular set of problems, 
we can distinguish the variety of meanings attached to it. Before historical investigation, 
it is safer to assume in these cases difference rather than equivalence. Nonetheless, what 
is fascinating for the period is the conspicuous rise in the number of notions developed 
for the given.   
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atomistically but rather as continuous parts of a whole; a whole that can 
be demarcated in different ways depending on interest and attention. It is 
as parts of wholes that presentations have what Stout awkwardly calls a 
“representative function”; that is to say, presentations are always directed 
at something other than themselves. Presentations are not identified with 
physical objects, but are rather “psychical existents” in their own right 
(and thus are not the mere appearances of things) that point us to what 
they are correlated with in the physical world. In contrast to Locke and 
Berkley, then, Stout concludes in his paper that though distinct, both pri-
mary and secondary qualities of things are correlated but not identical 
with corresponding qualities of sensation.  
The first reaction to Stout’s work on primary and secondary qualities 
was by a student of Thomas Case, the Oxford realist, John Cook Wilson. 
In a long letter to Stout, he launched an attack from the perspective of an 
old or “natural realist” which assumed a subject’s unmediated relation to 
physical things in the world themselves. As such, Cook Wilson challenged 
Stout’s supposed representationalism. It was in reaction to this misun-
derstanding that Stout read a paper to the British Academy, “Things and 
Sensations” (1905), wherein he rejected a representational reading, and 
doubled-up on the distinctions between physical objects and sensible-pre-
sentations, and between the world of physics and the plain man’s world 
of sense experience (the explanandum of analytic psychology). It is only 
a year later that one finds the idealist neo-Kantian, Dawes Hicks’ prolix 
reactions to Stout (read May 7, 1906), and T. Percy Nunn’s earliest articu-
lation of new realism (read February 5, 1906).
It is noteworthy that many participants of the controversy came to the 
problem of the external world by way of psychology. Besides Dawes Hicks, 
who explicitly frames the issue as a psychological one in 1900, we must 
underline the fact that Samuel Alexander had independently developed a 
new realism, similar to that of Nunn’s, in the context of a symposium on 
the nature of mental activity. It is after Stout directly challenges Alexan-
der (read to the Society on July 5, 1909; among those who participated 
in discussion of the paper were Moore, Nunn, Hodgson, and Wolf), that 
the latter switches from a psychological mode to an epistemological (and 
eventually a metaphysical) one, which might be described as phenomeno-
logical, only to conclude, among other things, that sensible-presentations 
are not mental but rather “physical”; a position reminiscent of Nunn’s 
more general thesis, defended earlier and inspired by Moore and Russell, 
that whatever a subject must “reckon with” in perception, imagination, 
or judgment, is “objective.” 
But it is really at a symposium on the question “Are Secondary Quali-
ties Independent of Perception?” (read at a symposium at the joint meeting 
with the Mind Association on June 25, 1909) that Nunn not only defends 
22
The Aristotelian SocietyOmar W. Nasim Virtual Issue No. 2
Alexander’s general position about presentations being “extra-mental” 
but also articulates in the clearest way the position against Stout. The 
result is a powerful new realism that acknowledges the existence of count-
less extra-mental presentations (or sense-data), that are not to be identi-
fied with physical things, but which might all be related to a thing as con-
sistently being in the same place at the same time as it —undercutting one 
of Stout’s most potent postulates that contradictory sense-presentations 
cannot exist in the same place at the same time.15 The British New Realism 
therefore conceded and framed the need for a new epistemology of space, 
matter, and time. It is exactly within this framework that the labour of 
Russell must be understood, particularly his: “On Matter,” (1912), “The 
Relation of Sense-Data to Physics” (1914), “The Ultimate Constituents of 
Matter” (1915) and Our Knowledge of the External World (1914). Rus-
sell, in fact, openly acknowledges Nunn and Alexander in some of these 
papers, an acknowledgment that cannot be appreciated without an appre-
ciation of their roles within the controversy as a whole.
It should be clear by now that when Russell proclaimed in 1914 that 
the “chief outcome” of his work on the problem of the external world 
was to bring the world of physics together with the world of psychology, 
that this claim must be understood in light of how others in the con-
troversy framed and tackled similar problems.16 I cannot get into other 
facets of the controversy which had an impact on Russell’s philosophy 
in this period—a period that also overlaps in part with his presidency of 
the Aristotelian Society (1911-1913). But suffice it to point out at least 
four: (1) the complex interconnections between Stout’s “ideal construc-
tions,” Nunn’s “primary and secondary constructions,” and Russell’s own 
“logical constructions”; and the distinction gradually arrived at between 
inference and construction by both Stout and Russell;17 (2) the distinc-
15 It should be added that it was in the name of metaphysical paucity that the idealist, B. 
Bosanquet, composed a tract against the new realists, but particularly Alexander, with 
the title, The Distinction Between Mind and Its Objects (1913). Alexander responds in a 
pamphlet published by the British Academy as The Basis of Realism (1914). Both these 
works are important contributions to the controversy.
16 See, O. Nasim, “The Spaces of Knowledge: Bertrand Russell, Logical Construction, 
and the Classification of the Sciences,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 
20 (2012), pp. 1163-1182.
17 It remains to be asked by historians: what were the conceptual and historical relation-
ships between these notions of constructions and F. H. Bradley’s extensive discussions of 
what he already referred to in 1883 as “ideal constructions”—a term used by James Sully 
in 1881 in a book on illusions that was reviewed, coincidently, by our own Dr. J. Burns-
Gibson. As in the case of “sense-data,” one must resist the temptation to simply presume 
that the same things are meant when the same terminology is employed. For one thing, 
Stout’s “ideal constructions” are heavily psychologised as mental processes, mostly un-
conscious, and are actually modeled after Helmholtz’s “unconscious inferences.” An-
other important factor to keep in mind is that while for Bradley constructions are forms 
of inference, Stout would later distinguish construction from inference, as would Russell.
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tion between acquaintance and description; (3) the nature of sense-data 
that are not data to any subject, i.e., Russell’s sensibilia—a notion already 
dismissed by Stout as early as 1904, discussed by Moore, and revived 
by Nunn in 1909; and (4) the indispensable role played by psychologies 
(whether functional or structural, analytic or genetic, etc.) in this early 
period of British analytic philosophy.18 
There are two further points that must be made before I conclude. The 
first is that I do not want to suggest that the only context in which to un-
derstand Russell’s philosophy or the rise of analytic philosophy is the one 
provided by the controversy. There are a whole host of other factors at 
play, many of which still require research. But what is important about the 
controversy is that it brings together a number of different kinds of philo-
sophical positions and methods to bear on a set of specific questions that 
Russell himself took up in order to showcase the applications of his own 
novel methods for philosophy. Indeed, the controversy is not only a source 
for understanding the evolution of Russell’s philosophy in the period, but 
it is also an excellent resource for understanding the reception, impact, 
and absorption of Russell and Moore’s thought by those around them. 
The second point is that my research has focused, for the most part, on 
the impact the controversy had in shaping Russell’s philosophy, and this in 
a very focused way. In so doing, I do not want to imply that there is noth-
ing else to explore.19 In fact, one of the reasons I believe it is worthwhile to 
collect a large bulk of the controversy in one place is so that it can act as 
a resource for a number of other, even alternative, avenues of exploration. 
Allow me to briefly state a couple that come to mind: 
(1) The import of the relationship between Stout and Moore—both 
of whom shared an interest in grounding their work in common 
sense—has recently been explored.20 But it might also be of some 
interest to investigate the ways in which Moore’s philosophy was 
embedded in the controversy. After all, he played a direct role in 
it as a participant, contributing not only arguments for problems 
posed, but also by proposing terminology that would aid in clarify-
ing issues implicated in the controversy. One of these was of course 
his proposal for using “sense-data” instead of Stout’s “sense-pre-
18 For more details see, O. W. Nasim, Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers: 
Constructing the World, 2008; and Nasim, “Spaces of Knowledge.”
19 See my, “The Spaces of Knowledge”, where I attempt to broaden some aspects of 
the controversy to include others. For another expansion of the relevant circle, see the 
informed paper by Gary Hatfield, “Psychology, Epistemology, and the Problem of the 
External World: Russell and Before,” The Historical Turn in Analytic Philosophy, edited 
by E. H. Reck, 2013, pp. 171-200.
20 See for instance, Consuelo Preti, “On the origins of the contemporary notion of propo-
sitional content …”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, vol. 39 (2008), 
pp. 176–85.
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sentations;” a proposal that, interestingly enough, Moore aban-
dons in 1913 for the term “sensibles” instead. 
(2) Given the fact that many participants of controversy were ei-
ther trained in Germany or were deeply influenced by German-
speaking philosophers and psychologists, the controversy should 
be an invaluable resource for those wanting to study the impact 
of this training and influence on English thought. Stout’s mastery 
of the German sources is well known, including the fact that he 
was among the first to bring the likes of Herbert, Brentano, and 
Meinong to the attention of English thinkers, including Russell 
and Moore.21 Less known is that Stout’s own teacher, James Ward, 
and John Cook Wilson, were both pupils of R. Hermann Lotze in 
Germany; and that from 1891 onwards Dawes Hicks studied in 
Leipzig (where Wundt’s influence dominated), finishing his doctor-
ate on Kant a few years later. And while pursuing experimental 
psychology, Samuel Alexander left Oxford to study under Hugo 
Müsterberg at Freiburg im Breisgau. If not always by name, Ger-
man-speaking philosophers and psychologists certainly loomed 
large in the controversy, providing, thereby, many opportunities 
to overcome a number of artificial divides, such as the continental 
and analytic ones. 
Turning to what is included in the collection of reprints below, I should 
begin by saying that it is not complete. This is for reasons of space, but 
also due to the simple fact that I have been invited by the general editor 
to collect only those papers that were published in the Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society (abbreviated PAS below); anything published else-
where has had to be excluded. Therefore, in order to provide as complete 
a picture of the controversy as possible, while complying with the limita-
tions imposed on this collection, I’ve had to divide the papers into three 
categories. First, there are the classic papers from the Society’s archive 
that have been reprinted, and which constitute, by in large, the core of the 
controversy. Then there are those that, while comprising the core, cannot 
here be reprinted and have therefore been designated as “Essential Read-
ing.” Finally, there are those that are important surrounding sources over-
lapping with and informing the controversy, which have been designated 
as “Additional Reading.” Only those papers that are reprinted have been 
numbered for the reader’s convenience. 
21 Stout was also read by German scientists and philosophers; see, for instance, the fas-
cinating review by Theodor Lipps, “G. F. Stout: Analytic Psychology. London, Swan, 
Sonnenschein & Co., 1896. 2 Bände,” Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der 
Sinnesorgane, vol. 16 (1898), pp. 399-409.
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G. F. Stout (1860-1944) was a leading English philosopher and psycholo-
gist who included Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore among his students. 
He studied psychology at Cambridge University under James Ward and 
opposed the prevalent theory of associationism. G. F. Stout held positions 
as a fellow at St. John’s College Cambridge (1884-96), a lecturer in Com-
parative Psychology at the University of Aberdeen (1896) and a reader in 
mental philosophy at Oxford (1898-1902) before serving as professor of 
logic and metaphysics at St. Andrews, Fife until his retirement in 1936.
G. F. Stout was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1899 to 1904.
The following paper - “The Common-Sense Conception of a Material 
Thing” - was Stout’s Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society. It 
was published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol-
ume I (1900-1901), pp. 1-17.
34
I .  T H E  C O M M O N - S E N S E  C O N C E P T I O N  O F  A 
M AT E R I A L  T H I N G
G. F.  S T O U T
WE have to enquire what constitutes a material thing, such as a stone, a 
tree, or a billiard ball, as it is apprehended by the ordinary consciousness. 
For purposes of exposition it will be convenient to deal first with things in 
their static aspect, and afterwards to consider them as subject to change. 
However true it may be that, as a matter of fact, all things are in per-
petual flux, it is undeniable that to the ordinary consciousness most things 
appear to remain precisely in the same condition and position for long 
periods of time. For instance, I find my writing table this morning to all 
appearance exactly as I left it last night, and I presume that it has persisted 
unaltered in the interval. Considered in this static aspect, we may offer the 
following sketch of the essential constituents of the ordinary conception 
of a material thing.
To begin with, it is clear that a material thing has duration in time 
and position in space. Of these two characters spatial position is the more 
distinctive. For existences which are not material have temporal duration. 
Next we ask how the space occupied by a material thing is filled. What 
are its contents? We may give a partial answer to this question by saying 
the place occupied by a body is filled by a complex of sensible qualities. 
But not all sensible qualities have, in the strict sense, a position in space. 
Sounds and smells are not spatially localised as tangible and visible quali-
ties are. We do, indeed, speak of localising a sound; but what we mean is 
that we fix the position of its source, determine its place of origin. We do 
not mean that the sound itself occupies this place. We say that a sound 
comes from a bell, not that it is in the bell, and we express by this such 
facts as that the sound is l heard when the bell is struck and not otherwise, 
and that it becomes fainter as we recede from the bell and intenser as 
we approach it. The position of the bell itself is the position of its visible 
and tangible qualities. All colour is spread out in space of two dimen-
sions, and every coloured surface has a definite position relatively to other 
coloured surface. The same is true of tangible qualities, such as rough-
ness and smoothness, hardness and softness, hotness and coldness. But 
the same place cannot be simultaneously occupied by different colours, 
and it cannot at the same time be both hot and cold, both hard and soft, 
both rough and smooth. These are mutually exclusive, because they are 
specific variations in the same respect of the same generic quality. On the 
other hand, specific variations of different generic qualities, or of the same 
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in different respects, can occupy the same place. A body may be hot, hard, 
and smooth in the same place. In particular, visible and tangible quali-
ties are capable of having an identical position in space, and, as a rule, 
they are actually apprehended as spatially coincident and co-extensive on 
the bounding surfaces of material things. The exceptions are confined to 
instances, such as that of the air, in which a thing is tangible but not vis-
ible. The inverse exception does not occur; what is visible but intangible is 
regarded as a phantom, not as a material thing at all. We may then affirm 
in general that a material thing is a complex of sensible qualities, and that 
within this complex there is a central core constituted by visible and tan-
gible qualities which have spatial extension and position, and are spatially 
coincident and co-extensive. Other sensible qualities are more loosely at-
tached to this central core. They are attached to it in so far as their appear-
ances, disappearances, and variations are connected in definite ways with 
change in it, and in its spatial relations.
Up to this point we have considered only sensible qualities and their 
interconnection, and our results harmonise with Mill’s famous definition 
of a material thing as a group of permanent possibilities of sensation. But 
our next step brings us into conflict with Mill. Only the bounding sur-
faces of bodies are visible and tangible. But these bounding surfaces have 
something in between them, and this something, by its nature, is invisible 
and intangible. We may indeed be said to perceive it by means of sight and 
touch. But it is not in itself a visual or tactual or any other kind of sense- 
presentation.
Solidity in the strict sense is rather a permanent impossibility than a 
permanent possibility of sensation. It is true that it involves possibilities of 
sensation, but these possibilities depend on it; they do not of themselves 
constitute it. At any rate, this is the unsophisticated view of common sense. 
I have, let us say, a billiard ball before me. I can see and feel the surface, 
but not what lies beneath. But this surface is only the outer surface; there 
are an indefinite number of inner surfaces which it hides from me. I can 
suppose the billiard ball divided into an indefinite number of concentric 
layers, and I can suppose these concentric layers to be peeled off succes-
sively like the coats of an onion. In the process an indefinite number of 
visible tangible surfaces would be disclosed. Again, I can suppose the bil-
liard ball to be sliced across in an infinite variety of ways, and each section 
would disclose two surfaces. Thus the solidity of the billiard ball involves 
a very complex system of permanent possibilities of sensations. None the 
less, the solidity itself remains a permanent impossibility of sensation. For 
no combination of surfaces can constitute solid thickness; the solid thick-
ness is always apprehended as lying between them; they cannot constitute 
it just because they have no solid thickness themselves, and, if they had, 
would cease to be mere surfaces. The surface is in space of three dimen-
sions what the line is in space of two dimensions, merely a boundary. The 
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line formed by the meeting of two coloured surfaces is no part of either of 
them. Similarly the surfaces, disclosed by slicing an apple form no part of 
the solid content of either half of the apple. The next item which seems es-
sential to the ordinary conception of matter is impenetrability – the mutual 
exclusiveness of solids in space. Each occupies its own place, and no two 
can simultaneously occupy identically the same place. This characteristic 
of matter is most important for the conception of mechanical causation.
We have considered the material thing, as an impenetrable solid and 
as a complex of sensible qualities. We have now to add that it is also a 
complex of powers and susceptibilities, or in Locke’s language, of powers 
active and passive. “Fire has a power to melt gold, and gold has a power 
to be melted. The sun has a power to blanch wax, and wax has a power to 
be blanched by the sun.” A material thing has powers active and passive – 
powers corresponding to all the changes which it is capable of undergoing 
or producing. There is here an explicit reference to change and causation 
which points beyond the static point of view, but does not, I think, actu-
ally carry us beyond it. For reference is not to actual change and causation 
but only to their possibility. Arsenic is poisonous even though it poisons 
nobody, and tea-cups are fragile even though they remain unbroken. A 
material thing has a power or susceptibility corresponding to every change 
which it is capable of undergoing or producing under varying circum-
stances. It thus possesses an infinite number of powers – active and pas-
sive powers – which never have been and never will be actualised. Such 
attributes attach to the material thing because of their connection with 
its other characters, its position in space, sensible qualities, solidity, and 
impenetrability. The changes which the material thing is capable of under-
going are changes of position, of sensible quality, of the spatial relations 
of its parts at the bounding surfaces, or within the solid content and the 
like. Changes in other things are referred to it as their source, because 
they arise in connection with its own changes of position, sensible qual-
ity, etc., or with the varying spatial relations of other things relatively to 
it, or some such conditions. Here the question may be raised whether 
some of the other attributes of matter which we have enumerated are not 
in reality mere powers. “Sensible qualities,” says Locke, “what are they 
but the powers of different bodies in relation to our perception?” Now 
an ordinary educated person who has some acquaintance with popular 
philosophy or science would perhaps be ready to acquiesce in this view, as 
far as regards colour, sound, smell, and taste. But he would be inclined to 
draw the line at touch. As a matter of fact, he would be quite illogical in 
doing so, for touch sensations are just as much effects produced in us by 
external things as visual sensations. In any case the whole question is for 
common sense merely speculative. In ordinary practical life we attribute 
to material things the sensible qualities themselves, not the mere power 
of producing them in something else. The whiteness of the sheet of paper 
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before me actually belongs to the paper: it is spread out over its surface; it 
is not spread out over the surface of my brain, or my retina, or my soul, or 
my consciousness. This is the natural view of common sense, and I cannot 
help adding that common sense seems to me to be in the right. Doubtless 
there is a problem here, but you cannot solve it by saying that colour is a 
state of the percipient mind or organism and not of the thing seen. 
I have already said enough to show that solid occupation of space 
in three dimensions is not a power of producing sensations in us, and it 
seems evident that it cannot be reduced to a mere power of any kind. The 
case of impenetrability seems more doubtful. For impenetrability might be 
described as the power of a body to exclude other bodies from the space 
which it occupies itself. But this power may be regarded rather as a conse-
quence of impenetrability than as identical with it. It involves a reference 
to possible movement or stress which is not necessary to the conception. 
No such reference is involved when we say that two different colours can-
not simultaneously occupy the same place, and it need not be involved in 
the statement that two solid bodies cannot occupy the same place.
We have so far considered only the general conception of matter. In 
order to complete our inquiry we must also consider the characters which 
mark off one material thing from another. What constitutes the unity and 
distinctness which is implied in the use of the indefinite article when we 
speak of a material thing, or of the plural number when we speak of mate-
rial things, or of the demonstrative pronoun when we speak of this or that 
material thing? Within wide limits this unity and distinctness is fluctuat-
ing, and varies as our own subjective interest varies. The cloud of dust 
which meets us on the highway is one thing, and we do not distinguish its 
portions or particles as separate things. But if a particle gets into our eye, 
it at once assumes individuality and independence. When we contemplate 
a tree from a distance, its parts may not assert themselves as separate 
things; but if we attempt to climb it, the protuberances of its trunk and 
each branch which offers foot-hold or hand-hold emerge from the whole 
as distinct portions of matter. In spite of this fluctuation, there are, none 
the less, relatively fixed and permanent unities corresponding to relatively 
fixed and permanent interests. We find a unity of this kind wherever a 
portion of matter is marked by a separate name. Thus chairs, tables, dogs, 
horses, trees, etc., are portions of matter permanently marked off from 
their environment, and, so to speak, ticketed as separate articles by the 
current use of language. In particular, those portions of matter which are 
the vehicles of conscious life appear to have a peculiar claim to indepen-
dent individuality. Such are the living organisms and men and animals, 
and the material products of their activity as guided by intelligent purpose 
– horses, ploughs, steam engines, and the like. On the whole, we may af-
firm that the unity and distinctness of a material thing is bound up with 
the unity and distinctness of our interest in it, and that it is shifting or 
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permanent according as our interest is shifting or permanent. But this is 
only one side of the question. In order that we may have an independent 
interest in a thing, the thing must by its own nature be capable of excit-
ing this independent interest. The conditions necessary and sufficient for 
this may, of course, vary indefinitely in different cases; but there is at least 
one condition which, though by no means always sufficient, appears to be 
nearly always necessary to the unity and distinctness of a thing – I refer to 
that definite limitation in space which is called shape. What is regarded as 
a single thing must, as a rule, have bounding surfaces which are sensibly 
distinguishable from empty space or from the bounding surfaces of other 
things. Of course, what I here call empty space is really filled with air: but 
as air is usually invisible, and as its tangible quality usually escapes atten-
tion, space which is only filled with air is generally regarded by common 
sense as if it were empty. Any portion of matter which is wholly or par-
tially separated from other portions by this virtually empty space may be 
apprehended as a distinct thing. One branch of a tree is separated in this 
way from other branches, though it is spatially continuous with them in so 
far as they all spring from the trunk. Thus we may either regard the whole 
tree as one thing, or we may distinguish each branch as a separate thing. 
Portions of matter which are continuous with each other in space may be 
distinguished by difference in the sensible quality of their bounding sur-
faces. Where both means of distinction fail, we may introduce them by a 
mental artifice. In what appears as a uniform sheet of white paper there is 
nothing to prompt me to single out one portion from another. If I attempt 
to do so, I shall find myself looking for slight differences in the texture or 
shading of the different parts, and if I fail I must have recourse to the arti-
fice of mentally introducing differences which are not actually present. For 
instance, I imagine black lines drawn on the paper or perhaps I represent 
a bit of the paper as torn off from the rest. Thus it seems that in all cases, 
in order to apprehend a portion of matter as a distinct thing, I must either 
perceive or imagine it as separated from other things by intervening empty 
space, or at least as discriminated from surrounding matter by difference 
in the sensible quality of its bounding surfaces.
I have now, I think, given a tolerably complete account of common 
sense conception of a material thing in its static aspect. Before taking up 
the question of change, it will be well to say something concerning an 
attribute of material existence which belongs to it equally whether we re-
gard it as undergoing alteration or persisting unaltered – I refer to its inde-
pendence of the processes by which it is perceived or ideally represented. 
This is a point on which Kant lays great stress, and he simply identifies it 
with the objectivity of matter. But he apparently fails to recognise that the 
objectivity which belongs to material things and process is only a special 
case of objectivity in general. Whatever we can in any way perceive or 
think has a being and nature of its own independently of the processes 
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by which we cognise it. We do not create it, but only become aware of it 
in the process of cognition. The number two, the fact that 2 + 1 = 3, the 
validity of a syllogism in Barbara, the necessity or the arbitrariness of the 
transitions in Hegel’s Logic, a symphony of Beethoven, the moral law, all 
these are possible objects of our cognition, and all these, in as much as 
they are objects, possess a being and nature of their own, whether anyone 
is actually thinking of them or not. But their independent being and nature 
differs profoundly from that of material things, because it does not consist 
in independent persistence and change in time and space. 2 + 1 was equal 
to 3 before anyone began to count, and this planet existed before the ap-
pearance of life on it. But the word “before” has a different meaning in the 
two cases. When I say that this planet existed before the appearance of life 
on it, I mean that it has had an actual history lasting through successive 
moments of time from some determinate date up to the moment at which 
I am now speaking, and that in each of these successive moments it has 
had a definite position in space. When I say that 2 + 1 was equal to 3 be-
fore anyone began to count, I do not mean that this fact endured through 
successive moments in time, and had in each moment a definite position 
in space before it was discovered; I only mean that it has a being indepen-
dent of its discovery, not affected by such occurrences as man beginning or 
ceasing to count. To put the case in another way; when I leave my house I 
regard the house as still existing, though I no longer perceive or think of it: 
I regard it as continuing to exist in time just as I myself and my conscious 
experience continue to exist in time, and just as the flow of my conscious 
existence is divisible into successive moments of duration, so I regard the 
continued existence of the house as divisible into successive moments, so 
that each moment of its history synchronises with a moment in in my his-
tory. It is true that the flow of my conscious life has, strictly speaking, no 
position in space such as the house possesses. But my body has always a 
determinate position in space, and my body is continually presented to 
sight and touch. I regard other things which I neither perceive or think of 
as maintaining or changing their position in space just as my body, which 
is continuously presented, maintains or changes its position in space. I em-
phasise this point because it seems to have an important bearing on Kan-
tian criticism. Kant would investigate the conditions of the possibility of 
experience. He assumes that there can be no experience without an object, 
and this assumption is no doubt entirely justified. He also teaches that an 
object is such only so far as it has a being and nature independent of the 
actual occurrence of the subjective process by which it is cognised. So far 
we can follow him. But he also makes another tacit assumption which I 
cannot admit as legitimate. He seems to take it for granted that the inde-
pendence necessary to constitute any object whatever, must be of the same 
kind as that which is characteristic of material things and processes – in-
dependent persistence and change – through successive moments of time. 
This assumption he in no way attempts to justify, and it seems quite unten-
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able. It is abstractly conceivable that an experience might exist, concerned 
exclusively, let us say, with sounds. The sounds. might be compared as 
regards their pitch, intensity, and timbre, and arranged in series according 
to their resemblances or differences; their musical combination might be 
apprehended and enjoyed; all this, and the like of this, might take place, 
without ever a thought of the sounds as enduring, changing, and succeed-
ing each other, apart from their actual presence to consciousness. When 
we speak of the possibility of experience, we ought to explain very care-
fully what kind of experience we mean.
We have next to deal with change in material things. In the first place 
it is necessary to distinguish between change in the thing itself and change 
in its appearance to the percipient. To the thing itself we ascribe those 
changes and those only which form part of its independent existence – of 
the existence which belongs to it whether or not it is actually perceived 
or thought of. But there are innumerable variations in the appearance of 
material objects which are not regarded as changes in the object itself; and 
all these variations have the common characteristic of being recognisably 
due to the varying conditions of the process of perception. If I close my 
eyes, the things around me disappear from sight. But I do not for that 
reason regard either the things or their visible qualities as having ceased to 
exist, or as having undergone any kind of alteration. Again, as I shift the 
position of my eyes, head, and body, the things around present constantly 
varying visible appearances corresponding to the constantly varying size, 
shape, and position of the images which they produce on my retina. But 
just so far as they arise in connection with movements of my eyes, head, 
and body, these variations are not regarded as changes in the material ob-
jects themselves. The things themselves are unaltered; it is only the point 
of view of the percipient which changes. When similar variations appear 
to take place independently of our own active movement or changing po-
sition they are regarded as changes in the things seen; the things are ap-
prehended as varying in their position in space or in their shape and size. 
So when we look at a thing through yellow glasses we do not suppose that 
the thing itself becomes yellow. But if the same alteration in our experi-
ence took place without the use of the yellow glasses, or some equivalent 
condition, we should say that the thing itself had changed its colour. The 
same holds good for touch and the other senses as well as for sight. We do 
not regard things as having lost their odour because we have a cold in the 
head. If I move my finger tip along the edge of the table, I do not regard 
the variations in my tactual experience as changes in the tangible quality 
of the table. The succession is in me, not in it. If, on the contrary, similar 
variations occur while my finger is unmoved, I am aware of the table itself 
as moving, or otherwise undergoing alteration. It is to be noted that only 
variations due to free movement are thus regarded as attaching, not to the 
thing but to its appearance. Movement against resistance always involves 
41
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2G. F. Stout
alteration in the position or shape of the thing which resists. The reason 
is plain: what lies within the sphere of our own initiative is the power to 
move or to attempt to move in a certain direction. It does not depend on 
us what kind or degree of resistance we shall encounter, whence or where 
we shall meet it, or whether we shall meet it at all. Hence the yielding of 
a resistant surface to our efforts when we push, pull, or compress it, is re-
garded as a change in the material object itself, not merely its appearance 
to us.
A word may here be added on Kant’s treatment of this question. He 
also distinguishes between change in a material thing and change in its 
appearance to us. But he seems to me to draw the line between the two 
very incorrectly. He says that change in the thing itself is apprehended as 
such, because it is regarded as following on some other change according 
to a fixed rule, whereas mere variation in its subjective appearance is not 
so determined. But this seems quite untenable. The changes in appearance 
are just as much subject to rule as the changes in the thing itself. Take his 
own example. I survey a house, and in doing so my eyes travel from the 
top to the bottom, and again from the bottom to the top. The correspond-
ing sequence of varying visual presentations is not regarded as change in 
the house. The roof is not transformed into the door. The change merely 
consists in looking at the door after looking at the roof. So far well and 
good. But can it be truly said that the sequence of visual presentations has 
no fixed order? On the contrary, it has just as much a fixed order as in 
the case which Kant contrasts with it, that of a ship being carried down-
stream by the current. In both cases the order is conditional. Given the 
starting point and direction of my ocular movements, the order of my 
visual impressions is predetermined according to a rule. Given that the 
ship is merely moved by the current, there is like fixity of order. But, as 
my ocular movement may vary, so the ship may steam or sail against the 
current. The difference lies in the nature of the condition in the two cases. 
In the case of the house the conditions belong to the perceptive process, in 
the case of the ship they do not.
In what follows we shall consider change in the thing itself as distin-
guished from change in its mode of appearance. We have three questions 
to consider. (1) What is the nexus between a thing and its changes which 
enables us to say that it is a change in this thing rather than in that? (2) 
At what point does change become transformation so that in undergoing 
the change the thing loses its identity? (3) When a thing changes, what is 
it that really undergoes the change? As for the first question, it is evident 
that all cognition of change involves the presentation or representation of 
a relatively new content of experience. When we ascribe the change to a 
material thing, we mean that the new content is a new state of that thing 
which previously existed in a different state. Now the question is this. In 
what relation must the new content be thought of as standing to the thing, 
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in order to be recognised as a state of that thing displacing a previous 
state? We answer: (a) The new content must be a specific determination of 
some general property or attribute of the thing, and before its emergence 
the thing must have possessed some other specific determination of the 
same general property or attribute. Every change in the thing is a change 
in some respect, a change in position, or in shape, or in size, or in colour, 
or in texture, or in temperature, or in solid content, or in powers active or 
passive, or the like. Each successive state is a specification of some more 
general character, and for that very reason they are incapable of belong-
ing to the thing simultaneously. They are mutually exclusive alternatives 
which can only qualify the thing successively if at all. (b) These mutually 
exclusive alternatives must displace each other continuously in time. The 
commencement of the one must either coincide with the cessation of the 
other, or if there is an interval of time between them, this interval must be 
filled up by continuous transitions from one alternative to another. Let us 
take as an example the movement of a billiard ball. To the ball belongs 
the attribute of having position in space, and at any instant, this position 
must be completely determined. Further, it cannot occupy two positions 
at the same time, though it does so at different times. In order to occupy 
different places at different times, the varying positions must succeed each 
other continuously so that in passing from one it ipso facto enters another. 
(c) Finally we have to add that each successive determination must bear to 
the total complex of attributes constituting the thing, a relation analogous 
to that of the precedent state which it displaces. When the billiard ball 
moves, its new place, like its old place, is the place of its visible-tangible 
qualities, and of its solid content, and determines in like manner its other 
sensible qualities and its powers active and passive. Similarly when a leaf 
turns yellow, the relation of its colour and shape is maintained as it was 
when the leaf was green. Of course, what thus persists is only the general 
form of combination characteristic of a material thing. This general form 
receives various specific determinations as the general attributes vary ei-
ther separately or together.
Our next question concerns the limits within which a thing is regarded 
as maintaining its individual identity in spite of the changes which it un-
dergoes. The answer is that so long as the general conditions we have 
laid down are observed, there is no fixed limit except one, and even this 
is not absolutely fixed. A thing ceases to be regarded as the same when it 
suffers disruption,– when it is broken up into parts separate in space, so 
that each is thenceforth capable of having its independent history. When 
this happens, the thing no longer exists but only its fragments. Apart from 
this restriction, a material thing may always be regarded as maintaining 
its identity through change. I say that there is always a possibility of so 
regarding it. Whether in any given case a change is or is not treated as 
involving loss of identity depends upon subjective interest. So long, and as 
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far as the unity and continuity of our interest in the thing is unbroken it re-
mains for us the same thing. “Imperial Cesar dead and turned to clay, may 
stop a hole to keep the wind away.” The lump of clay is identified with the 
body of Imperial Cesar, simply because the poet is interested in the con-
tinuity of the transition by which the one became the other. Change the 
point of view and the identification will not be made. You say that Cesar 
is no more and that what is left is only a clod of earth. The embryologist, 
interested in continuity of development, may regard the egg as a stage in 
the continuous existence of the chicken. But for most people the egg is 
one thing, and the chicken another. The chicken hops about and feeds 
on corn, and the egg does nothing of the kind. Both are edible, but they 
are eaten in very different ways and have very different tastes. The knife 
which had its blade and handle several times replaced remained the same 
knife from the point of view of its possessor. It had a continuous history, 
and throughout its history the personal interest taken in it by its possessor 
was uninterrupted. Hence it is for him one thing, throughout its changes. 
On the other hand, the outsider who is without this personal interest will 
be likely to say that there have been several different knives, not one and 
the same knife.
Even the disruption of a thing into separate fragments does not un-
conditionally involve loss of individual identity. It only does so in so far 
as the fragments are regarded as having thenceforth an independent his-
tory with discontinuity of interest. But this is not so at the moment of 
the disruption. When a valuable china tea-cup falls and is broken into 
shivers, we naturally, for the moment, regard the collection of fragments 
as being the piece of china itself, as being the same thing in fragments. In 
the future we adopt the same attitude whenever our minds revert to the 
occurrence. Similarly, if we regard the fragments as capable of being put 
together again, we continue to think of them as preserving their individual 
identity with the unbroken cup. On the other hand, if we think of them 
as thrown on the dust-heap, so that each for the future is to have its own 
history independent of the rest, then from this point of view the cup is no 
more, and only fragments of pottery remain.
In more primitive stages of human development, solution of spatial 
continuity is less capable of interrupting continuity of interest and con-
sequent identification. Primitive culture, as represented in savage races, 
regards the severed fragment of a thing as still capable of sympathetic 
communion with the whole from which it has been detached. On this view 
it is possible to make a man ill or cause his death by operating on the cut-
tings of his hair or the parings of his nails. Hence there is a very important 
difference between the primitive view of individual identity and our own 
– a difference which has an important bearing on the development of the 
concept of a thing.
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The third question we raised was: When a material thing changes, 
what is it that really undergoes the change? The nature of the problem 
requires some explanation. It arises out of Kant’s statement that only the 
unchanging changes. Kant said that successive states do not change, but 
only succeed each other. Each, in any moment, is just what it is, and noth-
ing else. Hence the true subject of change must be the thing so far as it 
remains unchanged. Now, I cannot see that this statement is in reality any 
less nonsensical than it appears to be at the first blush. So far as the thing 
is unaltered, it is unaltered, and no more can be said. On the other hand, 
the successive states do change. This is obviously true if we consider any 
finite period in time, however small; for during, this period, the state in-
cludes changes. If, on the contrary, we consider the state as it is in a bare 
instant of time without duration, it is true that there is no change, but it 
is equally true that in that instant there is not, in any proper sense, a state 
of the thing. There is only a boundary between the immediately preceding 
and immediately succeeding state. There is only the transition from the 
one to another. Just as the surface is only the meeting, of two solids, so the 
instant of time is only the meeting of preceding and succeeding portions 
of duration. Like the surface, it is a boundary possessing a positive char-
acter, but still it is only a boundary. This is true, whether we apply it to the 
case of a state which is changing or to one which remains unchanged. Of 
course all change implies some qualitative continuity. It implies a generic 
content which receives varying specific determinations. But the change is 
not constituted by the generic content, nor yet by its specific determina-
tions. The change is constituted by the continuous transition of one spe-
cific determination into another; the coincident emergence of the one and 
cessation of the other.
It will, however, be urged that we have not touched the essential point 
of Kant’s criticism. We can only cognise change in a thing if we are able to 
recognise the thing as the same in spite of its differences in successive mo-
ments of time, and we attribute change to this something which is recog-
nisably the same throughout its varying states. This seems beyond dispute. 
But we have still to enquire what we mean by the sameness of the thing. 
Do we mean material or individual identity? Do we mean merely likeness 
of quality, or do we mean that continuous connection of successive phases 
which makes possible unity and continuity of interest? Clearly it is the 
latter kind of identity we have in mind. In our conception of a thing we 
include all its actual changes past and future, and all the possible changes 
which it would undergo under varying conditions.
We comprehend all these changes in our thoughts of the thing so far 
as they do not interrupt the continuity of our interest in it. We mean to 
include them even if we do not know what they are. It is to the thing con-
ceived in this manner that change is ascribed as a predicate.
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“EVERYONE,” says Thomas Reid, “knows that extension, divisibility, 
figure, motion, solidity, hardness, softness, and fluidity were by Mr. Locke 
called primary qualities of body; and that sound, colour, taste, smell, and 
heat or cold were called secondary qualities. Is there a just foundation for 
this distinction? Is there anything common to the primary which belongs 
not to the secondary? And what is it?”
The first of the questions thus formulated by Reid may be regarded as 
settled. No competent person doubts that the distinction has a real foun-
dation. But on the second question it seems to me that there is much room 
for discussion. The answer which is most familiar and also most precise 
and clear is, I think, definitely wrong. On the other hand, those philoso-
phers who reject this false doctrine do not in general substitute for it any 
positive and detailed view of their own which I find myself able to accept. 
They are more bent on showing their opponents do not solve the problem 
than on solving it themselves.
The definite view commonly accepted by representatives of Physics 
and Physiology and also by many Philosophers is that, the primary quali-
ties really do belong to bodies, whereas the so-called secondary qualities 
are not qualities of external things at all but qualities of sensations expe-
rienced by percipient minds when external things stimulate the organs of 
sense in certain ways.
Postponing consideration of that part of this theory which relates to 
primary attributes, let us first examine the contention that the secondary 
attributes are attributes not of bodies but of sensations. This contention is 
urged against what is presumed to be a natural fallacy of ordinary think-
ing. It is directed against a supposed confusion of common sense between 
qualities of sensation and properties of external things. When the plain 
man says that burning coal is hot he is taken to mean that the peculiar 
quality of the sensation felt by him when he holds his bands near the fire 
is actually part of the nature of the burning coal. Similarly, when he says 
that grass is green he is taken to mean that the specific quality of the visual 
appearance of the grass when he looks at it by ordinary daylight inheres 
in the grass itself. Against such a view it is urged that heat in this sense 
is no more in the fire, and that greenness in this sense is no more in the 
grass than pain is in the surgeon’s knife. Grass and burning coal being, 
insentient cannot experience temperature-sensations or colour-sensations. 
49
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2G. F. Stout
Hence, all that the plain man ought to mean in asserting, for example, that 
the fire in the grate is hot, is that it has a power of making him feel hot 
under certain conditions. If we enquire on what this power depends we 
are referred to the primary properties of the fire, such as the vibrations of 
its molecules.
Now, this criticism of common sense seems to me to be founded on 
a misconception of the actual procedure of ordinary thinking. In prin-
ciple the plain man is not really guilty of the confusion with which he is 
charged. He does not in general confound intrinsic characters of his own 
sensations with attributes of external things. On the other hand, I admit 
and maintain that in ascribing secondary qualities to corporeal things he 
does not merely mean their power to produce certain sensations in us. His 
point of view is not that of his critics; but neither is it that which his crit-
ics ascribe to him. What it really is remains to be investigated. When it is 
fairly presented it will, I think, be found defensible, and indeed the only 
one which is defensible, for the case of primary as well as of secondary 
qualities.
In investigating the view of the plain man, the very worst course we 
can pursue is to ask the plain man himself what he means. His thought is 
through and through based on latent assumptions and implicit inferences 
which he does not ordinarily attempt to define and formulate. So soon 
as he attempts to define and formulate them he becomes a philosopher. 
But his first untrained ventures in philosophical analyses are sure to be 
extremely crude and unsatisfactory. To depend on his raw opinions about 
such topics as we are here concerned with is like depending on a child 
for an account of the psychology of his own mental processes. If we wish 
really to understand common sense we must follow and analyse its ac-
tual procedure with the view of bringing out the presupposition is which 
underlie this procedure. We must not ask it directly to give an account of 
these presuppositions.
This being understood, we may now proceed to enquire what is meant 
in ordinary, unreflective thought, when things are asserted to be hot, cold, 
sweet, red, blue, etc. We may take as typical the case of temperature. I 
touch a piece of iron and feel a sensation of heat. I consequently assert 
that the iron is hot. What do I mean by this assertion? Not merely that 
the body is actually producing a certain sensation in me. For I presume 
that the iron was hot before I touched it or came near it, and that it will 
continue to be so if I remove my hand and go away. Do I, then, regard the 
hotness of the iron as a power to produce a sensation of heat under certain 
assignable conditions? That is certainly a part of my meaning. But it is 
far from being the whole of it. On the contrary, the hotness of the iron is 
thought of as being a quality in it as specific and positive as the quality of 
my sensation when I touch it. The one is no more a mere possibility than 
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the other. This is shown by the fact that in ascribing secondary qualities to 
things we normally think of the things as if they were actually producing 
the sensations in a hypothetical percipient. When we think of iron as hot 
and gradually cooling down, we think of it as if it were in fact generating 
gradually diminishing sensations of heat in some one near enough to feel 
them, even though we are quite well aware that no one is actually pres-
ent. When we now think of the books in our library as red, blue, green, 
and yellow, we think of them as they would appear to us were we there to 
look at them in ordinary daylight. But we proceed quite otherwise in the 
case of mere possibilities. When we think of a hayrick as inflammable we 
do not do so by representing it as if it were actually in flames. When we 
think of a window pane as brittle we do not represent it as actually being 
broken. In such case we consciously distinguish between possibility and its 
actualisation. We do not lose sight of the possibility as such and mentally 
substitute the actuality.
Are we then to conclude that common sense actually supposes sensa-
tions exist and change when no one actually experiences them? Before 
charging it with so flagrant an absurdity we ought, I think, to enquire 
first whether there may not be another and more defensible interpretation 
of its procedure. It seems to me that there is another which is not merely 
defensible, but the only one which is defensible.
There are two main points to be emphasised. The first is that the sensa-
tions which mediate our knowledge of the secondary qualities do so only 
in so far as they represent, express, or stand for something other than 
themselves; and their representative function being independent of their 
actual existence at this or that moment in this or that mind, they may be 
validly thought of as if they existed when in fact they do not and cannot 
exist The second point is that the distinction between what is represented 
and its sense-representation is only a latent presupposition of ordinary 
thinking. The plain man does not in general formulate it, though in our 
logical analysis of his procedure we must formulate it for him. What are 
called the secondary qualities of matter are not identified with what is 
represented in distinction from its sense-representation, nor yet with the 
sense-representation in distinction from what it stands for. It is rather the 
complex unity formed by both together and commonly left unanalysed.
The representative function of sensation may be best exhibited by con-
trast with cases in which it is absent.
The gradual diminution and final discontinuance of heat sensations 
which ensue when the sentient organism is withdrawn from the perceived 
object is without representative value. It depends on movements of the 
organism which neither produce nor imply any relevant change in the 
object. Hence the concomitant change of sensation is rightly regarded as 
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merely a change in the sensible appearance of the thing which does not 
express or represent any corresponding alteration in the thing itself. All 
such variations in sense experience may therefore be ignored or cancelled 
as irrelevant in mentally dealing with external objects. Now, if it is le-
gitimate to cancel out variations of sensible appearance due merely to 
variable conditions of perception, it is for that very reason legitimate to 
represent the object as it would appear under uniform onditions of per-
ception, whether or not it is actually so perceived, or indeed, whether or 
not it is perceived at all. All sensible changes and differences under uni-
form conditions of perception express or represent corresponding changes 
in things perceived; for by hypothesis they can be due to no other cause 
(and the principle of causality underlies the whole procedure). Hence we 
are interested in their representative value, and not in their actual exis-
tence. We may and do think of them as if they actually existed when they 
do not actually exist. We may, for instance, legitimately represent the sun 
as sensibly hot before any sentient beings appeared on this planet. Such 
procedure is logically justifiable provided always that one grand rule is 
observed. In comparing one thing with another, or different states of the 
same thing, it is always presupposed that the conditions of perception 
are sufficiently similar to prevent confusion between mere difference of 
sensible appearance and difference in the nature of the things compared. 
The uniformity is, of course not absolute, but only sufficient in view of the 
fineness of discrimination required.
Coming now to our second point, we must insist that, though this dis-
tinction between the independent nature of material things and the mode 
in which their nature is sensibly represented is logically presupposed in 
ordinary thinking, yet it is not, as a rule, explicitly recognised. On the con-
trary, both the sensible representation and what is represented are equal-
ly included in what are called the secondary properties of matter. Were 
it otherwise the secondary properties would be for common sense mere 
powers, or occult qualities, or if they had a positive and specific content, 
this would be definable only in terms of the primary properties. In fact, 
however, they have for common sense a positive and specific qualitative 
content of their own. They possess this content because the qualities and 
relations of temperature, colour, sound, smell, and taste sensations enter 
in virtue of their representative function into the essential constitution of 
the corresponding secondary attributes of matter.
If this analysis is correct it follows that the secondary attributes of 
matter are correlated but not identical with corresponding qualities of 
sensation. Hence, in ordinary language we speak not of a yellow sensa-
tion or a hot sensation, but of a sensation of yellow or a sensation of heat. 
In ordinary life our predominant interest is in the sensible properties of 
bodies with which we are conversant through the medium of sense, and 
therefore we name these directly. The corresponding sensations are named 
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indirectly by reference to these. But it would be a gross error to suppose 
on this account that the sensations as such are without qualitative content. 
On the contrary, whatever qualitative content belongs to the secondary 
properties of matter presupposes and is derived from the qualitative con-
tent of sensations qua sensations. This is to be borne in mind when we 
come to deal with primary qualities.
We have seen that in comparing objects with each other as regards their 
secondary qualities, standard conditions of perception are presupposed. 
The selection of the standard conditions is, of course, in part determined 
by convenience of reference. But there is also another motive which in-
volves an important principle. Distinct sensible appearances are preferred 
to those which are relatively indistinct. The principle involved is that dif-
ference in the sensible appearance under uniform conditions of perception 
always expresses difference in the things perceived, whereas absence of 
difference in the sensible appearance does not necessarily express absence 
of difference in the things perceived. In the latter case all that is implied is 
that the differences which fail to appear are slighter than those which do 
appear. For this reason a near view of an object is preferred to a more dis-
tant view, and in determining, the proper or constant colours of things we 
think of them as they appear by ordinary daylight and not as they appear 
in the dusk when only different shades of grey are discernible and other 
colour distinctions are hidden from view.
This analysis of the secondary attributes of matter holds good in all 
essential respects for the primary also. The primary, like the secondary, are 
correlated but not identical with intrinsic characters of sensation, especial-
ly visual, tactual, and motor sensation. The correlation is essentially of the 
same kind for both. Sensation enters into the constitution of the primary 
attributes only in so far as certain features of sense-experience represent 
something other than themselves, and it is only because this representative 
function is logically independent of the actual occurrence and fluctuation 
of sense-affections that the primary qualities can be validly thought of as 
existing in the absence of percipients. We are justified in thinking of matter 
as extended and movable in space before the existence of sentient being. 
But we have exactly the same justification for thinking of it as hot or co-
loured. Finally, the positive and specific nature of the primary qualities no 
less than that of the secondary is derived from corresponding sensations.
We may take as our chief example the most fundamental of the pri-
mary qualities – Extension. In ordinary language it seems strange to speak 
of sensations as extended. The reason is that they are not extended in the 
same sense as corporeal things. Bodies are extended in space. But touch 
and sight sensations do not in the ordinary sense of the words occupy 
Space. They do not occupy any part of the single, homogeneous, infinite 
space which embraces all material things and their distances. They do 
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not occupy any part of the space in which Cardiff or Oxford is so many 
miles from London, and in which bodies attract each other inversely as the 
square of their distance. None the less, touch and sight sensations have an 
intrinsic character correlated with spatial size and shape, just as the qual-
ity of sensations of yellow is correlated with the yellowness of buttercups 
arid oranges. We may call this intrinsic character sensible extension. Since 
in ordinary life we are interested in sensible extension mainly as an expres-
sion or manifestation of spatial extension, spatial extension may be called 
real and sensible extension apparent. Thus we contrast the apparent size 
of a thing as seen at this or that distance from the eye with its real size 
as measured in feet or inches. Spatial or real extension is throughout ho-
mogeneous; sensible extension is of two kinds, the visual and the tactual. 
Their difference is perhaps comparable to that of the intensity of light 
sensations and the intensity of sound sensations.
Consider first visual extension. On closing the eyes though we cease 
to see external objects or any part of our own bodies, there is still a field 
or expanse of visual sensation which may be entirely grey or variegated 
with colour. Each distinguishable part of this field or expanse has local 
relations of position and distance to other parts, and the whole is a single 
continuous extensive quantum. Yet the visual expanse thus presented for 
our attentive scrutiny does not occupy any part of space. If it is in space it 
must be here or there. But we cannot from the nature of the case say where 
it is. There is no room for it in the space occupied by bodies. It may be sug-
gested that the extent of the visual field coincides with that of the retina. 
To this it seems a sufficient reply that the extent of the visual field or its 
parts is not merely dependent on the size of the retina or its parts, but also 
on its anatomical structure – on the packing of rods and cones. Thus, the 
same stimulation of the lateral portions of the retina gives a less extensive 
sensation than stimulation of the fovea centralis. Again, if the expanse of 
visual sensation occupies any portion of space it must be conterminous 
with other outlying portions of space. But in this sense it is boundless 
though not of course infinite in magnitude. Parts within it are bounded by 
other contiguous parts, but in its totality it does not form part of a more 
extensive whole, and it has therefore no limits which are in any sense spa-
tial. It has no shape. If you doubt this try to discover what its shape is. In 
the next place, if it occupied space, it would be commensurable with other 
spatial quanta. It ought to be possible to express its magnitude in feet or 
inches. But this is an intrinsic impossibility. We cannot, for instance, say 
that it is equal in extent to the total tract of the external world which 
comes within the range of vision when the eyes are open. For what we can 
thus embrace in one view may vary indefinitely in extent. It may include 
the expanse of the starry heavens or it may be confined to the walls of a 
room. Again, a part of space may be conceivably empty; but the concep-
tion of a vacuum has no application to visual extension. There is no visual 
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extension where there are no colour and brightness sensations.
Finally, space is a common object, in principle equally accessible to all 
of us. But each of us is directly acquainted only with his own visual field. 
The extension of colour and brightness sensations disappears with the 
sensations themselves, when a man dies or is afflicted with cortical blind-
ness. But no part of space is thereby annihilated.
What has been said of the visual field of the closed eye holds also in all 
essentials for the visual field of the open eye. To avoid tedious repetition, 
I shall leave you to make the application for yourselves. I now pass on to 
consider the relation of real or spatial extension to the visual extension, 
which is its sensible appearance. The relevant facts are familiar to every-
one. Everyone knows that the size and shape of the visible appearance of 
a thing vary indefinitely as we approach or recede from it, or otherwise 
change our position in relation to it, while the thing remains constant in 
shape and size. The visual appearance of a match-box in in my hand may 
be co-extensive with the visual appearance of a distant mountain. The 
entire disappearance of things when we go far enough away is a limiting 
case of such variations. Now, we cannot identify the real size of a thing 
with the whole series of possible changes in the extent of its visible appear-
ance, nor yet with the fixed order of their possible occurrence. For the real 
extension may remain constant, while its appearance alters, and it does 
not in its own nature include or imply the concept of change. Still less can 
we select this or that apparent extension and identify it with the real. For 
each of them has in principle just as much and just as little logical title to 
be so regarded as any of the others. They pass into one another by con-
tinuous gradations, so that it is impossible to fix on one only, to the exclu-
sion of all others differing ever so slightly from it. We do, indeed, usually 
think of the real extension in terms of its visual appearance under certain 
conditions. But these conditions are loosely determined, and they are vari-
able according to our convenience or the degree of accuracy required. We 
may choose any conditions we please, provided we abide by them with 
sufficient strictness in comparing one object with another, and provided 
they yield visual appearances sufficiently distinct in view of the required 
fineness of discrimination. If we are interested in differences too slight to 
be revealed to the naked eye, we have recourse to a magnifying glass; and 
the visible extent of the thing under the magnifying glass has just as much 
claim to be identified with its real magnitude as its extent when it is seen 
by the naked eye.
In general, extension as a characteristic of visual sensation is quite 
distinct from the extension of things in space. And yet if we leave tactual 
experience out of count, extension as a property of bodies and the space 
in which bodies are extended derive their positive and distinctive con-
tent from the extensiveness of visual sensation. Real extension is, indeed, 
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something other than visual extension; but its extensive character belongs 
to it only inasmuch as this something is represented in terms of the exten-
siveness of sight sensations or of touch sensations.
Since Berkeley’s time it has been customary to assume that touch af-
fords an immediate revelation of the real size and shape which is denied to 
sight. Visual extension is admitted to have a merely representative value, 
but the reality represented is identified with tactual extension. It is easy to 
show that this distinction is indefensible. Apply the blunt end of a pencil 
to the forehead, to the lips, to the back of the hand, to the tip of a finger, 
to the drum of the ear. The resulting tactual sensations vary conspicuously 
in extent, though time areas of the skin affected are throughout equal and 
the surface with which they are brought in contact remains constant in 
size. None of the tactual extensions has any better logical claim than the 
others to be identified with the real extent either of the skin stimulated or 
of the surface applied to it; and their rival claims are mutually destructive. 
Skin sensibility is also variable in this respect from one individual to an-
other; it is different in the child and the adult; it is affected by diseases of 
the brain, and by the use of drugs such as narcotics.
The case is not altered if we turn to what are called kinaesthetic sen-
sations-muscle, joint, and tendon sensations. Berkeley identified the real 
distance between one body and another with the series of joint, muscle 
and tendon sensations which would be experienced in moving, from one 
to the other. We ask what series is meant? Is it that which would be experi-
enced in walking, or in running, or in hopping on one leg? Is it that which 
would be experienced by a child of three or by an adult with a long stride? 
Which of these series consists of feet and of yards? There is only one 
tenable answer to such questions, whatever sense-experience we may be 
considering. Given uniform conditions of perception, whatever these may 
be, differences of sensible extension and differences of more and less in 
the series of motor sensations represent differences in the external world 
and the differences as thus represented – the differences together with the 
mode of representing them are what we call differences of real, physical, 
or spatial extension. The more differences are discernible in the sensible 
appearance under sufficiently uniform conditions, the fuller and more ex-
act is our knowledge of real size, shape, and distance. But we cannot fix 
on any set of conditions and identify the corresponding sensible extension 
with extension in space. Neither tactual nor visual extension occupy any 
part of the space in which bodies attract each other inversely as the square 
of the distance.
It follows that the single infinite all embracing Space of Kant is not, 
as he assumes, a form of sensibility at all. It is essentially a form of what 
he calls external objects, and as such already presupposes the work which 
he ascribes to the categories. Yet it is presented by him at the outset as a 
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pre-condition of the work of the categories, and is from the outset con-
founded with sensible extension. No wonder that he found in it a most 
convenient middle term between the pure concepts of the understanding 
and the disparate matter of sense. This confusion, and a similar one relat-
ing to time, seem to me to vitiate the argument of Critique of Pure Reason 
from beginning to end.
It is needless for me to deal separately with the other primary qualities, 
resistance and mobility. These are correlated with sensations of muscular 
tension and with sensible displacement within the field of sight and touch 
just as real extension is correlated with tactual and visual extension.
Our general result up to this point is that there is no essential differ-
ence between the primary and secondary attributes of matter so far as 
regards their connexion with sense-experience. Both are in one way inde-
pendent of sense and in another dependent on it. Both are dependent on it 
for the positive content which makes them more than mere powers or oc-
cult qualities. Both are in the sense explained independent of it as regards 
their existence.
What, then, is the true foundation of the undoubted distinction be-
tween them which is marked by calling them respectively primary and 
secondary qualities? So far as I can see the difference lies in their respec-
tive relation to the interaction of material things. The executive order of 
the material world can be expressed only in terms of the primary and not 
in terms of the secondary properties of matter. The unity and continuity 
of material processes is intelligible only through the unity and continuity 
of Space. The system of uniformities of co-existence and sequence, and of 
quantative equivalences and correspondences which constitutes the order 
of physical nature in its causal aspect can be formulated only in terms 
of extension, motion, and tension. On the other hand, we find no such 
constancy, continuity, and quantitative equivalence in the occurrence of 
sounds, colours, or smells. There is, e.g., no system of laws according to 
which sounds succeed each other or vary concomitantly in loudness. But 
you can always obtain a certain note by striking, the right key of a piano, 
and by striking more or less hard you can make it louder or softer.
This is mere common-place and needs no further exposition. But some-
thing must be said concerning the implications of this common-place. For 
an attempt may be made to use it so as to upset the results of our previous 
analysis. It may be urged that if agency belongs to matter in virtue of its 
primary properties, these properties must have an existence independent 
of sense-experience such as does not belong to the secondary. The steam 
hammer beats out the bar of steel and the sun attracts the planets indepen-
dently of anyone’s sensations. The primary properties are presupposed in 
the processes by which the organs of sense are stimulated; how, then, can 
57
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2G. F. Stout
they be dependent on the resulting sensations? Again, science finds itself 
bound to postulate operative conditions and therefore primary qualities 
where the secondary can have no place. Thus the particles of luminiferous 
ether cannot themselves be coloured. Does not this point to a radical dif-
ference between the primary and the secondary qualities in their relation 
to sense-experience?
In reply to such contentions, I need only refer again to the distinction 
between sensible representation and that which is represented. What is 
represented exists and operates independently of the coming and going 
of the sensuous presentations through which we express its existence and 
operation. It is independent of these as the topography of England is in-
dependent of the map of England, or as the rise and fall of temperature 
is independent of the rise and fall of the mercury in a thermometer. There 
is a systematic agency which we express in terms of sensible extension, 
motion, and muscular tension; so expressed it is what we call material 
causation – the interaction of bodies in space. But the features of sense-ex-
perience through which we represent it, contribute nothing to its agency. 
On the other hand, since the representative value of sense-experience is 
independent of the existence of sensations, we may validly represent in 
terms of sensible extension, motion, and resistance, the processes through 
which these and other sense-experiences come to be and cease to be. From 
the same point of view, it is easy to account for the existence of primary 
qualities in the absence of the secondary. There is no reason why sensible 
extension, motion, and resistance should not have a representative value, 
where sensible colour, sound, heat, and taste have none, just as relative 
positions and distance on a map have representative value where the flat-
ness of the map, its absolute size, and the colouring of the counties have 
none. Similarly, in thinking of empty space, representative value attaches 
only to sensible extension and the series of muscle joint, and tendon sensa-
tions.
And now I might regard my immediate problem as disposed of, so far 
as I am able to deal with it, were it not that a rival theory still demands 
attention – the theory which resolves the material world into a system of 
possibilities of sensation. This view is advocated in its purity by Mill, and 
with a well known reservation by Berkeley, and Kant at times seems to 
lean to the same side. According to it sensations have indeed a representa-
tive value, but what they represent is always only the possibility of getting 
other sensations in a fixed and systematic order. The material world is 
supposed by it to be constituted of actual sense-experiences, together with 
the systematic order of possible sense-experience. Against this doctrine I 
urge in the first place that the order of possible sensations is widely di-
vergent from the order of the physical world and its processes. Consider 
the fluctuation of the visible appearance of a body as we approach or 
recede from it, and the variations of tactual extent as a body is applied 
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to different parts of the skin. Such differences are not differences in the 
size of the body itself, and they are not included in what we mean when 
we say, for instance, that the body is three inches long. Again, as Kant 
has insisted, there is a contrast between the succession of our sensations 
and co-existence in the external world. The back and front of a house co-
exist, but the corresponding sensations are successive. Finally, how can 
the internal content of a solid body be resolved into any possible series 
of sensory presentations. Slice it as you will you only disclose surfaces; 
not solid content, but only the boundaries of solid content. The support-
ers of the theory usually meet such arguments by the help of extravagant 
illustrative hypotheses. They urge, for instance, that sentient beings, oth-
erwise conditioned than ourselves, would experience simultaneously the 
sensations which we can experience only successively. But the appeal to 
such an imaginary percipient implies that at least the successive order of 
our own sensations, in spite of its fixed and systematic character, forms 
no part of the order of the physical world. Nor can the theory so long as 
it remain self-consistent supply us with any reason why the imaginary 
experience should be preferred to ours. The relevant difference cannot lie 
in the diverse conditions of perception. For these conditions, according to 
the theory, can themselves consist only in an order of actual and possible 
sensations. There seems to be no assignable ground for preferring the ficti-
tious experience unless we already presuppose a knowledge that, e.g., the 
order of the external world is co-existent as contrasted with the successive 
order of its sensible appearance to us. There is a still more fundamental 
objection to the doctrine. It dislocates and transposes the relation of the 
possible and actual. It commits the old blunder of dogmatic metaphysics, 
making essence prior to existence, investing it with a pseudo-existence, 
and deriving actual existence from it. Possibility essentially presupposes 
actuality. To say that something is possible is to say that there is something 
actual which would behave in a certain way under certain conditions. But 
the doctrine we are discussing deals freely in mere possibilities without 
any such relation to anything actual; these naked possibilities it regards as 
the source of actual sensations, and to intensify the absurdity it supposes 
that actual changes take place in these naked possibilities, and also that 
change in one naked possibility determines changes in others. Take Mill’s 
example of the table which is believed to exist when no one is present to 
perceive it. This belief is construed as meaning that if any one went into 
the room, or were now in it, and suitably directing his organs of sense he 
would be aware of certain sensations, e.g., of a group of visual sensations. 
Now, the going into the room and the being in the room and the adjust-
ment of the sense organs must, of course, in accordance with the theory be 
simply identified with having certain possible sensations in a certain order. 
Suppose these sensations actualised. It does not therefore follow that a 
table become visible. I should have just the same sensations without see-
ing any table if no table were there. The table itself is that which so reacts, 
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or would so react under the assigned conditions, as to give rise to those 
actual sensations which are called the visible appearance of the table. But 
according to the theory under discussion the table is nothing actual but 
only a naked possibility. Thus a naked possibility is supposed to operate as 
an agent giving rise to something actual – to actual sensations. To crown 
the absurdity, it is supposed to effect this by determining other naked and 
unactualised possibilities of sensation which again consist in changes tak-
ing place in yet other naked and unactualised possibilities. For such is the 
only interpretation which the theory can put on the proposition that the 
table affects the sentient organ is by reflecting light to the eye and so set-
ting up molecular processes in the nervous system.
For these, among other reasons, I feel bound to reject the doctrine of 
Mill and Berkeley, though I imagine it is held in substance by some at the 
present day who belong to a very different school of thought. I am quite 
prepared to be told by thinkers with whom I have at bottom much in com-
mon that my own position is at least as untenable. I expect to be charged 
with reviving the exploded doctrine of things in themselves, disparate and 
discontinuous with our immediate experience. With a clear conscience I 
plead not guilty to all counts of this indictment.
There is, indeed, a sense in which I postulate things in themselves. But 
in this sense I do not see how anyone can deny them. I postulate things 
in themselves in the sense in which another man’s toothache is relatively 
to me thing in itself as having an inner being of its own which I do not 
immediately experience though I may know of it. I postulate them in the 
sense in which my own past toothache is a thing in itself relatively to my 
present existence inasmuch as I do not immediately experience it when I 
remember it. But so understood things in themselves are surely admitted 
facts and not exploded figments of an obsolete metaphysics.
In distinguishing between sensible representation and what it repre-
sents I do not commit myself to any irreducible dualism. I do not divide 
the universe into disparate and discontinuous parts. On the contrary, the 
existences and processes which have an inner being of their own are the 
very same existences and processes which as sensibly represented con-
stitute the world of material phenomena. It is with the things in them 
selves, if we choose to name them thus, that we are incessantly conversant 
through the medium of sense. They constitute the constant presupposi-
tion and necessary complement of our conscious experience. Their inner 
being cannot therefore be disparate and discontinuous with our own con-
scious life. On the contrary, we and they must form part of one continuous 
whole. They must be bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. This means 
for me that their inner being is ultimately psychical. Indeed, like Lotze, I 
fail to understand what “inner being” can possibly mean unless it means 
“psychical being.”
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But how, it will be asked, can we know all this? Am I not begging 
the question in assuming that in any relevant sense we are or can be con-
versant with the things in themselves so as to be able to represent them 
in terms of sensation? Granted that they determine modifications of our 
sense-experience how can we be aware of anything except the resulting 
sensation. The scratch, as H. Stirling, says, knows nothing of the thorn.
Confined at the outset to our own states – our own immediate experi-
ence – by what possibility can we ever transcend these? Evidently we can 
only do so by way of inference. But how can we infer from A to B, when 
B is supposed to be something with which we are totally unacquainted?
As regards this last question I would point out that unless what is 
inferred is other than the datum there is no inference. All that is neces-
sary for inference is (1) that the datum shall be by its intrinsic nature a 
fragment of a wider whole, and shall therefore point beyond itself to its 
own necessary complement; (2) that there shall be a thinking and willing 
being capable of discerning and actively eliciting the implication. Turning 
to our special problem, I admit that on my view the primary datum for 
the individual mind is its own immediate experience. But this proposition 
seems to me to be not only distinct from but in direct contradiction to the 
statement that in the first instance we know only our own states. If our 
own states could be known in pure isolation from naught else, they would 
not be data. An isolated datum is a contradiction in terms. A datum is a 
datum only because being essentially a fragment it points beyond itself; 
and what it thus implies cannot be merely being in general or merely the 
absolute, but always something as specific as itself. A state of feeling inca-
pable of revealing anything beyond itself that would be a petty absolute. 
This applies to the primary datum – immediate experience; the immediate 
experience of each of us being a fragment of the one continuous universe 
must manifest itself as such to a thinking being. Immediate experience 
must from the outset be inseparably blended with immediate inference, 
and this in manifold ways. It is in this direction and not in any a priori 
contribution of the understanding, that I would look for the source and 
the justification of the Kantian categories.
I can here only say one word or two to indicate the bearing of these 
general remarks on the question, how we can know the existence and 
processes which, as represented in terms of sensation, constitute the ex-
ternal world. The only answer which I have to offer is an old one, but 
one which has not, so far as I can discover, been yet properly stated or 
understood or intelligently criticised. I turn for a solution to the intrinsic 
nature of conation and will and the mode in which conation and will 
find themselves conditioned as regards success or failure in the control of 
sense-experience. From the same source I coincidently derive the concept 
of tendency which seems to be the most distinctive and indispensable ele-
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ment in concrete causality. It lies beyond the limits of this paper to follow 
out this line of thought in detail. It is sufficient for my present purpose if I 
have succeeded in showing how I conceive the problem without attempt-
ing to solve it.
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THERE are two beliefs in which almost all philosophers, and almost all 
ordinary people are agreed. Almost everyone believes that he himself and 
what he directly perceives do not constitute the whole of reality: he be-
lieves that something other than himself and what he directly perceives 
exists or is real. I do not mean to say that almost everyone believes that 
what he directly perceives is real: I only mean that he does believe that, 
whether what he directly perceives is real or not, something other than it 
and other than himself certainly is so. And not only does each of us thus 
agree in believing that something other than himself and what he directly 
perceives is real: almost everyone also believes that among the real things, 
other than himself and what he directly perceives, are other persons who 
have thoughts and perceptions in some respects similar to his own. That 
most people believe this I think I need scarcely try to show. But since a 
good many philosophers may appear to have held views contradictory of 
this one, I will briefly point out my reason for asserting that most philoso-
phers, even among those (if any) who have believed the contradictory of 
this, have yet held this as well. Almost all philosophers tell us something 
about the nature of human knowledge and human perception. They tell us 
that we perceive so and so; that the nature or origin of our perceptions is 
such and such; or (as I have just been telling you) that men in general have 
such and such beliefs. It might, indeed, be said that we are not to interpret 
such language too strictly: that, though a philosopher talks about human 
knowledge and our perceptions, he only means to talk about his own. But 
in many cases a philosopher will leave no doubt upon this point, by ex-
pressly assuming that there are other perceptions, which differ in some re-
spects from his own: such, for instance, is the case when (as is so common 
nowadays) a philosopher introduces psycho-genetic considerations into 
his arguments – considerations concerning the nature of the perceptions 
of men who existed before and at a much lower stage of culture than him-
self. Any philosopher, who uses such arguments, obviously assumes that 
perceptions other than his own have existed or been real. And even those 
philosophers who think themselves justified in the conclusion that neither 
their own perceptions nor any perceptions like theirs are ultimately real, 
would, I think admit, that phenomenally, at least, they are real, and are 
certainly more real than some other things.
Almost everyone, then, does believe that some perceptions other than 
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his own, and which he himself does not directly perceive, are real; and 
believing this, he believes that something other than himself and what he 
directly perceives is real. But how do we know that anything exists except 
our own perception is, and what we directly perceive? How do we know 
that there are any other people, who have perceptions in some respects 
similar to our own?
I believe that these two questions express very exactly the nature of the 
problem which it is my chief object, in this paper, to discuss. When I say 
these words to you, they will at once suggest to your minds the very ques-
tion, to which I desire to find an answer; they will convey to you the very 
same meaning which I have before my mind, when I use the words. You 
will understand at once what question it is that I mean to ask. But, for all 
that, the words which I have used are highly ambiguous. If you begin to 
ask yourselves what I do mean by them, you will find that there are several 
quite different things which I might mean. And there is, I think, great dan-
ger of confusing these different meanings with one another. I think that 
philosophers, when they have asked this question in one sense, have often 
answered it in quite a different sense; and yet have supposed that the an-
swer which they have given is an answer to the very same question which 
they originally asked. It is precisely because there is this ambiguity – this 
danger of confusion, in the words which I have used, that I have chosen to 
use them. I wish to point out as clearly as I can, not only what I do mean 
by them, but also some things which I do not mean; and I wish to make it 
clear that the questions which I do not mean to ask, are different questions 
from that which I do mean to ask.
I will take the second of my two questions, since there is in the other 
an additional ambiguity to which I do not now wish to call attention. My 
second question was: How do we know that there exist any other people 
who have perceptions in some respects similar to our own ? What does 
this question mean?
Now I think you may have noticed that when you make a statement 
to another person, and he answers “How do you know that that is so?” 
he very often means to suggest that you do not know it. And yet, though 
he means to suggest that you do not know it, he may not for a moment 
wish to suggest that you do not believe it, nor even that you have not that 
degree or kind of conviction, which goes beyond mere belief, and which 
may be taken to be essential to anything which can properly be called 
knowledge. He does not mean to suggest for a moment that you are say-
ing something which you do not believe to be true, or even that you are 
not thoroughly convinced of its truth. What he does mean to suggest is 
that what you asserted was not true, even though you may not only have 
believed it but felt sure that it was true. He suggests that you don’t know 
it, in the sense that what you believe or feel sure of is not true.
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Now I point this out, not because I myself mean to suggest that we 
don’t know the existence of other persons, but merely in order to show 
that the word “know” is sometimes used in a sense in which it is not 
merely equivalent to “believe” or “feel sure of.” When the question “How 
do you know that?” is asked, the questioner does not merely mean to 
ask – “How do you come to believe that, or to be convinced of it?” He 
sometimes, and I think generally, means to ask a question with regard to 
the truth, and not with regard to the existence of your belief. And simi-
larly when I ask the question “How do we know that other people exist?” 
I do not mean to ask “How do we come to believe in or be convinced of 
their existence?” I do not intend to discuss this question at all. I shall not 
ask what suggests to us our belief in the existence of other persons or of 
an external world; I shall not ask whether we arrive at it by inference or 
by “instinct” or in any other manner, which ever has been or may be sug-
gested: I shall discuss no question of any kind whatever with regard to its 
origin, or cause, or the way in which it arises. These psychological ques-
tions are not what I propose to discuss. When I ask the question “How do 
we know that other people exist?” I do not mean: “How does our belief 
in their existence arise?”
But if I do not mean this, what do I mean? I have said that I mean to 
ask a question with regard to the truth of that belief; and the particular 
question which I mean to ask might be expressed in the words: What rea-
son have we for our belief in the existence of other persons? But these are 
words which themselves need some explanation, and I will try to give it.
In the first place, then, when I talk of “a reason,” I mean only a good 
reason and not a bad one. A bad reason is, no doubt, a reason, in one 
sense of the word; but I mean to use the word “reason” exclusively in the 
sense in which it is equivalent to “good reason.” But what, then, is meant 
by a good reason for a belief? I think I can express sufficiently accurately 
what I mean by it in this connection, as follows:- A good reason for a be-
lief is a proposition which is true, and which would not be true unless the 
belief were also true. We should, I think, commonly say that when a man 
knows such a proposition he has a good reason for his belief; and, when 
he knows no such proposition, we should say that he has no reason for it. 
When he knows such a proposition, we should say he knows something 
which is a reason for thinking his belief to be true – something from which 
it could be validly inferred. And if, in answer to the question “How do 
you know so and so?” he were to state such a proposition, we should, I 
think, feel that he had answered the question which we meant to ask. Sup-
pose, for instance, in answer to the question “How do you know that?” 
he were to say “I saw it in the Times.” Then, if we believed that he had 
seen it in the Times, and also believed that it would not have been in the 
Times, unless it had been true, we should admit that he had answered our 
question. We should no longer doubt that he did know what he asserted, 
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we should no longer doubt that his belief was true. But if, on the other 
hand, we believed that he had not seen it in the Times – if, for instance, 
we had reason to believe that what he saw was not the statement which he 
made, but some other statement which he mistook for it; or if we believed 
that the kind of statement in question was one with regard to which there 
was no presumption that, being, in the Times, it would be true: in either of 
these cases we should, I think, feel that he had not answered our question. 
We should still doubt whether what he had said was true. We should still 
doubt whether he knew what he asserted; and since a man cannot tell you 
how he knows a thing, unless he does know that thing, we should think 
that, though he might have told us truly how he came to believe it, he had 
certainly not told us how he knew it. But though we should thus hold that 
he had not told us how he knew what he had asserted, and that he had 
given us no reason for believing it to be true; we must yet admit that he 
had given us a reason, in a sense – a bad reason, a reason which was no 
reason because it had no tendency to show that what he believed was true; 
and we might also be perfectly convinced that he had given us the reason 
why he believed it – the proposition by believing which he was induced 
also to believe his original assertion.
I mean, then, by my question, “How do we know that other people 
exist?” what, I believe, is ordinarily meant, namely, “What reason have 
we for believing that they exist?” and by this again I mean, what I also be-
lieve is ordinarily meant, namely, “What proposition do we believe, which 
is both true itself and is also such that it would not be true, unless other 
people existed?” And I hope it is plain that this question, thus explained, 
is quite a different question from the psychological question, which I said 
I did not mean to ask – from the question, “How does our belief in the ex-
istence of other people arise?” My illustration, I hope, has made this plain. 
For I have pointed out that we may quite well hold that a man has told us 
how a belief of his arises, and even what was the reason which made him 
adopt that belief, and yet may have failed to give us any good reason for 
his belief – any proposition which is both true itself, and also such that the 
truth of his belief follows from it. And, indeed, it is plain that if any one 
ever believes what is false, he is believing something for which there is no 
good reason, in the sense which I have explained, and for which, there-
fore, he cannot possibly have a good reason; and yet it plainly does not 
follow that his belief did not arise in any way whatever, nor even that he 
had no reason for it – no bad reason. It is plain that false beliefs do arise in 
some way or other – they have origins and causes: and many people who 
hold them have bad reasons for holding them – their belief does arise (by 
inference or otherwise) from their belief in some other proposition, which 
is not itself true, or else is not a good reason for holding that which they 
infer from it, or which, in some other way, it induces them to believe. I 
submit, therefore, that the question, “What good reason have we for be-
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lieving in the existence of other people?” is different from the question, 
“How does that belief arise?” But when I say this, I must not be misun-
derstood; I must not be understood to affirm that the answer to both 
questions cannot, in a sense, be the same. I fully admit that the very same 
fact, which suggests to us the belief in the existence of other people, may 
also be a good reason for believing that they do exist. All that I maintain 
is that the question whether it is a good reason for that belief is a different 
question from the question whether it suggests that belief: if we assert that 
a certain fact both suggests our belief in the existence of other persons and 
is also a good reason for holding that belief, we are asserting two different 
things and not one only. And hence, when I assert, as I shall assert, that 
we have a good reason for our belief in the existence of other persons, I 
must not be understood also to assert either that we infer the existence of 
other persons from this good reason, or that our belief in that good reason 
suggests our belief in the existence of other persons in any other way. It 
is plain, I think, that a man may believe two true propositions, of which 
the one would not be true, unless the other were true too, without, in any 
sense whatever, having arrived at his belief in the one from his belief in the 
other; and it is plain at all events, that the question whether his belief in 
the one did arise from his belief in the other, is a different question from 
the question whether the truth of the one belief follows from the truth of 
the other.
I hope, then, that I have made it a little clearer what I mean by the 
question: “What reason have we for believing in the existence of other 
people?” and that what I mean by it is at all events different from what is 
meant by the question: “How does our belief in the existence of other peo-
ple arise?” But I am sorry to say that I have not yet reached the end of my 
explanations as to what my meaning is. I am afraid that the subject may 
seem very tedious. I can assure you that I have found it excessively tedious 
to try to make my meaning clear to myself. I have constantly found that I 
was confusing one question with another, and that, where I had thought I 
had a good reason for some assertion, I had in reality no good reason. But 
I may perhaps remind you that this question, “How do we know so and 
so?” “What reason have we for believing it?” is one of which philosophy 
is full; and one to which the most various answers have been given. Phi-
losophy rarely consists in giving reasons; and the question what are good 
reasons for a particular conclusion and what are bad, is one upon which 
philosophers have disagreed as much as on any other question. For one 
and the same conclusion different philosophers have given not only differ-
ent, but incompatible, reasons; and conversely different philosophers have 
maintained that one and the same fact is a reason for incompatible conclu-
sions. We are apt, I think, sometimes to pay too little attention to this fact. 
When we have taken, perhaps, no little pains to assure ourselves that our 
own reasoning is correct, and especially when we know that a great many 
70
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2G. E. Moore 
other philosophers agree with us, we are apt to assume that the arguments 
of those philosophers, who have come to a contradictory conclusion, are 
scarcely worthy of serious consideration. And yet, I think, there is scarcely 
a single reasoned conclusion in philosophy, as to which we shall not find 
that some other philosopher, who has, so far as we know, bestowed equal 
pains on his reasoning, and with equal ability, has reached a conclusion 
incompatible with ours. We may be satisfied that we are right, and we 
may, in fact, be so; but it is certain that both cannot be right: either our 
opponent or we must have mistaken bad reasons for good. And this be-
ing so, however satisfied we may be that it is not we who have done so, I 
think we should at least draw the conclusion that it is by no means easy 
to avoid mistaking bad reasons for good; and that no process, however 
laborious, which is in the least likely to help us in avoiding this should be 
evaded. But it is at least possible that one source of error lies in mistaking 
one kind of reason for another – in supposing that, because there is, in one 
sense, a reason for a given conclusion, there is also a reason in another, or 
that because there is, in one sense, no reason for a given conclusion, there 
is, therefore, no reason at all. I believe myself that this is a very frequent 
source of error: but it is at least a possible one. And where, as disagree-
ments show, there certainly is error on one side or the other, and reason, 
too, to suppose that the error is not easy to detect, I think we should spare 
no pains in investing rating any source, from which it is even possible that 
the error may arise. For these reasons I think I am perhaps doing right in 
trying to explain as clearly as possible not only what reasons we have for 
believing in an external world, but also in what sense I take them to be 
reasons.
I proceed, then, with my explanation. And there is one thing, which, 
I think my illustration has shown that I do not mean. I have defined a 
reason for a belief as a true proposition, which would not be true un-
less the belief itself – what is believed – were also true; and I have used, 
as synonymous with this form of words, the expressions: A reason for a 
belief is a true proposition from which the truth of the belief follows from 
which it could be validly inferred. Now these expressions might suggest 
the idea that I mean to restrict the word “reason” to what, in the strictest 
sense, might be called a logical reason – to propositions from which the 
belief in question follows, according to the rules of inference accepted by 
Formal Logic. But I am not using the words “follow,” “validly inferred,” 
in this narrow sense; I do not mean to restrict the words “reason for a 
belief” to propositions from which the laws of Formal Logic state that the 
belief could be deduced. The illustration which I gave is inconsistent with 
this restricted meaning. I said that the fact that a statement appeared in 
the Times might be a good reason for believing that that statement was 
true. And I am using the word “reason” in the wide and popular sense, 
in which it really might be. If, for instance, the Times stated that the King 
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was dead, we should think that was a good reason for believing that the 
King was dead; we should think that the Times would not have made such 
a statement as that unless the King really were dead. We should, indeed, 
not think that the statement in the Times rendered it absolutely certain 
that the King was dead. But it is extremely unlikely that the Times would 
make a statement of this kind unless it were true; and, in that sense, the 
fact of the statement appearing in the Times would render it highly prob-
able – much more likely than not – that the King was dead. And I wish it 
to be understood that I am using the words “reason for a belief” in this 
extremely wide sense. When I look for a good reason for our belief in the 
existence of other people, I shall not reject any proposition merely on the 
ground that it only renders their existence probable – only shows it to 
be more likely than not that they exist. Provided that the proposition in 
question does render it positively probable that they exist, then, if it also 
conforms to the conditions which I am about to mention, I shall call it a 
“good reason.”
But it is not every proposition which renders it probable that other 
people exist, which I shall consider to be a good answer to my question. I 
have just explained that my meaning is wide in one direction – in admit-
ting some propositions which render a belief merely probable; but I have 
now to explain that it is restricted in two other directions: I do mean to 
exclude certain propositions which do render that belief probable. When 
I ask: What reason have we for believing in the existence of other people? 
a certain ambiguity is introduced by the use of the plural “we.” If each of 
several different persons has a reason for believing that he himself exists, 
then it is not merely probable, but certain, according to the rules of For-
mal Logic, that, in a sense, they “have a reason for believing” that several 
people exist; each has a reason for believing that he himself exists; and, 
therefore, all of them, taken together, have reasons for supposing that sev-
eral persons exist. If, therefore, I were asking the question: What reason 
have we for believing in the existence of other persons? in this sense, it 
would follow that if each of us has a reason for believing in his own exis-
tence, these reasons, taken together, would be a reason for believing in the 
existence of all of us. But I am not asking the question in this sense: it is 
plain that this is not its natural sense. What I do mean to ask is: Does each 
single one of us know any proposition, which is a reason for believing that 
others exist? I am using “we,” that is to say, in the sense of “each of us.” 
But again I do mean each of us: I am not merely asking whether some one 
man knows a proposition which is a reason for believing, that other men 
exist. It would be possible that some one man, or some few men, should 
know such a proposition, and yet the rest know no such proposition. But I 
am not asking whether this is the case. I am asking whether among propo-
sitions of the kind which (as we commonly suppose) all or almost all men 
know, there is any which is a reason for supposing that other men exist. 
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And in asking this question I am not begging the question by supposing 
that all men do exist. My question might, I think, be put quite accurately 
as follows. There are certain kinds of belief which, as we commonly sup-
pose, all or almost all men share, I describe this kind of belief as “our” 
beliefs, simply as an easy way of pointing out which kind of belief I mean, 
but without assuming that all men do share them. And I then ask: Sup-
posing a single man to have beliefs of this kind, which among them would 
be a good reason for supposing that other men existed having like beliefs?
This, then, is the first restriction which I put upon the meaning of my 
question. And it is, I think, a restriction which, in their natural meaning, 
the words suggest. When we ask: What reason have we for believing that 
other people exist? we naturally understand that question to be equivalent 
to: What reason has each of us for that belief? And this question again is 
naturally equivalent to the question: Which among the propositions that a 
single man believes, but which are of the kind which (rightly or wrongly) 
we assume all men to believe, are such that they would not be true unless 
some other person than that man existed? But there is another restriction 
which, I think, the words of my question also naturally suggest. If we 
were to ask anyone the question: How do you know that you did see that 
statement in the Times? and he were to answer “Because I did see it in the 
Times and in the Standard too,” we should not think that he had given 
us a reason for the belief that he saw it in the Times. We should not think 
his answer a reason, because it asserts the very thing for which we require 
a reason. And similarly when I ask: How do we know that any thing, or 
person exists, other than ourselves and what we directly perceive? What 
reason have we for believing this? I must naturally be understood to mean: 
What proposition, other than one which itself asserts or presupposes the 
existence of something beyond ourselves and our own perceptions, is a 
reason for supposing that such a thing exists? And this restriction obvi-
ously excludes an immense number of propositions of a kind which all 
of us do believe. We all of us believe an immense number of different 
propositions about the existence of things which we do not directly per-
ceive, and many of these propositions are, in my sense, good reasons for 
believing in the existence of still other things. The belief in the existence 
of a statement in the Times, when we have not seen that statement, may, 
as I implied, be a good reason for believing, that someone is dead. But no 
such proposition can be a good answer to my question, because it asserts 
the very kind of thing for which I require a reason: it asserts the existence 
of something other than myself and what I directly perceive. When I am 
asking: What reason have I for believing in the existence of anything but 
myself, my own perceptions, and what I do directly perceive? you would 
naturally understand me to mean: What reason, other than the existence 
of such a thing, have I for this belief?
Each of us, then, we commonly assume, believes some true proposi-
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tions, which do not themselves assert the existence of anything other than 
himself, his own perceptions, or what he directly perceives. Each of us, 
for instance, believes that he himself has and has had certain particular 
perceptions: and these propositions are propositions of the kind I mean 
– propositions which do not themselves assert the existence of anything 
other than himself, his own perceptions, and what he directly believes: 
they are, I think, by no means the only propositions of this kind, which 
most of us believe: but they are propositions of this kind. But, as I say, I 
am not assuming that each of us – each of several different people-does 
believe propositions of this kind. All that I assume is that at least one man 
does believe some such propositions. And then I ask: Which among those 
true propositions, which one man believes, are such that they would prob-
ably not be true, unless some other man existed and had certain particu-
lar perceptions? Which among them are such that it follows (in the wide 
sense, which I have explained) from their truth, that it is more likely than 
not that some other man has perceptions? This is the meaning of my ques-
tion, so far as I have hitherto explained it: and I hope this meaning is quite 
clear. It is in this sense that I am asking: What reason have we for believing 
that other people exist? How do we know that they exist? This, indeed, 
is not all that I mean by that question: there is one other point – the most 
important one – which remains to be explained. But this is part of what I 
mean to ask; and before I go on to explain what else I mean, I wish first 
to stop and enquire what is the answer to this part of my question. What 
is the answer to the question: Which among the true propositions, of a 
kind which (as we commonly assume) each of us believes, and which do 
not themselves assert the existence of anything other than that person 
himself, his own perceptions, or what he directly perceives, are such that 
they would probably not be true unless some other person existed, who 
had perceptions in some respects similar to his own?
Now to this question the answer is very obvious. It is very obvious that 
in this sense we have reasons for believing in the existence of other per-
sons, and also what some of those reasons are. But I wish to make it quite 
plain that this is so: that in this sense one man has a reason for believing 
that another has certain perceptions. All that I am asking you to grant, 
is, you see, that some of you would not be having just those perceptions 
which you now have, unless I, as I read this paper, were perceiving more 
or less black marks on a more or less white ground; or that I on the other 
hand, should not be having just those perceptions which I now have, un-
less some other persons than myself were hearing the sounds of my voice. 
And I am not asking you even to grant that this is certain – only that it is 
positively probable – more likely than not. Surely it is very obvious that 
this proposition is true. But I wish to make it quite clear what would be 
the consequences of denying that any such propositions are true – propo-
sitions which assert that the existence of certain perceptions in one man 
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are a reason for believing the existence of certain perceptions in another 
man – which assert that one man would probably not have had just those 
perceptions which he did have, unless some other man had had certain 
particular perceptions. It is plain, I think, that, unless some such proposi-
tions are true, we have no more reason for supposing that Alexander the 
Great ever saw an elephant, than for supposing that Sindbad the Sailor 
saw a Roc; we have no more reason for supposing, that anybody saw 
Julius Caesar murdered in the Senate House at Rome, than for supposing 
that somebody saw him carried up to Heaven in a fiery chariot. It is plain, 
I think, that if we have any reason at all for supposing that in all prob-
ability Alexander the Great did see an elephant, and that in all probability 
no such person as Sindbad the Sailor ever saw a Roc, part of that reason 
consists in the assumption that some other person would probably not 
have had just those perceptions which he did have, unless Alexander the 
Great had seen an elephant, and unless Sindbad the Sailor had not seen a 
Roc. And most philosophers, I think, are willing, to admit that we have 
some reason, in some sense or other, for such propositions as these. They 
are willing to admit not only that some persons probably did see Julius 
Caesar murdered in the Senate House; but also that some persons, other 
than those who saw it, had and have some reason for supposing that some 
one else probably saw it. Some sceptical philosophers might, indeed, deny 
both propositions; and to refute their views, I admit, other arguments are 
needed than any which I shall bring forward in this paper. But most phi-
losophers will, I think, admit not only that facts, for which there is, as we 
say, good historical evidence, are probably true; but also that what we call 
good historical evidence really is in some sense a good reason for thinking 
them true. Accordingly I am going to assume that many propositions of 
the following kind are true. Propositions, namely, which assert that one 
man would probably not have certain perceptions which he does have, 
unless some other man had certain particular perceptions. That some of 
you, for instance, would probably not be having precisely the perceptions 
which you are having, unless I were having the perception of more or less 
black marks on a more or less white ground. And, in this sense, I say, we 
certainly have reasons for supposing that other people have perceptions 
similar, in some respects, to those which we sometimes have.
But when I said I was going to ask the question: What reason have we 
for supposing that other people exist? you will certainly not have thought 
that I merely meant to ask the question which I have just answered. My 
words will have suggested to you something much more important than 
merely this. When, for instance, I said that to the question “How do you 
know that?” the answer “I saw it in the Times” would be a satisfactory 
answer, you may have felt, as I felt, that it would not in all circumstances 
be regarded as such. The person who asked the question might, in some 
cases, fairly reply: “That is no answer: how do you know that, because 
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you saw a thing, in the Times, it is therefore true?” In other words he 
might ask for a reason for supposing that the occurrence of a particular 
statement in the Times was a reason for supposing that statement true. 
And this is a question to which we all believe that there may be an answer. 
We believe that, with regard to some kinds of statements which the Times 
makes – some kinds of statements with regard to Fiscal Policy for example 
– the fact that the Times makes them is no reason for supposing them to 
be true: whereas with regard to other kinds of statement which it makes, 
such a statement, for instance, as that the King was dead, the fact that it 
makes them is a reason for supposing them true. We believe that there 
are some kinds of statement, which it is very unlikely the Times would 
make, unless they were true; and others which it is not at all unlikely that 
the Times might make, although they were not true. And we believe that 
a reason might be given for distinguishing, in this way, between the two 
different kinds of statement: for thinking that, in some cases (on points, 
for instance, which, as we should say, are not simple questions of fact) the 
Times is fallible, whereas in other cases, it is, though not absolutely infal-
lible, very unlikely to state what is not true.
Now it is precisely in this further sense that I wish to consider: what 
reason have we for believing that certain particular things, other than 
ourselves, our own perceptions, and what we directly perceive, are real? I 
have asserted that I do have certain perceptions, which it is very unlikely I 
should have, unless some other person had certain particular perceptions: 
that, for instance, it is very unlikely that I should be having precisely those 
perceptions which I am now having, unless someone else were hearing the 
sound of my voice. And I now wish to ask: What reason have I for sup-
posing that this is unlikely? What reason has any of us for supposing that 
any such proposition is true? And I mean by “having a reason” precisely 
what I formerly meant. I mean: What other proposition do I know, which 
would not be true, unless my perception were connected with someone 
else’s perception, in the manner in which I asserted them to be connected? 
Here again I am asking for a good reason; and am not asking a psycho-
logical question with regard to origin. Here again I am not asking for 
a reason, in the strict sense of Formal Logic; I am merely asking for a 
proposition, which would probably not be true, unless what I asserted 
were true. Here again I am asking for some proposition of a kind which 
each of us believes; I am asking: What reason has each of us for believing 
that some of his perceptions are connected with particular perceptions of 
other people in the manner I asserted?– for believing that he would not be-
lieve certain perceptions that he does have, unless some other person had 
certain particular perceptions? And here again I am asking for a reason – I 
am asking for some proposition other than one which itself asserts: When 
one man has a perception of such and such a particular kind, it is probable 
that another man has a perception or thought of this or that other kind.
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But what kind of reason can l be given for believing a proposition of 
this sort ? For believing a proposition which asserts that, since one par-
ticular thing exists, it is probable that another particular thing also exists? 
One thing I think is plain, namely that we can have no good reason for be-
lieving such a proposition, unless we have good reason for believing some 
generalisation. It is commonly believed, for instance, that certain so-called 
flint arrow-heads, which have been discovered, were probably made by 
prehistoric men; and I think it is plain that we have no reason for believ-
ing this unless we have reason to suppose that objects which resemble 
these in certain particular respects are generally made by men – are more 
often made by men than by any other agency. Unless certain particular 
characteristics which those arrow-heads have were characteristics which 
belonged at least more frequently to articles of human manufacture than 
to any articles not made by men, it would surely be just as likely as not 
that these arrow-heads were not made by men – that they were, in fact, 
not arrow-heads. That is to say, unless we have reason to assert a gener-
alisation – the generalisation that objects of a certain kind are generally 
made by men, we have no reason to suppose that these particular objects, 
which are of the kind in question, were made by men. And the same, so 
far as I can see, is true universally. If we ever have any reason for asserting 
that, since one particular thing exists, another probably exists or existed 
or will exist also, part of our reason, at least, must consist in reasons for 
asserting some generalization – for asserting that the existence of things of 
a particular kind is, more often than not, accompanied or preceded or fol-
lowed by the existence of things of another particular kind. It is, I think, 
sometimes assumed that an alternative to this theory may be found in the 
theory that the existence of one kind of thing “intrinsically points to,” or 
is “intrinsically a sign or symbol of” the existence of another thing. It is 
suggested that when a thing which thus “points to” the existence of an-
other thing exists, then it is at least probable that the thing “pointed to” 
exists also. But this theory, I think, offers no real alternative. For, in the 
first place, when we say that the existence of one thing A is a “sign” of or 
“points to” the existence of another thing B, we very commonly actually 
mean to say that when a thing like A exists, a thing like B generally exists 
too. We may, no doubt, mean something else too; but this we do mean. 
We say, for instance, that certain particular words, which we hear or read, 
are a “sign” that somebody has thought of the particular things which we 
call the meaning of those words. But we should certainly hesitate to admit 
that the hearing or reading of certain words could be called a “sign” of the 
existence of certain thoughts, unless it were true that when those words 
are heard or read, the thoughts in question generally have existed. If when 
those words were heard or read, the thoughts had generally not existed, 
we should say that, in one sense of the word at all events, the hearing of 
the words was not a sign of the existence of the thoughts. In this sense, 
therefore, to say that the existence of A “points to” or “is a sign of” the 
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existence of B, is actually to say that when A exists, B generally exists 
also. But, no doubt, the words “points to,” “is a sign of” may be used 
in some other sense: they may, for instance, mean only that the existence 
of A suggests in some way the belief that B exists. And in such a case we 
might certainly know that the existence of A pointed to the existence of B, 
without knowing that when A existed B generally existed also. Let us sup-
pose, then, that in some such sense A does “point to” the existence of B; 
can this fact give us a reason for supposing it even probable that B exists? 
Certainly it can, provided it is true that when A does point to the existence 
of B, B generally exists. But surely it can do so, only on this condition. If 
when A points to the existence of B, B, nevertheless, does not generally ex-
ist, then surely the fact that A points to the existence of B can constitute no 
probability that B does not exist: on the contrary it will then be probable 
that, even though A “points to” the existence of B, B does not exist. We 
have, in fact, only substituted the generalisation that A’s pointing to B is 
generally accompanied by the existence of B, for the generalisation that A’s 
existence is generally accompanied by the existence of B. If we are to have 
any reason for asserting that, when A points to or is a sign of the existence 
of B, B probably exists, we must still have a reason for some generaliza-
tion – for a generalisation which asserts that when one thing points to the 
existence of another, that other generally exists.
It is plain, then, I think, that if we are to find a reason for the assertion 
that some particular perception of mine would probably not exist, unless 
someone else were having or had had a perception of a kind which I can 
name, we must find a reason for some generalisation. And it is also plain, 
I think, that in many cases of this kind the generalisation must consist in 
an assertion that when one man has a certain kind of perception, some 
other man generally has had some other perception or belief. We assume, 
for instance, that when we hear or read certain words, somebody besides 
ourselves has thought the thoughts, which constitute the meaning of those 
words; and it is plain, I think, that we have no reason for this assumption 
except one which is also a reason for the assumption that when certain 
words are heard or read, somebody generally has had certain thoughts. 
And my enquiry, therefore, at least includes the enquiry: What reason 
have we for such generalisations as these? for generalisations which assert 
a connection between the existence of a certain kind of perception in one 
man, and that of a certain kind of perception or belief in another man?
And to this question, I think, but one answer can be given. If we have 
any reason for such generalisations at all, some reason must be given, in 
one way or another, by observation – by observation, understood in the 
wide sense in which it includes “experiment.” No philosopher, I think, has 
ever failed to assume that observation does give a reason for some general-
isations – for some propositions which assert that when one kind of thing 
exists, another generally exists or has existed in a certain relation to it. 
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Even those who, like Hume, imply that observation cannot give a reason 
for anything, yet constantly appeal to observation in support of generali-
sations of their own. And even those who hold that observation can give 
no reason for any generalisation about the relation of one man’s percep-
tions to another’s, yet hold that it can give a reason for generalisations 
about the relation of some to others among a man’s own perceptions. It 
is, indeed, by no means agreed how observation can give a reason for any 
generalisation. Nobody knows what reason we have, if we have any, for 
supposing that it can. But that it can, everyone, I think, assumes. I think, 
therefore, most philosophers will agree, that if we can find any reason at 
all for generalisations of the kind in which I am interested, a reason for 
some of them at all events must be found in observation. And what I pro-
pose to ask is: What reason can be found in observation for even a single 
proposition of the kind I have described? for a proposition which asserts 
that when one man has one kind of perception, another man generally has 
or has had another?
But, when it is said that observation gives us a reason for generalisa-
tions, two things may be meant, neither of which I mean. In the first place, 
we popularly use “observation” in a sense in which we can be said to 
observe the perceptions, feelings, and thoughts of other people: in which, 
therefore, we can be said to observe the very things with regard to which 
I am asking what reason we have for believing in their existence. But it is 
universally agreed that there is a sense in which no man can observe the 
perceptions, feelings or thoughts of any other man. And it is to this strict 
sense that I propose to confine the word. I shall use it in a sense, in which 
we can certainly be said to observe nothing, but ourselves, our own per-
ceptions, thoughts and feelings, and what we directly perceive. And in the 
second place, it may be said that observations made by another person 
may give me a reason for believing some generalisation. And it is certainly 
the case that for many of the generalisations in which we all believe, if we 
have a reason in observation at all, it is not in our own observation that we 
have it: part of our reason, at all events, lies in things which other people 
have observed but which we ourselves have not observed. But in asking 
this particular question, I am not asking for reasons of this sort. The very 
question that I am asking is: What reason has any one of us for supposing 
that any other person whatever has ever made any observations? And just 
as, in the first meaning which I gave to this question, it meant: What thing, 
that any single man observes is such that it would probably not have ex-
isted, unless some other man had made a particular observation? So now 
I am asking: Which among the things, which one single man observes are 
such that they would probably not have existed, unless it were true that 
some of them generally stood in certain relations to observations of some 
other person ? I am asking: Which among my own observations give me a 
reason for supposing that some of them are of a kind which are generally 
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preceded or accompanied by observations of other people? Which, for 
instance, among my own observations give a good reason for the gener-
alisation that when I hear certain words, somebody else has generally had 
certain particular thoughts, or that whenever anyone hears certain words, 
somebody else has generally had the thoughts which constitute what we 
call the meaning of those words? I am asking: Which among the vast se-
ries of observations, which any other individual makes during his lifetime, 
give a good reason for any generalisation whatever of this kind – a gener-
alisation which asserts that some of them are generally preceded by cer-
tain thoughts perceptions or feelings in other persons? I quite admit that 
there are some generalisations of this kind for which the observations of 
some particular men will not give a reason. All that I ask is: Is there even 
one generalisation of this kind, for which the kind of observations, which 
(as we commonly assume) each man, or nearly every man, does make, do 
give a reason? Among observations of the kind which (as we commonly 
assume) are common to you and to me, do yours, by themselves, give any 
reason for even one such generalisation? And do mine, by themselves, 
give any reason for even one such generalisation? And if they do, which, 
among these observations, is it which do so?
My question is, then: What reason do my own observations give me, 
for supposing that any perception whatever, which I have, would proba-
bly not occur, unless some other person had a certain kind of perception ? 
What reason do my own observations give me for supposing, for instance, 
that I should not be perceiving what I do now perceive, unless someone 
were hearing the sound of my voice? What reason do your own observa-
tions give you for supposing that you would not be perceiving just what 
you are perceiving, unless I were perceiving more or less black marks on 
a more or less white ground? The question does, I think, appear to be a 
reasonable one; and most philosophers, I think, have assumed that there 
is an answer to it. Yet it may be said that there is no answer to it: that my 
own observations give me no reason whatever for any single proposition 
of this kind. There are certain philosophers (even apart from thorough 
sceptics, with whom, as I have said, I am not now arguing) who have 
denied that they do. There are certain philosophers who hold that noth-
ing which any single one of us observes or can observe, gives the slightest 
reason for supposing that any of his own perceptions are generally con-
nected with certain perceptions in other people. There are philosophers 
who hold that the only generalisations for which our own observations 
do give any warrant are generalisations concerning the manner in which 
our own perceptions, thoughts and feelings do and probably will succeed 
one another; and who conclude that, this being so, we have no reason 
whatever for believing in the existence of any other people. And these phi-
losophers are, I think, right in drawing this conclusion from this premiss. 
It does not, indeed, follow from their premiss that we have not a reason 
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in the sense in which I first explained, and in which, I insisted, it must 
be admitted that we have a reason. It does not follow that some of our 
perceptions are not such as would probably not exist, unless some other 
person had certain perceptions. But, as l have urged, when we say that 
we have a reason for asserting the existence of something not perceived, 
we commonly mean something more than this. We mean not only that, 
since what we perceive does exist, the unperceived thing probably exists 
too; we mean also that we have some reason for asserting this connection 
between the perceived and the unperceived. And holding, as we do, that 
no reason can be given for asserting such a connection, except observa-
tion, we should say that, if observation gives no reason for asserting it, 
we have no reason for asserting it; and having no reason for asserting 
this connection between the perceived and the unperceived, we should 
say that we have none either for asserting the even probable existence of 
the unperceived. This, I think, is what we commonly mean by saying that 
we have no reason to believe in the existence of a particular thing which 
we do not perceive. And hence, I think, those philosophers who hold that 
our own observations give us no reason whatever for any generalisation 
whatever concerning the connection of any of them with those of other 
people, are quite right in concluding that we have no reason to assert that 
any other person ever did have any particular thought or perception what-
ever. I think that the words of this conclusion, understood in their natural 
meaning, express precisely what the premiss asserts. We need not, indeed, 
conclude, as many of these philosophers are inclined to do, that, because 
we have no reason for believing in the existence of other people, it is there-
fore highly doubtful whether they do exist. The philosophers who advo-
cate this opinion commonly refute themselves by assigning the existence 
of other people as part of their reason for believing that it is very doubtful 
whether any other people exist. That for which we have no reason may, 
nevertheless, be certainly true. And, indeed, one of the philosophers who 
holds most clearly and expressly that we do know not only the existence 
of other people but also that of material objects, is also one of those who 
denies most emphatically that our own observations can give any reason 
for believing either in the one or in the other. I refer to Thomas Reid. Reid, 
indeed, allows himself to use not only the word “observe,” but even the 
word “perceive,” in that wide sense in which it might be said that we ob-
serve or perceive the thoughts and feelings of others: and I think that the 
fact that he uses the words in this sense, has misled him into thinking, that 
his view is more plausible and more in accordance with Common Sense 
than it really is: by using the words in this sense he is able to plead that 
“observation” really does give a reason for some of those generalisations, 
for which Common Sense holds that “observation” (in a narrower sense) 
does give a reason. But with regard to what we observe or perceive, in the 
strict sense to which I am confining those words, he asserts quite explicitly 
that it gives us no reason either for believing in the existence of material 
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objects or for believing in the existence of other minds. Berkeley, he says, 
has proved incontrovertibly that it gives us no reason for the one, and 
Hume that it gives us no reason for the other.
Now these philosophers maybe right in holding this. It may, perhaps, 
be true that, in this sense, my own observations give me no reason what-
ever for believing, that any other person ever has or will perceive anything 
like or unlike what I perceive. But I think it it desirable we should realise, 
how paradoxical are the consequences which must be admitted if this is 
true. It must then be admitted that the very large part of our knowledge, 
which we suppose to have some basis in experience, is by no means based 
upon experience, in the sense, and to the extent, which we suppose. We 
do for instance, commonly suppose that there is some basis in experience 
for the assertion that some people, whom we call Germans, use one set 
of words, to express much the same meaning, which we express by using 
a different set of words. But, if this view be correct, we must admit that 
no person’s experience gives him any reason whatever for supposing that, 
when he hears certain words, anyone else has ever heard or thought of the 
same words, or meant anything by them. The view admits, indeed, that I 
do know that, when I hear certain words, somebody else has generally had 
thoughts more or less similar to those which I suppose him to have had: 
but it denies that my own observations could ever give me the least reason 
for supposing that this is so. It admits that my own observations may give 
me reason for supposing that if anyone has ever had perceptions like mine 
in some respects, he will also have had other perceptions like others of 
mine: but it denies that they give me any reason for supposing that anyone 
else ever has had a perception like one of mine. It admits that my own 
observations may give me reason for supposing that certain perceptions 
and thoughts in one person (if they exist) will be followed or preceded by 
certain other perceptions and thoughts in that person: but it denies that 
they give me any reason whatever for any similar generalisation concern-
ing the connection of a certain kind of perception in one person with a cer-
tain kind of perception in another. It admits that I should not have certain 
perceptions, which I do have, unless someone else had had certain other 
perceptions; but it denies that my own observations can give me any rea-
son for saying so – for saying that I should not have had this perception, 
unless someone else had had that. No observations of mine, it holds, can 
ever render it probable that such a generalisation is true: no observation of 
mine can ever confirm or verify such a generalisation. If we are to say that 
any such generalisation whatever is based upon observation, we can onlu 
mean what Reid means, that it is based on a series of assumptions. When 
I observe this particular thing, I assume that that particular thing, which I 
do not observe, exists; when I observe another particular thing, I again as-
sume that a second particular thing, which I do not observe, exists; when 
I observe a third particular thing, I again assume that a third particular 
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thing, which I do not observe, exists. These assumed facts – the assumed 
fact that one observation of mine is accompanied by the existence of one 
particular kind of thing, and that another observation of mine is accom-
panied by the existence of a different particular kind of thing,will then 
give me a reason for different generalisations concerning the connection 
of different perceptions of mine with different external objects – objects 
which I do not perceive. But (it is maintained) nothing but a mass of such 
assumptions will give me a reason for any such generalisation.
Now I think it must be admitted that there is something paradoxical 
in such a view. I think it may be admitted that, in holding it, the philoso-
pher of Common Sense departs from Common Sense at least as far in one 
direction as his opponents had done in another. But I think that there is 
some excuse for those who hold it: I think that, in one respect, they are 
more in the right than those who do not hold it – than those who hold that 
my own observations do give me a reason for believing in the existence 
of other people. For those who hold that my observations do give me a 
reason, have, I believe, universally supposed that the reason lies in a part 
of my observations, in which no such reason is to be found. This is why I 
have chosen to ask the question: What reason do my observations give me 
for believing that another person has any particular perceptions or beliefs? 
I wish to consider which among the things which I observe will give such a 
reason. For this is a question to which no answer, that I have ever seen, ap-
pears to me to be correct. Those who have asked it have, so far as I know, 
answered it either by denying that my observations give me any reason or 
by pointing to a part of my observations, which, as it seems to me, really 
do give none. Those who deny are, it seems to me, right in holding that the 
reason given by those who affirm it is no reason. And their correct opinion 
on this point will, I think, partly serve to explain their denial. They have 
supposed that if our observations give us any reason at all for asserting the 
existence of other people, that reason must lie where it has been supposed 
to lie by those who hold that they do give a reason. And then, finding that 
this assigned reason is no reason, they have assumed that there is no other.
I am proposing then to ask: Which among the observations, which I 
make, and which (as we commonly suppose) are similar in kind to those 
which all or almost all men make, will give a reason for supposing that 
the existence of any of them is generally connected with the existence 
of certain kinds of perception or belief in other people? And in order to 
answer this question, it is obvious we must first consider two others. We 
must consider, in the first place: Of what nature must observations be, if 
they are to give a reason for any generalisation asserting that the existence 
of one kind of thing is generally connected with that of another? And we 
must consider in the second place: What kinds of things do we observe?
Now to the first of these questions I am not going to attempt to give 
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a complete answer. The question concerning the rules of Inductive Logic, 
which is the question at issue, is an immensely difficult and intricate ques-
tion. And I am not going to attempt to say, what kind of observations 
are sufficient to justify a generalisation. But it is comparatively easy to 
point out that a certain kind of observations are necessary to justify a 
generalisation; and this is all that I propose to do. I wish to point out 
certain conditions which observations must satisfy, if they are to justify a 
generalisation; without in any way implying that all observations which 
do satisfy these conditions, will justify a generalisation. The conditions, I 
shall mention, are ones which are certainly not sufficient to justify a gen-
eralisation; but they are, I think, conditions, without which no generali-
sation can be justified. If a particular kind of observations do not satisfy 
these conditions, we can say with certainty that those observations give 
us no reason for believing in the existence of other people; though, with 
regard to observations which do satisfy them, we shall only be able to say 
that they may give a reason.
What conditions, then, must observations satisfy, if they are to justify a 
generalisation? Let us suppose that the generalisation to be justified is one 
which asserts that the existence of a kind of object, which we will call A, 
is generally preceded, accompanied, or followed by the existence of a kind 
of object, which we will call B. A, for instance, might be the hearing of a 
certain word by one person, and B the thought of that which we call the 
meaning of the word, in another person; and the generalisation to be justi-
fied might be that when one person hears a word, not spoken by himself, 
someone else has generally thought of the meaning of that word. What 
must I have observed, if the generalisation that the existence of A is gener-
ally preceded by the existence of B, is to be justified by my observations? 
One first point, I think, is plain. I must have observed both some object, 
which is in some respects like A, and which I will call α, and also some 
object in some respects like B, which I will call b: I must have observed 
both α and β, and also I must have observed β preceding α. This, at least, 
I must have observed. But I do not pretend to say how like α and β must 
be to A and B; nor do I pretend to say how often I must, have observed β 
preceding α, although it is generally held that I must have observed this 
more than once. These are questions, which would have to be discussed, 
if we were trying to discover what observations were sufficient to justify 
the generalisation that the existence of A is generally preceded by that of 
B. But I am only trying to lay down the minimum, which is necessary to 
justify this generalisation; and therefore I am content to say that we must 
have observed something more or less like B preceding something more or 
less like A, at least once. 
But there is yet another minimum condition. If my observation of β 
preceding α is to justify the generalisation that the existence of A is gener-
ally preceded by the existence of B, it is plain, I think, that both the β and 
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the α, which I observed, must have existed or been real; and that also the 
existence of β must really have preceded that of α. It is plain that if, when 
I observed α and β, α existed but β did not, this observation could give me 
no reason to suppose that on another occasion when A existed, B would 
exist. Or again, if, when I observed β preceding α, both β and α existed, 
but the existence of β did not really precede that of α, but, on the contrary, 
followed it, this observation could certainly give me no reason to suppose 
that, in general, the existence of A was preceded by the existence of B. 
Indeed this condition that what is observed must have been real might 
be said to be included in the very meaning of the word “observation.” 
We should, in this connection, say that we had not observed β preceding 
α, unless β and α were both real, and β had really preceded α. If I say “I 
have observed that, on one occasion, my hearing of the word ‘moon’ was 
followed by my imagining a luminous silvery disc,” I commonly mean to 
include in my statement the assertion that I did, on that occasion, really 
hear the word “moon,” and really did have a visual image of a luminous 
disc, and that my perception was really followed by my imagination. If it 
were proved to me that this had not really happened, I should admit that 
I had not really observed it. But though this condition that, if observation 
is to give reason for a generalisation, what is observed must be real, may 
thus be said to be implied in the very word “observation,” it was neces-
sary for me to mention the condition explicitly. It was necessary, because, 
as I shall presently show, we do and must also use the word “observation” 
in a sense in which the assertion “I observe A” by no means includes the 
assertion “A exists” – in a sense in which it may be true that though I did 
observe A, yet A did not exist.
But there is also, I think, a third necessary condition, which is very apt 
to be overlooked. It may, perhaps, be allowed that observation gives some 
reason for the proposition that hens’ eggs are generally laid by hens. I do 
not mean to say that anyone man’s observation can give a reason for this 
proposition: I do not assume either that it can or that it cannot. Nor do 
I mean to make any assumption as to what must be meant by the words 
“hens” and “eggs,” if this proposition is to be true. I am quite willing to al-
low for the moment that, if it is true at all, we must understand by “hens” 
and “eggs,” objects very unlike that which we directly observe, when we 
see a hen in a yard, or an egg on the breakfast-table. I am willing, to allow 
the possibility that, as some Idealists would say, the proposition “Hens lay 
eggs” is false, unless we mean by it: A certain kind of collection of spirits 
or monads sometimes has a certain intelligible relation to another kind of 
collection of spirits or monads. I am willing to allow the possibility that, 
as Reid and some scientists would say, the proposition “Hens lay eggs” 
is false, if we mean by it anything more than that: Certain configurations 
of invisible material particles sometimes have a certain spatio-temporal 
relation to another kind of configuration of invisible material particles. 
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Or again I am willing to allow, with certain other philosophers, that we 
must, if it is to be true, interpret this proposition as meaning that certain 
kinds of sensations have to certain other kinds a relation which may be 
expressed by saying that the one kind of sensations “lay” the other kind. 
Or again, as other philosophers say, the proposition “Hens lay eggs” may 
possibly mean: Certain sensations of mine would, under certain condi-
tions, have to certain other sensations of mine a relation which may be 
expressed by saying, that the one set would “lay” the other set. But what-
ever the proposition “Hens’ eggs are generally laid by hens” may mean, 
most philosophers would, I think, allow that, in some sense or other, this 
proposition was true. And they would also I think allow that we have 
some reason for it; and that part of this reason at all events lies in observa-
tion: they would allow that we should have no reason for it unless certain 
things had been observed, which have been observed. Few, I think, would 
say that the existence of an egg “intrinsically points” to that of a hen, in 
such a sense that, even if we had had no experience of any kind concern-
ing the manner in which objects like eggs are connected with animals like 
hens, the mere inspection of an egg would justify the assertion: A hen has 
probably existed.
I assume, then, that objects having all the characteristics which hens’ 
eggs have (whatever these may be) are generally laid by hens (whatever 
hens may be); and I assume that, if we have any reason for this generalisa-
tion at all, observation gives us some reason for it. But now, let us suppose 
that the only observations we had made were those which we should com-
monly describe by saying that we had seen a hen laying an egg. I do not say 
that any number of such observations, by themselves, would be sufficient 
to justify our generalisation: I think it is plain that they would not. But 
let us suppose, for the moment, that we had observed nothing else which 
bore upon the connection between hens and eggs; and that, if therefore 
our generalisation was justified by any observations at all, it was justified 
by these. We are supposing, then, that the observations which we describe 
as “seeing hens lay eggs” give some reason for the generalisation that eggs 
of that kind are generally laid by hens. And if these observations give rea-
son for this, obviously in a sense they give reason for the generalisation 
that the existence of such an egg is generally preceded by that of a hen; 
and hence also, they give us reason to suppose that if such an egg exists, a 
hen has probably existed also that unless a hen had existed, the egg would 
not have existed. But the point to which I wish to call attention is that it is 
only in a limited sense that they do give reason for this. They only give us 
reason to suppose that, for each egg, there has existed a hen, which was at 
some time near the place where the egg in question then was, and which 
existed at a time near to that at which the egg began to exist. The only 
kind of hens, whose existence they do give us reason to suppose, are hens, 
of which each was at some time in spatial and temporal proximity (or, if 
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Idealists prefer, in the relations which are the “intelligible counterparts” 
of these) to an egg. They give us no information at all about the existence 
of hens (if there are any) which never came within a thousand miles of an 
egg, or which were dead a thousand years before any egg existed. That is 
to say, they do give us reason to suppose that, if a particular egg exists, 
there has probably existed a hen which was at some time near that egg; 
but they give us no reason to suppose that, if a particular egg exists, there 
must have existed a hen which never came near that egg. They do give us 
reason to suppose that, for each egg, there has probably existed a hen, 
which at some time stood to the egg in question in that relation which we 
have observed to hold between an egg and a hen, when we observed the 
hen laying an egg. But they give us no reason to infer from the existence 
of an egg any other kind of hen: any hen which never stood to the egg in 
the relation in which we have observed that some hens do stand to eggs.
What I wish to suggest is that this condition is a universal condition 
for sound inductions. If the observation of β preceding α can ever give us 
any reason at all for supposing that the existence of A is generally pre-
ceded by that of B, it can at most only give us reason to suppose that the 
existence of an A is generally preceded by that of a B which stands to A 
in the same relation in which β has been observed to stand to α. It cannot 
give the least reason for supposing that the existence of an A must have 
been preceded by that of a B, which did not stand to A in the observed 
relation, but in some quite different one. If we are to have any reason to 
infer from the existence of an A the existence of such a B, the reason must 
lie in some different observations. That this is so, in the case of hens’ eggs 
and hens, is, I think, obvious; and, if the rule is not universal, some reason 
should at least be given for supposing that it does apply in one case and 
not in another.
Having thus attempted to point out some conditions which seem to be 
necessary, though not sufficient, where observation is to give any reason 
for a generalisation, I may now proceed to my second preliminary ques-
tion What kinds of things do we observe?
In order to illustrate how much and how little I mean by “observa-
tion” or “direct perception,” I will take as an instance a very common 
visual perception. Most of us are familiar with the experience which we 
should describe by saying that we had seen a red book and a blue book 
side by side upon a shelf. What exactly can we be said to observe or direct-
ly perceive when we have such an experience? We certainly observe one 
colour, which we call blue, and a different colour, which we call red; each 
of these we observe as having a particular size and shape; and we observe 
also these two coloured patches as having to one another the spatial rela-
tion which we express by saying that they are side by side. All this we cer-
tainly see or directly perceive now, whatever may have been the process by 
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which we have come to perceive so much. But when we say, as in ordinary 
talk we should, that the objects we perceive are books, we certainly mean 
to ascribe to them properties, which, in a sense which we all understand, 
are not actually seen by us, at the moment when we are merely looking 
at two books on a shelf two yards off. And all such properties I mean to 
exclude as not being then observed or directly perceived by us. When I 
speak of what we observe, when we see two books on a shelf, I mean to 
limit the expression to that which is actually seen. And, thus understood, 
the expression does include colours, and the size and shape of colours, and 
spatial relations in three dimensions between these patches of colour, but 
it includes nothing else.
But I am also using observation in a sense in which we can be said 
actually to observe a movement. We commonly say that we can some-
times see a red billiard-ball moving towards a white one on a green table. 
And, here again, I do not mean to include in what is directly perceived or 
observed, all that we mean by saying that the two objects perceived are 
billiard-balls. But I do mean to include what (we should say) we actually 
see. We actually see a more or less round red patch moving towards a 
more or less round white patch; we see the stretch of green between them 
diminishing in size. And this perception is not merely the same as a series 
of perceptions – first a perception of a red patch with a green stretch of 
one size between it and the white; then a perception of a red patch with 
a green stretch of a different size between it and the white; and so on. In 
order to perceive a movement we must have a different perception from 
any one of these or from the sum of them. We must actually see the green 
stretch diminishing in size.
Now it is undoubtedly difficult, in some instances, to decide precisely 
what is perceived in this sense and what is not. But I hope I have said 
enough to show that I am using “perceive” and “observe” in a sense in 
which, on a given occasion, it is easy to decide that some things certainly 
are perceived, and other things, as certainly, are not perceived. I am us-
ing it in a sense in which we do perceive such a complex object as a white 
patch moving towards a red one on a green field; but I am not using it in 
any sense in which we could be said to “perceive” or “observe” that what 
we saw moving was a billiard-ball. And in the same way I think we can 
distinguish roughly between what, on any given occasion, we perceive, as 
we say, “by any one of the other senses,” and what we do not perceive by 
it. We can say with certainty that, on any given occasion, there are certain 
kinds of “content” which we are actually hearing, and others which we 
are not actually hearing; though with regard to some again it is difficult 
to say whether we are actually hearing them or not. And similarly we can 
distinguish with certainty in some instances, between what we are, on a 
given occasion, actually smelling or feeling, and what we are not actually 
smelling or feeling.
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But now, besides these kinds of “things,” “objects,” or “contents,” 
which we perceive, as we say, “by the senses,” there is also another kind 
which we can be said to observe. Not only can I observe a red and a 
blue book side by side; I can also observe myself observing, them. I can 
perceive a red patch moving towards a white, and I can also perceive my 
perception of this movement. And what I wish to make as plain as I can 
is that my perception of the movement of a coloured patch can at least be 
distinguished from that movement itself. I wish to make it plain that to 
observe a coloured patch moving is to observe one thing; and to observe 
myself observing a coloured patch moving is another. When I observe my 
own perception of a movement, I observe something more than when 
I merely observe the movement, and something very different from the 
movement. I may perceive a red and a blue book side by side on a shelf; 
and at another time I may perceive a red ball moving towards a white. The 
red and the blue patch, of one shape, at rest side by side, are different from 
the red, of another shape, moving towards the white; and yet, when I say 
that both are “perceived,” I mean by “perceived” one and the same thing. 
And since, thus, two different things may both be perceived, there must 
also be some difference between each of them and what is meant by say-
ing that it is perceived. Indeed, in precisely the same way in which I may 
observe a spatial relation between a red patch and a blue (when I observe 
them “side by side”) I do, when I observe my own perception of them, ob-
serve a spatial relation between it and them. I observe a distance between 
my perception and the red and blue books which I perceive, comparable 
in magnitude with the breadth or height of the red book, or the breadth 
or height of the blue book, just as these are comparable in magnitude with 
one another. And when I say I observe a distance between my perception 
of a red book and that red book itself, I do not mean that I observe a 
distance between my eyes, or any other part of what I call my body, and 
the red patch in question. I am talking not of my eyes, but of my actual 
perception. I observe my perception of a book to be near the book and 
further from the table, in exactly the same sense in which I observe the 
book to be near the shelf on which it stands, and further from the table. 
And just as, if the distance between a red patch and a white is to be per-
ceived, the red patch must be different from the white, so, if I perceive a 
certain distance between my perception and the red patch, my perception 
must be different from the red patch which I perceive.
I assume, then, that we observe, on the one hand, coloured patches 
of certain shapes and sizes, and their spatial relations to one another, to-
gether with all the other kinds of “contents,” which we should usually 
be said to perceive “through the senses.” And, on the other hand, we 
also sometimes observe our own perceptions of such “contents” and our 
thoughts. And these two kinds of “content” are different from one anoth-
er: my perception of a red patch with gold letters on it, is not itself a red 
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patch with gold letters on it; and hence, when I observe my perception of 
this patch, I observe something different from that which I observe when 
I merely perceive the patch. Either of these two kinds of “contents” – ei-
ther colours, moving or at rest, sounds, smells, and all the rest – or, on the 
other hand, my perceptions of these – either of these two kinds, or both, 
might conceivably, since both are observed, give grounds for a generali-
sation concerning what exists. But, as I have said, if observations are to 
give any ground for such a generalisation, it must be assumed that what 
is observed exists or is real. And since, as I have insisted, when I observe 
my perception of a red patch with gold letters on it, I observe something 
different from what I observe when I merely observe a red patch with gold 
letters on it, it follows that to assume the existence of my perception of 
this red and gold is not the same thing as to assume the existence of the 
red and gold itself.
But what, it may be asked, do I mean by this property of “existence” 
or “reality,” which may, it would seem, belong to every content, which I 
observe, or may again belong to none, or which may belong to some and 
not to others? What is this property which may belong to my perception 
of a movement, and yet not belong to the movement perceived, or which 
may again belong to the movement perceived and not to my perception of 
it; or which may again belong to both or to neither?
It is necessary, I think, to ask this question at this point, because there 
are some philosophers who hold that, in the case of some kinds of “con-
tents,” at all events, to say that they “exist” is to say that they are “per-
ceived.” Some hold that to say “A exists” is to say neither more nor less 
than “A is perceived” – that the two expressions are perfect synonyms; 
and others again would say that by “A exists or is real” we may mean 
more than that “A is perceived,” but that we must at least mean this. 
Now, I have hitherto used the word “existence” pretty freely, and I think 
that, when I used it, I used it in its ordinary sense. I think it will generally 
have suggested to you precisely what I meant to convey, and I think that, 
in some cases at all events, it will not even have occurred to you to doubt 
whether you did understand what I meant by it. But, if these philosophers 
are right, then, if you have understood what I meant by it, I have all along 
been using it in a sense, which renders the end of my last paragraph per-
fect nonsense. If these philosophers are right, then, when I assert that what 
is perceived may yet not exist, I am really asserting, that what is perceived 
may yet not be perceived – I am contradicting myself. I am, of course, 
quite unaware that I am doing so. But these philosophers would say either 
you are contradicting yourself, or you are not using, the word “exists” in 
its ordinary sense. And either of these alternatives would be fatal to my 
purpose. If I am not using the word in its ordinary sense, then I shall not 
be understood by anyone; and, if I am contradicting, myself, then what I 
say will not be worth understanding.
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Now, with one class of these philosophers – the class to which, I think, 
Berkeley belongs – I think I can put myself rihht comparatively easily. The 
philosophers I mean are those who say that it is only in the case of one 
particular class of “contents” (the kind of “content” which Berkeley calls 
“ideas”) that to say “the ‘content’ A. exists” is to say “A is perceived,” 
and who admit that in the case of other contents – myself and my percep-
tions and thoughts, for example – to say that these exist or are real, is 
to say of them something different from this. These philosophers admit, 
that is to say, that the word “exists” has two different senses: and that in 
only one of these senses is it synonymous with the words “is perceived.” 
When (they hold) I say of such a content as a red patch with gold letters 
on it that it “exists” I do mean that it is perceived; but when I say of my 
perception of such a patch that it exists, I do not mean that my perception 
is perceived, but something different from this. Now, it would be nothing 
strange that one and the same word should be used in two different senses; 
many words are used in many different senses. But it, would, I think, be 
something very strange indeed, if in the case of a word which we con-
stantly apply to all sorts of different objects, we should uniformly apply it 
to one large class of objects in the one sense and the one sense only, and to 
another large class in the other sense and the other sense only. Usually, in 
the case of such ambiguous words, it happens that, in different contexts, 
we apply it to one and the same object in both senses. We sometimes wish 
to say of a given object that it has the one property, and sometimes we 
wish to say of the same object that it has the other property; and hence we 
apply the same word to the same object, at one time in one sense, and at 
another in the other. I think, therefore, that, even if there were these two 
different senses of the word “existence,” it would be very unlikely that we 
should not commonly, in some contexts, apply it in the sense, in which 
(as is alleged) it does apply to perceptions, to “contents” which are not 
perceptions. Indeed, I think, it is quite plain that we constantly do ask, 
with regard to what is not a perception, whether it exists, in precisely the 
same sense, in which we ask, with regard to a perception, whether it ex-
ists. We ask in precisely the same sense: Was the Roc a real bird, or merely 
an imaginary one? and, Did Sinbad’s perception of the Roc really exist, 
or is it a fiction that he perceived a Roc? I think, therefore, that the sense 
in which these philosophers admit that we do apply the word “existence” 
to perceptions, is one in which we also commonly apply it to “contents” 
other than perceptions. But, even if this is not the case, I can set myself 
right with them by a simple explanation. I need merely explain that the 
sense in which I am proposing to enquire whether a red patch exists, is 
precisely the sense in which they admit that my perception of a red patch 
does exist. And in this sense, it is plain that to suppose that a thing may 
exist, which is not perceived, or that it may not exist, although it is per-
ceived, is at least not self- contradictory.
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But there may be other philosophers who will say that, in the case of a 
perception also, to say that it exists or is real is to say that it is perceived-
either that alone or something more as well. And to these philosophers I 
would first point out that they are admitting that the proposition “This 
perception is real” is significant. There is some sense or other in which we 
may say: “Alexander’s perception of an elephant was real or did exist, but 
Sindbad’s perception of a Roc was not real – never did exist”: the latter 
proposition is, in some sense or other, not self-contradictory. And then I 
would ask of them: When they say, that to call a perception “real” is to as-
sert that it is perceived, do they mean by this that to call it real is to assert 
that it is really perceived, or not? If they say “No,” then they are asserting 
that to call a perception “real” is merely to say that it was perceived in the 
sense in which Sindbad did perceive a Roc: they are asserting that to call 
it “real” is not to say, in any sense, that it was really perceived: they are 
asserting that to call a perception “real” is to say that it was perceived, 
in some sense quite other than that in which we ordinarily use the word: 
for we certainly commonly mean, when we say “A was perceived,” that 
a perception of A was “real”: we should commonly say that Sindbad did 
not perceive a Roc – meaning, that no such perception ever did exist. I do 
not think they do mean this; and, in any case, if they do, I think it is plain 
that they are wrong. When we say that a perception is “real,” we certainly 
do not mean merely that it is the object of another perception, which may 
itself be quite unreal – purely imaginary. I assume, therefore, that when 
they say: To call a perception “real” is to say that it is perceived; they 
mean, what we should naturally understand, namely, that: To call it “real” 
is to say that it is really perceived – to say that it is the object of another 
perception, which is also real in the same sense. And, if they mean this, 
then what they say is certainly untrue. Their definition of reality is circu-
lar. It cannot be the case that the only sense in which a perception may be 
said to be real, is one in which to call it so is to assert that not it alone, 
but another perception is real also. It cannot be the case that the assertion 
“A is real” is identical with the assertion “A and B are both real,” where 
A and B are different, and “real” is used in the same sense as applied to 
both. If it is to be true that the assertion “A is real” ever, in any sense, 
includes the assertion “A is really perceived,” there must be another sense 
of the word “real,” in which to assert “A is real” is to assert less than “A 
is really perceived” – the sense, namely, in which we here assert that the 
perception of A is real.
We find, therefore, that the other class of philosophers were at least 
right in this: they were right in allowing that the sense in which we com-
monly say that our perceptions exist is one in which “exist” does not 
include, even as a part of its meaning, “is perceived.” We find that there is 
a common sense of the word “existence,” in which to say “A exists” must 
mean less than “A is really perceived”: since, otherwise, the only possible 
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definition of the word “existence” would be a circular definition. And I 
may point out that two other definitions, which have been sometimes sug-
gested by philosophers as giving what we commonly mean by “reality” or 
“existence” are vitiated by the same fault – they also are circular. Some 
philosophers have sometimes suggested that when we call a thing “real,” 
we mean that it is “systematically connected” in some way with other 
things. But, when we look into their meaning, we find that what they 
mean is (what, indeed, is alone plausible) – systematically connected with 
other real things. And it may possibly be the case that we sometimes use 
the word “real” in this sense: but, at least, it must be certainly the case, 
that, if we do, we also use it in another and simpler sense – the sense in 
which it is employed in the proposed definition. And other philosophers 
have suggested that what we mean by “real” is – “connected in some 
way with a purpose–helping or hindering, or the object of a purpose.” 
But if we look into their meaning, we find they mean-connected with a 
real purpose. And hence, even if we do sometimes mean by “real,” “con-
nected with a real purpose,” it is plain we also sometimes mean by “real” 
something simpler than this – that, namely, which is meant by “real” in 
the proposed definition.
It is certain, therefore, that we do commonly use the word “existence” 
in a sense, in which to say “A exists” is not to say “A is perceived,” or “A 
is systematically connected with other real things,” or “A is purposive.” 
There is a simpler sense than any of these – the sense in which we say that 
our own perceptions do exist, and that Sindbad’s perceptions did not ex-
ist. But when I say this, I am by no means denying that what exists, in this 
simple sense, may not always also exist in all the others; and that what 
exists in any of them may not also always exist in this. It is quite possible 
that what exists is always also perceived, and that what is perceived al-
ways also exists. All that I am saying is that, even if this is so, this propo-
sition is significant – is not merely a proposition about the meaning of a 
word. It is not self-contradictory to suppose that some things which exist 
are not perceived, and that some things which are perceived do not exist.
But, it may be asked: What is this common simple sense of the word 
“exists”? For my own part, it seems to me to be so simple that it cannot 
be expressed in any other words, except those which are recognised as its 
synonyms. I think we are all perfectly familiar with its meaning: it is the 
meaning which you understood me to have throughout this paper, until 
I began this discussion. I think we can perceive at once what is meant by 
asserting that my perception of black marks on a white ground is “real,” 
and that no such perception as Sindbad’s of a Roc ever was “real”: we are 
perfectly familiar with the property which the one perception is affirmed 
to possess, and the other to be without. And I think, as I have said, that 
this property is a simple one. But, whatever it is, this, which we ordinarily 
mean, is what I mean by “existence” or “reality.” And this property, we 
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have seen, is certainly neither identical with nor inclusive of that complex 
one which we mean by the words “is perceived.”
I may now, then, at last approach the main question of my paper. Which 
among the “contents” which I observe will give me reason to suppose that 
my observation of some of them is generally preceded or accompanied or 
followed by the existence of certain particular perceptions, thoughts or 
feelings in another person? I have explained that the “contents” which I 
actually observe may be divided into two classes: on the one hand, those 
which, as we commonly say, we perceive “through the senses”; and, on 
the other hand, my perceptions of these last, my thoughts, and my feel-
ings. I have explained that if any of these observed contents are to give 
reason for a generalisation about what exists, they must exist. And I have 
explained that with regard to both classes of “contents” I am using the 
word “exist” in precisely the same sense – a sense, in which it is certainly 
not self-contradictory to suppose that what is perceived, does not exist, 
and that what is not perceived, does exist; and, in which, therefore, the 
assumption that a red patch with gold letters on it exists, is a different 
assumption from the assumption that my perception of a red patch with 
gold letters on it exists; and the assumption that my perception of a red 
patch with gold letters on it exists, is a different assumption from the as-
sumption that a red patch with gold letters on it exists.
What, then, that we observe, can give us any reason for believing that 
anyone else has certain particular perceptions, thoughts, or feelings? It 
has, I think, been very commonly assumed that the observation of my own 
perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, can, by itself, give me such a reason. 
And I propose, therefore, to examine this assumption. If, as I hope to 
show, it is false; it will then follow, that if our own observations give us 
any reason whatever, for believing in the existence of other persons, we 
must assume the existence, not only of our own perceptions, thoughts, 
and feelings, but also of some, at least, among that other class of data, 
which I may now, for the sake of brevity, call “sense-contents”; we must 
assume that some of them exist, in precisely the same sense in which we 
assume that our perceptions, thoughts, and feelings exist.
The theory which I propose to examine is, then, the following. My 
observation of my own thoughts, feelings, and perceptions may, it asserts, 
give me some reason to suppose that another person has thoughts, feel-
ings, and perceptions similar to some of mine. Let us assume, accordingly, 
that my own thoughts, feelings, and perceptions do exist; but that none 
of the “sense-contents,” which I also observe, do so. Where, among my 
perceptions am I to look for any which might conceivably give me a rea-
son for supposing the existence of other perceptions similar to my own? It 
is obvious where I must look. I have perceptions which I call perceptions 
of other people’s bodies; and these are certainly similar in many respects 
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to other perceptions of mine – to the perceptions which I call perceptions 
of my own body. But I also observe that certain kinds of perceptions of 
my own body are preceded by certain other perceptions, thoughts, or feel-
ings of mine. I may, for instance, observe that when I perceive my hand 
suddenly catch hold of my foot in a particular way, this perception was 
preceded by a particular kind of feeling of pain. I may. perhaps, observe 
this often enough to justify the generalisation that the perception of that 
particular motion of my body is generally preceded by that particular feel-
ing of pain. And in this way I may perhaps have reason for quite a number 
of generalisations which assert that particular kinds of perceptions of my 
own body are generally preceded by other particular kinds of perceptions, 
thoughts, or feelings of my own.
But I may also, no doubt, have the perception, which I call the per-
ception of another person’s hand catching hold of his foot, in a manner 
similar to that in which I have perceived my own hand catch hold of my 
own foot. And my perception of another person’s hand catching hold of 
his foot may undoubtedly be similar in many respects to my perception of 
my own hand catching hold of my own foot. But I shall not observe the 
same kind of feeling of pain preceding my perception of his hand catching 
hold of his foot, which I have observed preceding my perception of my 
hand catching hold of my foot. Will my generalisation, then, give me any 
reason to suppose that nevertheless my perception of his hand catching 
hold of his foot is preceded by a similar feeling of pain, not in me but in 
him? We undoubtedly do assume that when I perceive another person’s 
body making movements similar to those which I have observed my own 
body making, this perception has generally been preceded by some feeling 
or perception of his similar to that which I have observed to precede my 
perception of similar movements in my own body. We do assume this; and 
it is precisely the kind of generalisation, which, I have insisted, must be 
admitted to be true. But my present question is: Will such observations as 
I have described give any reason for thinking any such generalisation true? 
I think it is plain that they will not give the slightest reason for thinking 
so. In the first place, all the perceptions which I call perceptions of another 
person’s body differ very considerably from any of those, which I call 
perceptions of my own. But I am willing to waive this objection. I am not 
offering any theory as to what degree of likeness is sufficient to justify a 
generalisation: and therefore I will allow that the degree of likeness may 
be sufficient. But there remains an objection which is, I think, quite fatal 
to the proposed inference. This objection is that the inference in question 
plainly does not satisfy the third condition which I suggested above as 
necessary, wherever any generalisation is to be justified by observation. I 
am willing to allow that my observations of the fact that my perception 
of a certain movement in my own body is preceded by a certain feeling of 
pain, will justify the generalisation that my perception of any such move-
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ment, whether in my own body or in that of another person, is generally 
preceded by a similar feeling of pain. And I allow, therefore, that when I 
perceive a certain movement in another’s body, it is probable that the feel-
ing of pain exists, though I do not perceive it. But, if it is probable that 
such a feeling of pain exists, such a feeling must stand in the same relation 
to my perception of the movement in another person’s body, in which a 
similar feeling of pain has been observed by me to stand to my perception 
of such a movement in my own body. That is to say the only kind of feel-
ing of pain, which my observations do justify me in inferring, if (as I admit 
they may) they justify me in inferring any at all, is a feeling of pain of my 
own. They cannot possibly justify the belief in the existence of any such 
feeling except one which stands to my perception in the same relation in 
which my feelings do stand to my perceptions – one, that is to say, which 
is my own. I have no more reason to believe that the feeling of pain which 
probably precedes my perception of a movement in another person’s body 
can be the feeling of another person, than, in my former example, I had 
reason to suppose that the hen, whose existence probably preceded that 
of a given egg, could be a hen, which had never been near the egg in ques-
tion. The two cases are exactly analogous. I observe a feeling of pain of 
my own preceding a perception of my own. I observe the two, that is to 
say, as standing to one another in those relations (whatever they may be) 
in which any perception of mine stands to any other thought, perception 
or feeling of mine, and which are, at all events, different from any rela-
tion in which a perception or feeling of another person can stand to one 
of mine. I never perceive the feeling and the perception as standing in any 
other relation. In any case, therefore, where I do observe something like 
the perception, but do not observe the feeling, I can only be justified (if 
justified in inferring any feeling at all), in inferring an unperceived feeling 
of my own.
For this reason I think that no observations of my own perceptions, 
feelings or thoughts can give me the slightest reason for supposing a con-
nection between any of them and any feeling, perception, or thought in 
another person. The argument is perfectly general, since all my percep-
tions, feelings and thoughts do have to one another those relations, in 
virtue of which I call them mine; and which, when I talk of a perception, 
feeling or thought as being another person’s, I mean to say that it has not 
got to any of mine. I can, therefore, merely from observation of this class 
of data never obtain the slightest reason for belief in the existence of a 
feeling, perception, or thought which does not stand in these relations to 
one of mine – which is, that is to say, the feeling, perception or thought, of 
another person. But how different is the case, if we adopt the hypothesis, 
which I wish to recommend – if we assume the existence of that other 
class of data which I have called “sense-contents”! On this hypothesis, 
that which I perceive, when I perceive a movement of my own body, is 
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real; that which I perceive when I perceive a movement of another’s body, 
is real also. I can now observe not merely the relation between my percep-
tion of a movement of my body and my own feelings, but also a relation 
between a real movement of my body and my own feelings. And there is 
no reason why I should not be justified in inferring that another person’s 
feelings stand in the same relation to the real movements of his body, in 
which I observe my own feelings to stand to similar real movements of 
mine.
But there is another argument which may still be urged by those who 
hold that my own perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, by themselves, may 
be sufficient to justify a belief in the existence of other persons. It may be 
said: “Our observation of our own perceptions may be sufficient to verify 
or confirm the hypothesis that other persons exist.” This hypothesis is 
one which “works.” The assumption that other persons have particular 
thoughts, feelings, and perceptions enables us to predict that they will 
have others and that our own perceptions will be modified accordingly: it 
enables us to predict future perceptions of our own; and we find that these 
predictions are constantly verified. We observe that we do have the per-
ceptions, which the hypothesis leads us to expect we should have. In short, 
our perceptions occur just as they would do, if the hypothesis were true; 
our perceptions behave as if other persons had the perceptions, thoughts, 
and feelings which we suppose them to have. Surely, then, they confirm 
the truth of the hypothesis – they give some reason to think it probably 
true?”
All this, which I have supposed an opponent to urge, I admit to be 
true. I admit that the fact that an hypothesis works may give some reason 
to suppose it true. I admit that my perceptions occur just as they would 
do, if other people had the perceptions which I suppose them to have. I 
admit that that assumption enables me to make predictions as to future 
perceptions of my own, and that I observe these predictions to come true. 
I admit all this. But I admit it only in a sense in which it in no way conflicts 
with the position which I am maintaining. The words, which I have put 
into the mouth of a supposed opponent, may, in fact, mean three different 
things, which it is worth while to distinguish. In two of those meanings, 
which I shall admit to be true and which are what make them seem plau-
sible, they do not deny what I assert. Only in the third sense are they an 
objection to my position: and in that sense they are false.
One of the meanings which I admit to be true is as follows:– I have 
not only admitted but insisted that some of my perceptions are just such 
as would occur if another person had certain particular feelings: I have 
insisted that I should not have just those perceptions which I do have, 
unless some other person had certain feelings and perceptions which I 
suppose him to have. And I admit further that the fact that I have one of 
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the perceptions in question – for instance, that of another person’s hand 
catching hold of his foot – this fact, together with the true assumption 
that I should not have this perception, unless some other person felt pain, 
will justify the assertion that another person has felt pain. In this sense, 
I admit, the fact that I perceive what I do perceive will give me reason 
to suppose that another person has felt pain. And, on the other hand, I 
also admit that the fact that I have this perception, together with the true 
assumption that when I have it another person has felt pain, may help 
to justify the assumption that the perception in question is one which I 
should not have unless another person had felt pain – it helps to justify the 
generalisation that certain of my perceptions are just what would occur, if 
another person had felt pain. In general terms, that is to say, I admit that 
the occurrence of B, together with the assumption that B is just the sort of 
thing which would occur if A existed, will justify the assertion that A ex-
ists in that particular instance. And I also admit that the occurrence of B, 
together with the assumption that A exists in that particular instance, may 
help to justify the assumption that B is just the sort of thing which would 
exist, if A existed. In other words: When it is said that the observation of 
B’s existence confirms or verifies the assumption that A exists, either of 
two things may be meant. It may be meant that, assuming B to be the sort 
of thing which would exist if A existed, the observation of B confirms the 
assumption that A exists in this particular instance. Or, on the other hand, 
it may be meant that, assuming A to exist in this particular instance, the 
observation of B may confirm the generalisation that B is just the sort of 
thing which would exist, if A existed. Either the one or the other of these 
two things is, I think, what is generally assumed, when it is assumed that 
what we do observe confirms or verifies the assumption that there exists 
some particular thing which we don’t observe. And I am admitting that 
both these assumptions are true.
But neither of them conflicts in any way with the position I am main-
taining,. What I am maintaining is that no observation of my own per-
ceptions, by itself, can confirm the generalisation that any one of them is 
just what would occur if another person had a particular feeling. I admit 
this generalisation to be true; and I admit that my observation of my own 
perceptions and feelings may give me reason to suppose that if another 
person has certain perceptions or feelings he will also have certain others. 
What I deny is that they give me the slightest reason to suppose that the 
existence of any such feeling or perception in another has any connection 
with the existence of any perception of my own – to suppose that any 
perception of my own is the sort of thing which would occur if another 
person had a particular feeling. What, therefore, my opponent must affirm 
is that the observation of a perception of my own, without the assumption 
(which Reid makes) that in that particular instance any feeling or percep-
tion of another person, of any kind whatever, has preceded it, may give 
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me reason to suppose that that perception of my own is of a kind which is 
generally preceded by a particular kind of feeling in another person. And 
this, I thinik, is plainly false.
But there is yet a third thing which may be meant, and which I am 
willing to admit may be true. It may be said: “I believe many generalisa-
tions of the following kind. I believe that when I have a perception A, 
some other person has generally had a feeling X; I believe that the exis-
tence of the feeling X is generally followed, in the same person, by that 
of the feeling Y; and I believe also that when another person has the feel-
ing Y, I generally have the perception B. I believe all this.” And it must, 
I think, be admitted that we do believe generalisations of this kind, and 
generalisations in which there are not merely two steps between A and 
B, but a great number of steps. “But, then,” it may be said, “my belief in 
this generalisation causes me, when I observe my perception A, to expect 
that I shall have the perception B; and such expectations, I observe, are 
constantly realised.” And this also, I think, must be admitted to be true. 
“But, finally,” it may be said, “beliefs which produce expectations which 
are constantly realised are generally true. And hence the fact that these 
beliefs of mine about the connection of feelings in other persons with per-
ceptions of my own do lead to expectations which are realised, gives me 
reason to suppose that these generalisations are true and hence that other 
persons do have particular kinds of feelings.” And I am willing to admit 
that this also is true. I am willing to admit that true predictions can, as a 
rule, only be produced by true beliefs. The generalisation that this is so, 
is, indeed, one which can only be justified by the observation of beliefs, 
which are, in some way, independently proved to be true; and hence, if it 
is to be justified, without assuming the existence of anything other than 
my own perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, it can only be justified by my 
observation that beliefs with regard to the manner in which these succeed 
one another, generally lead to true predictions. Whether the observation 
of such beliefs alone could give sufficient reason for it, is, I think doubt-
ful; but I am willing to admit that it may be so. One thing, however, is, I 
think, quite plain: namely, that this generalisation “Beliefs which lead to 
true predictions are generally true” cannot be true, unless some other of 
the “contents” which I observe, beside my own perceptions, thoughts, 
and feelings, do exist. That is to say, in giving a reason for supposing 
the existence of other people, this generalisation also gives a reason for 
the very theory which I am advocating, namely, that some of those data 
which I have called “sense-contents” do exist. It does this, because it is 
quite certain that beliefs in generalisations about the existence of sense-
contents can (and do) constantly lead to true predictions. The belief that 
when I have observed a fire of a certain size in my grate, something similar 
to what I have observed will continue to exist for a certain time, can, and 
constantly does, lead to the true prediction that, when I come back to my 
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room in half an hour’s time, I shall observe a fire of a certain size still burn-
ing. We make predictions on such grounds, I think, every day and all day 
long. And hence unless such beliefs as that what I observe, when I see a fire 
burning, does exist, are true, we certainly have no reason to suppose that 
beliefs which lead to true predictions are generally true. And hence on this 
hypothesis also it remains true that, unless some of the contents which I 
observe other than my own perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, do exist, I 
cannot have the slightest reason for supposing that the existence of certain 
perceptions of my own is generally connected with that of certain percep-
tions, thoughts, or feelings in any other person.
I conclude therefore that, unless some of the observed data which I 
have called sense-contents do exist, my own observations cannot give me 
the slightest reason for believing that anybody else has ever had any par-
ticular perception, thought, or feeling. And, having arrived so far towards 
an answer to my first question: How do we know that any other persons 
exist? I may now point out that precisely the same answer must be given 
to my second question: How do we know that any particular kind of thing 
exists, other than ourselves, our perceptions, thoughts, and feelings, and 
what we directly perceive? There is a view concerning what exists, which 
deserves, I think, much more respect than it generally receives from phi-
losophers nowadays. The view I mean is the view that material objects, 
such as they are conceived by physical science, do really exist. It is held 
by some persons (and Reid is among them) that we do know of the exis-
tence, not only of other persons, but also of the movements of matter in 
space. It is held that we do know, with considerable precision, what kinds 
of movements of matter generally precede my perception, when I have a 
particular perception. It is held, for instance, that when I perceive a red 
and blue book side by side on a shelf, at a certain distance from me, there 
have existed, between two material objects, which may be called books, 
and another kind of material object, which may be called my eyes, certain 
wave-like motions of a material medium; that there have existed two dif-
ferent sets of waves, of which the one is connected with my perception of 
red and the other with my perception of blue; and that the relative heights 
and breadths of the two different sets of waves, and the relative velocity 
of their movements are very exactly known. It is held that some men have 
a vast amount of very precise information about the existence of objects 
of this kind; and I think the view that this is so deserves a great deal of 
respect. But what I wish now to point out is that no one’s observation of 
his own perceptions, thoughts and feelings, can, by itself, give him the 
slightest reason for believing in the existence of any such material objects. 
All the arguments by which I have tried to show that this kind of observa-
tion alone can give me no reason to believe in the existence of any kind of 
perception or feeling in another person, apply, with at least equal force, to 
show that it can give me no reason to believe in the existence of any kind 
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of material object. On the other hand, if we are to admit the principle that 
“Beliefs which lead to true predictions, are generally true,” this principle 
will give us at least as much reason to believe in the existence of certain 
kinds of material objects as to believe in the existence of other persons; 
since one of the most remarkable facts about beliefs in the existence of 
such objects is that they do so often lead to true predictions. But it must be 
remembered that we can have no reason for believing this principle itself, 
unless our own perceptions, thoughts and feelings are not the only kind 
of observed “content” which really does exist: we can have no reason for 
it, unless some such things, as what I perceive, when I see a red and blue 
book side by side, do really exist.
It would seem, therefore, that if my own observations do give me any 
reason whatever for believing in the existence either of any perception in 
any other person or of any material object, it must be true that not only 
my own perceptions, thoughts and feelings, but also some of the other 
kinds of things which I directly perceive – colours, sounds, smells, etc. – 
do really exist: it must be true that some objects of this kind exist or are 
real in precisely the same simple sense in which my perceptions of them 
exist or are real. Is there then any reason to think that this is not true? Is 
there any reason to think, for instance, that none of the colours which I 
perceive as occupying areas of certain shapes and sizes really exist in the 
areas which they appear to occupy? This is a question which I wished to 
discuss at length, because I think that it is one in which there are real dif-
ficulties. But I have given so much space to other questions, that I can only 
deal with it very briefly here.
Some philosophers are very fond of asserting, that a colour cannot 
exist except when it is perceived; and it might possibly be thought that 
when I suggest that colours do really exist, I am suggesting that they do 
exist when they are not perceived. I wish, therefore, briefly to point out 
that the question whether anything does exist, when it is not perceived, 
is one which I have not argued and shall not attempt to argue in this pa-
per. I have, indeed, tried to show that, since “exists” does not mean “is 
perceived,” it is, at least, conceivable that things should exist, when they 
are not perceived. But I have admitted that it is quite possible none do 
so: it may be the case that whenever a thing exists, it is also at the same 
time perceived, for anything that I have said or shall say to the contrary. 
I think, indeed, that, if such things as colours do exist, my observation of 
their behaviour will justify me in concluding that they also exist when I 
myself am, at least, not aware of perceiving them: but since I have not at-
tempted to determine what kinds of observation are sufficient to justify a 
generalisation, I do not pretend to say whether this is so or not: and still 
less do I pretend to say whether, if they exist when I do not perceive them, 
we are justified in supposing that someone else must be perceiving them. 
The question whether anything exists, when it is not perceived, and, if so, 
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what things, seems to me to be one which can only be settled by observa-
tion; and thus, I conceive, observation might justify us in concluding that 
certain kinds of things – pains, for example, do not exist, when they are 
not perceived and that other kinds of things – colours, for example, do 
exist, when they are not perceived. The only way, in which, so far as I am 
aware, the theory I am advocating does conflict with ordinary Idealistic 
conclusions, is that it does suggest that things, which are not “spiritual,” 
do sometimes exist, as really and as truly, as things which are.
The theory, therefore, that nothing exists, except when it is perceived, 
is no objection (even if it be true) to the supposition that colours do exist. 
What objections are there to this supposition? All serious objections to it 
are, I think, of one type. They all rest upon the assumption that, if a cer-
tain kind of thing exists at a certain time in a certain place, certain other 
kinds of things cannot exist at the same time in the same place. They are 
all, that is to say, of the same type as Berkeley’s argument: that, though 
the same body of water may appear to be simultaneously both hot and 
cold (if one of the hands we plunge into it is warm and the other cold), yet 
the heat and the cold cannot both really be in the same body at the same 
time. And, it is worth noticing, that anyone who uses this argument must 
admit that he understands what is meant by “really existing in a given 
place,” and that he means by it something other than “being perceived as 
in a given place.” For the argument itself admits that both the heat and 
the cold are really perceived as being in the same place, and that there is 
no difficulty in supposing, that they are so; whereas it urges that there is a 
difficulty in supposing that they both really exist in it.
Now there is one obvious defect in this type of argument, if designed 
to prove that no sensible quality exists at any place where it is perceived as 
being – a defect, which Berkeley himself admits in his “Principles,” though 
he omits to notice it, where he repeats the argument in his “Hylas.” Even 
if we assume that the heat and the cold cannot both exist in the same place 
(and I admit that, in this case, the contrary assumption does seem repug-
nant to Common Sense), it does not follow that neither exists there. That 
is to say this type of argument, even if we grant its initial assumption, will 
only entitle us to conclude that some sensible qualities which we perceive 
as being in a certain place at a certain time, do not exist in that place at 
that time. And this conclusion, I am inclined to think, is true. In the case, 
for instance, of the so-called “images” which we perceive in a looking-
glass, we may very readily admit that the colours and shapes which we 
perceive do not exist at the places where they appear to be – namely at 
various distances behind the glass. But yet, so far as I can see, we have no 
reason whatever for supposing that they do not, except the assumption 
that our observations give us reason to believe that other sensible quali-
ties do exist in those positions behind the glass; and the assumption that 
where these other sensible qualities do exist, those which we see in the 
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glass do not exist. I should, therefore, admit that some sensible qualities 
which we perceive as being in certain places, do not exist in those places, 
while still retaining my belief that others do. And perhaps this explanation 
is the one which should also be adopted in the case of sensible qualities 
which appear to be at a great distance from us. When, for instance (as 
we say), “we see the moon,” what we perceive (if the moon be full) is a 
round bright silver disc, of a small size, at a place very distant from us. 
Does that silver disc exist at that place? With what suppositions does the 
assumption that it does, conflict? Only, so far as I can see, with the sup-
position that the place in question is really occupied by a body such as 
science has taught us to suppose that the moon really is – a spherical body 
immensely larger than objects, in comparison with which the silver disc 
which we perceive is small; or else with the supposition that the place in 
question is really occupied by some part of our atmosphere, or some part 
of the medium which science supposes to exist between our atmosphere 
and the moon; or else with the supposition that the place in question is 
really occupied by what we might see, if the moon were nearer to us by 
many thousands of miles. Unless we suppose that some other object is in 
the place, in which the silver disc appears to be, and that this object is of 
a kind which cannot occupy the same place which is occupied by a silver 
disc, we have no reason to suppose that the silver disc does not really ex-
ist in the place where it appears to be. And, in this case, we perhaps have 
reason for both suppositions and should therefore conclude that the silver 
disc, which we perceive, does not exist in any real place.
Part, therefore, of these objections to our theory may, I think, be met 
by admitting that some of the sensible qualities which we perceive do not 
exist at the places where they appear to exist, though others do. But there 
is, I think, another class of cases, in which we may be justified in denying 
that two things which (it is asserted) cannot occupy the same space, really 
cannot. I will take an instance which is, I think, typical. When we look at a 
drop of blood with the naked eye, we perceive a small red spot, uniformly 
red all over. But when (as we say) we look at the same object under a 
micro- scope of a certain power, I am informed that we see a much larger 
spot, of similar shape, indeed, but not uniformly red – having, in fact, 
small red spots at different positions in a yellowish field. And if we were 
again to look at the same object through a microscope of much higher 
power still, we might perceive yet a third different arrangement of colours. 
Is there any fatal objection to supposing that all three appearances – the 
uniform red spot, the yellowish field with reddish spots in it, and the third, 
whatever that may be – do all really occupy the same real spatial area? I 
cannot see that there is. We are familiar with the idea that a given spatial 
area may contain parts which are invisible to us. And hence, I think, it is 
quite conceivable that parts of a given area may be really occupied by one 
colour, while the whole is really occupied by another. And this, I think, is 
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what we actually do believe in many cases. At all events, we certainly be-
lieve that the area which appears to be occupied by one colour really is the 
same area as that which appears to be occupied by another. And, unless 
we assume that the area, in both cases, really is the same, we can certainly 
have no reason to deny that each colour does really occupy the area which 
it appears to occupy.
For these reasons I think that the difficulties in the way of supposing 
that some of the sensible qualities which we perceive as being in certain 
places, really exist in the places in which we perceive them to be, are not 
insuperable. I have indeed not done justice to these difficulties; but then, 
neither have I done justice to what is to be said on the other side. At all 
events, I think it is plain that we have no reason to assert, in any case 
whatever, that a perceived colour does not really exist in the place where 
it is perceived as being, unless we assume that that very same place really 
is occupied by something else – either by some different sensible qualities 
or by material objects such as physical science supposes to exist. But what 
reason can we give for such an assumption? I have tried to show that our 
own observations can give us none, unless we assume that some of the 
sensible qualities, which we observe as occupying certain places, do really 
exist in those places. And, if this is so, then we must admit that neither 
he who believes (with Reid) in the existence of other minds and of matter 
also, nor he who believes in the existence of other minds and denies that 
of matter, can have, in his own observations, the slightest reason either for 
his assertion or for his denial: we must admit that he can have no reason 
for either assertion or denial, except one which consists in the assumption 
of the existence or non-existence of something which he does not observe 
– something, therefore, of the very same kind as that for which he gives it 
as a reason. I am very unwilling to suppose that this is the case: I am very 
unwilling to suppose that he who believes that Sindbad the Sailor really 
saw, what the “Arabian Nights” represent him as seeing, has just as good 
reason (so far as his own observation goes) for believing this as he who 
denies it has for denying it. Still this may be the case. We must, perhaps, 
be content to assume as certain that for which our observation gives no 
reason: to assume such propositions as that Sindbad did not see a Roc, 
and that you do hear my voice. But if it is said that these things are certain; 
then it also appears to me to be certain that the colours which I perceive 
do exist (some of them) where I perceive them. The more I look at objects 
round me, the more I am unable to resist the conviction that what I see 
does exist, as truly and as really, as my perception of it. The conviction is 
overwhelming.
This being, then, the state of the case, I think I may at least plead that 
we have grounds for suspense of judgment as to whether what I see does 
not really exist; grounds, too, for renewed enquiry, more careful than such 
enquiry has sometimes been in the past.
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I V.  S E N S E - P R E S E N TAT I O N  A N D  T H O U G H T
G. DAW E S  H I C K S
THE subject I am going to discuss is a psychological one, and as such I 
shall, in the main, treat it. But the relation of thought to sense percep-
tion has formed, since the time of Kant, the central theme of discussion 
in the field of theoretical philosophy generally, and in dealing with the 
more specifically psychological problem it is scarcely possible, even were 
it desirable, to lose sight of the wider issues involved. In point of fact, 
however, many of the hard and fast distinctions which formerly separated 
opposing systems of philosophical speculation break down when looked 
at in the light of results obtained from a genetic study of concrete psychi-
cal phenomena. Herbert Spencer evinced perhaps greater insight than he 
is sometimes credited with when he discerned in the doctrine of Evolu-
tion a mode of mediating between the extreme contentions of empiricism 
and rationalism, even though the precise lines of mediation he himself 
suggested may not have been happily chosen. In the present paper, for ex-
ample, I shall be endeavouring to show that the activity of thought, in the 
psychological sense of the term, is to be traced back to simpler and more 
elementary processes of mind, and to that extent, at least, I shall be giving 
adhesion to what has always been a fundamental principle of empiricism. 
With Mr. Bradley I am convinced that “thought proper is a product” and 
that psychological science can trace its probable generation. But like him 
I am persuaded that such a position can be maintained only if we are 
prepared to allow that much more is involved in the simpler processes of 
mind than writers of the empirical school have generally been willing to 
recognise. And with that proviso, I believe the really valuable portions of 
Kant’s epistemological theory retain their significance. If we are justified 
in regarding one form of conscious experience as a product evolved from 
a lower form, then it must be fundamentally the same process that is at 
work in both, and whatever can be shown to be a necessary condition of 
the possibility of the former must be implied also in the latter. 
Obviously, in endeavouring to trace the development of what is spe-
cifically called “thinking” from more rudimentary states of mind, we are 
compelled to frame some conception of the condition of things charac-
teristic of the earlier stages of mental life. In our mature experience there 
is no act or process of consciousness from which elements of thought are 
wholly absent, or the nature of which is not to a large extent influenced 
and determined by the fact that the subject in question is a thinking or re-
flectively self-conscious individual. Consequently, the sense perception as 
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it takes place in the mature mind is a much more elaborate operation than 
sense perception can possibly be in the primitive consciousness. Even the 
apprehension of the simplest sense quality, although no doubt it preserves 
a certain continuity of character throughout the entire range of  conscious 
experience, cannot be supposed to have remained unaffected by the evolu-
tion and growth of the mental life as a whole. This circumstance occasions 
probably the most serious obstacle the psychologist has to encounter in 
attempting to explain or to describe the facts of mind. So far as method 
of procedure is concerned, there is for him no option. He is compelled 
to start with an analysis of experience as it actually comes before him 
in his own mental life, and the tendency, almost insuperable, of taking 
what there seems indispensable as ultimate and fundamental may read-
ily enough lead to misinterpretation and error. The course of evolution is 
clearly much more subtle and complicated in the field of mental phenom-
ena than in that of biology: it is impossible to find in physical nature an 
exact parallel for the peculiar mode of transformation the simpler kinds of 
psychical process undergo in the gradual advance to self-consciousness. In 
default of any direct information we can only pursue the more hazardous 
method of inference, and by reasoning backwards from the complex facts 
of our mature experience, as a basis of fairly assured knowledge, attempt 
to reconstruct in thought the constituents of the primitive mental life.
i. sense-presentation in its rudimentary form
Mr. Bradley’s conjectural sketch of the earliest stage of soul-life has often 
been quoted. “In the beginning,” he believes, “there is nothing, beyond 
what is presented, what is and is felt, or is rather felt simply. There is no 
memory or imagination or hope or fear or thought or will, and no per-
ception of difference or likeness.” “There is nothing beyond presentation 
which has two sides, sensation and pleasure and pain.”1 Mr. Bradley is 
here attempting to describe the experience in question as a scientific psy-
chologist would do if it were possible for him in some way to be a specta-
tor of it. In one respect there is, I imagine, little ground for dissenting from 
his mode of statement. With a reservation that will appear immediately, 
the features he has excluded seem to me, at any rate, secondary and de-
rivative, and therefore rightly regarded as factors of later growth. Dif-
ficulty begins when we proceed to inquire as to the nature of that which 
admittedly is present. I shall have something to say about the doctrine of 
sentience further on. Here, however, I would urge, at the outset, that if 
presentation is there at the start, then what is there is incorrectly described 
as “all one blur” within which differences may be contained but of which 
there is no recognition. Even the awareness of a “blurred whole” implies 
that such “blurred whole” is not absolutely devoid of any characteris-
ing mark. I can find no means of realising what a state of mind can be in 
1 Mind, xii, 1887, pp.363 and 367.
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which there is in some sense awareness, and yet awareness of nothing. It 
seems to me that the simplest, and most rudimentary, phase of conscious-
ness conceivable must be described as at least recognition, – as indefinite, 
vague, and confused as you will – of a quality or content possessing to 
some infinitesimal extent a distinguishable character. And the difference 
between infinitesimal and none at all is here of first-rate importance, be-
cause there is involved in it the crucial point as to the fundamental nature 
of the attitude of “being aware.” The minimum which I have claimed as 
necessary for consciousness precludes the possibility of carrying back the 
mental life to a stage when it would consist entirely of what is simply “giv-
en” (even in Mr. Bradley’s sense of “that which is simply, and comes as it 
is”), without the exercise of any activity on the part of the subject. I am 
fully mindful of the woeful ambiguity of the phrase “exercise of activity 
on the part of the subject.” I am not committing the “barbarism” of sup-
posing that the activity in question is an activity of which the subject itself 
is aware. Far from it. I gather that when Mr. Bradley speaks of psychical 
states as events or occurrences, he is himself assuming an ultimate mental 
agency of which they are modes or exemplifications.2 For the subject a 
presentation may be simply what is presented and yet the hypothetical 
psychological spectator may misdescribe that presentation even as it is for 
the subject, if he leave out of account the fact that the presenting is not 
an external but an internal process, and fail to inquire into the conditions 
which render such internal process possible. Just as little ill the form of a 
chaotic undifferentiated whole as in that of a succession of atomic sensa-
tions can what is presented be psychologically treated as so much datum 
supplied to the subject and in relation to which the latter may be viewed as 
in an attitude of simple passivity. However far back in the history of mind 
we go, apprehension of any sort necessarily implies some amount of men-
tal construction, dependent no doubt for its origination and continuance 
upon outer stimulation, but never itself to be reduced to mere reception 
of, or even reaction on, stimulation. If presentation, then, involves a men-
tal act of presenting, the subject must necessarily be aware in and through 
such act of some distinguishable feature. For the act consists in presenting 
something, in being aware of something, even though that something be 
“one blurred whole.”
To put the matter quite generally, it is precisely the peculiarity of mind, 
as contrasted with what we are accustomed to call phenomena of outer 
observation, that mental facts exhibit a unique double-sided aspect, suf-
ficiently difficult to express with scientific exactitude, but neglect of which 
in any psychological treatment of mind cannot but lead to downright er-
ror and confusion. Apprehension, alike in its lowest and its highest forms, 
is invariably twofold in character: it implies (α) a process or occurrence, 
which takes place, an act, as we will call it, of apprehending, and (β) a more 
2 See, for instance, Mind, N.S. xii, 1903, p.166.
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or less definite content of which the subject is aware in and through the act 
of apprehending. The distinction itself is, of course, sufficiently familiar;3 
certain considerations in connection with it need alone concern us here. 
In the first place, it is not a distinction which we in our mature experience 
have to wait for the psychologist to point out to us. It is a distinction with 
which all of us in ordinary everyday life are perfectly acquainted, however 
liable we may be to misinterpret it. No distinction seems to us more self-
evident than that between hearing and the sound heard, seeing and that 
which is seen, imagining and that which is imagined, thinking and that 
about which we think. But it would, I think, be a mistake to conclude 
that the distinction, in this form, is an invariable feature of conscious ex-
perience; it would be a mistake to suppose that, because psychologically 
apprehension always involves process and content, that therefore every 
apprehending subject must be capable of distinguishing its apprehending 
from that which it apprehends. The subject can only draw that distinction 
through the aid of a number of ideas and thoughts that lie completely 
beyond the scope of a primitive mental life. As such it can only make its 
appearance in conscious experience when through reflection the content 
presented has come to be definitely connected with the objective order of 
things. In fact, for the subject itself it is practically synonymous with the 
distinction between self and not-self, a distinction which we can hardly 
hesitate to admit lies beyond the range of the earlier stages of conscious 
experience. From the very beginning, then, process and content are un-
doubtedly there, and must be psychologically distinguished; the subject’s 
own distinction between its act of apprehending and what it apprehends 
on the other hand is not there from the beginning, though the indispens-
able condition of its being afterwards attained is. In the second place, the 
distinction of process and content is not, psychologically considered, so 
it appears to me, at any stage a distinction of two separable facts. There 
is only one fact involved, the act, namely, of apprehending, which is in 
its nature the apprehending of a content.4 In our mature experience, we 
readily enough come to regard the distinction as a distinction between two 
separate things. That we do so is due to the circumstance that in ordinary 
life we tend to identify the content perceived with the real thing which, for 
the moment we will say, it indicates; we seldom stay to consider that there 
3 One of the earliest writers to emphasise its importance was Arnauld, in his exceedingly 
suggestive little work, Des Vraies et des Fausses Idées, published in 1683. In Chapter V, 
for instance, occurs the following passage: - “J’ai dit que je prenais pour la même chose la 
perception et l’idée. Il faut néanmoins remarquer que cette chose, quoique unique, a deux 
rapports, l’un a l’âme qu’elle modifie, l’autre a la chose aperçue, en tant qu’elle est objec-
tivement dans l’âme ; et que le mot de perception marque plus directement le premier 
rapport, et celui d’idée le dernier. Ainsi la perception d’un carré marque plus directement 
mon âme comme apercevant un carré : et l’idée d’un carré marque plus directement le 
carré, en tant qu’il est objectivement dans mon esprit.”
4 This consideration is repeatedly urged by Arnauld; immediately after the passage al-
ready quoted, for example, he proceeds to insist upon it.
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is any difference between the appearance and that which appears. Such 
tendency on our part in no way militates against the view that process 
and content, though distinguishable, are inseparable, that the one is not 
without the other.
The consequences which result from assuming that process and con-
tent are two independent facts are nowhere more clearly illustrated than 
in the writings of the Herbartian psychologists. Volkmann, for example, 
lays stress, as Herbart had done before him, upon the distinction between 
presentative activity and presentation. “The presentation,” he says, “is 
related to the act of presenting as product to process, as the qualitative 
determination of that which is produced to the quantitative character of 
that which produces. The presentation (Vorstellung) is the presentatum 
(das Vorgestellte), i.e., that which the presentative act brings forward and 
holds firm. It follows from this, “he admits, “that the notions of presen-
tation and of presentative activity are correlative notions, and that ul-
timately it is impossible to think of a presentation without presentative 
activity or of a presentative activity without presentation.”5 But, he goes 
on, “since presenting is an activity and every activity may be inhibited by 
another opposed to it, it is as a matter of fact possible that the present-
ing of a presentation may be converted into a mere striving to present, 
into an activity which misses its effect. We should then have an act of 
presenting which for the time being produces nothing,; we should thus 
have a presentation which is not actually presented. Anyone, for instance, 
may quite well have the presentation, Hannibal, without actually now 
presenting it. In order to originate a presentation, the act of presenting is 
indispensable, but the presentation may continue, without the act of pre-
senting continuing in its activity. Every presentation originates through an 
act of presenting, but the act of presenting continues, either as an actual 
presenting or as a mere striving to present.” So soon as it is thus supposed 
that presentation and presentative activity may be altogether isolated, and 
exist in separation the one from the other, we lose all the help, it seems 
to me, that might otherwise be obtained for psychological analysis from 
the distinction itself. Presentations come then to be regarded as veritable 
entities, which act and react upon each other, and which in fact discharge 
all the functions we are accustomed to ascribe to actually existent things. 
It is true that Herbart him- self does assert that presentations are not in 
themselves forces (Kräfte), but he contends that a number of presentations 
when in conjunction-and they always are in conjunction by reason of the 
underlying unity of the soul-become forces and resist or oppose one an-
5 Lehrbuch der Psycholoqie, 1875, Bd. i, p. 168 sqq. As an instance of the baffling confu-
sion attaching to the term Vorstellung, it is of interest to note that Brentano employs it 
with exactly the opposite meaning to that adopted in the above quotation. “I understand 
by Vorstellung,” he writes, “not that which is presented, but the act of presenting” (Psy-
chologie vom emipirischen Standpunkte, p. 103).
112
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2G. Dawes Hicks
other.6 They may conflict with one another, they may be fused together or 
be mechanically combined in groups or series, they may exert energy and 
withstand pressure. In short, the Herbartian psychologists were driven by 
the exigencies of their method of treatment to attribute a quasi-substan-
tive mode of existence to these so called presentations.
ii. content and process
With the Herbartian doctrine before us let us now draw by way of con-
trast what seem to be the legitimate consequences of the conception of 
apprehension as involving the distinguishable though inseparable aspects 
of content and process.
I consider, firstly, the content. The admission that process and content, 
understood in the sense explained at the commencement, are inseparable 
carries with it, I think, the further admission that to presentations, in the 
sense of contents, the predicate of existence does not rightly attach. I am 
not going to dispute that a meaning may be found for the term “exis-
tence” in the light of which it would be sheer nonsense to deny existence 
of presentations. But I have no hesitation in asserting that in precisely that 
significance with which we are constantly employing the word in ques-
tion, the above statement correctly represents the assumption on which 
the common opinion of mankind tacitly proceeds. Ordinary popular us-
age consistently distinguishes an existing thing from an imaginary thing. 
In the former case, it is not the presentation of the thing, but the thing in 
the external world that is taken to exist. The ordinary man, when once 
he is brought to the point of recognising a distinction between content 
and external things at all, no more regards his visual image of the friend 
actually beside him as an existent reality than he regards his visual image 
of a friend a hundred miles away as an existent reality. Or, using, another 
illustration, it would be generally admitted that “the visual appearance 
of the full moon as seen from the earth’s surface” is not an existent thing 
either in the sky or in the head of the observer. In other words, the content 
of an act of perception and the content of an act of imagination would be 
ordinarily recognised as standing, so far as existence is concerned, upon 
exactly the same level; the predicate of existence would be withheld from 
both. And the principle involved in this denial is not difficult to decipher. 
Ordinary reflection implicitly recognises that a presentation or content 
forms in itself no element in that system of interconnected facts or events 
which together make up what is usually described as “the real world,” 
that, adopting Dr. Shadworth Hodgson’s terminology, it is not a “real 
condition” in the realm of change and genesis. That implicit assurance 
of the ordinary consciousness seems to me to be philosophically justified. 
The apprehension of any specific quality involves as we have seen, an act 
6 Herbart’s Werke (Hartenistein), Bd. v, pp. 15 and 16.
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or process, whether material, as Dr. Hodgson holds, or psychical as I hope 
to show reason for thinking. On the latter hypothesis, we have described 
what happens as an act of mind in and through which there is awareness 
of a relatively definite content, which content may be compared with the 
contents of other acts of mind. But this content ought not itself to be 
spoken of as a mental fact, as an existing constituent of consciousness; 
the mental fact, the constituent of consciousness as an existent, is the act 
of apprehending. Of the content what Herbart maintained of presenta-
tions generally is doubtless true, – it may be said to have a perpetual and 
unchanging mode of being. Nothing can alter it, simply because it is not 
something that can be operated upon or that itself can operate upon any-
thing else. But just in this sense it neither was nor is a component part of 
the existing reality called the individual mind, and it is to mix up in hope-
less fashion two totally heterogeneous lines of consideration to apply to 
process and content indiscriminately the same set of attributes.
It may perhaps be worth while to add that the view here taken of the 
nature of the content is by no means new. It is at least as old as Aristotle. 
Sense-perception, Aristotle explains in a well-known reference (Dc An., ii, 
12) is the power of apprehending the form of sensible things without the 
matter of them, just as wax receives the impress of the seal without the 
iron or gold of which it is composed. The apprehended content, therefore, 
is not an existent concrete thing, a τόδε τι, but a τοιονδί, a qualitative deter-
mination; the αὶσθητὸν as apprehended is, in Aristotelian phraseology, an 
αὶσθητὸν κατ`ὲνέργειαν (lb., iii, 2). And here it is interesting to observe that 
it is just because sense perception is of this character that, according to Ar-
istotle, it has what is implicitly universal for its content, and the advance 
from it to the higher kinds of knowledge is possible. The Aristotelian con-
trast between what is apprehended by the mind in the process of know-
ing and what belongs to existent facts in the external world reappears in 
numerous pairs of terms that belong to the rich vocabulary of scholastic 
philosophy. The scholastic distinctions between subjective (in the sense 
of substantia) and objective (in the sense of that which is involved in ob-
jicere, in the act namely of bringing before the mind), between existence 
and essence, between esse reale and esse intentionale, all refer with vary-
ing shades of significance, to the same fundamental consideration. The 
distinction is preserved in slightly different phraseology throughout the 
whole body of Cartesian literature. Descartes himself repeatedly sets over 
against one another the realitas objectiva attaching to the idea of a thing 
and the realitas actualis or formalis attaching to the thing in its indepen-
dence of the act of apprehension (vide, e.g., Med., iii and v). Similarly 
Spinoza distinguishes the essentia objectiva of a thing, i.e., the nature of 
a thing as represented in an act of apprehension, or as content of an idea, 
from the essentia formalis of a thing, i.e., its real or “formal” nature, as a 
mode in the system of natura naturata (vide, e.g., De intell. Emend., § 33). 
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The distinction was lost sight of in subsequent philosophical discussion, 
mainly, I take it, in consequence of Locke's unfortunate use of the term 
“idea,” his application of it indifferently either to mental process or to ap-
prehended content, a confusion which perpetuated itself in the writings of 
those who followed him.
The distinction as it reappears in the works of Lotze and Mr. Bradley 
has, I venture to think, retained not a little of Locke's confusion, and 
thereby lost much of its original value. It comes before us there as the 
distinction between idea in the sense of psychical existence and idea in 
the sense of logical meaning or significance. Lotze, for example, starts by 
assuming an “unconscious psychical mechanism,” capable of preparing, 
given sensuous material for the supervening activity of thought, regarded 
as a special and unique faculty of the mind. The first operation of thought 
is, he considers, to set in movement that process of the “objectification of 
the subjective,” the ultimate outcome of which is the body of systematised 
knowledge. The operation itself consists in separating something previ-
ously unseparated, namely, the sensitive act from the sensible matter to 
which it refers, and, as a consequence, we present the latter to ourselves 
no longer as a state or event which we undergo, but as a content, which 
itself is what it is, and means what it means, whether we are conscious of 
it or not. In other words, mere impressions are converted into ideas. But, 
in order that this process of severance should take place, it is essential 
that the sensuous states or impressions should themselves be there, enter-
ing, by the very fact of their co-existence, into relations, and, in virtue of 
the grouping to which the psychical mechanism gives rise, forming felt 
combinations which may be described as sensuous images or pictures. In 
other words, the psychical state or event is itself, according to this view, 
what we have called a content: it is that which is apprehended prior to 
the act of judgment. Mr. Bradley's treatment of the subject does not, in 
regard to the particular point I am referring to, differ greatly from Lotze's. 
He, too, holds that the psychical event or existence is a mental image. 
“Neither outside my head, nor yet inside it,” he writes, “can ideas have 
existence; for the idea is a content, which, being universal, is no phenom-
enon. The image in my head exists psychologically, and outside it the fact 
has particular existence, for they both are events. But the idea does not 
happen, and it cannot possess a place in the series.”7 The whole view on 
which the statement I have quoted is based will call for discussion further 
on. I anticipate here only to the extent of asking on what plea it can be 
maintained that, whilst an idea is not something that happens, a mental 
image is something that happens. What happens, as an event in my mental 
history is surely, in either case, the process or act of apprehending; and 
the process or act in question is as little an image in the one case as it is a 
logical idea in the other. A mental image, I presume, does not, any more 
7 Principles of Logic, p. 526.
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than a logical idea, apprehend itself; it involves, therefore, just as the logi-
cal idea does, an act or process whereby it is apprehended. And there is 
no more appropriateness that I can discover in saying that what imaged 
is “in my head” than, in saying that what is conceived is stationed there. 
Moreover, I venture to urge, that if we start by assuming so fundamental 
a difference between, what I will call for the moment, mere perceiving 
and thinking, if we ascribe existence to a sensuous image and deny it of 
the logical idea, we have ex hypothesi shut ourselves off from the pos-
sibility of finding a psychological means of transition from the one to the 
other. The cleft between sense and thought would be complete and final, 
and could not be bridged over by any amount of psychical development. 
Evolution can be called in to aid us only if the earlier and the later stages 
are the same in kind; it is helpless as a means of explanation if they are 
not. Lotze, indeed, is consistent in this respect: he postulates a unique and 
special activity to account for the products of thought. Mr. Bradley, on the 
other hand, seeks to make the passage partly by means of the principle 
of Association, although, as I shall try to show, the interpretation he puts 
upon that principle itself contradicts the notion that ideal contents differ 
in kind from sensuous contents.
I consider, secondly, the act of apprehending. The act of apprehending 
is, we have maintained, an existing fact, and therefore is not as such a 
content apprehended. But although it be true, as I think, that we have no 
direct or immediate knowledge of the nature of a psychical state, we can 
legitimately enough seek to secure inferential knowledge about it from a 
consideration of the results to which it gives rise. As a convenient way of 
leading to such inference, I refer here to Professor Huxley’s somewhat re-
markable defence of Hume’s theory of the original “furniture of the mind.” 
Huxley admits that, in treating of “ideas of relation,” Hume fell into “a 
chaos of confusion and self-contradiction.” But he conceives it possible by 
the introduction of a slight modification to save the doctrine from incon-
sistency. Huxley’s own solution of the problem over which, he thinks, 
Hume stumbled is the following, “When a red light,” he declares, “flashes 
across the field of vision, there arises in the mind an ‘impression of sensa-
tion’ which we will call red. It appears to me that this sensation, red, is a 
something which may exist altogether independently of any other impres-
sion, or idea, as an individual existence.” So far he is in accord with Hume. 
But if a second flash of red light were to follow the first, then presuming 
the sentient being is endowed with memory there might, so Huxley con-
ceives, arise in his mind two altogether new impressions, those of succes-
sion and of similarity. Or if two flashes of red light were to occur together, 
then there might arise in addition an impression of co-existence. Such 
impressions of relation are, he holds, ultimate, simple, unanalysable facts 
of mind. “They differ from other impressions in requiring the pre-exis-
tence of at least two of the latter. Though devoid of resemblance to the 
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other impressions, they are, in a manner generated by them. We may re-
gard them as a kind of impressions of impressions.”8 This mode of sur-
mounting the difficulty is interesting because it exhibits with undisguised 
clearness an assumption which lies at the root, not only of the doctrine of 
psychological Atomism, but also of other ways of solving the problem 
indicated, more in favour at the present day. It is assumed namely that 
presentations already formed, with distinguishable traits of resemblance 
and difference, become first of all the possession of the mind, and then, 
through a subsequent process, are compared and distinguished. They are 
taken to be the material upon which the process of recognising features of 
relatedness supervenes. The Atomism implied in Huxley’s statement need 
not detain us. Let that statement be so far modified as to involve the ad-
mission that if on the appearance of two presentations a and b, a third 
new idea γ arises, expressing their likeness or, difference, there must be 
some inner activity of mind at work, which at once holds a and b together 
and holds them apart. Even then the assumption remains that this idea of 
comparison springs up de novo when the presentations, a and b, already 
with definiteness and precision of outline, are compared or discriminated 
from one another, in the inner field of the mind’s contemplation; the as-
sumption remains that the presentations are so many given or prepared 
entities upon which a unique activity operates and produces by its opera-
tion the new ideas of relation. One can hardly avoid the reflection that 
such a mode of viewing the matter simply precludes us from framing any 
intelligible theory of how the results we are anxious to explain come 
about; it is at least certain that it offers none. If, however, we are in earnest 
with the contention that the content apprehended is not an existing fact, 
then we are bound to reject the assumption in question as unwarranted 
and untenable. For, in that case, presentations, as we have seen, are not 
offered data which we have merely to accept, but are themselves in all 
cases products. In that case, recognition of a sense-presentation as a sepa-
rate content is only possible if there be furnished in the inner life sufficient 
means of discriminating it from whatever else may happen to be present-
ed. In other words, the act of presenting is itself an act of discriminating, 
comparing and relating; there could be no presentation at all, not even the 
crudest, without the exercise of an activity identical in kind with, however 
it may differ in degree of complexity from, the more mature and elaborate 
activity to which the name thinking is specifically assigned. I quite ac-
knowledge that definite apprehension of relations as distinguishable fea-
tures in the whole complex of contents is not there at the outset, that only 
by degrees do we become able, partially at least, to contemplate relations 
in their generality, as apart from the concrete whole in which at first they 
make their appearance. In other words, I do not imagine that, even though 
discrimination and assimilation are primitive processes, involved even in 
the simplest form of sense-presentation, the subject would, therefore, be 
8 Hume (English Men of Letters), pp. 68 and 69.
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originally capable in any way of separating from the like or different con-
tents the more general, the more abstract conceptions, of likeness or dif-
ference. But that is not at all inconsistent with the view that even the 
simplest apprehension of a sense content takes place through means of an 
activity the same in kind as that with which we are acquainted when we 
regard in isolation the relations of likeness and difference, of equality and 
inequality, and so on. Let me try to make my meaning clear in yet another 
way. Mental development does not begin with differing presentations al-
ready given, and then by a process of subsequent reflection upon them 
discover wherein they differ. Subsequent reflection is mainly concerned in 
clearing up, in giving prominence to, characteristics already involved in 
having different presentations at all. Some amount of recognition of their 
difference is, that is to say, an indispensable part of the presentations 
themselves. Thus, instead of assuming an initial multiplicity of separately 
given presentations, by comparison of which we attain to ideas of relation 
– of similarity, dissimilarity, and the like – we are entitled, in conformity 
with the principle on which we are proceeding, to maintain that the expe-
rience of a primitive mind would consist of a vague, confused, ill-differen-
tiated, whole of presentation, and that, by successive acts of discriminat-
ing there would gradually emerge definite contents, the relations of which, 
in consequence of a development, some of the chief steps of which I hope 
to show it is not impossible to trace, come later to be apprehended by us 
in the form of concepts or notions. The further back we go in the history 
of the mental life the cruder and more incomplete we must suppose its 
contents to be – wanting in sharpness of outline, loosely distinguished 
from one another. At such a stage, the several stimulations of sense would 
be taken up and interpreted by a mind containing but scanty preparation 
for the purpose. Moreover, the vagueness of apprehension at this early 
period would be aggravated by the fact that the sole general point of refer-
ence in the mental life would consist almost entirely of that obscure mass 
of sense-presentations and feelings connected primarily with organic 
changes in the body. No background of self-consciousness would as yet 
have been formed, over against which successive presentations might 
stand out as referring to that which was other than self. In consequence 
there would be a certain want of continuity in the mental life, it would be 
easily distracted and essentially aimless in character. And in like manner a 
correspondingly rudimentary type of being, would be exhibited by the 
process of apprehending; the several modes in which the mind ultimately 
comes to operate would not yet have acquired definiteness of character; 
the elementary activities which lie at the root of all the after developments 
would be as yet in closest conjunction with one another, there would, for 
example, be few marks of demarcation between feeling and perceiving 
and striving. Accordingly, in respect both to content and process, there 
would be manifested the same features of vague formlessness and indefi-
niteness. So far as the content is concerned, development would take place 
118
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2G. Dawes Hicks
through increase in the number of points of difference that were recog-
nised, through increase in the lines of connectedness by which the several 
features were grouped together, and through change in the character of 
the relations by which they were united one with another. So far as the act 
of apprehending is concerned, development would take place through the 
elementary processes gradually acquiring distinct characteristics – perceiv-
ing, for example, coming to be distinguished from imagining, or remem-
bering – and through increasing ease and quickness in their exercise. Alike, 
then, in its earlier and in its more developed stages, the essence of an act 
of apprehending would appear to consist in discriminating, comparing, 
and relating.
iii. apprehension considered as attention
A comparison of the position just sketched with Dr. Ward’s much discussed 
theory of Attention may serve as a means of further elucidation. Dr. Ward 
proposes to denote by the term “Attention” the one common element at 
the root of all psychical processes, the activity namely of the subject mani-
fested in them. Recognising the somewhat formidable enlargement of the 
ordinary meaning of the word involved in his proposal, Dr. Ward defends 
it on the ground that to use Attention in this wider sense would be fol-
lowing the precedent of physicists in their usage of the terms “magnitude” 
or “heat” (i.e. temperature). “Many an unsophisticated old lady would 
demur to one who described the minuteness of a snow crystal in terms of 
magnitude or its temperature as so many degrees of ‘heat’ (reckoning from 
absolute zero).”9
I note, at the outset, that what has been said above about the act of 
apprehending agrees in certain not unimportant respects with Dr. Ward’s 
account of Attention. We have followed him in holding that an ultimate 
psychical activity is involved in the apprehension of any presentation 
whatsoever, whether such presentation take the form of the crude con-
tents of the primitive consciousness or of the most elaborate concepts of 
scientific reasoning. We have followed him, also, in resisting the attempt 
to transfer this activity from the side of the subject to that of the presented 
contents, and to endow the latter with mysterious powers of interacting, 
of attracting and repelling one another. And, once more we have accepted 
his principle that the activity in question is not qua actually occurring 
a content of apprehension. The grounds offered, however, in support of 
this last principle are different in the two cases. According to Dr. Ward, 
attending cannot itself be attended to, because whilst Attention is psycho-
logically subjective, presentations are not, and, since the subjective qua 
subjective cannot be presented, we can only know of Attention by its ef-
fects, by the changes it produces in the character and succession of our 
9 Mind, xii, 1887, p. 56.
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presentations. According to the view I am trying to explain, on the other 
hand, an act of apprehending does not apprehend directly its own activ-
ity, because that activity consists in discriminating a content, and cannot, 
therefore, at the same moment, and in the same relation, be itself that 
which is discriminated. Moreover, if by a further act of apprehending a 
previous act of apprehending is made matter of contemplation, – and I am 
far from denying, that it can be, – then it has become an object, and there 
is no more reason to suppose that content and object are identical in its 
case than in any other case of apprehension.
The difference just indicated leads at once to the fundamental point 
concerning which I find myself compelled to dissent from Dr. Ward’s theo-
ry. Dr. Ward, if I understand him rightly, regards activity and presentation 
as toto genere separate and distinct; the subjective faculty or function of 
Attention or Consciousness, on the one band, and the field of Conscious-
ness, consisting of presentations or ideas, on the other, seen to him to be-
long to two entirely independent orders of psychological facts. Attention 
has its seat in the “pure” ego, presentations go to constitute what in con-
trast thereto may be called the “empirical” ego. Presentations are “given” 
and may be said to be there, before the direction of Attention upon them; 
Attention may not unfairly be described in Lotze’s words as “a moveable 
light which the mind directs on to the presentations it receives,” Dr. Ward, 
if I mistake not, would be ready to admit that Attention, as psychical 
activity, may be conceived as practically identical in character through-
out the course of mental evolution, somewhat after the manner in which 
biologists may conceive of vital force as practically identical in character 
throughout the various stages of the evolution of living  organisms; what 
grows or develops is the objective continuum, which is gradually differ-
entiated into increasingly distinct and definite presentations and ideas. 
Here, then, we have a conception of conscious experience, worked out 
with great care and thoroughness, which presupposes a severance between 
activity and content precisely such as I have been attempting to show is 
inadmissible. And I cannot think that the severance, as it appears in Dr. 
Ward’s treatment of the mental life, is either in itself justified or that it en-
ables us in any way to account for the facts it is supposed to explain. I do 
not think it is justified in itself. The argument offered for it appears to be 
based on the around that either the severance must be allowed or else we 
stand committed to the “Presentationism,” which would resolve psychical 
activity ultimately into a property of “contents of consciousness,” consid-
ered as independent existences that act and react upon one another. But 
these alternatives are not by any means exhaustive of the possibilities of 
the case. They only seem to be so through our inveterate habit of ascribing 
a mode of existence to presentations which, if there be any validity at all in 
the considerations I have been urging, cannot maintain itself as a result of 
critical examination. I venture to suggest that Dr. Ward has made in reality 
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too large a concession to “Presentationism.” If presentations, full fledged, 
are allowed to be there prior to the exercise of attention or psychical ac-
tivity, if the chief function of the latter be limited to bringing, the former 
into clearness and distinctness of apprehension, then the fundamental po-
sition of “Presentationism” has been already conceded. It is surely from 
the constitution of presentations themselves that the main evidence of the 
mind’s activity must be sought; it is the appearance at all of presentations, 
which “Presentationism” has simply to accept, that is rendered wholly 
enigmatical on the assumption that no such activity is involved. Again, I 
do not think that the severance in question enables us in any way to ac-
count for the facts it is supposed to explain. I mean, in other words, that 
no insight into the psychological character of these facts is possible if we 
conceive of Attention as a unique and separate power, the variations in 
which depend only on the way in which it is exercised. By concentrating 
attention upon presentations we are said to increase their intensity, their 
clearness, their distinctness. But, as Lotze long ago pointed out, a mere 
gazing at anything, even if it were heightened to infinity, would in itself be 
utterly powerless to achieve this result. The clearness or obscurity of the 
content does not signify that we apprehend with more or less energy the 
same content, but that in the one case we are, and in the other case we are 
not, able to apprehend a sufficient number of distinguishable marks. The 
possibility of recognising such distinguishable marks is evidently condi-
tioned to a large extent by the amount of experience that can be brought 
to bear upon the content attended to. It is only in so far as there are means 
at hand of comparing the presented content with, of relating it to, trains 
of representations and ideas already acquired by the mind, that a larger 
number of characteristic marks will be ascribed to it, and that it will stand 
out with greater definiteness and distinctness. In strictness, we are not, I 
should say, psychologically warranted in regarding that which we appre-
hend now more and now less intensely as the same content. It is, in truth, 
in each case a different content, just as in each case the act of apprehend-
ing is different.
I believe, then, that we can furnish a psychological explanation of the 
clearness and distinctness, which form at least one familiar result of at-
tending, only by connecting the whole process of attending with what 
seems to me the more comprehensive and ultimate activity of discrimi-
nating and comparing, of recognising differences and likenesses. But the 
activity of discriminating and comparing, is never a bare activity, never a 
mere putting forth of force or energy. It exists only in its .concrete modes 
of operation, and it derives its concreteness, its specific character, from the 
variety of content with which it is inseparably connected. We have not, 
therefore, here, let me repeat, two independent facts. The content appre-
hended possesses whatsoever mode of being we may consider ourselves 
justified in ascribing to it only in and through the process of apprehend-
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ing itself. It is in this respect a product (although, as we shall see later, to 
call it a product in another, and very different, respect is an error), and 
any individuality or distinctness it may exhibit depends in large part upon 
acquired experiences which in and through the act of apprehending may 
be brought to bear upon it. I say “in part,” because it is not intended, by 
any means, to assert that what may be described as the positive nature of 
sense-presentations is generated by any node of subjective agency. Quite 
the contrary. That we should distinguish, for example, red from blue is 
possible only if there be, in addition to stimulation of the senses, discrimi-
nating activity on our part, but the positive nature which renders each 
of these colours what it is depends undoubtedly upon what is peculiar 
to the specific kind of stimulation involved. The stimulation itself, how-
ever, forms no part of the apprehended content, and, whatever its exact 
relation to the latter may be, is, in any case, only one of the determining 
conditions that occasion the process in and through which the content 
makes its appearance. The acts of apprehension which constitute the veri-
table movements in the life of the subject are carried out under varying 
conditions, and similar stimuli may be, and will be, followed by presenta-
tions of very great variety of characteristics in successive apprehensions. 
In other words, although the general character of such acts be preserved 
through all the stages of mental development, there must needs be endless 
differences in the specific modes in which this general character will be 
manifested, depending on the degree of richness and fullness of the mental 
life in question.
iv. the theory of sentience
I have sought in the preceding section to bring out, through means of a 
criticism of Dr. Ward’s theory of Attention, some of the implications of 
the view I am taking of the nature of an act of apprehension. I propose 
now to attack once more the problem before us from the other side and to 
contrast the view we have taken of the content apprehended with a widely 
accepted doctrine of current psychology. I refer to the doctrine of what is 
described as “sentience,” or “anoetic consciousness.”
The meaning which is attached to these terms has been explained from 
two points of view, from the point of view of analysis of what is involved 
in mature experience and from the point of view of mental growth or de-
velopment. From the first point of view, it has been maintained that there 
is a certain body of indirect evidence confirming the conclusion that there 
is more in consciousness at any one moment than can be discriminated or 
known. “My thought discrimination,” it is contended, “is very far from 
keeping pace with the differentiation of the sensory data as immediately 
experienced,” and this statement is supported by reference to what psy-
chologists have been accustomed to describe as the “area of inattention,” 
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and by reference to the mass of organic sensations, constantly present in 
consciousness though usually only in the vaguest way. On the strength of 
these and allied phenomena, the conclusion is drawn that “thought and 
sentience are fundamentally distinct mental functions,” and that we ought 
to recognise even in the mature inner life a radical distinction between 
presentations as differentiations of sensory data immediately experienced 
on the one hand, and presentations which have been discriminated by 
thought and have thus become significant for thought, on the other. The 
former, the undiscriminated zone of presentations surrounding, at any 
moment those which are distinctly apprehended is, then, to be conceived 
as at all times an ultimate constituent of mind, having an existence rela-
tively independent of thought, which is discriminative only because it has 
presentation for its vehicle.10 From the second point of view, it has been 
maintained that the earliest stage of mental life must be regarded as a mere 
mass of undiscriminated presentations, which from one whole of feeling, 
in the sense of immediate experience. In the beginning, says Mr. Bradley, 
in the article to which reference has already been made, “there are no rela-
tions and no feelings, only feeling. It is all one blur with differences that 
work, and that are felt, but not discriminated.” And again in the beginning 
there is for the mind “no discretion, or even discrimination.” “All is feel-
ing in the sense, not, of pleasure and pain, but of a whole given without re-
lations, and given therefore as one with its own pain or pleasure.”11  From 
this basis of pure sentience it is, he considers, the business of psychology 
to trace the way in which apprehension of definitely discriminated presen-
tations, with distinct objective reference, comes about. And in as much as 
a felt background of sentience is supposed to persist throughout all the 
stages of mental experience, forming one feature at least of the conscious-
ness of self, this account of the matter may be regarded as supplementing 
from the genetic point of view the other analysis already referred to. 
With regard to the substantial truth of much that is involved in these 
contentions one can entertain no doubt. As against the older doctrine of 
Atomism, for example, the theory has done good service in emphasising 
and working out the conception of experience as a continuous advance 
from a condition of vague, chaotic indeterminateness to a condition of 
relative definiteness and distinctness of apprehension, – an advance, which 
consists not in somehow connecting the unconnected but in the gradual 
differentiation of what was previously undifferentiated, and thus, by de-
grees, to use one of John Grote’s metaphors, enabling a pattern to come 
out of what was originally a confused whole. It has done good service, 
again, in insisting upon the essentially discriminative character of thought, 
and in connecting this feature with what we call, obscurely enough, “ref-
erence to an object,” although it does not follow that discrimination and 
10 G. F. Stout, Analytic Psychology, vol. i, p. 48 sqq. 
11 Mind, xii, 1887, pp. 363 and 367.
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objective reference are rightly confined to thought, in the usual accepta-
tion of that term. And it has done good service, also, in enforcing the 
consideration that, as we descend the scale of psychical existence, we must 
conceive of sense-presentations and feeling-tone as distinguishable from 
one another by fewer and fewer characteristics, although it has been too 
hastily interred that if these two become indistinguishable they must needs 
be identical, and too little recognised that feeling-tone no less than sense-
presentation must be very different at the higher end of the scale from 
what it is at the lower, where definite self-reference would be no feature of 
it. The points, however, which concern us at present are whether, on the 
basis of the theory, a sufficient case has been made out: (a) for distinguish-
ing a thought from a, sense-presentation on the ground that the former 
involves reference to something which is not a present modification of the 
individual’s consciousness whilst the latter per se involves no such refer-
ence but is a “special mode of subjective experience,” and (b) for suppos-
ing that differences may be felt or immediately experienced without the 
exercise of discriminative activity on the part of the subject.
There is difficulty in coming to close quarters with the first of these po-
sitions, on account of the ambiguity attaching to the term “subjective,” an 
ambiguity which is liable fatally to confuse the question at issue. As to the 
differing meanings of the term “subjective,” something will be said further 
on. Meanwhile, it must be pointed out that the term may be used to indi-
cate a process or event taking place in the individual mind, more strictly a 
process or event of the individual mind or it may be applied to any content 
of apprehension which an individual for the time being includes in those 
trains of presentations, ideas and feelings that constitute what he calls 
himself as distinguished from the not self. Evidently it is the former and 
not the latter significance that the term is here intended to bear. But, when 
the appeal is made to introspection, when, in illustration of what is meant 
by sentience, we are directed to such experiences as those in the field of 
inattention, – “the rumble in the street, the ticking of the clock, the pres-
sure of the seat on which we are sitting,”12 and so on, –  the plausibility 
of the contention that these are “special modes of subjective experience” 
lies, I think, in the fact that they may all of them be, for us, “subjective” in 
the latter sense. The mature mind tends, not of course invariably, but cer-
tainly in no small measure, to refer experiences that are vague, indefinite, 
incoherent, to what Professor James calls the me; extremely faint auditory 
and visual presentations we tend to assign to the “empirical ego,” largely 
because the means of localising them in the objective sphere are absent. 
This, therefore, is one of the results of the formation in us of a distinct 
conception of self; it lends no confirmation to the view that presentations 
are, either for us or for the primitive mind, “subjective” in the former of 
the two senses I have mentioned.
12 A. F. Shand, Mind, N.S. vii, p. 485. 
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Passing, then, now to the contention that presentations are “subjec-
tive” in the sense that they are immediately experienced as “modifica-
tions” of the individual consciousness, I urge, in the first place, that, if they 
are, the operation which, according to the theory, is performed by thought 
is altogether inexplicable. The function of thought is to refer “this very 
feeling or presentation to an object.”13 But why should thought refer a 
“modification” of the individual consciousness to something which is not 
a modification of the individual consciousness, but exists independently of 
that consciousness? And if this were thought’s method of procedure, what 
possible logical validity could it possess? A modification of my conscious-
ness is eo ipso precluded from being a modification of anything else either 
in earth or heaven and any “transcendence of immediate experience” as 
thus understood would be infected through and through with contradic-
tion. The assumption of the “unity of the universe,” even if we grant that 
thought is entitled to that assumption, would not save it from contradic-
tion, for the universe may be a unity and yet full of the greatest variety of 
difference. The procedure of thought becomes all the more unaccountable 
when we remember that it, too, psychologically considered, is a “passing 
modification of consciousness,” that it, too, as it occurs, is “an immediate 
experience or feeling.” Why should one of the individual’s feelings refer 
another of the individual’s feelings to an object which is either outside the 
field of the individual’s feeling, altogether, or, if inside, is essentially other 
than the particular feelings involved in the operation?14 “Immediate expe-
rience,” it is argued, “being essentially fragmentary, points beyond itself, 
so that in knowing it we ipso facto know that to which it is related.”15 But 
on what criterion can it be pronounced “fragmentary”? In the beginning, 
at any rate, we have no other experience with which to contrast it; the 
fact of its fragmentariness cannot therefore be used to explain how any 
other kind of experience arises on its basis. How does it happen that out 
of this immediate experience there should spring the mediate experience 
which knows it as related to what at the moment is not immediately ex-
perienced? And, assuming that one portion of immediate experience does 
come to cognise another in this way how can we ever be assured that it is 
not through the very act of cognition and not in virtue of its own inherent 
nature that immediate experience appears fragmentary and full of implica-
tions that point beyond itself? Moreover, the distinction between process 
and content, which has been denied in the case of immediate experience, 
is abruptly introduced, as a consciously recognised distinction, when, in 
the case of cognition, we advance beyond what is immediate, for then pre-
sentation becomes for thought a content, whilst thought itself as occurring 
is an “immediate experience or feeling.” But why should a colour, in so 
far as at any moment it is actually being seen, be psychologically identi-
13 Ibid., p. 479.
14 Cp. Ibid., p. 502.
15 G. F. Stout, Things and Sensations (in Proceedings of British Academy, vol. ii).
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fied with the seeing, whilst, in so far as at any moment it is actually being 
cognised, it is not identified with the cognising? What difference is there 
in the red that I immediately experience and in the red that I cognise, to 
justify me describing the latter as a quality and the former as a process?
I urge, in the second place, that if we start with presentations as sub-
jective modifications, it is even more a question of how we come to an 
awareness of self as an individuality, of “how we get into ourselves,” as 
Dr. Caird puts it, than of how we come to an awareness of an independent 
not-self. If we begin with an experience in which experiencing and the 
experienced are identical, and if this experience remains the basis of our 
knowledge throughout, then it is impossible, so far as I can see, to account 
for the fact that we come to attribute the experiencing to our own finite 
personality. A succession of subjective modifications, in which experienc-
ing and experienced were one, would be, in Dr. Ward’s words, an “entirely 
impersonal and intransitive process,” in regard to which the term subjec-
tive would really be meaningless. Even though it be allowed that in such 
a process the experiencing is distinguished from the content as “colour in 
general is distinguished from this or that special colour,” the difficulty is 
not lightened, for the finite self is certainly not conceived as experiencing 
in general. Nor can I see that the fact of some of these subjective modifica-
tions becoming cognitive would mend the case. For, since presentation is 
its “vehicle” throughout, and since presentations are all subjective modifi-
cations, cognition would have no ground on which to found a distinction 
between subject and object. The basis of that distinction must be there 
from the beginning; there is no possibility of introducing it later on.16 
16 Dr. Stout, in his recent contribution to the Proceedings of the British Academy (vol. ii), 
has indicated how, in his view, some of the objections I have been raising can be met. He 
admits that “if we start by assuming that the individual is initially confined within the 
circle of his own immediate experiences, it seems impossible to discover how he can ever 
get beyond them.” But, he argues, “from the outset, there, are features of our immediate 
experience which perpetually point beyond themselves to actual existence, other than 
our own, or than any immediate experience of ours.” Such features are “our awareness 
of passivity in undergoing sensations, in combination with our awareness of activity in 
determining what sensations we shall undergo.” It is to be regretted that within the limits 
of his paper he was prevented from developing, this contention in detail. Certainly, the 
brief exposition which he gives of it suggests numerous difficulties. I do not understand, 
for example, how “specific modifications of the individual consciousness” can be de-
scribed as “passive.” Are we to suppose that the subject merely receives presentations as 
so much material imported into his being from without? But in that case, they would not 
be “specific modifications of the individual consciousness,” that is to say, not processes 
of experiencing at all. And, on the other hand, if they are not thus received, if they are 
reactions of the mind on stimulation, how is the antithesis of passivity and activity to be 
constituted? Again, “our awareness of activity in determining what sensations we shall 
undergo,” is a perplexing notion when used of experience “from the outset.” If the primi-
tive subject is already capable of determinations of this sort, and all that they involve, 
– the distinguishing of ideas from presentations, the representation of an end, awareness 
of self, and so on, – then, no doubt, it may accomplish much. But the crux comes when 
we attempt to conceive of all this as a “feature of immediate experience.” Further, even 
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I turn to the other of the two points singled out for discussion. Has 
the theory we are considering succeeded in showing that differences may 
be felt or immediately experienced without the exercise of discriminative 
activity on the part of the subject? It is admitted that there is no direct 
evidence to be offered in favour of the position. We can only know what 
we do discriminate. But it is regarded as one of the characteristic marks 
which distinguish sentience from knowledge that the latter is discrimina-
tive whilst the former is not. I cannot agree that the facts adduced, which 
in themselves no one need he concerned to dispute, are in any way conclu-
sive proof of the theory; they seem to me quite compatible with another 
mode of explanation. The difference between the presentations of an ob-
ject in the area of inattention and the presentations of the same object 
in the area of attention need not, for example, be the difference between 
presentations discriminated and presentations undiscriminated; the dif-
ference may quite well be, as James and Lipps have maintained, between 
a greater and less degree of such discrimination. Dr. Stout quotes, as an 
illustration of the way in which thought discrimination fails to keep pace 
with the differentiation of the sensory data as immediately experienced, a 
case mentioned by Abraham Tucker, who says, – “we may see leaves fall-
ing from the trees, birds flying in the air or cattle grazing upon the ground, 
without affirming, or denying, or thinking anything concerning them; and 
yet, perhaps, upon being asked a minute afterwards, we could remember 
what we had seen.” Quite so; but then these are not undiscriminated pre-
sentations. On the contrary they are presentations that are characterised 
by a very large amount of discrimination. And if it be argued, we know 
on reflection that there was more detail in those presentations than we did 
discriminate at the time, the reply is that such an assurance on our part 
is perfectly explicable without resorting to the hypothesis of merely felt 
differences that have not been discriminated. “Leaves falling from trees,” 
“birds flying in the air,” and so on, are familiar objects enough, and, al-
though for the moment they occupy the area of inattention, they have 
been attended to over and over again. And when, on reflecting afterwards 
upon the circumstance depicted, we conclude that we might have seen 
very much more than we actually did see, we may be doing no more than 
bringing previous experience to bear upon the particular phenomena in 
question. And so with reference to another instance upon which stress has 
been laid.17 “In cases of lingering illness and where a pain of low inten-
sity is an almost constant accompaniment, the sufferer will say that he is 
able to forget it at times, using the word ‘forget’ in reference, not to past 
granting that, in the manner indicated, the primitive subject does become aware of the 
not-self as an activity correlative with his activity, why should that suggest that it is like 
in kind to his own? His activity consists in “getting sensations,” its activity consists in 
“determining their occurrence,” – surely two very different operations.
17 By Mr. A. F. Shand, in a suggestive article already referred to, on “Feeling and Thought” 
(Mind, N.S. vii, 1898, pp. 487 and 489).
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feelings of pain which he no longer remembers, but to present feelings of 
pain which he ceases to discriminate.” Here, once more, I believe the facts 
can be accounted for, and without in the least distorting them, by means 
of a different hypothesis. The patient, when the period of so-called “for-
getfulness” has elapsed, is aware that all through this period he has been 
experiencing the pain in a lesser degree of intensity, that there has been in 
truth no break between the pain in its former acuteness and the pain in its 
present acuteness, he is aware that in the interval his “attention” has been 
“absorbed in a pursuit disconnected with it,” and that if it had not been 
so absorbed the condition of things during the interval would have been 
for him otherwise. It is not, therefore, surprising that instead of describing 
his present experience as new, he should use the expression which our psy-
chologist insists on interpreting with such literalness. And, indeed, on any 
hypothesis, it is impossible to maintain that the pain as a mental occur-
rence would be altogether uninfluenced by other mental occurrences going 
on contemporaneously; on any hypothesis there could not be processes 
of attention taking place in the way described without in some measure 
inhibiting other states of mind to which they were opposed. Moreover, 
particularly in regard to pain, the theory we are considering can be met by 
an appeal to ordinary experience. That theory implies that pain may and 
constantly does exist as a feeling, and yet the subject be totally unaware 
of its existence. For feeling in itself is “blind,” is “unconscious”;18 in or-
der to become conscious of it, the subject must discriminate and identify 
it by an act of thought or cognition. Now, if there is one thing certain to 
be obtained from introspection, it is that there may be experience of the 
most intense pain without anything of the nature of what is usually called 
thought or reflexion. This fact is, I submit, much more consonant with the 
view that the discrimination necessary for apprehending the pain comes 
about in and through the mental state by means of which it is experienced 
than it is with the view according to which the pain is one mental state and 
its discrimination another.
The theoretical objection to severing the discriminative acts from the 
contents of consciousness, regarded as so much data for discrimination, is 
precisely similar in import to that which we have already urged against Dr. 
Ward’s theory of Attention. “I do not hesitate,” says Dr. Stout, “to stig-
matise this separation of activity from content as a most serious error.”19 
If, however, it is an error in the one case, there seems little reason for 
supposing it to be anything else in the other. Yet, when presentations are 
described as “material” which thought may or may not utilise, when the 
objective reference of thought is spoken of as “supervening on purely ano-
etic experience” and giving rise to “a completely new psychical fact,” it 
can hardly be denied that a separation of the kind stigmatised has, in 
18 Mind, N.S. vii, 1898, pp. 484 and 490.  
19 G. F. Stout, Op. cit., vol. i, p. 201.
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truth, been made. Presentations are taken to be differentiated facts upon 
which the activity of discriminating is directed, and which, as a result of 
such activity, are cognised by us as different facts. But the moment the 
question is asked, how, then, is the discrimination to be conceived as com-
ing about, insuperable difficulties confront us. Suppose, for example, we 
say that the discrimination of a content A implies recognition of its resem-
blance to other presentations, its reference to a class of which A1 A2 A3 are 
members, then if we separate the contents A, A1, A2, A3 from the act of 
discriminating, we shall be unawares taking the content A as it is after the 
act of discrimination to be the fact given to be discriminated. The conse-
quence is our answer to the question will involve us in a vicious circle, – 
on the one hand, we shall assume recognition of the resemblance between 
A and the other members of the class in order to explain the discrimina-
tion, and on the other hand we shall assume discrimination in order to 
explain the recognition of resemblance to the other members of the class. 
And whenever the attempt is made to show in what way a presentation 
as immediately experienced differs from a presentation that is cognised, 
that same dilemma, in one form or another, breaks out afresh. On the one 
hand, it is contended that the cognition of a presentation implies that it is 
both immediately experienced and related to what at the moment is not 
presented; on the other hand, that the immediate experience of a presen-
tation implies its differentiation, which differentiation must needs imply 
that it too is related to what at the moment is not presented.20 In other 
words, although thought and sentience are declared to be “fundamentally 
distinct mental functions,” there is no point save one on which the distinc-
tion can be made to turn. In the long run, it would have to be admitted 
that, according to the theory, thought involved the conscious use of ideas 
of relation recognised as such. But, in the first place, it could not be main-
tained that without such recognition, knowledge is impossible, and, in the 
second place, to suppose that ideas of relation spring up de novo when 
presentations already with definiteness and precision of outline are delib-
erately compared and contrasted is to relinquish the problem of giving any 
psychological account of their genesis.
Apparently, Dr. Stout does hold that, since sentience and thought are 
fundamentally distinct, any attempt to trace the psychological develop-
ment of thought from sentience is eo ipso precluded. At all events, he 
expressly dissociates himself from Mr. Bradley’s mode of effecting the pas-
sage from the one to the other.21 Let us, however, look for a moment 
at Mr. Bradley’s account of the matter. He starts, as we have said, with 
a mental life consisting of “a continuous mass of presentation in which 
20 Cp. Mr. Shand’s article, p. 496, where he takes Mr. Bradley to task for denying the 
presence of relations in feeling, though the reason why the latter hesitates to take the step 
Mr. Shand desiderates is sufficiently obvious.
21 G. F. Stout, Op. cit., p. 51. 
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the separation of a single element from all context is never observed.”22 
From certain of his descriptions one would be almost tempted to con-
clude that lie conceived the primitive mind somewhat after the fashion of 
a Leibnizian monad, containing preformed within itself as feeling all that 
later becomes articulated into the phenomenal world of knowledge, had 
he not, on various occasions, so decisively repudiated that conception as 
scarcely deserving criticism. Given, then, this original psychical ἂπειρον, 
and recognising its position as a part of the whole to which it belongs, Mr. 
Bradley undertakes to show how thought may have been generated, with-
out importing into his analysis anything of the nature of a special power 
or faculty. The process he employs for the purpose is that of Association, 
but with its principles so modified that one can scarcely recognise in it any 
remnant of the traditional doctrine. The Atomism of the latter he banishes 
wholly, and in like manner the “Law of Similarity”; the “associated links” 
he regards no longer as conjunctions of existences, but as connexions of 
content. Every philosophical student is indebted to him for his masterly 
criticism of the discarded features, a criticism which is as convincing as it 
is brilliant. The question, however, presents itself whether Association as 
thus modified is not too delicate and refined a process for the work it is 
here called upon to do, and for the material with which it has here to deal. 
We shall see. First of all, Mr. Bradley restates the meaning of Contiguity 
so as to make it depend on identity of content: the law becomes that of 
Redintegration, expressed in the form “every mental element when pres-
ent tends to reinstate those elements with which it has been presented.” 
Then he postulates further what lie calls the law of Blending or Fusion, 
much neglected, so he thinks, by English psychologists, – the law, namely, 
that “where different elements (or relations of elements) have any feature 
the same, they may unite wholly or partially.” And, finally, he considers 
that underlying these two laws there is to be discerned one principle, – the 
principle which we may describe as that of Individuation, according to 
which “every mental element strives to make itself a whole or to lose itself 
in one,” or, in other words, “tends to give itself a context through identity 
of content.”
I remark not now upon the prevailingly active character ascribed to 
mental elements by the use of such phrases as “striving” and “tendency”23 
– phraseology which forcibly recalls Herbartian conceptions. I confine at-
tention rather to the one fundamental consideration as to how the prin-
ciple of Individuation can find application to the contents of the rudi-
mentary or primitive mind. Redintegration, we are repeatedly told, is an 
association not between particular facts but between universals; what op-
22 Mind, xii, 1887, p. 357.
23 It seems curious that in discussions about “psychical activity” it should be so persis-
tently ignored that it is the activity to which the above expressions point that calls for 
explanation, and not specially the activity involved in volition.
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erates in it is never an external relation between individuals, but an ideal 
identity within the individuals. Granted; but then in the mental life at the 
start there is nothing “beyond mere presentation, that is, feeling with the 
distinctions of quality, quantity, and ‘tone,’ which we abstract from one 
another, but which at first come within one blurred whole which merely 
is.”24 At the stage of sentience, existence and content form one unbroken 
totality, no feature in the “what” of given fact has been as yet alienated 
from its “that,” and where this is the case, we are expressly told, there is 
nothing ideal.25 How, then, is it possible for the principle of Individuation 
to come into operation? On the one hand, it is declared to be precisely 
one of the functions of thought to “separate an element from the concrete 
basis” in which it is imbedded, and prior to some degree of such separa-
tion the principle of Individuation, according to the account given of it, 
would be useless. And on the other hand, the principle of Individuation 
is called into requisition in order to explain how thought itself emerges 
from the condition of mere feeling. Mr. Bradley tries to deprive this ob-
jection of its force by arguing that some degree of idealizing is prior to 
thought proper. “From the outset universals,” he says, “are used, and the 
difference between the fact and the idea, the existence and the meaning, 
is unconsciously active in the undeveloped intelligence.”26 Be it so, but 
in that case the difficulty has only been removed to some stages further 
back. If “from the very first beginnings of soul-life universals are used,” 
then obviously those “very first beginnings” are no longer the “begin-
nings” out of which thought was to be shown to emerge. The latter were 
declared to be “unbroken wholes” of feeling, at a level below distinctions, 
the elements of which are but conjoined, and are not connected, in which, 
therefore, universals cannot be used, because they have not yet made their 
appearance. And the moment the effort is made to advance from the one 
assumed phase of primitive psychical life to the other, the dilemma, just 
noted recurs. Mr. Bradley points to the incoming of fresh sensations, the 
disappearance of the old ones, and the conflict involved therein, as the 
“machinery” by means of which the transition is effected. But he admits 
that it is only as working together with the laws of Association and Blend-
ing that “the blind pressure and the struggle of changed sensations first 
begins to loosen ideal content from psychical fact.”27 Here, then, we come 
again to the same impasse, – some loosening of ideal content from psychi-
cal fact there must be before the principle of Individuation can come into 
operation at all, whilst until the principle of Individuation has come into 
operation the loosening of ideal content from psychical fact cannot so 
much as begin.
24 Mind, xii, 1887, p. 365.
25 Appearance and Reality, chapter xv. 
26 Principles of Logic, p. 39.
27 Appearance and Reality, chapter xxvi.
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In no respect do the implications of the theory we are considering, come 
more clearly to the surface than in the repeated stress laid by Mr. Bradley 
on the process of so-called Blending or Fusion. By that tern there appears 
to be understood the successive experience of contents possessing features 
indistinguishably alike, in consequence of which the contents unite, their 
differences are destroyed, and there ensues a transfer, of strength to the re-
sult. It would seem as though the formation of the fused or blended prod-
uct came about by a kind of superposition of contents previously present 
as so many separate and independent facts in the mind of the individual. 
The whole phraseology accommodates itself readily: to that mode of re-
garding the mental life according to which isolated sense-presentations 
are conceived as the original units out of whose aggregations conscious 
experience in its richness and fullness proceeds. There would, of course, 
be no justification whatever for attributing this view to Mr. Bradley, –no 
one has criticised it with more vigour and thoroughness than he, – but his 
retention of the notion in question indicates that presentations and im-
ages are still treated by him as having a quasi-substantive mode of being, 
altogether different from what can be ascribed to ideas or concepts. And 
in the end he is bound to confess that, in spite of all his efforts, there is no 
road that we can discover from the first to the second. “We are,” he says, 
“unable to make the transition from the fused to the relational condi-
tion of mind, in such a way as either to see how this particular result did 
come, or to feel simply that it must be so and that no further explanation 
is required.”28 The reason, I think, is obvious. The theory of sentience, 
according to which differentiation must necessarily be prior to discrimi-
nation in the order of time and continue to be its basis throughout, rests 
upon the assumption that sense contents are factual existences, “hard in-
dividuals,” so unique that each one “not only differs from all others, but 
even from itself at subsequent moments.” The contents of thought, on 
the other hand, are certainly not existing facts, they, at any rate, do not 
as such, as universal ideas, form part of the sum total of existence. These 
two, then, if the assumption referred to be warranted, are separated from 
one another by the whole diameter of being, and we ought, in that case, 
to recognise that we are propounding an illegitimate problem in propos-
ing to trace the way in which the one has been developed from the other.
v. sense-content and objective reality
The outcome of the foregoing criticism has been to confirm the position 
laid down at the outset that the term existence is wrongly applied to any 
contents of apprehension. I have tried to show that the opposite supposi-
tion which ascribes existence to the contents of sense-perception leads 
to contradiction and confusion. We may now seek to determine more in 
detail the implications of the view we have taken to be the true one. Let us 
28 Mind, xii, 1887, p. 377.
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confine attention for the present to what, in the language of the theory we 
have just been considering, would be called the knowledge or cognition of 
a sense-presentation, and try to make clear to ourselves the meaning we 
attach to a sense-presentation in this context.
We have used the word “product” in reference to a sense-presentation, 
and I have indicated that we require to be on our guard in so describing it. 
A sense-presentation we have taken to be a product in the significance that 
it is not a given fact, something imported into the mind, but is essentially 
that which arises in and through the act of apprehension. But a sense-
presentation we have not taken to be a product in the significance that 
it is formed by the putting together of mental elements that have existed 
previously in separation. The latter is in truth precisely the notion we have 
striven all along to avoid. To sever the shares supposed to be contributed 
by sense and thought, whether the contributions be regarded as due to 
the operations of these assumed powers or in whatsoever other way they 
may be accounted for, is inevitably to conceive of the presentation as a 
resultant, a compound, that has come about through a combination of 
what were originally two detached elements. This mode of viewing the 
matter meets us most undisguisedly perhaps in the philosophy of Locke, 
and in his hands it leads to the conclusion that the element of reality in 
knowledge is that which is furnished from without. External things act 
upon the mind through the senses and produce impressions, which, when 
received, become images or psychical states, that exist in the mind exactly 
as a quality is supposed to exist in an external thing. These images are 
the data of knowledge, the subject uses them to construct pictures or like-
nesses, so near as is possible, of external things. The external thing exists, 
the picture exists, and the latter is all that can immediately be known. It 
is a product in the second of the two senses mentioned and as a product, 
as an existing fact, it stands between the mind and the external thing, and 
by its very position there screens the external thing from our gaze. Locke, 
indeed, claimed to know how far the likeness was accurate, but that claim 
fell an easy prey to the sceptical criticism of his great successor.
I am quite aware that there are important points of difference between 
Locke’s theory and the modern theory of sentience. Yet they have at least 
the one point in common that the presentation, or sensible appearance, 
and the external thing are regarded as two relatively separate and inde-
pendent existences, of which only the latter can be immediately experi-
enced. However much it may be insisted that there is no distinction to be 
drawn between the way in which we know external things and the way in 
which we know sensible appearances, since knowledge in both cases in-
volves a transcendence of the immediately given, the fact remains that the 
immediately given which is a constituent of the second of these two acts 
of cognition possesses a very different significance for knowledge than the 
immediately given which is involved in the first. In the one case the imme-
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diately given is what is known, – known it may be as in relation to what 
at the moment is not immediately given, but still known as it is in itself; in 
the other case, the immediately given stands for, represents, the external 
thing we are assumed to know, but is not that thing, and the external thing 
is known not as it is in itself, but only through means of something, whose 
existence is not its existence, but distinct therefrom. Whether we call the 
process by which we apprehend “the independent not-self,” “inference,” 
or “intuition,” or prelogical “mediacy” matters in this respect but little; 
the “independent not-self” will not, in any case, come into knowledge as 
the sensible appearance comes into knowledge, and in some way you have 
got to get to the former through the latter. You may project the sensible 
appearance into, or fuse it with, the external thing, but still the projec-
tion or fusion is your act, not its, and there is no means of getting rid of 
the hypothetical character of the whole procedure. In other words, as in 
Locke’s theory, the sensible appearance occupies the position of a tertium 
quid between the knowing mind and the thing it would know, and inter-
poses an insuperable barrier to the mind acquiring any certain knowledge 
of what is beyond itself.
Now, according to the view for which I am contending, there is no such 
barrier between the mind and its objects as that just indicated. Apprehen-
sion, using the term to include awareness of whatsoever description, is 
the same in kind throughout. There is always the antithesis, whether rec-
ognised by the subject or not, between the act of apprehending and the 
content apprehended, but that antithesis, when rightly interpreted, instead 
of throwing doubt on the possibility of apprehending existent reality, is 
the one condition on which that possibility rests. To state the case briefly, 
there are not three existing facts involved in the apprehension of a sensu-
ous object, – the object, the presentation, and the act of apprehending, but 
two only, – namely, the object and the act of apprehending. The presenta-
tion does not stand between the act of apprehending and the object; it is 
no other than the way in which we apprehend the object.29 Our apprehen-
sion may be, and doubtless will be, faulty, imperfect, incomplete, but there 
is nothing, in the nature of the presentation, as such, that either must or 
can cause such faultiness, imperfection, or incompleteness. The presenta-
tion, in other words, is not a product in the second of the two senses men-
tioned above; it is not a compound of impressions and ideas; it is ideal in 
the sense that it is the interpretation or meaning which we, through the act 
of apprehending, put upon the object immediately before us. 
Nor is there anything, so far as I can discover, in the conditions giving 
rise to sense perception on our part that in the least conflicts with what 
has just been said. Undoubtedly, in having, as we say, sense-presentations 
there is involved stimulation of certain definite portions of the nervous or-
29 I am using the term “object” here to denote that to which the content of apprehension 
is referred, – probably, on the whole, the preferable usage.
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ganism, undoubtedly the particular character of any particular presenta-
tion will depend upon the particular character of the stimulation involved, 
and upon the particular portion of the nervous organism stimulated. But 
neither does the stimulation itself form any part of what we apprehend, 
nor is there, as it seems to me, any justification for supposing that it pro-
duces a subjective modification that enters into the presentation. What, on 
the contrary, it does do is to give rise to a particular act of apprehension, in 
and through which we discriminate a certain sense quality as belonging to, 
or appertaining to, the object which, at the moment, we are apprehending. 
We may, for convenience, call that component of the act of apprehension 
which is due purely and solely to the stimulation sensation, but, if we do 
so, we are compelled, on pain otherwise of endless confusion, to recognise 
that sensation and sense quality are fundamentally distinct. The sensation 
is, in that case, part of the mental act or process, – and a part, which we 
can only, psychologically abstract from the whole fact; the sense qual-
ity, on the other hand, is not part of the mental process but part of what 
is discriminated thereby. For example, in and through certain processes 
of sensation, I apprehend an object as round or square, heavy or light, 
rough or smooth; I do not apprehend the sensation as having shape or 
weight or roughness or smoothness. And notwithstanding the arguments 
that have been put forward to the contrary, I must be dogmatic enough 
to assert that in visual sensation likewise a similar distinction holds. On 
looking at an orange, I become aware of its yellowness, and I know, on 
scientific grounds, that certain physiological and psychological processes 
have occurred by means of which the awareness has come about. But the 
yellow colour is apprehended by me as a quality of the orange, and not as 
a quality of the mental process through which I apprehend the orange. It 
is quite true that the yellow, as a sensible appearance, may vary in a way in 
which I conceive the yellow of the orange does not vary, but the variation 
arises from particular objective conditions, and in no way entitles me to 
suppose that what I am apprehending, is a yellow state of consciousness. 
The sensible appearance is still an appearance to me and not in me; it is 
as little entitled to be called subjective as that sensible appearance which I 
identify with the orange. In other words, it is still a sense quality and not 
a sensation-process. “The infant who is delighted by a bright colour does 
not of course conceive himself as face to face with an object, but neither 
does he conceive the colour as a subjective affection.”30
A sense-presentation, then, is not something which we project or 
throw out into the real; it is not a datum produced in us by the action of 
the real; it is that which we find in the real, in and through the process of 
discrimination which, in some way, the action of the real upon us occa-
sions or calls forth. When in analysing the process of sense-apprehension, 
we take for granted that the sense qualities come into being as created 
30 James Ward, Art. “Psychology,” Encycl. Brit., vol. xx, p. 41B.
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products of that process, we are introducing an assumption of our own 
which most assuredly the analysis will not justify, and for which it would 
be hard to discover a warranty elsewhere. There is no reason to suppose 
that real things only appear to have sensuous qualities in consequence of 
the mental spectacles through which we observe them. From this, how-
ever, it does not follow in the least that no distinction ought to be drawn 
between the real that appears and the real as it appears. Even though it be 
admitted that our “experiencing makes no difference to the facts” (and I 
think there is a sense, and not an unimportant one, in which that assertion 
is eminently true), it does not follow in the least that the facts are as we 
experience them. Our mental spectacles may be truly transparent, but for 
all that there may be endless variety in their focussing and discriminating 
power. What they enable us to know may be in most cases but an inad-
equate, fragmentary and even erroneous representation of the real; and in 
any case, there will always be the difference between the representation 
and the actual fact. It is enough, if we can show that the representation 
is representation of actual fact and is not, itself a fact which prevents us 
from knowing any other. That is what is meant by insisting that the sen-
sible appearance is not itself an existent reality.
In the paper above referred to, Dr. Stout has made an able attempt to 
controvert this position. It breaks down, he thinks, when brought to the 
test of accounting; for simple instances of the distinction between sensible 
appearance and material thing. He takes two such instances: (a) “I look at 
a candle flame, and, in doing so, I press against my right eyeball so as to 
displace it; immediately I become aware of two visual appearances instead 
of one. One of the visual presentations dances up and down as I move my 
eyeball while the other remains at rest.” Now, insists Dr. Stout, “it is non-
sense to say that the doubled visual appearance is the candle flame itself as 
imperfectly apprehended by me. On this view the imperfect apprehension 
must involve positive error.” And why not? That is just what it would do 
were I not aware of the circumstances that have given rise to the appear-
ance. Why may it not be a wrong interpretation that I involuntarily put 
upon certain conditions which ordinarily would indicate the presence of 
two candle flames? Because, the reply is, there is really no such misappre-
hension. “I know quite well that there is only a single candle flame, and 
yet the two visual appearances persist unaffected by this knowledge.” A 
mistake, however, “vanishes when it is corrected.” But does it – always? 
Men have known for some hundreds of years that it is a mistake to sup-
pose that the sun revolves round the earth, and yet they continue to speak 
of the motion of the sun from east to west. Now, the sun’s motion is cer-
tainly not itself a sensible appearance. Its apparent motion is no doubt 
based on certain sensible appearances, but then so is the greater part of 
our knowledge. (b) The second instance is that of “the visual appearance 
of the full moon as seen from the earth’s surface.” “This,” says Dr. Stout, 
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“is certainly not a mere appearing but something which appears – a silvery 
patch with a perfectly determinate shape, and magnitude.” And we can-
not say that this something which appears is just the moon itself as imper-
fectly apprehended, because when the impression of its size is rectified by 
full astronomical knowledge, the visual appearance, as such, remains just 
as it was before. But why should I not say, as I believe most people would, 
that the silvery patch is just the moon itself as it appears at a distance of so 
many thousand miles from the observer? We are perfectly assured that if 
somehow the real moon were suddenly blotted out of existence, the silvery 
patch in a second or two would vanish along with it. If, however, it is itself 
something that appears, if it is itself an existent reality “distinct” from the 
material moon, then there is no obvious reason why the latter’s extinction 
should involve its extinction.; Related to one another they may be, but ex-
istent things may be related to one another without the destruction of the 
one necessarily carrying with it the destruction of the other. Nor am I able 
to grasp Dr. Stout’s meaning when he contends that a visual magnitude is 
incapable of being compared with the magnitude of a material thing. I do 
not grasp it, because immediately before he had been contending that or-
dinarily material thing and sensible appearance are blended in inseparable 
unity, and that our only knowledge of the extension of material things is 
obtained through our experience of the extensiveness of visual and tactual 
presentations.
To sum up. Sense-presentations, according to the view we have been 
taking, are not themselves existent facts, but manifestations of existent 
facts, as the latter are discriminated by apprehending minds. Our discrimi-
native activity can never be what it knows, and just for that very reason it 
can know the world of which it forms a part. The colours and sounds, and 
other sensible qualities, which it discerns in nature, are not creations of its 
own modes of exercise, they are, what they purport to be, features of the 
reality which it discerns. The discriminative power of finite minds may be 
circumscribed and limited in countless ways, they may be exposed to end-
less sources of error, but there is nothing in the nature of knowing as such 
to incapacitate it for the work it has to do, or to prevent it approximating 
ever nearer and nearer to the truth of things.
vi. perceiving and thinking
One way of expressing the main result of our enquiry so far would be to 
say that mind is cognitive from the first, that in its earliest experiences it 
knows reality and is never the spectator of subjective states as such, that 
even the simplest and most rudimentary modes of its activity are already 
in essence acts of judgment. There is, however, a psychological disadvan-
tage in extending too widely the scope of the terms thought and “judg-
ment.” If we recognise that the elementary function of discriminating, 
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comparing and relating is present from the outset of the mental life’s his-
tory, we may restrict the terms thought and judgment to the higher devel-
opments of mental activity, which involve both this elementary function 
and the results attained by it in the sphere of sense-perception. Thinking 
or judging as generally understood, is, of course, an extremely complex 
reflective act, which depends for its exercise on definite recognition of the 
distinction between the inner subjective experience of the individual and 
the real world apprehended by him about which his judgments turn. It is 
thought or judgment in this acceptation of the terms that I wish now to 
connect with sense-perception as we have interpreted it. I shall try to show 
grounds for holding that in thinking there is carried to a greater range of 
adequacy and completeness just that same activity, whose character we 
have exhibited in dealing with sense-perception. 
I propose then to consider three of the chief characteristics that would 
usually be assigned to thought as distinguished from sense-perception, 
premising only that thinking, as thus characterised, is never, in our mature 
experience, really absent from processes of perceiving.
(i) The Subjectivity of Thought. – I refer, in the first place, to the fa-
miliar distinction between sense-perception as immediate knowledge and 
thinking as mediate knowledge. Few expressions in psychology are used 
with such ambiguity as these terms “mediate” and “immediate.” Some-
times by “immediate” is meant primary as distinguished from derivative 
experience. If thus interpreted there are, it may safely be said, no elements 
in our mature mental life that can with any accuracy be pronounced “im-
mediate,” none, that is, that have simply preserved their original character 
unaffected by the process of psychical evolution as a whole. Undoubtedly 
we are justified in looking upon the state of mind involved in apprehen-
sion of thought relations as higher and more developed than that involved 
in the reinstatement of previously experienced features by redintegration. 
But obviously it would be an error to suppose that the attainment of the 
former stage in a mental life can have left the latter unaffected. Höffding 
very rightly points out that there is no ground whatever for regarding the 
process of Association which takes place in the mature mind as a low form 
of psychical existence since precisely the highest intellectual content can be 
elaborated through its means.31 Similarly, one may fairly conclude that not 
even the simplest sensory feature can remain through various phases of 
mental development unchanged. More frequently, however, “immediate 
experience” is described as signifying I experience just present, apart from 
definition, articulation, and in general from any insight into its relation-
ships,” “brute fact,” data of sense, as contrasted with experience more or 
less “idealized,” experience, namely, which “in addition to its mere pres-
ence, possesses Meaning.”32 Without repeating what has already been said 
31 Vierteljahrsschrift f wissenschaftl. Phil., xiv, 1890, S. 204.
32 Royce, The World and the Individual, vol. i, p, 56.
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in regard to the theory of sentience, I content myself here with emphasiz-
ing, what would now be generally conceded, that in in no way can this 
interpretation of the difference between immediacy and mediacy be made 
to correspond with the difference between perception and thought. But 
there is, it seems to me, another way of expressing the distinction in ques-
tion which does serve to bring out one of the prominent characteristics of 
thinking in opposition to perceiving as it takes place in mature experience. 
The distinction turns, I take it, not upon difference in the nature of the 
content but upon difference of relation to the object apprehended in the 
acts of perceiving and thinking respectively. In perceiving we appear to 
ourselves to stand in direct relation with the object perceived; in thinking, 
on the other hand, we appear to ourselves to stand in a much less direct 
relation with the object of our thought, the latter appears to be at a farther 
remove from our individual act of apprehension. It is this apparent re-
moteness of the object that furnishes at all events one of the grounds that 
lead us to represent thinking to ourselves as pre-eminently an inner activ-
ity. Thinking would ordinarily be contrasted with perceiving by what, for 
want of a better word, we may call its inwardness or reflective character. 
“The advance of thought, in my view,” writes John Grote, “is the si-
multaneous development of the distinct conception of ourselves, or our 
personality, and the distinct conception of objects of thought as indepen-
dent of us; and each conception brings out the other. By an object of 
thought, as distinctly conceived, we mean something, standing off from, 
though connected with, our thinking, and we cannot mean this without 
a co-conception of ourselves, from which the other is relieved; nor is 
there any means of setting ourselves before ourselves, as something, to be 
thought of, without distinguishing ourselves from something else.”33 As 
to the intimate connection between the development of self-consciousness 
and the development of the process of conceptual thinking there can be no 
question; a thinking mind and a mind conscious of itself are, as Adamson 
puts it, two ways of naming the same thing.34
I should prefer to state the problem of the psychological genesis of 
the consciousness of self in the form, – how to account for the origin of 
the distinction we draw so unhesitatingly in mature experience between 
the act of apprehending and the content apprehended. The key to the 
solution of that problem is to be sought, one can hardly doubt, in a con-
sideration of those conditions which enable the primitive mind to mark 
off the body from extra-organic things. Mr. Bradley lays stress, in this 
connection, upon the relative constancy of the organic or systemic sensa-
tions which early leads to the formation of an inner core of feeling, the 
latter attaching to itself the entire body group of sense-presentations. He 
points to the close and direct way in which changes in the body-group are 
33 Exploratio Philosophica, Part II, p. 146-7.
34 Development of Modern Philosophy, vol. ii, p. 290
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conjoined with feelings of pain and pleasure, and regards this feeling-mass 
as that which gradually grows into the self.35 Without in the least disput-
ing the soundness of this analysis so far as it goes, we are able, I think, 
to specify many other circumstances which tend in the same direction 
as those here indicated. In particular the experiences which come from 
movements of the body and its limbs are relatively regular as compared 
with the presentations which come about in consequence of such move-
ments. The importance of the elementary experiences, hard, no doubt, to 
reconstruct psychologically, that precede and accompany the execution of 
movement can scarcely be overrated in any attempt to trace the develop-
ment from their earliest beginnings of those complicated phenomena of 
strain or effort that come forward most prominently when the will has 
been definitely formed and when control is exercised over trains of con-
ceptual ideas. Even within the sphere of what is often called purely per-
ceptive experience, – and by that, according to the view I am here taking, 
we can only mean such experience as involves a relatively small amount 
of discrimination, – the muscular activity of the body gradually comes to 
be connected with the self, and whatever resists the exercise of muscular 
activity comes to be regarded as relatively external and objective. Neither 
thinking nor willing, in the strict sense of the terms, can make its appear-
ance in the mental life until these motor factors have become closely con-
nected on the one land with the permanent groups of ideas and feelings 
constituting the self in the more advanced stages of its development and 
on the other hand with the representations of anticipatory changes which 
the self is then able to form.
The gradual introduction of the more subtle distinction between the 
self and the bodily organism must again be the result of a variety of cir-
cumstances all of which, could we trace them, would be of moment in 
throwing light upon the psychological genesis of the reflective or mediate 
character ascribed to the products of thought. Evidently the apprehension 
of the inner self as distinct from the body involves as a precondition the 
possibility of definitely recognising the contrast between representation 
and presentation, between idea of imagination and percept. Evidently, 
too, it involves the possibility of combining, sense-presentations on the 
one hand and ideas of imagination on the other each into a unified series 
or group, so that whilst the latter may attach itself to the inner core of 
feelings and corporeal activities already referred to, and thus constitute 
part at least of what the subject comes to regard as its own mental life, 
the former, in contradistinction thereto, may come to be regarded as the 
appearance or manifestation of the objective world of fact.36
Thinking, in the strict sense of the word, we should habitually describe 
35 Mind, xii, p. 368 sqq.
36 Cp. Adamson, Op. cit., vol. ii, p. 290.
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as voluntary activity; in thinking, I am not only active but am aware of 
myself as active. The problem that meets us here is essentially the same in 
kind as that which we encounter in reference to the voluntary execution 
or control of bodily movements. So soon as there has been established a 
definite separation in the mental life between trains of sense-presentations, 
feelings, and ideas, more or less habitual, and forming the individual self, 
and the transitory presentations and feelings which come and go, so soon 
as this consciousness of self has obtained a certain stability and fixedness, 
there is rendered possible that peculiar mode of discriminative apprehen-
sion which is dependent upon selection among a number of motives and 
upon forming ideas beforehand of changes to be effected. I allude here 
only to one point often lost sight of in psychological discussions of the 
problem. Whether the attitude of the subject be that which we denote as 
the initiation or as the control of movement, in both cases he is in total 
ignorance of the mechanism by means of which the actual movement is 
either brought about or restrained.37 The mechanism of movement is at all 
events not worked by him in any such fashion as that in which a concrete 
individual may set in motion or stop a piece of apparatus the parts of 
which lie before him at his disposal, and no analogy could well be less ap-
propriate than that between the relation of the operator to the movements 
of his machine and the relation of the conscious subject to the movements 
of his body. Bodily movements, however voluntary, come about as natural 
facts, and in consequence of strictly natural laws; the subject is in no way 
concerned in devising the conditions of their possibility. For him they are 
groups of motor presentations and the feelings in conjunction therewith 
– groups which become connected in his inner life with presentations and 
representations other than motor. The conscious control or direction of 
bodily movement must therefore depend upon the establishment of empir-
ical correlations between certain phases of the inner life and certain states 
of the bodily mechanism. Just as in mature experience we can repress an 
emotion by inhibiting the physical movement through which such emo-
tion finds manifestation, so in general we can restrain bodily movements 
by dwelling upon presentations or representations which involve as part 
of their content the cessation of such movements. Primarily, therefore, it is 
the process of Attention that lies at the root of any control we can exercise 
over bodily movement. And precisely the same process is involved in the 
control we exercise over a train of thought. Now, as already indicated, it 
is perfectly possible, and I believe psychologically imperative upon us, to 
offer an explanation of the phenomena of Attention by connecting, the 
process of Attending with the fundamental function of apprehension, the 
act namely of discriminating, of recognising differences and likenesses. 
When we consider that all sense-presentations through the mere fact of 
their bodily origin, are naturally conjoined with motor presentations, that 
those sense-presentations which are conjoined with motor experiences re-
37 Cp. Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, pp.287 sqq.
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lated to the continuance of pleasure or the removal of pain will attain rela-
tively the largest place in consciousness, that motor experiences connect 
themselves from the first with those permanent groups of presentations 
and feelings which gradually come to constitute the self, that the rise into 
consciousness of the distinction between self and not-self coincides for 
the most part with the gradual formation of the individual will, and that 
the conditions involved in the formation of the individual will are very 
largely the experiences connected with the movements of the body, we 
can, I think, understand to some extent, how it should come about that 
with the phenomena of Attention in its higher forms there should be as-
sociated those experiences of strain or of effort so familiar in the exercise 
of thinking in the strict sense of the term.
In the light of what has been said, there seems to be no insuperable dif-
ficulty in accounting for the fact that to the developed mind act and con-
tent do appear to be sharply distinguishable. If the discriminative activity 
involved in having the simplest sense-content is the same in kind as that 
involved in apprehension of a content of greatest complexity, if its pro-
cedure, whatever be the nature or variety of the contents discriminated, 
has a general similarity of character throughout, there is furnished by that 
circumstance alone an intelligible ground for the separation prominent 
enough in our mature experience.
Our apprehension of things tends, then, as mind develops to become 
less and less immediate and direct. The contents of our knowledge tend 
gradually to wear the aspect of an inward possession, almost of an instru-
ment wherewith we may proceed perceptively to interpret the world to be 
known. Our thoughts seem to withdraw themselves further and further 
from the sensuous occasions of perceiving, and to be more and more the 
outcome of a purely subjective activity. This subjectivity, however, is very 
different from that which we have had before us at various stages of our 
inquiry. It is by no means inconsistent with the pre-eminently objective 
character of thought. It is a consequence of the formation in us of a per-
manent consciousness of self and of the ways whereby the consciousness 
of self obtains definiteness and distinctness in our mental life. But such 
consciousness does not spring up de novo from some hidden depths of 
our being; it develops along parallel lines and contemporaneously with 
our consciousness of the external world, and it would be deprived of all 
content and meaning apart from the latter.
(ii) The Generality of Thought. – I notice, in the second place, cer-
tain characteristics of the generality usually ascribed to the products of 
thought. Roughly, generalisation may be said to be based upon the process 
of selecting a mark or feature, or combination of marks or features, and 
liberating it from other marks or features with which it has been presented 
in experience. Generalisation, in other words, is reached through means of 
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abstraction, and by abstraction the content of any perception or imagina-
tion is freed from a variety of accidental or temporary concomitants and 
dwelt upon for itself apart from these. Generalisation is certainly not ex-
hausted in the act of abstracting. For the present, however, we can confine 
ourselves to the latter. It implies the possibility of retaining and comparing 
presented contents: an inner life which had before it a mere stream of giv-
en contents, of presentations and their images, could never advance to the 
stage of isolating any aspect, quality or relation from the whole in which 
it had originally made its appearance. For whatever else may be given, it 
is clear that one content’s difference from another cannot be given in that 
content, and without some recognition of difference the initial step in the 
liberation just referred to could never be taken. In our ordinary experience 
no content can be recognised as in any way different from another with-
out thereby becoming to a certain extent generalised – loosened, that is to 
say, from some of the numerous details with which it had been originally 
apprehended; and every feature, thus detached from the content, and re-
leased from the limitations imposed upon it, acquires by that very fact a 
new significance.
Many psychologists have emphasised the truth that the process of ab-
straction must be operative throughout conscious experience, and that 
alike in its primitive and in its higher forms the process is in essence the 
same. Hamilton, for example, insists that a natural basis of abstraction 
may be found in the simplest cases of self-apprehension.38 Adamson, on 
the other hand, finds the natural basis of abstraction in the capacity for 
reviving in idea what has been presented through sense-perception, – a 
capacity which must be accepted as ultimate, and in respect of which a 
psychological explanation cannot be offered. No content, he points out, 
is ever revived with all the detail it possessed on its original appearance. 
Some mutilation. some deprivation of those features which went along 
with its primary presentation it must have undergone, if only because it 
is now apprehended in a different setting and in changed surroundings; 
to a certain extent it will be severed from the temporal conditions of its 
original appearance.39 And, as Mr. Bradley observes, there is every reason 
for supposing: that the lower we descend in the scale of animate nature, 
the more typical, the less distinct, the more vaguely universal will be the 
deposit of experience.40 Gradually, then, through repetition of experiences 
more or less identical in character, and through the emphasis imparted to 
such identity by revived presentations disengaged from varying features 
which belonged to them as at first presented, the primitive mind would 
have at its disposal a stock of images which may not inappropriately be 
called generic, –images, that is, which, whilst representing characteristics 
38 Lectures on Metaphysics, xxxiv.
39 Adamson, Op. cit., vol. ii, p. 294. 
40 Principles of Logic, p. 39.
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of an indefinite number of particulars, are not precisely copies of any one 
of them. In some such way we may conceive of the “pre-logical” stage 
in the development of cognition. Doubtless the process I have briefly in-
dicated is to a large extent mechanical, but it is not mechanical in the 
sense that it could proceed a single step without involving that function 
of discriminating and comparing, which we have insisted it is an error to 
suppose only comes into operation when presentations, already with defi-
niteness and precision of outline, are compared and related one to another 
by a deliberate act of reflection.
It is not, of course, suggested that the transition from the one stage 
of consciousness to the other is by any manner of means easy to retrace. 
No minimising of the difficulty involved in trying to recover the links 
of connection that unite the reflective with the primitive mind is implied 
in the contention that what separates the thinking consciousness from 
the rudimentary consciousness is not so much what one may call formal 
differences in the activity of apprehending as material differences in the 
content apprehended, the latter being dependent on the alteration which 
is brought about through the gradual development of the inner life. From 
the apprehension of different presentations to the apprehension of the 
differences qua differences, from the apprehension of related facts to the 
apprehension of the relations as distinct from the related facts, is probably 
the most tremendous stride that comes before us in the history of mind, 
but I believe it can be shown psychologically to be perfectly compatible 
with the course of mental evolution, without resort, after the manner of 
Lotze, to the hypothesis of a specific faculty of relating. Were we justified 
in assuming that before this distinction had been effected presentations 
and their images were themselves apprehended as completely formed and 
separate individuals in the way in which they are apprehended after the 
distinction has been established, then I admit it would be futile to seek for 
any continuous line of development from the one grade of consciousness 
to the other. But the relinquishment of Atoms in in psychology ought to 
carry with it acceptance of the view that the definite individuality, the in-
dependence, which in mature experience is assigned to presentations and 
their images, is itself a result of the recognition of relations as relations 
and would be impossible without it.
If, then, it be asked what conditions are involved in separating the dif-
ferences from the contents that differ, in concentrating attention upon the 
relations apart from the contents related, the reply is, in the first place, 
precisely those which have been indicated as involved in the formation of 
that recognition of unity which is denoted by the term self-consciousness. 
In fact, consciousness of self and apprehension of relations among the 
parts of presentative experience must be conceived as coming about pari 
passu; the one is not without the other. A concrete example will perhaps 
serve to illustrate my meaning. It is, as Dr. Ward very truly remarks, “a 
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long step” from a “succession of presentations “ to a “presentation of suc-
cession,” and Lotze, too, dwells upon this antithesis as furnishing support 
for his own theory of a specific relating faculty. And, when the problem is 
formulated in that way there does seem to be a prima facie case for Lotze’s 
position. For we immediately interpret the phrase a “succession of presen-
tations” in the ordinary popular sense; we imagine the presentations A, 
B, C each as an apprehended content complete and distinct in itself, and 
then there seems to be no way of escaping the inference that the idea of 
succession must necessarily be imposed upon them from an independent 
source. But if our isolation of A, B, C is itself a result, —in part, at all 
events, —of our applying to them the idea of succession, then it is clearly 
a ὕστερον πρότερον to assume such isolation as one of the data of the prob-
lem. On any supposition, however, the expression referred to is an inad-
equate mode of representing to ourselves the total experience out of which 
we, even in mature reflection, arrive at the judgment “B follows A and C 
follows B.” The situation is this. The presentations A, B, C appear in a 
whole complex of presentations and images, they are referred to the unity 
of the apprehending subject, they are attended to through a complicated 
process of discrimination and comparison, and although there is nothing 
in the content either of A or B or C to indicate that one is in a relation of 
sequence to the other, there may well be amongst the totality of the con-
comitants of each of them just those factors which enable us to recognise 
a relation of temporal sequence. Each of the presentations in question will 
be apprehended in connection with that group of perceptions, feelings 
and ideas, constituting the self, —a group, which, although as a whole 
relatively permanent, is yet also in the midst of constant change. The way, 
therefore, in which C stands to this identical factor will be different from 
the way in which B stood to it, and again from the way in which A stood 
to it, and we have thus data furnished on which the judgment of succes-
sion may be based. I do not pursue the analysis further; we are certainly 
not in a position to lay out anything like exhaustively the psychological 
factors involved. But enough has been said to indicate the extraordinarily 
complicated set of circumstances implied in even one of the simplest ideas 
of relation habitually employed by a thinking mind.
It may not be out of place to point out here that if this way of looking 
at the matter be the correct one, it defines our attitude towards a well-
worn philosophical doctrine. T. H. Green’s favourite Kantian dictum that 
“thought constitutes relations” expresses at the best only a half truth, 
and, at the worst, a positive error. What has been said would lead us 
rather to violently reverse the dictum and to insist that “relations consti-
tute thought.” Neither mode of statement is a happy one. What we do, 
however, need to realise is on the one hand that reflective thinking is only 
possible when relations have come to be recognised as relations, and on 
the other that we are not entitled to assert that such recognition is a neces-
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sary precondition of perceptive experience.
Were we attempting to give anything like a systematic account of the 
process of abstraction, it would of course be necessary to refer to the all 
important function discharged in our thinking by language and the use of 
signs. It would be well nigh impossible to preserve the generalised contents 
of conceptual thinking without the establishment of associations between 
them and particular empirical facts which serve to retain them at our com-
mand. In one respect, signs are themselves the outcome of abstraction,—
although particular empirical facts they are liberated from accidental fea-
tures which would tie them down to this or that special circumstance of 
our experience; in another respect, they are the indispensable auxiliaries 
of our abstract thinking,—they serve to make abstract ideas concrete by 
connecting them with the particular objects around us. Further, a word or 
symbol gives to the content symbolised a definiteness and independence, 
that at once constitutes a contrast between it and the series of particular 
presentations on which the conception of it was based. A perception yields 
us a content with a complex of characteristics, such as were only to be 
found at one particular time and under one particular set of conditions. A 
name or symbol never suggests all the detail of the perceived object, but 
calls up what rightly or wrongly we have taken to be its essential nature, 
and what we tend to regard as remaining the same amid a variety of unes-
sential concomitants. And, on that account alone, remembered facts tend 
to lose very largely their concrete character; we recall and depict to our-
selves facts and events more by means of words than by means of concrete 
imagery.
Partly for this reason, one would be inclined to reject the view that 
there must always be present in the mind when we employ ideas or gen-
eral notions a mental image or picture of some kind from which the idea 
is abstracted. One might indeed question whether we ever have before 
us in reflective thinking images that could possibly be called individu-
al or particular. The immense variety in the contents of our thought,—
a variety due not merely to differences in the power of abstraction but 
to the manifold nature of what may be object of contemplation,—ren-
ders it probable that it depends largely upon the nature of the matter 
under consideration whether there will be much or little or no imag-
ery involved in our thinking. If the objects of our thought be concrete 
and particular, then doubtless we shall have before us a relatively large 
amount of representative imagery. Such imagery may take the form of a 
sort of typical instance, or of a rapid succession of different instances each 
possessing some special features, or of representations in vague indefinite 
fashion of some of the marks or attributes of the things about which we 
are thinking. But in all such cases, the images would be no more mental 
states or events, they would be as truly “meanings,” however vaguely 
they might be apprehended, as the ideas conceived by their help. If, on the 
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other hand, the objects of our reflection be abstract or general in charac-
ter, then probably representative imagery will be reduced to a minimum 
or be entirely absent. That we are able to apprehend abstract relations at 
all, to attend to some features of a thing and not to others, is in itself quite 
sufficient ground to warrant the assertion that in thinking we need not 
necessarily have before us any concrete mental picture.
(iii) The Objectivity of Thought. —Abstraction, we have said, is only 
one phase of generalisation. “The concept,” as Nettleship puts it, “is not 
made general by being abstracted, its generality means its capability of 
being abstracted.”41 A concept or general notion is certainly very much 
more than a merely attenuated or impoverished particular, very much 
more than a “wandering adjective” divorced from the content of a mental 
image. Were it no more, what Mr. Bradley describes as thought’s chief 
characteristic,—its invariable reference to an objective connection in the 
real world,—would be inexplicable. Let us look for a moment at this char-
acteristic. Thinking seems to stand, so to speak, aloof from the mechanical 
order in which our presentations and representations happen to come and 
go; the principles according to which valid thinking is conditioned are not 
the laws according to which occurrences take place in the mental life. The 
content of thought refers to that, which in Lotze’s phraseology, has its 
being and meaning in itself, and which continues to be what it is and to 
mean what it means, whether we are conscious of it or no.
So long as the old method of distinguishing Thinking from Perceiv-
ing,—by the help, namely, of the opposition between general, in the sense 
of abstract, and individual, in the sense of concrete,—is adhered to, it 
must be confessed that the characteristic of Thought just indicated rais-
es an awkward psychological problem. How should we account for the 
fact that precisely those contents of apprehension which ought to bear 
upon them the very stamp of subjectivity should somehow exhibit the 
most decided reference to that which is not subjective? Let it, however, 
be granted that, in the history of mind, we start with vague, indefinite, 
crudely differentiated contents, that what comes first in experience can 
be described neither as general, if by that we mean the generality ascribed 
to concepts or judgments, nor yet as individual, if by that we mean the 
individuality ascribed to the concrete objects of our mature perception, 
then it would seem to follow that progress in knowledge ought to be con-
ceived as taking place along two lines of advance, which need not by any 
means be diverging from one another, but may well be tending towards 
a common goal. A psychological examination of the activity of knowing 
would yield abundant evidence of the soundness of this position. No ap-
prehending mind ever rests content with a bare abstract generality. Each 
generality acquired enables the relatively indefinite experience from amid 
which it has been gathered to be viewed as a group of more determi-
41 Philosophical Lectures and Remains, vol. i, p. 220.
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nate individual facts, these facts are at the same time disengaged from 
masses of irrelevant surroundings, and thus gradually come to stand out, 
as it were, in well-defined relief against a background whose parts form 
a confused and ill-differentiated whole. Each individual fact, thereby ren-
dered determinate, is apprehended as sharing in features common to, par-
ticipated in by, other individual facts, which latter facts in their turn are 
thus increasingly individualised and differentiated from one another. The 
child mind that has extracted from some fact of perceptive experience, say 
a chair, the elementary idea of hardness, never keeps this quality floating 
in the air, but forthwith proceeds to find it in as many other facts as pos-
sible. By a series of rudimentary judgments, the vague objects from which 
the child mind starts are seen to have general characteristics, and the larg-
er the number of such characteristics recognised, the less vague, the more 
individual, do the objects of its experience become. And, conversely, the 
larger the number of objects to which a general characteristic is ascribed, 
and the greater the amount of difference they are otherwise seen to possess, 
so much the more definite and distinct does the general characteristic itself 
become. The child’s first apprehension of a general notion is certainly no 
less vague that his first apprehension of a particular object; only by slow 
degrees does its essential meaning gradually begin to appear. And what is 
true in this respect of knowledge in its earlier stages is likewise true, mu-
tatis mutandis, of knowledge in all its stages. Every great scientific gener-
alisation carries with it a more accurate and definite individualising of the 
particulars in which it finds exemplification. If Newton abstracted from 
the particular phenomenon of a falling apple the law of universal gravita-
tion, the falling apple must immediately have become transformed for him 
into a much more pronounced and distinctive individuality than it had ever 
been before. By discerning in it an identity with all other moving bodies, he 
was at the same time determining with greater precision its points of dif-
ference from them. Knowledge, then, advancing by a series of judgments, 
exhibits a two-fold progress, on the one hand analytical, and on the other 
synthetical,—on the one hand, an ever-increasing number of recognised 
distinctions, on the other, an ever-increasing richness and fulness of the 
individual concrete objects into which the whole has been differentiated. 
“It is not,” as T. H. Green puts it, “that there is first analysis and then 
synthesis, or vice versa, but that in and with the putting together of experi-
ences, the world before us, which is for us to begin with confusedly every-
thing and definitely nothing, is resolved into distinctness; or, conversely, 
that as resolved into distinctness, it assumes definite features which can be 
combined.”42
When, in the light of these considerations, we turn to the problem of 
the objective character of Thought, we find ourselves relieved of at least 
one perplexity that has baffled many of those who have attempted its solu-
42 Works of T. H. Green, vol. ii, p. 193.
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tion. We have no longer to account for the “objectification of the subjec-
tive”; that which in thinking we recognise as objective is not something 
which had a prior mode of appearance as subjective. The objectivity of 
Thought implies no sudden introduction of a new factor into conscious 
experience. It implies rather the explicit unfolding of what was implic-
itly involved in the more elementary processes of mind, those processes, 
already alluded to, whereby apprehension of the difference between self 
and not-self, inner experience and outer world of reality, gradually took 
its rise. If, with Adamson, we fix upon extendedness as that feature in the 
contents of primitive apprehension which furnished the earliest basis of 
the experience of the objective,43 then it must not be assumed that such 
recognition of a quantitative extensity originally emerged from what at 
first was mere qualitative intensity. Our mode of expressing an ultimate 
distinction labours unavoidably under the disadvantage of making it ap-
pear as though one member of the distinction preceded the other,—in this 
case, as though the subject’s recognition of its own character as purely 
psychical and qualitative preceded its recognition of quantitative exten-
sion on the part of the object. But if what we understand by qualitative in-
tensity attained its peculiar meaning only in antithesis to, in contrast with 
quantitative extendedness, then the latter can by no means be regarded as 
logically posterior to the former, and, in however dim and crude a fashion, 
the opposing characteristics of extendedness and non-extendedness must 
have arisen in consciousness together. Starting, then, with this antithesis 
and taking account of that development in the mental life which later en-
ables a distinction to be drawn between the direct immediate experience 
of perception and the indirect mediate experience of reflective thinking, 
we can represent to ourselves, in a general way, how it comes about that, 
whilst on the one hand the contents of thought acquire more and more the 
character of generality, they should yet, on the other, retain throughout 
that objective significance, the earlier and cruder manifestation of which 
was a feature in primitive perceptive experience. For the generalising and 
comparative work of thought will always appear to have space perception 
as its basis, as that on which its discriminating and reflective activity is 
directed. From first to last its distinctions will be made and its compari-
sons instituted between features in the objective sphere, so that there will 
be no reason why it should not, but every reason why it should, represent 
the laws of dependence amongst individual facts as being in no way less 
real than the individual facts which exemplify them. Even that highly spe-
cialised mode of reflective thinking which makes the inner life itself an 
object of contemplation can only be carried out in so far as that inner life 
is conceived as related to, and in intimate connection with, the world of 
extended things in space.
One other circumstance may be mentioned as contributing to the same 
43 Op. cit., vol. i, p. 291 sqq.
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result. In conceptual thinking, even though attention be strenuously ex-
ercised, there is a relatively small proportion of personal feeling. And this 
for two reasons. In the first place, as thinking tends to dwell more and 
more in the region of generalities, it will liberate itself no less from the 
concomitants of individual feeling than from the accidental concomitants 
of presentation. And in the second place, the explicit reference to the ob-
jective connections of what is signified by the contents of its reflections 
will tend to concentrate interest on those objective connections to the ex-
clusion of mere personal interest.
vii. thought and reality
Is, then, we may fitly ask in conclusion, the claim to objective significance 
which the contents of our thinking carry with them one that can stand 
the test of critical examination? Have we any reason for supposing either 
from the character of the thought process itself, or from the mode of its 
development, that the interpretation of reality which through the exercise 
of reflective thinking the human mind is gradually attaining, not merely 
falls short of expressing the full meaning of that reality, but so misrepre-
sents it that it must for ever escape our grasp?
As in previous cases, we may draw out our answer to this question by 
criticising at first another answer. In Mr. Bradley’s view, thought, as the 
interpreter of reality, suffers from an incurable limitation, inherent, so to 
speak, in its very nature. Briefly, that limitation arises from the fact that 
thought is from beginning to end discursive in character, —it never succeeds 
in surmounting the distinctions in instituting which its procedure consists. 
Mr. Bradley does not, of course, ignore the synthesis involved in an act of 
judgment; it is indeed the cardinal feature of his doctrine that in judging we 
re-unite a “what” and a “that,” which have been provisionally estranged. 
But the synthesis or reunion of the distinguished implies, notwithstanding, 
a “separation, which, though it is over-ridden, is never unmade.” In the 
midst of its synthetic function, in the act, namely, of attributing a quality 
to reality, thought has to consent to a partial abnegation. “It has to recog-
nise the division of the ‘what’ from the ‘that,’ and it cannot so join these 
aspects as to get rid of mere ideas and arrive at actual reality.” Even when 
the judgment is complete, the divorced elements never are restored to solid 
unity.44
If we start as Mr. Bradley does with a sensuous datum, assumed to be 
experienced in some unique way, in some way, that is to say, absolutely 
different from that in which the facts of the objective world are or can be 
apprehended by us, and if that unique experience furnishes the only hold 
we can secure on reality, then it follows inevitably that an attempt to reach 
44 Appearance and Reality, chapter xv.
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a reality beyond is doomed, from the necessity of the case, to at least the 
degree of disability indicated in the above quotations. The only question 
one could raise would be whether its disability is not of a much more seri-
ous kind. For observe how we stand. Our mental life consists of psychical 
states or events, each possessed of two aspects, existence and content, 
the content being the complex of qualities and relations constituting the 
character of the existence. These psychical states are our data; their occur-
rence is our experiencing; in their case reality (or such degree of reality as 
belongs to them) and experience are one and the same. So far there is no 
thought and no logical judgment. But certain of these psychical states, qua 
existences, are signs of an immediate relation to, a direct encounter with, 
a reality beyond themselves. In sense-presentation we are in actual contact 
with this reality, but such contact in itself only assures us that the reality 
is and not what it is. By means of the judgment we qualify, interpret, im-
part meaning to the signified real. And we are enabled to do so, because 
the psychical state, which qua existence is in contact with the presented 
reality, is qua content a mental image, part of which can be used ideally 
and referred to that which is beyond itself. The subject of the judgment 
is the signified real, the predicate a portion of the content of the mental 
image, abstracted from the rest, fixed by the mind as a universal, and at-
tached to the signified real. It is, then, clear why the unification involved 
in an act of judgment never can present us with a concrete reality, such as 
that which has been mutilated in order that the act of judging should take 
place. The subject of the judgment cannot own its predicate in the same 
way as the mental image owned its content, and that for two reasons. In 
the first place, it is a different existent from the mental image and its con-
tent, therefore, must be different from the content of the mental image; 
and, in the second place, a fragment of content torn from its particular 
setting in one context has not thereby been fitted, by being deprived of 
its clothing45 for transportation into another context, “to live on strange 
soils, under other skies, and through changing seasons.” But these do not 
exhaust the difficulties of the situation. Consider again the subject of the 
judgment. It is a “reality beyond the act,” which the thinking mind en-
counters directly in sense-presentation. Yet that alone which the thinking 
mind can immediately experience, according to the view of “immediate 
experience” adopted by Mr. Bradley, will be the result of the encounter; 
that there has been an encounter, that the encounter signifies a reality be-
yond the act, that the reality beyond the act is continuous with the present 
sensation, and that it is of such a character as to permit the ascription to 
it of an ideal content,—all this may be true, but, in any case, is something 
of which the thinking subject can only become aware by judging, and, 
instead of guaranteeing the validity of judgment, itself presupposes such 
validity. Consider, once more, the predicate. It is an adjective, a meaning, 
a universal idea, and its universality consists in its being cut loose from its 
45 Cp. Principles of Logic, p. 9.
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own existence and referred to a reality beyond. How, then, are we to ac-
count for this reference, and how are we to justify it? We have seen, at an 
earlier stage of our inquiry, how Mr. Bradley would answer the first part of 
the question. “Facts,” he insists, “which are not ideal and which show no 
looseness of content from existence, seem hardly actual.”46 And by way of 
explanation we are reminded that given fact “changes in our hands,” and 
“compels us to perceive inconsistency of content.” Consequently, “this 
content cannot be referred merely to its given ‘that’ but is forced beyond 
it, and is made to qualify something outside.” But, why should changes in 
given fact be perceived as inconsistency of content? Awareness of inconsis-
tency involves surely some sort of idea of the demands of consistency and 
that the merely sentient mind is ex hypothesi not in a position to attain. 
In other words, the loosening of content from existence presupposes the 
objective reference of thought, and cannot, therefore, be assumed in order 
to account for its emergence. And even were it otherwise, it would still 
require to be shown on what grounds we are entitled to use an adjective 
abstracted from a psychical state to qualify an existence outside of it. For 
in the first place, granted that the psychical state is a sign, we can never be 
sure that it is a sign of the right meaning. And in the second place, if we 
take the immediate experience of a psychical state as our criterion of real-
ity, then to dismember this reality which is immediately experienced and 
to use one of the disjecta membra to qualify the reality which is not im-
mediately experienced seems to contradict in violent fashion the assumed 
criterion. As a “wandering adjective” the idea could no longer qualify so 
much as the psychical state, and its radical incapacity in this respect can 
hardly establish its claim to qualify that which lies beyond. Accordingly, 
the conclusion appears to be inevitable that the procedure of thinking has 
set out on the wrong track; that in attempting to reach reality, it is getting 
farther and farther away from it and that the more we think about the 
world, the less we know about it.
Thought, then, on this view of it, seems condemned to be confronted 
for ever by its own insoluble problem. The pathway to objective knowl-
edge, to knowledge of the real world of fact, has been foreclosed at the 
outset by masses of psychical material which block up the mind’s every 
way of exit to the realm of nature. No amount of manipulation of a men-
tal state will make it more than a mental state, or constitute the “idea” 
that results therefrom into anything other than an attenuated mental im-
age. In short, if we treat mental states not simply as modes of experiencing 
but as data experienced, they will possess the entire field, and thought will 
be no more able than sense to transcend them.
We have here before us the large problem of the validity of judgment, 
and I propose only to indicate briefly the way in which the line of reflec-
tion we have been pursuing has bearing upon it. That perhaps can best be 
46 Appearance and Reality, chapter xv.
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done by bringing together for comparison the three different significations 
which the term “subjective” may possess when applied to thinking and its 
products.
The first of these we have been encountering in one form or another 
throughout the foregoing discussion, and it is prominent in the theory of 
judgment we have just been considering. Thought is subjective because 
besides being itself an activity of mind, the material from which it takes its 
departure is also psychical, because although the ideas which it employs 
are not psychical existences, they are yet abstracted from particular facts 
or events which are psychical existences, and can therefore never lose the 
mental colouring that saturates them from the start. If thought converts 
the “degradation” of psychical events to its “ideal uses,” yet “it builds 
its own world out of them,” and there is no escaping the conclusion that 
its world may be not only a “beggarly show” as contrasted with the real 
world, but a wretched and delusive caricature of the latter. In short, on 
these premisses, absolute scepticism can entrench itself with a security 
that is proof against any and every kind of attack.47 Now, we have seen 
reason for holding that neither sense-presentation nor thought is subjec-
tive in this sense. Sense-presentations, as we have been regarding them, 
are no more affections or modifications of the individual mind, no more 
constituent parts of the mind’s existent nature, than the most exalted idea 
ever framed. They are not bits of consciousness, not pieces of mental fact; 
from the outset, they are qualities which the mind discriminates in the 
reality that confronts it, such aspects of the real world as its powers of 
discriminating enable it to apprehend.
If the view we are defending be correct, it is misleading to say that the 
reference of an idea to reality is first introduced by the judgment, or that in 
the subject of a judgment there is an element of existence which is absent 
from the predicate. Both the subject and the predicate of a judgment are 
contents of apprehension, each is a discriminated aspect of the real. If the 
judgment be an assertion about some concrete fact, then its subject is the 
representation in the form of content of that concrete fact from which the 
person judging starts. He may, of course, take some feature of that content 
and predicate it of the subject, but in that case his judgment will be analyt-
ic, and will not advance his knowledge. Every synthetic judgment, on the 
other hand, will add a characteristic to the content from which he starts; 
it will thus transform for him the concrete fact, and enrich it by a new 
determination. In either case, the predicate will be an “idea,” abstracted 
not from a mental event but from contents representative of objective real-
ity. As Dr. Bosanquet puts it, although he seems often to depart from his 
dictum, “there is in knowledge no passage from subjective to objective, 
but only development of the objective.” No doubt in every judgment the 
47 Cp. Mr. Carr’s paper on “The Metaphysical Criterion and its Implications,” in the last 
volume of the Proceedings.
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“idea” is held suspended in thought before it is predicated of the subject. 
Such “division” of predicate from subject is not, however, the essence of 
an act of judgment. There is no judgment until the two are brought into 
connection, until there is a putting into one of two contents, a σύνθεσις 
νοημάτων, in Aristotle’s phraseology.
In regard to a second signification of the term “subjective,” the attitude 
we have taken has been of another kind. We have admitted, as, indeed, un-
der any supposition must be admitted, that in one sense both thinking and 
perceiving are subjective. Even were we anxious to maintain that things 
exactly correspond with the ordinary popular conception of them, that 
they are known in their real relations by the finite minds apprehensive of 
them, it would still be the case that such knowing on the part of the subject 
would be subjective in the sense of being an act or process of the mind it-
self. There could be no knowledge without that antithesis between know-
ing and the known; even omniscient knowledge could not transcend it, for 
it is implied in the very notion of knowledge. To demand of knowledge 
that it shall be one with the object known is tantamount to demanding 
that knowledge shall both be and not be knowledge. But “does it not seem 
absurd to say, that by interposition of mind, by which alone knowledge is 
possible, knowledge is at the same time impossible? What alone renders 
something possible, alone renders it impossible! I know, but because I 
know, I do not know! I see, but because I see, I do not see! Is it a fact, then, 
that because both—subject and object—are present in cognition, the one 
must be destroyed by the other, and not that cognition may be made true, 
but that it may be made false? In a word, is it not worth while to consider 
the whole antithesis: an object is known because there is a subject to know 
it; an object is not known because there is a subject to know it.”48 The 
consideration here suggested is one that may be approached from many 
sides; we have come to it along the road of psychological inquiry. And un-
less our inquiry has been wholly misdirected, we have obtained a result of 
no small importance with respect to the antithesis thus propounded. For 
we are now in a position to assert that the subjectivity which is of neces-
sity implied in all knowledge, inasmuch as knowledge is dependent on the 
activity of a knowing mind, has not in itself a vitiating influence upon the 
knowledge it is the means of obtaining. The activity of knowing throws 
no colour of its own upon that representation of the world of fact which 
through it is possible, simply because it has no colour of its own to throw. 
In essence, it is throughout a process of discriminating, comparing and re-
lating; and there is nothing in such a process that need of necessity distort 
or falsify the contents which thus come into recognition. As an activity 
of this kind, it cannot itself get in the way of that which it discriminates, 
compares and relates; it gives no form, in the Kantian sense, no portion 
of its own being to the contents that in and through it make their appear-
48 J. H. Stirling, Annotations to Schwegler’s History of Philosophy, pp. 391-2.
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ance. Accordingly, scepticism must relinquish the general ground it is en-
abled to occupy so long as subjectivity is interpreted in the way we have 
previously noticed, and, if it is to obtain a foothold at all, must depend 
upon the strength of the ease it can make out for distrusting knowledge 
on account of the difficulty of discriminating, comparing and relating the 
manifold and complex objects upon which the mind’s activity is directed. 
This, however, implies a complete change of front so far as the sceptical 
argument is concerned; it is no longer the inherent nature of knowledge, 
as such, but the imperfection due to our limited powers of knowing, that 
is the rock of offence, —an imperfection which the growth and expansion 
of those powers will gradually tend to overcome.
Subjectivity has yet a third significance with reference more specifically 
to the process of thinking, a significance the basis of which I have tried to 
exhibit in dealing with the characteristics of thought as contrasted with 
sense-perception. We have seen how the contents of acquired knowledge 
gradually come to be conceived as the property of the self, which, in ma-
ture experience, we are able to make an object of our contemplation. The 
self is regarded as possessing a body of knowledge, as having at its dis-
posal a whole storehouse of notions and categories wherewith to arrange 
and interpret the details of experience. In receding from sense-perception 
to ideas of imagination and concepts of discursive thinking, we see in to 
be withdrawing from the real word of fact into an inner world of our own 
construction, and the question inevitably arises whether the formation of 
the latter does not in turn distract and pervert our view of the former. In 
other words, is not the direct and immediate apprehension of an unre-
flecfcive mind more likely faithfully to discriminate the features of reality 
than the apprehension of a mind that brings to the task a host of ideas 
and thoughts with which to interpret what is actually presented in sense-
experience? The characteristic of fact, it may be said, is its concreteness, 
whilst the characteristic of our ideas and concepts is their universality. In 
the order of fact, it may be urged, the parts seem to be connected through 
the relatively external relations of co-existence and sequence, whilst in the 
order of thought, ideas and concepts are connected through the relations 
of logical dependence. Does it not follow, then, that our thought proceeds 
after a fashion of its own and that it imposes on the materials furnished 
to it forms that are entirely peculiar to itself? Undoubtedly this conclusion 
would be difficult to resist on the assumption that thought is a “fundamen-
tally distinct mental function” which operates upon presentations given to 
it by means of another “fundamentally distinct mental function.” But if 
that assumption be, as we have contended, unwarranted, if the process of 
thinking be, in truth, a development from the more primitive process of 
sense apprehension and continuous with it in nature, then we are entitled 
to answer the question just propounded with a decided negative. We are 
entitled to point out that universality is not a feature abruptly introduced 
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into the contents of apprehension when we begin to contemplate them re-
flectively, that, on the contrary, it is implicitly involved in the crude presen-
tations of the rudimentary consciousness, and that so soon as a perceived 
object is regarded as having a permanent existence of its own, and as be-
ing common to a number of percipient minds, the qualities discriminated 
in it are tacitly recognised as universal. Universality, therefore, instead of 
being a form of our individual thinking, is a characteristic which we dis-
cover in all the materials with which our modes of apprehension are con-
cerned. And so, too, with reference to the relations of logical dependence. 
They are in no sense accidents due to the particular mechanism of think-
ing on the part of finite subjects. It is perfectly true that those relations 
which we represent by means of judgments and syllogisms are not to be 
regarded as precise copies or counterparts of relations that subsist in the 
world of real fact. But in the first place, we never, in our thinking, assume 
any such literal correspondence; thought never claims for its relations of 
logical dependence that they are more than generalised representations of 
those modes of systematic connectedness which we gradually come to dis-
cover in reality as a whole. And, in the second place, our activity of think-
ing is not some miraculous function suddenly transported into a world 
alien to it; it has itself originated and developed as part of that world; its 
growth has been throughout conditioned and determined by the very ma-
terial upon which in turn it comes to be exercised, and which we have no 
ground whatever for supposing has been engaged in the strange freak of 
so shaping the discriminative process as to convert it into a mechanism for 
distorting and defiling that which fashioned it. The categories of thought, 
then, are not mere forms invented by capricious finite minds; they are con-
tents with the aid of which reality becomes intelligible to finite minds, and 
which finite minds have been constrained to elaborate by the reality thus 
rendered intelligible. Subjectivity, therefore, in the sense we are now using 
the term, offers no inherent obstacle to the attainment of objective truth. 
And generally, it may be said, that a similar line of argument is relevant 
in regard to the influence of what is sometimes called the “personal equa-
tion” upon our intellectual representations of things. As the gradual result 
of development, the finite subject does, no doubt, reach a consciousness of 
self that has a pronounced and definite character of its own; and, in conse-
quence, his apprehension of what is other than self will to a certain extent 
bear upon it the stamp of his particular individuality. “Strata upon strata, 
from acquired habit, through deep-seated hereditary instincts down to the 
vital energies of the body, lie beneath the clearer, thinner atmosphere of 
thinking, and he is a poor psychologist who does not recognise the endur-
ing influence of these lower layers.49 Yet, in this connection, it is in the 
first place again to be remembered that the individual self-consciousness 
is not, so far as any of its instincts or interests are concerned, a lawless or 
an unaccountable factor in the scheme of things, but has itself grown up 
and developed through participation in the world of real fact, apart from 
49 Adamson, Moral Theory and Practice, in the volume Ethical Democracy, p. 241.
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which it would have no instincts or interests at all; and it is to be observed, 
in the second place, that the advance of knowledge largely consists in 
eliminating and correcting the errors that arise through the idiosyncrasies 
of this or that knowing mind.
Philosophical reflexion is, at the present day, face to face with an antith-
esis, the importance of which is only by degrees beginning to be realised. On 
the one hand, the assumption that “immediate experience” or sentience is 
the one and only hold we possess on reality leads by easy steps to the position 
of Mach, and in large measure also of Avenarius, that the activity of thinking 
has no other function to discharge than that of enabling us to arrange and 
systematise, in as simple and “economical” a way as possible what is thus 
“given” directly through sense. So regarded, thoughts or notions have only 
significance in so far as they subserve this purpose of “economy”; the 
concepts of science become mere signs or symbols, useful for reducing the 
multiplicity of sensuous experience to some kind of manageable order, 
but utterly misleading if they are supposed to represent anything actual in 
the universe of being. On the other hand, the rejection of the assumption 
in question need not by any means imply that thinking is to be identi-
fied with the structure of reality, or even that the products of thought 
are forthwith to be taken as strictly accurate representations of the real 
world of fact. But it does imply that the reflective scientific interpretation 
of nature is infinitely nearer the truth of things than the crude, uncritical 
discriminations of the ordinary consciousness. It does imply that Hegel’s 
splendid confidence in reason was not unjustified, although the justifica-
tion rests on other grounds than those upon which he reposed it. “There 
is,” to use Adamson’s weighty words, “a contradiction in supposing that 
thought—which is but the methodised fashion of reaching self-conscious-
ness, of defining, therefore, in their relation to one another the parts of 
reality within our experience—should by its own nature be incapable of 
solving problems which it must put to itself, even although, as a continu-
ous process, it has still much to achieve.”
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RECENT psychology, recent logic, and recent speculation are at one in 
laying stress upon the solidarity between man’s “theoretical” and “practi-
cal” activities. Without the implication of acceptance or rejection of the 
metaphysical contentions of “Pragmatism” we may usefully fall in with 
the prevailing fashion in Thought so far as to replace the current static 
conception of Science as a body of truths by a dynamic conception of it 
as a definite pursuit. Such a conception of it is adopted in this paper. Sci-
ence is here conceived as a definite secular conative process which may be 
distinguished in and traced through the conscious life of civilisation. Only 
when a scientific “result” is thus considered in connexion with the whole 
conscious process of ‘which it is the “end” can we hope (as Mach taught 
us long ago) to submit it to profitable criticism. Since some such criticism 
is aimed at in this paper, it follows that either an attempt must be made to 
characterise that process or some current characterisation must be adopt-
ed as satisfactory. As I do not know one which I can accept as altogether 
suitable for my purpose, the former alternative must be embraced.
The statement that the conative process with which Science is iden-
tified reaches its end only in the enunciation of judgments of a certain 
class will probably be received without demur. Nor, if I say that these 
judgments refer to the Objective in experience will it be complained that 
I am ungenerously narrowing their field. The whole “furniture of earth 
and choir of heaven,” “ the starry heavens without and the moral law 
within” are but items in the inventory of the Objective. At the same time, 
although the Objective is here conceived as containing much more than 
“physical nature,” it has its limits, and does not include everything that 
(in Mr. Bradley’s phrase) can be set over against the set, and so become an 
“object” of attention; not everything that (because it can be thought of) is 
maintained by Mr. Moore and Mr. Russell to have Being. A round square 
and Colonel Newcome are examples of objects of thought which are to 
be excluded from the Objective. We can, it would seem, characterise them 
by saying that these objects lack a certain priority to and independence 
of our thinking which is the necessary mark and guarantee of undoubted 
items of the Objective. It may be difficult to refute the argument that 
Colonel Newcome must have had being before 1854 or Thackeray could 
not have thought of him, but it will hardly be maintained that Thackeray 
discovered him “in just the same sense in which Columbus discovered the 
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West Indies.” At most it could be claimed (presumably) that “the elements 
so mixed in him” subsisted before Thackeray, by selecting them, brought 
them into a special relation in which they were not related prior to the act, 
and so “created” the Colonel.
The same distinction might have been indicated by saying, that the 
Objective contains everything that must be “reckoned with,” everything 
that must be considered as a datum for human action. From this point 
of view it is clear that although Colonel Newcome forms no part of the 
Objective, Thackeray’s conception of him does, being a thing that has in-
fluenced human action on a comparatively large scale, and being precisely 
the conception it was and no other in virtue of its particular content, 
which must be distinguished from its object. Similarly, the Objectivity of 
my thought of a round square is demonstrated if it moves me to mirth or 
becomes so irresistibly attractive as to make me a “case” for the alienist.
But I am not disposed – at least without a struggle – to accept the 
position that this relevance to action is the essence of the Objective, and 
not merely a property of it coordinate with others. My whole paper is in 
a sense a contribution to the discussion of this burning question, so that 
I will make here only one suggestion – a suggestion that has probably oc-
curred to many. If to be Objective means to have a relevance to purpose 
and action, how is it that we recognise material things and thoughts as 
having that relevance before the course of events has revealed it? Why do 
I ascribe Objectivity to the hundred thalers on the table, and deny it to 
the content of my thought of a hundred thalers before I have attempted to 
spend or even to touch them? The reply that it is because the former are 
like in all respects to thalers which have been things “to reckon with” – 
or upon, while the latter are not, is plausible in this special case, but does 
not seem sufficient to meet the general case of the recognition of Objective 
existents before experience of their relevance to action. Surely, we may 
retort, the perception of this similarity which is the signal of subsequent 
relevance to action is the direct and simple perception of the presence of 
Objectivity as such – a property which as a matter of fact is accompanied 
by the property of relevance to action.
In a somewhat similar way we may meet the contention that the Ob-
jective is that which is “the same for all.” Upon this view the “finite cen-
tres” in which all experience occurs, find it at once possible, and necessary 
for the development of intercourse with other centres, to “pool “ a large 
part of their experience, and this common matter becomes the objective 
world, exterior to all and the same for all. Some writers (e.g., M. Poincaré) 
attribute a very great importance in this connexion to language, which 
they seem to regard as actually the means by which a “same for all” comes 
to exist, and not merely the means of our becoming aware that it does ex-
ist. Here we may repeat our objection that the Objective is known directly 
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as such prior to the discovery that it is the same for all. We may add in 
this case the further objection that in the inventory of the Objective we 
include not only unique experiences in the world of physical existents – 
such as astronomical observations incapable of repetition – but also the 
whole world of psychical existents, whose very nature it is to appear in the 
“panorama” surrounding a single centre only. Not a single feature of such 
facts can be excluded from the operations of Science, yet how can they be 
regarded as “the same for all”? Only, I submit, by a kind of extrapolation 
from that part of the Objective – “physical reality” – which, as a matter 
of fact is the same for all. We must say, that is, of such experiences, not 
that being the same for all they become Objective, but that being Objec-
tive (simpliciter) they are regarded as the same for all, and therefore, part 
of the proper subject matter of Science. Being experiences whose content 
announces itself as independent of the self of the moment over against 
which they are set, they may be thought of as occurring with an identical 
character in any centre. They become, that is, objects whose features, like 
those of “material objects” are capable of exact determination without 
reference to their presentation at all – although, of course, their position 
as a class of existents is fixed by their peculiar relation to the “finite cen-
tre” in which they occur.
The actual contents of the Objective must be reviewed very briefly. 
“Everyone except a philosopher,” says Mr. Russell,1 “can see the differ-
ence between a post and my idea of a post.” I ignore this uncompliment-
ary reservation and assume that we are all prepared to admit not only 
that they are existents of different orders, but also that both have (like 
all existents) the character of Objectivity – the post, because it would 
be the particular thing which it is, even if I did not happen to see it; the 
idea because it would be an idea with just that particular content, even if 
I did not happen to perceive that I had “had” it. Difficulty only arises in 
the absence of the plain guarantee of “priority” which the perception of 
existence itself gives. In this case, to quote Mr. Russell again, “there exists 
everywhere the greatest confusion” – confusion that can only be removed 
by the frank recognition of another type of Objectivity which we may call 
Objective subsistence. If we think of the number 100, or of π, or of the 
tangent to an ellipse it must be recognised that the object of our thought 
has a priority to our thinking, that entitles it to be called Objective in the 
same sense as existents must be called Objective. Such objects of thought 
present themselves as features of experience which must be “reckoned 
with,” and are not subject to our caprice. They may not be obvious to 
untrained inspection any more than the finer details of a microscopic sec-
tion are, but when once envisaged by the competent mental eye they are 
observed to have their peculiar features as a matter of fact, quite apart 
from the observation. In Mr. Russell’s forcible phrase such “subsistents” 
1 Russell, Principles of Mathematics, i, p. 451.
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must be “discovered in just the same sense in which Columbus discovered 
the West Indies”: – they are Objective subsistents.
The Objective, of course, contains – and Science accepts at the outset 
of its task – a great deal more than the very general distinctions that have 
just been made. Lack of time forbids me to attempt more than to indi-
cate its further contents roughly by saying that they constitute the “plain 
man’s” view of the world. My omission to deal with them more fully is 
more than compensated by the fact that I am able to refer you to Profes-
sor Stout’s convincing paper on “Primary and Secondary Qualities” read 
before this Society in 1903, with the results of which I cordially agree. 
The main point of Professor Stout’s paper is his rehabilitation of the sec-
ondary qualities as equally objective with the primary qualities of things. 
The explanation of the prevailing confusion upon the subject is without 
doubt that subsequent criticism has tampered here so constantly and for 
so long a time with the unsophisticated deliverances of the “plain man’s” 
consciousness that it is not easy to ascertain precisely what those deliver-
ances are.
To take one or two simple instances. The thing which is bright at noon, 
becomes grey at nightfall. Two materials whose colours “match” in sun-
light, in candlelight are obviously discordant. To credit these changes in 
colour to the things themselves is not (I submit) the consequence of “a 
natural fallacy of ordinary thinking,” but only appears in that character 
in the light of special scientific attempts to “explain” the phenomena. But 
such explanations simply show that these objective facts are in necessary 
relation to other occurrences which may be conceived in terms of pri-
mary qualities only. This relation does not destroy the Objectivity of the 
phenomena in question any more than the demonstration of a necessary 
relation between psychoses and brain changes destroys the Objectivity of 
the former.
Without further argument, then, I assume the truth of what I take to 
be the view enunciated by Professor Stout, and reaffirmed recently before 
us by Mr. Moore, that secondary qualities have as indefeasible a claim as 
primary qualities to the Objectivity which I hold that the “plain man” 
ascribes to them.
Another characteristic of the Objective is so important that it would 
demand my detailed attention if I were not able as in the former case 
to subscribe assent to the conclusions of incomparably more competent 
students than myself. I refer particularly to the admirable chapters in the 
Principles of Mathematics, in which Mr. Russell has restated and complet-
ed the results of manly thinkers on the subject of series. The constituents 
of all the three orders of the Objective which we have recognised, may be 
considered as forming series in respect of many of their various charac-
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ters. Among these the series which we know as the numerical series is of 
prime importance, for through correlation of its members with terms of 
other series distinguishable in the Objective, our race has advanced to that 
persistent and complicated measuring, which is the most salient feature of 
scientific activity.
ii.
In attempting to exhibit the main outline of the Objective as it appears to 
the “plain man” before the advent of scientific interpretations, one runs 
the risk of an accusation of merely adding to the inhabitants of the shad-
owy land, where the “economic man” and the “natural man” who enters 
into “social contracts” already dwell. At the least one may be met by the 
objection that many or all of the plain man’s “views” are, after all, in-
terpretations – interpretations which themselves at one time represented 
the high water mark of “scientific” investigation. The objection undoubt-
edly has force and we must return to it later, but the accusation may be 
evaded by the admission: that the plain man as such is a fiction insofar 
as he is an abstraction from within the wider self of each of us. Much as 
the total outlook of mankind upon the world varies from China to Peru, 
there seems to be a solid core of agreement everywhere which alone truly 
answers to the description which we have given of the Objective. The sci-
entific traveller on a high plateau of the Andes and his native guides view 
in different ways the impossibility of getting their potatoes to cook.2 To 
the latter the impossibility is due to the simple fact that “the cursed pot,” 
doubtless owing to the devil in it, “did not wish to cook potatoes”; to the 
former it is an interesting example of the dependence of the boiling point 
upon the pressure. But although the whole “situation” may be very differ-
ent in the two cases, there is yet a common basis of inevitable fact upon 
which the scientist and the native (if he is intelligent enough) can see that 
their “animistic” or “scientific” interpretations are simply embroideries. 
If (remembering at this point that there exists a science of psychology) we 
say that the “things” before our travellers – the fire, the pot, the lukewarm 
yet boiling, water, the unsoftened potatoes – are all of them “constructs,” 
we must admit at the same time that they are inevitable or primary syn-
theses which mankind everywhere would make from the same sensational 
data, while the whole situation as it exists for the two men is a secondary 
synthesis which, when one’s attention is called to the matter, is seen not to 
be inevitable. Wherever the “objects” of attention dealt with in the former 
section must be held to have a synthetic character, only these primary syn-
theses were intended. Adopting this distinction we may say that the scien-
tific process is one out of several possible alternative processes by means 
of which primary facts may be submitted to further construction, and it 
will be recognised as true that the object of this secondary synthesis is to 
2 Darwin, The Voyage of the “Beagle.”
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make the primary facts intelligible. But this characteristic, though of fun-
damental importance, does not suffice to distinguish the scientific from all 
the alternative processes contemplated. To assert that a thing is intelligible 
or that it has meaning is to imply that it forms an element in a system of 
terms in relation. Thus a word – for example the word “button” – stand-
ing alone has meaning chiefly in so far as it is recognised as belonging to 
the English vocabulary within which it may be either a verb or a noun. 
When I say, “Pray you, undo this button,” the fact that the word is now 
brought into relation with other words in a definite system gives it a fuller 
but still incomplete meaning: I may mean a coat button or a door button. 
The doubt can be resolved only by the context, that is, by the position of 
the sentence in a still wider synthesis. In this way the request, “Pray you, 
undo this button,” may have all manner of meanings from the trivial one 
which a common domestic context would give it, to the profound and 
pathetic significance it has on the dying lips of King Lear.3
The point in question could be illustrated indefinitely, but it seems 
necessary to note only that in every case the “system” in which an ele-
ment finds its meaning must ultimately be an apperceptive system. This 
term, although it appears to have lost its former vogue in psychology, is, 
perhaps, yet the best available to suggest the integral, the vital connection 
of such systems with the past experience and present interests of an indi-
vidual consciousness – the connection which is part of what I have already 
sought to suggest by speaking of Science as a conative process. No treat-
ment, in fact, which isolates the efforts that have generated Science from 
their psychological milieu can hope to do justice to its subject, the true 
nature of which can only be brought out by placing the scientific process 
in its proper position in a Natural History of processes which all aim at 
rendering the Objective intelligible. Only by following such a method is 
it possible to reach a clear understanding of the relations to one another 
of the various elements which a cross section of contemporary scientific 
thought would exhibit.
Among the interpretations of the Objective which demand comparison 
with the scientific, the most important from the point of view of distribu-
tion is “animism,” the system of beliefs upon which are based those prac-
tices of “magic “ which not only are found to-day under curiously similar 
forms among all savage races, but also have preceded the existing modes of 
thought among all civilised peoples. Indeed, the researches of authors like 
Professor Frazer4 have revealed these ancient ideas still persisting widely 
beneath the modern intellectual surface, and have even seemed to justify 
a fear lest the depths should some day be upturned and the results of 
centuries of man’s toils and genius be overwhelmed. Moreover, they have 
3 Act v, scene iii.
4 J.G. Frazer, The Golden Bough, 2nd ed., i, p. 74.
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shown that magic, so far from being an unorganised collection of bizarre 
superstitions, has every claim to the title of a logical intellectual system 
based upon fundamental principles, to repudiate which would be at the 
same time to repudiate science.5 At the base of the whole structure we find 
the “scientific” Principle of Uniformity, which differs from the fundamen-
tal principle of Logic, that “of the same the same is always true,”6 only by 
the addition of what we may, perhaps, call an “existence postulate” that 
“the same” for the purpose of predication actually occurs. As Dr. Frazer 
points out,7 the principle takes the special form of arguments based either 
upon Similarity or upon Contiguity. Thus to secure the destruction of a 
distant foe, you procure a waxen effigy of him, and submit it to slow-
roasting or to other ill-treatment, in the confident expectation that the 
unfortunate original will suffer analogous torments. Your hope springs, 
of course, from the belief that the two cases have a “core of identity” suf-
ficient to make the “substitution of similars” effective. Again, if you have 
succeeded in wounding your adversary, and seek to complete your work 
by recovering the spearhead and allowing it to rust away, in order that 
he may simultaneously languish and die, you are assuming this time, that 
the intimate association between weapon and wound has set up so much 
identity between two situations that their future developments must to a 
large extent be the same.
It seems highly probable that beliefs of this character arose as interpre-
tations of observed facts, and it is most unlikely that they have survived 
through ages without the support of facts which have been taken to be 
verifications of them; there must, at least, have been a widespread belief 
that they “worked.” Formally, then, the processes are unexceptionable, 
and differ from a modern investigation apparently only in the material cir-
cumstance that now-a-days we should not fix upon these particular “cores 
of identity” in the situations contemplated as having any relevance to the 
similarity between the courses of their subsequent development alleged 
to be observed. Since, however, mistaken beliefs as to the significance of 
certain elements of phenomena have been common in the history of Sci-
ence, if we are to find an essential difference between Science and Magic 
we must look elsewhere.
We can find the differentia we are seeking only by considering the 
whole primitive attitude towards the Objective, the system of beliefs and 
interests by which new phenomena were “apperceived.” The primitive 
thinker had not reached the clear distinctions we make between the dead 
world and our living and conscious selves, and peopled the physical en-
vironment with active individual principles whose wills had constantly to 
5 Op. cit., i, pp. 61, 62.
6 Cf. Bradley, Principles of Logic, p. 133.
7 Op. cit., i, Ch. II, esp. pp. 10-18 and 56 et seq.
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be reckoned with. Moreover, his attitude towards this environment was 
determined to a predominant extent by considerations that touched the 
immediate safety and wellbeing of himself and of his tribe. To a very large 
extent it was the attitude of a being who combined with the passions and 
vices of a man the terror of the child in the presence of the unknown. 
Bearing these two facts in mind, the failure to distinguish between the 
animate and the inanimate which made him regard the environment as a 
great community of beings, for the most part to be dreaded or placated, 
and the constant pressure of the needs of defence and preservation, which 
made it necessary that something should be done, we can understand his 
at first sight capricious logic; and can see the psychological force of the 
considerations which led ultimately to his submission to the burden of a 
rigid system of beliefs and customary acts “heavy as frost and deep almost 
as life.”
It was such a system of interpretations of the Objective which was los-
ing its authority at the momentous epoch which we mark as that of the 
birth of Greek Philosophy. Philosophy, the child of Wonder, began when 
advancing knowledge was banishing the nymph and dryad from the world 
of practical activity to the fantasy world of the poet, when no longer the 
lonian could
“Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea; 
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathèd horn.”
With the realisation of the inadequacy of the once sufficing explana-
tions of the world’s happenings, there arose the need for more satisfactory 
ones, while the widening and deepening of intellectual interests that came 
with an age of comparative personal and social security, brought men face 
to face with the old problems of change and decay in a much more general 
form. The motive of the movement, which we commnonly date from the 
speculations of Thales, was to seek escape from the intellectual oppression 
of the world’s ceaseless flux in some abiding reality. The animistic “mo-
ment” was passed, but men had not yet come to that realisation of the 
great gulf fixed between their real selves and physical nature which is the 
distinguishing mark of the modern consciousness.8 We find accordingly 
that the new effort to render the Objective intelligible takes the form of an 
attempt “to give back to Nature the life of which it had been robbed by 
advancing knowledge .... simply by making it possible for that life which 
had hitherto been supposed to reside in each thing, to be transferred to the 
one thing of which all others were passing forms.”9 Animism was replaced 
by Hylozoism.
Once more we have to distinguish the “secular conative process” here 
8 Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, i, pp. 123, 124.
9 Burnet, Early Greek Philosophers, p. 13.
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initiated from Science. That the Greeks collected material indispensable to 
the structure of Science is not to be disputed, whatever estimate we adopt 
of the actual value of their achievements on the whole and in detail. As 
a result of recent research that estimate has undoubtedly tended to rise.10 
We can no longer accuse them of an entire neglect of physical experiment, 
and. the late Professor Huxley, after a careful consideration of the existing 
records, arrived at “a very favourable estimate of the oldest anatomical in-
vestigations among” them.11 Burnet has, moreover, defended the hastiness 
with which hypotheses were advanced upon the warrant of a very slender 
bridge of facts, regarding this haste as naturally characteristic of early 
undisciplined enthusiasm, and retorting effectively that the same fault is 
by no means absent from the history of modern investigation.12 Finally, 
Jowett has attributed to these “general notions” a positive value, regard-
ing them as “necessary to the apprehension of particular facts . . . Before 
men can observe the world, they must be able to conceive it.”13
Against these apologies it must be maintained that, with certain ex-
ceptions that hardly affect the argument, the “scientific” achievements 
of the Greek thinkers were simply incidental to the search for the “abid-
ing reality” which is the predominant characteristic of the whole intel-
lectual movement. This which was true of Milesian Nature-philosophy, 
was still more obviously true when their speculations gave place to the 
“moralised”conceptual investigations in Being and Becoming of Heracli-
tus and his Eleatic opponents. We must maintain the same of Empedo-
cles, though he “anticipated” the theory of organic evolution, though his 
ῤιζώματα were the direct ancestors of the modern elements, and though 
his “mechanical” Weltbildung, in which, besides these στοιχεῑα, only the 
forces of Love and Hate play their part, may not so fancifully be com-
pared with the object of physical science as conceived (for example) by 
Helmholtz.14 To be brief, not even the elaborate systems of Democritus 
and Aristotle can be exempted from the general statement that we are 
dealing here with attempts to render the Objective intelligible which, on 
the ground of an essential difference in the whole “situation”, must be dis-
tinguished from Science.15 To justify this statement fully would obviously 
require so much time that I must ask to be forgiven for stating dogmati-
10 See Mach, Science of Mechanics, 2nd Eng. Ed., App. I. 
11 On certain Errors attributed to Aristotle in Science and Culture, p. 193.
12 Burnet, op. cit., p. 26.
13 Introduction to the Timaeus: Dialogues, iv, p. 416.
14 Ueber die Erhaltung der Kraft, Einleitung, p. 6: “Die Naturerscheinungen zurück-
zuführen auf [Materie und] unveränderliche, anziehende und abstossende Kräfte.”
15 Cf. Plato’s view that “the movements of the stars are only bad diagrams illustrating 
the truths of ideal astronomy,” or Aristotle’s conception of laws valid only “ἐπἱ τὀ πολὑ,” 
with Galileo’s conviction that unbiased investigation of matter will explain all apparent 
anomalies in its behavior. [Dialogues, Weston’s trans., p.3]
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cally a contention the principle of which you will, I hope, be inclined to 
admit without further argument.
For the same reason it is impossible to do more than illustrate the 
fact that my contention also holds good of many modern thinkers, who 
have yet made contributions to the fabric of Science, of fundamental im-
portance. In the ease of these moderns the individual systems of ideas by 
which Objective facts were apperceived were dominated by theological 
as well as philosophical elements. Thus Descartes when, to complete his 
philosophical system, he turns his attention to the actual particulars of the 
behaviour of the res extensa, deduces (in an imperfect form) the modern 
doctrine of the Conservation of Momentum from considerations of the 
perfection of God!16 A little later Leibniz corrects the deficiencies of this 
principle, pointing out that Descartes had neglected to observe that the 
direction as well as the quantity of “force” (momentum) is conserved. Our 
interest fastens on his further remark that if Descartes had noticed the fact, 
“he would have fallen into my System of Pre-established Harmony.”17
But for the illustrations most suitable to my purpose I must direct your 
attention to the writings of Keppler; for the student who picks his way 
discreetly through Frisch’s monumental edition 18 of the Omnia Opera 
of that heroic astronomer, will gain as his reward a vivid idea of how 
profoundly the whole “situation” in which Objective facts are actually 
central is determined by the character of what I have already called the 
“embroidery”; and will, moreover, catch sight of the human spirit at the 
precise moment of one of its most interesting metamorphoses.
Keppler begins (in the Mysterium Cosmographicum, 1596) as an en-
thusiastic young convert to the heliocentric doctrine of Copernicus. He 
defends the view theory on the ground of its superior simplicity, not bien 
ententdu, its simplicity as a description of the facts, but its real and meri-
torious simplicity as an actual creative plan.
“Amat [Natura] simiplicitatem: amat unitatem. Nunquam in ipsa 
quicquam otiosum aut superfluum extitit; at saepius una res multis ab illa 
destinatur effectibus.”19 One form of orbit, then, should be expected to 
suffice for all the planets, instead of the deplorably diverse orbits of the 
Ptolemaic system. In the spirit thus indicated he proceeds to determine 
the reasons why the solar system could not but be precisely as it is. First 
we learn why a combination of curves and linear distances (from the Sun) 
should be exhibited: “Quantitatem autem Deus ideo ante Omnia existere 
16 Descartes, Principia Philosophiae, 2nd part, § 36.
17 Leibniz, Monadologie, § 80; Théodicée, § 61.
18 Keppler, Omnia Opera, ed. Frisch, Franfurt, 1858 71.
19 Cap. I, p. 113 (Vol. I. of Frisch’s ed.).
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voluit, ut esset curvi ad rectum comparatio.”20 Moreover, these curves will 
lie upon spherical surfaces so as to exemplify the Trinity: “[Imago] Patris 
scilicet in centro, Filii in superficie, Spiritus in aequalitate σχεσεως inter 
punctum et ambitum.”21
Similarly there must have been the best of reasons for the choice of the 
particular dimensions of the orbits, the general principle being, “Nefas 
est . . . . quicquam nisi pulcherrimum facere eum qui esset optimus.”22 So 
it was inevitable that the Creator should lay the foundations of the plan-
etary worlds in accordance with the ideas He would gather from His con-
templation of the Five Perfect Solid Figures. Imagine the sphere of which 
the circular orbit of Saturn is a central section, to be circumscribed about 
a cube, then the sphere which contains in a similar manner the orbit of 
Jupiter will be inscribed within this cube. Next, within the sphere of Jupi-
ter let a regular tetrahedron be inscribed; this will in turn circumscribe the 
sphere of Mars. Thus we reach all the planets in turn, finding it obvious 
that Man – finis et mundi et omnis creationis – should have his habitation 
in the midst of the planetary host, three celestial bodies guarding, his path 
without, three (including the Sun) within.23
So far you will agree, the course of Keppler’s investigation has ex-
emplified my remark that, formally, non-scientific attempts to render the 
Objective intelligible may not differ from those which are admittedly sci-
entific. We have the usual primary Objective basis and the usual second-
ary construction – the Objective facts qualified by aln “hypothesis.” But 
the secondary construction here exhibited (you will object) is one that 
is capable of verification – i.e., of predicting new Objective facts which 
contributed nothing to the determination of that construction. The rela-
tive distances of the planets from the sun in Keppler’s system are open to 
calculation and comparison with data of observation. Keppler’s theologi-
cal prepossessions do not prevent him from recognising this truth in the 
clearest manner. “Transeamus modo,” he says, “ad ἀποσηματα orbium 
astronomiae et demonstrations geometricos: quae nisi consentiant, procul 
dubio omnen praecedentem operam luserimus.”24 So the relative radii of 
the spheres imprisoned in this complicated way between the regular solids 
are computed, and the results compared with the estimates of Copernicus. 
The concordance is practically perfect!25
In 1600 Keppler left his chair at Gratz, and received from Tycho Brahe 
20 Cap. II, p. 122. 
21  Ibid.
22 Cap. II.
23 Cap. IV, p. 128.
24 Cap. XIII, p. 148.
25 Table in Cap. XIV, p. 151.
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that introduction to the Emperor Rudolph which led to consequences of 
the first importance in the development of Science. Brahe died in the same 
year, and the Imperial mathematician inherited his splendid collection of 
observations on the planet Mars. In 1609 appears the famous treatise, De 
Motibus Stellae Martis, in which he sets forth with the delightful long-
windedness of a leisurely age the results of his patient study of these data. 
After the fashion of a day when philosophers reasoned even of Ethics 
more geometrico, Keppler prefixes to his work a collection of Axiomata 
physica de motibus stellarum. These are of the highest interest for they be-
tray a complete change (since the Mysterium Cosmographicum) in the as-
tronomer’s attitude towards his facts. To determine the particulars of the 
orbits of the planets we are no longer invited to consider that they must 
move “ad majorem Dei gloriam: motus a spatio dependet; planetae agun-
tur vi naturali; vis motrix opus habet propagatum a fonte ceu effuxu”; are 
among the startling “axioms” that meet us.
The body of the work is largely occupied by Keppler’s famous demon-
stration that the orbit of Mars instead of being a circle, as the preposses-
sion in favour of “perfection” had hitherto compelled him to suppose, is 
actually an ellipse of which the sun occupies one focus. It will interest us 
more to attend to the remarkable change in his whole attitude towards the 
Objective upon which I have already remarked. We find the evidences of 
this change most prominent in the introduction and the later chapters of 
the treatise. Ce n’est que le premier pas qui coûte, and when Keppler has 
once been compelled to seek the secondary construction that is to make 
the primary facts intelligible in a disinterested study of those facts them-
selves in their quantitative determination, he travels fast towards a char-
acteristically “modern” point of view. Since the planets no longer move 
in circles they must resign with these the crystal spheres in which since 
the days of Plato they have been “quiring to the young-eyed cherubim.” 
These destroyed, what is to guide a planet’s motion? The anima mundi 
remains, it is true, and Keppler, like his great contemporary Gilbert, finds 
nothing objectionable in the conception. He had, in fact, used the admit-
ted existence of the anima mundi as an argument against the Ptolemaic 
orbits, inviting his readers to pity the condition of the distracted world-
souls who in that complicated system “ad tam multa respicere jubentur ut 
planetam duobus permixtis motibus invehant!”26 Similar considerations 
seem to deter Keppler from assigning to the anima mundi the perpetual 
solution of the mathematical difficulties incidental to following an ellipti-
cal path round an eccentric sun. He looks elsewhere for a means of, at 
least, lightening the world-soul’s burden and finds what he wants within 
the Objective itself in a new conception of the sun as fons motus. This 
conception has not been reached without external suggestion, and when 
we meet the phrase orbs virtutis tractoria we are left in no doubt as to the 
26 Introd., p. 149 (Vol. 3 of Frisch’s ed.).
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source of that suggestion. Keppler has been reading the newly-published 
treatise De Magnete, by Gilbert, of Colchester, the Father of Experimental 
Science, and has fastened upon the fruitful analogy between magnetic and 
stellar phenomena. The first result is a “true doctrine of gravity” which 
points directly to the complete doctrine of Newton. Repeating the argu-
ment given above in connexion with the anima mundi Keppler asserts the 
impossibility “ut forma lapidis movendo corpus suum quaerat punctum 
mathematicum aut mundi medium.”27 On the contrary, “gravitas est af-
fectio corporea mutua inter cognata corpora ad unitionem seu conjunc-
tionem (quo rerum ordine est facultas magnetica) ut multo magis Terra 
trahat lapidem quam lapis petit Terram.”28 There are, it is true, difficulties 
in the application of the analogy. The investigations of a Galileo were 
necessary before a Newton could see that the moon is actually and always 
falling towards the earth. For Keppler the difficulty is to account for their 
remaining apart: “Si Luna et Terra non retinerentur vi animali aut alia 
aliqua acquipollenti … Terra ascenderet ad Lunam … Luna descenderet 
ad Terram … ibique jungerentur.”29
The words italicised in this passage illustrate at once Keppler’s willing-
ness to retain the conception of the anima mundi and his growing prefer-
ence for a facultas corporea to a facultas animalis if the former can make 
the facts intelligible. We may leave the consideration of the development 
of his ideas at the point where he reaches a “secondary construction” of 
the facts of the stellar observations suggested altogether by such mate-
rial analogies. In this conception the planetary movements are ascribed 
to a two-fold “virtue” – one of the planet and one of the sun. That of 
the planet is compared with the work of oars in rowing, that of the sun 
to the stream of the river. And so we reach the all-important conclusion, 
in which the soundness of this conception is based upon the solid experi-
mental results of Gilbert: “Quale flumen, talis remus. Flumen est species 
immateriata virtutis in Sole magneticae. Quin igitur et remus de magnete 
quippiam habeat? Quid si ergo corpora planetarum omnia sunt ingentes 
quidam rotundi magnetes? De Terra (uno ex planetis, Copernico) non est 
dubium. Probavit id Gulielmus Gilbertus.”30
It will be noted that Keppler’s final conception of the planetary system 
is formally less satisfactory than the earlier one – since it fails to suggest 
quantitative determinations by which it could be verified. At the same 
time it will, I hope, be agreed that when, at some moment between 1600 
and 1609, Keppler, wrestling with Brahe’s records, forgot his pious pre-
possessions in his anxiety to understand the behaviour of Mars for the 
27 Introd., p. 150.
28 Introd., p. 151.
29 Ibid.
30 Pars Quarta, Cap. LVII, p. 387
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sake of understanding it, he adopted for the first time an attitude which 
was genuinely “scientific.” The differentia of Science, then, as a conative 
process whose aim is to render the Objective intelligible is the presence 
of no motive except the desire to render it intelligible – particularly in its 
quantitative determinations. No philosophical leanings, not even the de-
sire of power over Nature for which Bacon was willing to be her minister 
can be admitted beyond the “margin” of the apperceptive area in which 
the Objective facts are central. The scientific attitude is essentially that of 
the savants who, drinking to the next great discovery, coupled with their 
toast the hope that it might never be of any use to anybody.
I need hardly say that Keppler does not provide us with the first ex-
ample on record of the scientific attitude. Mach holds that the begin-
nings of Science are to be found in the descriptive communications of the 
processes of the craft made by older members of a guild to beginners.31 
So Höffding,32 with truth, says that “the appearance of a Leonardo or a 
Galileo33 is only comprehensible when taken in connexion with Italian 
industry.” But industrial pursuits, I suggest, can never do more than sup-
ply the experience which forms the starting point for the scientific process 
which follows only from a specific attitude towards that experience which 
I have tried already to characterise. Just as J. A. Symonds has shown us 
that in the epoch of the Crusades and dominant Scholasticism the Latin 
songs of the Wandering Students “gave clear and artistic utterance” to a 
“bold, fresh, natural, and pagan view of human life”; so, doubtless, ever 
and anon men of intellect turned aside from the theologico-philosophical 
studies of their day to the task of rendering intelligible objective facts in 
which they took an immediate interest and delight. Such a one in part, 
was Roger Bacon, such a one was his master, Peter of Maricourt,34 such a 
one pre-eminently was Leonardo da Vinci who, though his discoveries do 
not appear actually to have affected the course of Science, left among his 
remarkable manuscripts a presentment of the scientific attitude which can 
hardly be improved. I conclude this section by quoting a typical expres-
sion of his opinion:35 “In dealing with a scientific problem I first arrange 
several experiments, since my purpose is to determine the problem in ac-
cordance with experience and then to show why the bodies are compelled 
31 Mach, Science of Mechanics, p. 4.
32 Höffding, Hist. of Modern Philosophy, i, p. 161.
33 Cf. the opening words of Galileo’s own Dialogues: “The constant employments in your 
famous arsenal of Venice, and especially those relating to what we call Mechanics, seem 
to me to afford, to a speculative genius, a large field to philosophise in.” (Tr. Weston.)
34 To whom Gilbert of Colchester was much indebted. See in Bridges’ edition of Bacon’s 
Opus Majus, 1897-1900.
35 From Grothe, Leonardo da Vinci also Ingenieur und Philosoph, Berlin, 1874, p. 22. 
Cf. the following passage: “Le me pare che quelle scienze sieno vane e piene di errori, le 
quali non sono nati dall’ experienza, madre di ogni certezza, e chi non terminano in nota 
experienza.” Frammenti litterari e filosophici, p. 94.
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so to act. That is the method which must be followed in all researches 
upon the phenomena of Nature. It is true that Nature as it were begins 
with reasoning and ends with experience, but nevertheless, we must begin 
with experience, and by means of it strive after the discovery of Truth.”
“The interpreter of the wonders of Nature is experience. We must con-
sult experience in the variety of cases and circumstances until we can draw 
from them a general rule that is contained in them. And for what purpose 
are these rules good? They lead us to further investigations of Nature and 
to creations of art. They prevent us from deceiving ourselves or others by 
promising results to ourselves which are not to be obtained.”
iii.
A “natural history” of the more sustained attempts that humanity has 
made to render the Objective intelligible – that is to give it a place in a 
definite apperceptive system – would lead us, then, to the conclusion that 
its differentia is not, as has been frequently supposed, a peculiar method, 
but simply and solely a definite attitude of the “Self of the moment” to-
wards the Objective, a definite character of the system by which new ele-
ments are “apperceived,” a character only to be expressed by saying that 
this system is dominated by a permanent interest in the particulars of the 
Objective as such. The next chapter in our natural history would exam-
ine in turn the various special attempts to make the Objective intelligible 
which are included in the genus “scientific.” Such an examination would, 
I submit, bring out the fact that it is difficult to declare any concept es-
sentially incapable of mediating a scientific interpretation of the Objective 
to some thinker. Thus it has already been pointed out that Keppler in his 
“scientific” period did not shrink from continuing to utilise the concep-
tion of the anima mundi. A less violent but essentially similar example 
is the use of the concept of cause in the sense of transeunt action – a no-
tion with which some scientific thinkers have entirely dispensed, while 
to others it is of cardinal importance. Facts of the same order are the 
marked preference of Weber and his Continental school for the concept 
of action at a distance and the equally marked preference of the British 
school for the concept of an intervening mediums as a means of rendering 
action at a distance intelligible. Especially illuminating in this connexion 
are the well-known facts that Maxwell based his immensely important 
electro-magnetic theory upon the concept of a “displacement” to which it 
is impossible to assign a definite meaning,36 while Lord Kelvin, speaking 
on the same subject said, “As long as I cannot make a mechanical model 
all the way through, I cannot understand, and that is why I cannot get 
the electro-magnetic theory of light.”37 An almost better illustration is af-
36 See Merz, Op. cit., ii, 93.
37 Quoted by Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, i, p. 119.
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forded by Mr. McDougall, who not only conceives his “neurin” as a fluid, 
but defends his practice in an excellent note38 by arguments essentially 
the same as those I am advancing. Finally, it is clear, that this doctrine of 
the relation of the scientific concept to the primary facts does not exclude 
the concept of “end” from the investigator’s armoury of interpretative 
weapons and so admits the methodological propriety of the practice of 
“neo-vitalists” such as Bunge and Rindefleisch. Our doctrine, moreover, 
has a normative value. It declares that a concept which is to render given 
primary facts intelligible must be formed as a reaction upon the stimulus 
of the presentation of those facts in their actual determinations. While it 
admits, then, the aid of any concept borrowed from any other context it 
refuses to allow objective facts to be annexed simply in order to widen 
the territories of an aggressive theory, and still less to permit their prima 
facie deliverances to be ignored through a bias in favour of any particular 
type of interpretation. Thus “electricity” and “neurin” may both be legiti-
mately conceived as fluids, but the physicist is not to rule the concept of 
“interaction” or of a “soul”39 out of court, and still less is he to refuse to 
entertain evidence in favour of “telepathy.”40
The only restriction upon the secondary construction is that its form 
shall be determined by the actual particulars of the primary facts. This 
condition limits the usefulness of such a conception as the anima mundi or 
the “end” to a phase in the development of knowledge of the facts when 
the particulars are not capable of full determination.41 At such a time such 
a concept as vitalism may legitimately be used “as a comfortable halting 
place where the reason may be laid to rest on a pillow of obscure ideas” 
when there is “danger of premature and, therefore, inadequate physico-
chemical explanations of the phenomena of life.”42
I am aware that in view of the vigorous and important attack upon 
“hypotheses” made by writers of such eminence as Ostwald43 my defence 
of them will appear reactionary. I venture to think, however, that Ostwald 
fails to distinguish between the real value and the psychological value of 
hypotheses. Hypotheses, such as Maxwell’s displacement, the weight of a 
molecule, electrons, the carbon-tetrahedron, entropy, heat itself, may not 
be verifiable and, therefore, have no real value, but their psychological 
value as “leading us to further investigations of Nature” and prompting 
38 McDougall, “The Physiological Factors of the Attention Process,” Mind, N.S., No. 
43, p. 350.
39 Cf. James, Pr. of Psych., i, p. 137; McDougall, Physiological Psychology, pp. 8 et seq., 
p. 78.
40 As at least one very distinguished scientist is reported to have done.
41 Cf. for “end,” Boyce Gibson, Philosophical Introduction to Ethics, p. 53.
42 Prof. Hering, quoted by McDougall, loc. cit.
43 Ostwald, Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie, X, esp. pp. 211-215
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to fresh determinations of the Objective may be immense. Ostwald’s asser-
tion that scientific advance has taken place in spite of, and not by means 
of, hypothesis44 is, at best, a half truth. It is true that hypotheses have 
temporarily delayed the progress of Science in some particular field, but 
when they have disappeared they have generally been devoured by their 
own children—objective determinations to which they led. To maintain 
that these determinations would have been made without the hypothe-
ses—for example that Maxwell, without the concept of electro-magnetic 
displacements in the field around a varying current would have thought of 
locating at points in the field the disembodied relations expressed by his 
differential equations, the manipulation of which led Hertz to discoveries 
of the highest importance, seems itself to be an indulgence in hypothesis 
of a thoroughly unwarrantable character. The point of Ostwald’s objec-
tion to a hypothesis—a Bild45 used to make the phenomena intelligible—is 
that the Bild will invariably contain elements which are not present in the 
original observations. There are two answers to this objection. In the first 
place it may be urged that this property of the hypothesis is that which 
above all makes it valuable. The portion of the Objective under investiga-
tion must be the seat of other relations than those “apperceived” by the 
conception, and it is already probable that the original analogy will extend 
to the other properties of the concept whose correspondence with proper-
ties of the Objective under examination has not yet been established. Thus 
“a descriptive theory of this kind does more than serve as a vehicle for the 
clear expression of well-known results, it often renders important services 
by suggesting the possibility of the existence of new phenomena.”46 
In the second place, physicists are so sensible of the aid they receive 
from such a descriptive hypothesis, that they do not discard it even when 
it is recognised as containing elements actually inconsistent with known 
Objective determinations. The conception of the ether as a frictionless 
fluid passing among the molecules of matter “more freely than the wind 
through a grove of trees,” has been none the less useful because incompat-
ible with the rigidity which the facts also seem to demand. Ultimately, of 
course, such incompatibility will not be tolerated, but its very presence 
sets a further problem—the replacement of the inconsistent hypotheses, 
both having reference to the same province of Objective fact by another 
which shall do justice at once to all its elements. Such a complete corre-
spondence between the elements of the descriptive hypotheses and of the 
province of the Objective is, of course, the ideal of the scientific process 
44 Ostwald, op. cit., p. 225.
45 “Dass .... man durch die Benutzung des Bildes in die Darstellung der Erscheinung Bes-
tandtheile hineinbringt, die dem Bilde angehören, nicht aber der Erscheinung selbst,” op. 
cit., p. 212.
46 Prof. J. J. Thomson, introducing his conception of the “Faraday tube” as an alternative 
to Maxwell’s “displacement.” Recent Researches in Electricity and Magnetism, 1893, p. 
1. 
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to which the successive concepts by which it is sought to render the facts 
intelligible approach, as Mach says “asymptotically.”47 Were it attained 
the “picture” and the “object” would coincide48 and we should have “a 
complete systematised representation,” “a complete synoptic [übersichtli-
ches] inventory of the facts of the province” of the Objective free from the 
extraneous elements that hypothesis admittedly introduces.49 When this 
consummation has been reached in any department of Science, descriptive 
hypotheses will still have a psychological value for the purposes of exposi-
tion and assimilation. Meanwhile they will continue to play an indispens-
able part in the conquest of the Objective whether in definite form as Lord 
Kelvin’s “mechanical model all through,” or a vague form like Maxwell’s 
“displacement,” being, as it were,  points de repère without which great 
systems of reasoning cannot be built, just as transient ones require the aid 
of shadowy visual, auditory or kinesthetic images. 
Finally it may be pointed out that it is of small consequence to the 
progress of the special sciences whether the investigator attaches real value 
to his hypothesis, or whether he recognises that it is merely psychological. 
Lord Kelvin and Principal Bucker are quoted by Dr. Ward50 as examples 
of the former class, holding that in the ether and in atoms and molecules 
we have realities behind the veil of phenomena, while Maxwell in his atti-
tude towards his earlier model of the ether,51 Wollaston, Davy, Liebig and 
Faraday in their attitude towards Dalton’s atoms, are given by Dr. Merz52 
as examples of the second. It seems probable that in the case of the latter 
class of investigators their attitude towards their conception is rhythmic, 
at one time yielding to a temporary belief in them, at another time criticis-
ing them as from an external point of view. 
Whenever in the foregoing allusion has been made to the fully deter-
mined particulars of a province of the Objective, it is highly probable that 
my hearers will have assumed that quantitative or at least numerical de-
terminations were intended. It is a commonplace that Science only moves 
with security where she can measure. Quite recently we have seen this truth 
47 Mach, Principien der Würmelehre, 1900, p. 461
48 “Wenn Bild und Gegenstand in allen Stücken übereinstimmten, so wären sie eben 
dasselbe, d.h. man kann eine Erscheinung volkommen nur durch sich selbst abbilden.” 
Ostwald, op. cit., p. 212.
49 Mach, loc. cit.
50 Ward, op. cit., i., pp. 113 and 306
51 “I do not bring it forward as a mode of connection existing in nature….. It is, however, 
a mode of connection which is mechanically conceivable and easily investigated .... so 
that I venture to say that any one who understands the provisional and temporary char-
acter of this hypothesis, will find himself rather helped than hindered by it in his search 
after the true interpretation of the phenomena.”  Collected Papers, i, p. 486; quoted by 
Merz,  op. cit., ii, p. 83. 
52 Merz,  op. cit., i, p. 418. 
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demonstrated anew in the field of Biology, where Professor Karl Pearson53 
has so brilliantly illustrated old Roger Bacon’s dictum that Mathematics is 
the “gateway and key to all other Sciences”; while, doubtless, even before 
Egyptian priests began to survey the lands left dry after the inundations 
of the Nile, men felt the application of number and measure to the spatial 
world to be natural and obvious. 
But as Mr. Russell has shown, if A is 12 inches and B 24 inches from 
O, there is really an element of convention in the familiar assertion that B’s 
distance from O is twice as great as A’s.54 Those distances are definite rela-
tions which cannot strictly be identified with the relation of one number 
to another. The fuller truth is that it is possible, since the numbers form 
a “continuous series,” to correlate every position on the straight line O 
B with a single number, while there is a practical convenience in arrang-
ing the “one-one correlation” in such a way that if the distance (i.e., the 
spatial relation itself before the advent of measurement) between O and 
A is equal to that between A and B, the difference between the numbers 
assigned to O and B is twice the difference between those assigned to A 
and O. 
By the simple device of measuring with the foot rule, we are able to 
overcome the difficulty that different perceived distances between A and B 
have yet the same “representative value,”55 that is, refer to the same real 
distance. Much the same holds good of such conceptions as temperature 
and weight. The same body at the same time may be pronounced by two 
different persons to be hot and cold, a result which is taken to mean not 
that the thing is both hot and cold, but that the felt hotness and coldness 
are simply different representatives of the same objective value. If a ther-
mometer is placed in contact with the body it is taken for granted that the 
different positions of the surface of the mercury are each correlated with 
one objective condition of the body. Thus if the thermometer gives the 
same reading in the wind as it does behind a screen, then the air, although 
it feels colder in the open, must really be in the same objective condi-
tion, have, as Boyle vividly expresses it, the same temper, in both places.56 
If now we “graduate” the stem of the thermometer upon the foot-rule 
method, we shall have a series of numbers correlated with the various 
“tempers” or temperatures of the body. In this case the statement that 
one difference of temperature is double another has obviously still more 
53 Pearson, The Grammar of Science, 2nd ed., and elsewhere.
54 Op. cit., p. 180.
55 Stout, Proc. Arist. Soc., 1903, loc. cit.
56 This problem is discussed by Boyle in his Experimental History of Cold, 1665, First 
Discourse; also p. 513. The conclusion may be claimed as a proof of our contention that 
hotness and coldness are objective qualities of things. 
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of the conventional character than we noted in the case of distances,57 for 
we have no method of deciding that the difference between temperatures 
A and B is equal to the difference in the case of B and C comparable with 
the use of the foot-rule in spatial measurement or of the pendulum in time 
determination. 
When a hot body is placed near colder ones it gets colder, they get 
hotter. These primary facts become intelligible—are systematised—by the 
thought of a transference of “something” from the one to the other. This 
something is heat. Black,58 who made such important conquests for Sci-
ence by means of this concept, was one of those who are able to keep 
on their guard against the dangers which Ostwald sees in the Bild. He 
declines to form any definite conception of the relation of the heat to the 
substance which occupies the same space, on the ground that no Objec-
tive facts are before him to justify his doing so. But if heat is regarded as 
a substance at all, the “amount” of it which reaches the cold bodies must 
be thought of as equal to that which left the hot body. The problem is set 
therefore of finding “something constant” at both ends, so to speak, of the 
transaction. If a steady flame is the “source of heat,” it is impossible not to 
suppose that the “quantity of heat” leaving the flame per minute is always 
the same. Let us place above the flame in succession different weights of 
water each for the same length of time. Examination of the results shows 
that the product of the weight of water by the rise of temperature is in 
each case the same. This constant product, then, may be identified with 
the “quantity of heat” of which we are in search. 
This simple example will serve to illustrate the weighty remark, made 
so long ago as 1867 by Rankine,59 that “one of the chief objects of mathe-
matical physics is to ascertain, by the help of experiment and observation, 
what physical quantities are ‘conserved.’” 
The illustration also brings out the fact that the constancies established 
in such investigations are of an entirely conventional character and refer 
to nothing objectively “transferred.” We assumed that the two tempera-
ture changes were different aspects of the same transaction, an assump-
tion whose consequences are made psychologically available by throwing 
it into the form of a transfer of “heat.” We correlated the various terms 
of the series of temperatures and weights which appear in this transac-
tion with numbers. If our initial assumption was correct, it seems now 
that some manipulation of the  data—here the weights and temperature 
changes—must yield an equality, the particular form of this manipulation 
depending upon the particular manner in which the number series has 
57 Kelvin’s “absolute thermometric scale” seeks to avoid this conventionality, but is too 
technical for discussion here.
58 Black, Lectures on Chemistry, 1803.
59 Quoted by Merz, op. cit., p. 140. See also Divers, in B.A. Report, 1902, p. 564.
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been correlated with the series of Objective states of the body. Our suc-
cess in finding the desired manipulation implies that, in the language of 
Lotze,60 the bodies do “take note” of one another’s changes of condition, 
and that the data we have manipulated, that is the original  data with 
which numbers were correlated, is the complete expression of that “no-
tice.” In short, it is the verification in a particular case of the postulate of 
the rationality of the world. 
We have now reached, perhaps, a point from which we obtain a clearer 
view of the circumstances under which, in the history of Science, psychical 
events came to be excluded from the causal series. To suppose that they 
are legally banished under the terms of Hume’s famous edict against in-
vestigations that do not “contain any experimental reasoning concerning 
matter of fact and existence,” is a view that no one could hold “except to 
save a theory.”61 And if they suffer through the condemnation pronounced 
against inquiries that do not “contain any abstract reasoning concerning 
quantity or number” we see that this defect is not essential to their nature 
as events, for “series” prevail in the psychical as widely as in the physical 
world. The difficulty is reduced to the practical difficulty of establishing 
for the terms of these series (which, as I have pointed out in the first sec-
tion, are regarded as being “the same for all”) an unambiguous correlation 
with the terms of the equally Objective number series which happens, like 
much of the physical, to be not only the same for all, but also accessible 
to all. Were such a correlation established it would apparently be possible 
to determine whether certain psychical changes and physical changes are 
or are not complete expressions of the “notice” which soul takes of body 
or body of soul. 
iv.
The precritical view that in certain concepts of Science we reach the re-
alities which lie at the back of perceived phenomena, is one which will 
always have an attraction for the actual workers in Science. It implies, per-
haps, a certain aloofness from practical life to resist conclusions supported 
by evidence upon which one would act with confidence even in affairs of 
the highest moment. From this point of view Huxley62 pours ridicule upon 
those who would decline to accept the geologist’s reading of the palæon-
tological record. If they were consistent, he argues, they would decline to 
draw the usual conclusions from the oyster shells outside the fishmonger’s 
door, or the mutton bone in the dust-bin. 
In the class of cases which Huxley adduces there are few who would 
60 Lotze, Metaphysics (Eng. Trans.), i, §45, p. 118. 
61 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 324.
62 In his lecture “On the Method of Zadig,” Science and Culture, p. 139.
181
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2T. Percy Nunn
reject his conclusions; there are few of us, again, who would be satis-
fied, as Professor Karl Pearson leads us to suppose that he would be,63 to 
“describe and classify [our] immediate sense-impressions and [our] stored 
sense-impresses by the aid of the theory of evolution,” even “had the uni-
verse been created just as it is yesterday”; or with a theory of matter upon 
which the negative “ether-sinks” (to which nothing perceptual appears 
to correspond) “would long ago have passed out of the range of ether-
squirts” (which correspond to perceptual matter), so that we need not 
concern ourselves about their fate. There are few, I repeat, who would not 
be troubled with “obstinate questionings” as to the truth as well as the 
“economy” of these conceptions. The scruples of such seem to imply the 
conviction—conscious or unconscious—that the business of Science is, as 
I have so often insisted, to render the Objective intelligible, and that the 
Objective thus systematised must ultimately be the whole Objective and 
nothing but the Objective.64 No gap in either the spatial or the time series 
is to be tolerated, nor can we suffer any place in either of the series to be 
filled by the hypothetical masquerading as Objective. 
But this principle, apparently so simple and so clear, discloses unsus-
pected difficulties of application when we try to determine by its aid the 
precise value and import of the concepts by means of which we seek to 
make accessible Objective phenomena intelligible. Many of these concepts 
assign positions in the spatial and temporal series to things which it is 
either essentially or else practically impossible to verify. “Attraction” is 
an example of the first class, “atoms” of the second. What is the actual 
standing of such entities? It cannot be denied that some of the evidence 
is forthcoming which, if completed, would establish their existence, and 
if this evidence actually produces conviction in men of the highest intel-
lect supremely conversant with the facts, what more is to be said? The 
denudation which “the Razor of Occam” would produce would depend 
entirely upon the hand that wielded it. If it were applied by Lord Kelvin 
the ether, for example, would be safe; if by Professor Karl Pearson, its fate 
would be at least doubtful.65 If it were handled by Professor J. J. Thom-
son, the “Faraday tubes” would disappear, while “ions” would, I imagine, 
remain. The truth seems to be that while cases of this kind were few and 
isolated, men’s attitude towards them might be indeterminate—each case 
was judged upon its merits. But when with the advance of Science a whole 
compact system of concepts appeared claiming to represent what “goes 
on behind what we see and feel” over the whole surface of the Objective, 
it became inevitable that individuals should take up a definite general atti-
tude towards them, only to be abandoned exceptionally: that is, that they 
should adopt a more or less explicit philosophy of Science. For those who 
63 Pearson, The Grammar of Science, 1st ed., pp. 418 and 319.
64 See Sigwart, Logic, ii, § 61. 
65 Grammar of Science, 1st ed., p. 214.
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accepted the claims of the new concepts, “atoms,” “energy,” “ether,” and 
the like became metaphysical terms, the names of ultimate realities, or of 
an hierarchy of realities, of which what we have described as the Objective 
is only the appearance. As metaphysical entities it was inevitable that they 
should eventually claim to be able to account for the whole of experience. 
Thus was developed that “mechanical philosophy” which has recently 
suffered such a severe cross-examination by the author of Naturalism and 
Agnosticism. 
Against this view many arguments have been brought. The one most 
relevant (from the standpoint here adopted) is that the concept of the “re-
alities” which are to replace the sensible data are themselves abstracted 
from those data. Thus Duhem66 not only argues, in a spirit entirely con-
sonant with the spirit of this paper, that water is not really the hydrogen 
and oxygen which disappear when it is formed, but also shows that the 
atomic hypothesis upon which it is possible to conceive the “elements” 
as still present in the “compounds” is derived historically from Newton’s 
famous Query 23. In this passage Newton suggests the application of the 
ideas that he had gained from his study of planetary bodies to the analysis 
of the behaviour of the bodies manipulated in experiments. Similar obser-
vations occur in several of Mr. Merz’ splendid chapters. More recently still 
it has been pointed out67 that the most thorough-going quasi-metaphysical 
attempt to account for perceived physical events is vitiated by the same 
circle. The most striking feature of the electric theory of matter is that it 
exhibits the property of “mass” as the consequence of the motion of “elec-
trons.” But to reach this result properties of the electromagnetic field are 
appealed to, and these properties are defined by differential equations into 
which the notion of mass derived from the study of molar bodies itself 
enters. 
Opposed to the thinkers who adopt the view of the value of scientific 
concepts which has just been repudiated, are those who have felt them-
selves forced to take up one of the various positions included under the 
name of the descriptive view of Science. Most of these positions have a 
relation to the wider philosophical position of Humanism,68 which makes 
them particularly interesting at the present moment. 
“The great Poincaré,” says Professor James,69 misses Humanism by a 
hair. He has demonstrated70 in a brilliant manner the conventional char-
66 In his Le Mixte et la Combinaison chimique, 1902, and in other writings.
67 See a review of works on “Electrontheorie,” by H. A. Wilson, in Nature for June 22, 
1905.
68 See James, “Humanism and Truth,” Mind, N.S., No. 52, p. 462.
69 James, loc. cit.
70 In the essays reprinted in La Science et l’Hypothèse, and the more recent La Valeur 
de la Science.
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acter of Science, and has laid special stress upon the manner in which 
one theory has succeeded another in the same physical field.71 He appears 
to accept what we may perhaps call the disintegrating results of math-
ematical physics, regarding perceived things and events as really due to 
the superposition of a great number of similar elementary phenomena.72 
Moreover, he removes from the Objective every element—such as the sec-
ondary qualities—which cannot be proved to be “the same for all” by 
the use of language. “Pas de discours, pas d’objectivité”73 If, then, per-
ception gives us no reality and the hypotheses of Science are only con-
ventions, what is there that remains? We find that while hypothesis may 
succeed hypothesis—as, for example, Maxwell’s electro-magnetic theory 
of light succeeded Fresnel’s undulatory theory—the differential equations 
remain the same, the expression of veritable relations between real terms 
which Nature hides from us eternally, though Fresnel may think of them 
as movements and Maxwell as electric currents.74 It is through its knowl-
edge of these Objective relations that Science has so much theoretical hold 
over the inscrutable reals, that it is able to predict the future; but that same 
knowledge has clearly a certain “intellectual” value quite apart from its 
value as a collection of recettes pratiques. 
Even this amount of intellectual value seems to disappear in the view 
of Science advocated by M. Le Roy.75 For this writer the laws of Science, 
when they are not conventional definitions, are simply recettes pratiques, 
“not true but efficacious,” “not concerning our knowledge so much as our 
actions,” “rather enabling us to capture the order of Nature, than reveal-
ing it to us.”76 Moreover, these laws have reference to artificial facts—faits 
scientifiques—created by the scientist out of the faits bruts of perception. 
M. Le Roy’s scientific fact seems to correspond to a large extent with 
our “secondary construction” by which the “primary fact” is apperceived. 
An “atom” and an “eclipse” are examples given. Poincaré adds an “elec-
tric current” as the scientific fact constructed from the brute fact of a gal-
vanometer deflection; also the “corrected reading” obtained by treatment 
of a number of direct readings. We may add ourselves the “rigid bar” by 
which the actual elastic lever is replaced in theory. But there is this im-
portant difference between Le Roy’s conception and our own: the laws of 
science as conceived by him seem hardly to touch the brute facts, which, 
71 See, e.g., La Science et l’Hypothèse, Ch. X.
72 Op. cit., p. 187.
73 La Valeur de la Science, p. 262.
74 La Science et l’Hypothèse, p. 190.
75 See the discussion reported at length in the Bulletin de la Société française de Philoso-
phie, Mai, 1901. Le Roy’s views are criticised by Poincaré in the essay reprinted in La 
Valeur de la Science, Ch. X. 
76 Bulletin, p. 5.
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not being scientific, are outside Science.77 This is why the law is in so many 
cases merely a rule of action. In our view, on the other hand, the whole 
object of the secondary construction is to render the primary facts intel-
ligible, to bring out real relations between the brute facts which constitute 
the scientific fact, and to lead to the discovery of new brute facts related to 
those already recognised within the system. 
The same kind of inversion of the relations of primary fact and sci-
entific construction is shown by the illustrations given of the dictum that 
laws are frequently definitions. Such a one is the law that “phosphorus 
melts at 44°,” which is asserted by M. Le Roy to be merely a definition 
of phosphorus. One feels here in a peculiarly tantalising form the want of 
security of the relations between ideas and the reality beyond which some 
of us find in other presentments of Pragmatism. The definition “works,” 
substances melting at 44° are actually encountered, but one has about 
their identity much the same kind of doubt as pursued the school-boy who 
feared that Shakespeare’s plays were not written by Shakespeare but by 
another man of the same name. 
Mach’s splendid labours in this field are too well-known to need char-
acterisation. For the founder and chief apostle of the new doctrine the 
concepts of Science are, as with us, means to an end, an end which is 
conceived as “the economic exposition of actual facts.”78 It is clear that 
this principle of “economy” pushes analysis further than the principle of 
intelligibility which we have been considering. It suggests, as Mach79 ap-
plies it, a value for the race as well as for the individual in what we have 
thought of simply as a psychological phenomenon. This suggestion is of 
the highest interest and importance, and as such may be gladly accepted. 
But when the same circumstance is made the ground upon which Mach is 
claimed by Professor James (in the article already quoted) as a Humanist, 
it seems necessary to determine what are the exact admissions implied by 
one’s applause. I am prepared to admit that the results of Science have this 
economical value; prepared to admit that by Natural Selection or in some 
other way Nature may have arranged that Science shall be pursued so that 
this value shall be secured to the race; but, as before, I hesitate when asked 
to grant that this relevance to purpose constitutes the  essence of the results 
in question. And Humanism is nothing more than an interesting genetic 
psychology if we do not take it as telling us not merely the circumstances 
under which we come to recognise such things as thinghood, or the con-
servation of energy, but what they are prior to our recognition. My own 
view of the principle of the conservation of energy I have endeavoured to 
77 Poincaré, La Valeur de la Science, p. 221. Cf. Bulletin, p. 21, where M. Le Roy says, 
“C’est ce qu’on ajoute au fait brut pour constituer le fait scientifique qui est le plus 
important.”
78 Mach, Science of Mechanics, 1902 ed., p. 555.
79 See op. cit., pp. 481 et seq.
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explain. It is a concept by means of which a definite range of given facts is 
made intelligible to an individual thinker. In consequence of this circum-
stance it has an economical value. Further, it is the property of “secondary 
constructions,” into which such concepts and the corresponding primary 
facts enter, that they lead to the “apperception” of new primary facts—re-
als or relations between reals—this being the external characteristic which 
distinguishes the scientific from other attempts to render the primary facts 
intelligible. Finally, the conception is a convention in that another could 
conceivably have been found to render the same facts intelligible, and, if 
“scientific,” would have led to the recognition of the same real relations 
between the real things. The conception, in fact, plays the part which Lo-
tze attributes to all ideas—the part of a tool which fits the mind and also 
fits reality. 
If pressed to consider also the case of thinghood, I should have first to 
remark that I find between concepts of this order and the concepts of Sci-
ence a distinct break. In this I differ from Mach, who does not appear to 
distinguish the process by which we supply a core to a mass of sensations, 
and so create a “thing” from the process by which we make a secondary 
construction out of certain data by means of the concept of a transference 
of something (“energy”) that remains constant in amount. We seem to 
have here the thought which Professor James expresses in his article on 
Humanism and Truth80 and the writers of the essay on The Nature of the 
Hypothesis.81 According to this thought Reality is not the same after our 
judgment as before; it is “increased and elevated” by the act of judgment. 
The implication seems to be that scientific judgments simply continue a 
process which “common-sense” judgments begin. There are aspects of 
the two processes of judgment of which this notion of continuity holds 
good; we may grant to Messrs. Ashley and Dewey that the hypothesis is 
a predicate, and to Mach and Professor James that the concepts, both of 
“thing” and “energy,” are economical. But, as I have already pointed out, 
“the secondary constructions” of Science which correspond to the “real-
ity qualified by an ideal content” of the ordinary judgment contain no 
element that is not drawn from the common-sense stratum of conscious-
ness. For example, if one body is cooling while another is simultaneously 
growing warmer, the secondary construction in which these primary facts 
are synthesised contains besides these facts merely the thought of another 
thing being transferred from one body to the other. On the other hand, 
the synthesis by which we bind the various qualities into the “thing” does 
not present us with anything analogous to this. The secondary construc-
tion is of a totally different character from the elements; the process does 
not reach its end by the ideal addition of a new element of the same type. 
Further, the hypothesis has, we have shown, merely a transient function. 
80 P. 468.
81 In Studies in Logical Theory, ed. Dewey, 1903.
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Setting aside purposes of exposition and convenience in conceptual han-
dling, its function is to point the way to the discovery of new facts, in-
cluding relations, and then to efface itself. Finally, at any moment it is at 
least ideally possible by criticism of the whole construction to separate the 
primary facts from the interpretative “embroidery,” and to realise that 
the synthesis was not strictly inevitable. Whewell’s dictum that “fact and 
theory have no essential difference except in the degree of their certainty 
and familiarity. Theory, when it becomes firmly established and steadi-
ly lodged in the mind, becomes fact”82—which is approved by Professor 
Dewey83—ignores this power of critical analysis. 
Before quitting my argument it seems necessary to anticipate a cross-
examination on what is my precise distinction between a common-sense 
judgment and a scientific judgment. A trivial example may make the dis-
tinction clear. If I say, “that man has a rolling gait,” the synthesis has the 
inevitable character that is the mark of the primary fact, the common-
sense judgment. If, on the other hand, I assert (on the ground of his roll-
ing gait) “that man is a sailor,” my synthesis has the secondary character 
which is not inevitable. If then you ask me if such a judgment is “scien-
tific,” I do not think I ought to hesitate to say “Yes” simply because the 
instance is trivial. The secondary construction is undoubtedly a reaction 
upon certain primary facts, and it has the property of leading to the obser-
vation of other primary “substantive” facts, and yet other facts, relations 
between these. In these respects it seems precisely like such a judgment as 
“this substance is copper sulphate,” based upon an experiment in chemi-
cal analysis—a judgment which would generally be admitted as scientific. 
The former judgment, in fact, is related to the “unconditional universal,” 
“All men with such and such a rolling gait are sailors,” in the same way as 
the latter is, to “all things that have such and such properties are copper 
sulphate.” Both these assert a “permanent connection of qualities in the 
Real”—that is, are the final products of a process in which primary facts 
have been unified, systematised, or made intelligible by a concept which 
has not failed to lead to discoveries of fresh primary facts without limit in 
its province. 
I need hardly disclaim the pretence that I have done more than bring 
out a few of the salient features of the scientific process. I have regarded it 
as a conative process, with certain primary facts as data, and the making 
of those facts intelligible the quaesitum. I should say that I had derived my 
conception of the primary facts from Mr. Moore and Mr. Russell, did I not 
fear to do those philosophers an injustice. I have conceived the Objective 
world of primary facts as containing physical and psychical existents, and, 
in addition, subsistents—such as relations—which share with the former 
82 Whewell, The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, 1840, p. 45. 
83 Op. cit., p. 164.
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the characteristics of being regarded as “the same for all,” and of having a 
certain relevance to human purpose, expressed by saying that “they have 
to be reckoned with.” In the case of physical existents I have not hesitated 
to attribute to them secondary as well as primary qualities, regarding our 
perceptions as at least aiming at expressing some Objective determination 
of the thing which is independent of perception. While it is not possible to 
conceive what those Objective determinations are apart from our percep-
tions, it is possible to assert that each such determination (as, for example, 
as of “temperature”) implies a definite set of relations between our chang-
ing perceptions of “hotness” and other simultaneously changing relations. 
The aim of the scientific process as it occurs in the individual is to 
render the Objective in its actual determinations intelligible. This happens 
when primary facts enter into an “apperceptive system.” They may be ap-
perceived by means of any concept drawn from any other context of expe-
rience, and if by means of this concept the actual particulars of experience 
are systematised, the “end” of the process will have been reached. But if 
the process has been of the kind intended by the term scientific, it will have 
the further property of leading to other determinations of the Objective, 
and these further determinations are the actual achievements of Science, 
and its “end,” therefore, from the universal point of view. Since primary 
facts present themselves for the most part in series, the most useful method 
of determining the Objective consists in correlating terms of these series 
with the members of the number series—the property of this series being 
that single members of it can be substituted for combinations of other 
members in accordance with definite laws easily applied. By means of 
such combinations it is often possible to characterise simply the relations 
between things, and to ascertain what changes in terms of relations can be 
regarded as complete expressions of those relations. Such cases typify the 
ideal of the scientific process which is actually exhibited in a large number 
of grades, which nevertheless are sharply distinguished from the processes 
by which the Objective itself is recognised—a fact which is claimed in sup-
port of the view of the unique character of the latter. 
Finally, it may be claimed that the concept here defended avoids the er-
ror contained in the theories of Science given by Jevons and other writers, 
which have been between hypothesis and fact. My concept allows the hy-
pothesis to determine largely what primary facts shall be apperceived, and 
admits that the fact before the individual, i.e., the secondary construction, 
is constituted by the apperception. At the same time the implication that 
the Objective in this construction is an ideal upon which we can never ac-
tually set the finger, is rejected; and it is maintained that to a critical scru-
tiny the Objective reveals itself in ordinary cases, though in some cases it 
may not be easy to determine it without reference to the “confirmatory 
tests” of sameness for all and relevance to purpose. 

S .  A L E X A N D E R ,  J A M E S  W A R D , 
C A R V E T H  R E A D  &  G .  F .  S T O U T
T h e  N a t u r e  o f  M e n t a l  A c t i v i t y : 
A  S y m p o s i u m
P R O C E E D I N G S  O F  T H E  A R I S T O T E L I A N  S O C I E T Y
V O L U M E  V I I I
1 9 0 8
E D I T O R I A L  N O T E
Samuel Alexander (1859-1938) was an Australian-born Bristish philoso-
pher and prominent figure in early twentieth-century British philosophy. 
He is best known as one of the leading figures of British Emergentism, a 
movement that claimed that mind "emerges" from matter. After obtain-
ing a first class degree in Greats at Balliol College, Oxford, Alexander 
was made a fellow of Lincoln College, where he developed an interest in 
psychology. He obtained a professorship at Owens College, Manchester 
in 1893 where he became a leading figure in the University. He was made 
a fellow of the British Academy in 1913 and appointed Gifford Lecturer 
at Glasgow in 1915. He later developed the Gifford Lectures into his best-
known work, Space, Time and Deity, which was published in two vol-
umes in 1920.
Samuel Alexander was President of the Aristotelian Society from 1936 to 
1937.
James Ward (1843-1925) was an English psychologist and philosopher 
who exerted a major influence on the development of psychology in Great 
Britain. After completing his theological studies at Spring Hill College 
(later Mansfield College), Oxford in 1869, he obtained a one-year schol-
arship at the university of Göttingen and began studying under Rudolf 
Hermann Lotze, champion of the emerging science of physiological psy-
chology. On his return to England he became minister at Emmanuel Con-
gregational Church in Cambridge, where his theological liberalism made 
him unpopular. He subsequently resigned as minister to continue studies 
at Trinity College, Cambridge, where he became a fellow in 1875. He was 
elected to the new Chair of Mental Philosophy and Logic at Cambridge in 
1897, where G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell were among his students. 
Ward was opposed to associationism, and together with G.F. Stout intro-
duced a functionalistic approach in psychology.
Carveth Read (1848-1931) was a British philosopher and logician. Hav-
ing obtained a Moral Sciences Tripos First Class B.A. and an M.A. from 
Christ's College Cambridge, he spent three years between 1874-1877 as 
the Hilbert travelling scholar at the Universities of Leipzig and Heidel-
berg. He lectured at Wren's 'Coaching' establishment in London from 
1878, and was Grote professor of philosophy of mind and logic at Univer-
sity College London from 1903 to 1911, after which he became Lecturer 
in Comparative Psychology at UCL until 1921. His most influential work, 
Logic, Deductive and Inductive, was published in 1898, which followed 
in the tradition of Mill and Bain, and drew from the contemporary Em-
pirical Logic of Venn and the Formal Logic of Keynes.
For the biography of G. F. Stout, please scroll up to page 33.
The following symposium - “The Nature of Mental Activty” - was pub-
lished in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Volume VIII 
(1907-1908), pp. 215-257.
192
V I .  T H E  NAT U R E  O F  M E N TA L  AC T I V I T Y
A  S y m p o s i u m  b y  
S.  A L E X A N D E R , J A M E S  WA R D, 
C A RV E T H  R E A D  &  G.  F.  S T O U T
I .  S.  A L E X A N D E R
THERE are two questions which may be intended when we are asked 
what is the consciousness of activity. We may mean what is it to be con-
scious of activity as distinguished from passivity. Or we may mean simply 
and generally what is the consciousness of performing any mental process 
whatever, supposing we have such a consciousness of activity. The second 
interpretation of the question is not, perhaps, the more natural or usual 
one. We speak rather of mental process in this sense than of mental activ-
ity. On the other hand, we commonly do speak of acts of hearing, perceiv-
ing, inference, and it is not strained to speak of a sensory action or an act 
of sensation. Activity in this sense is mental function in general. Both the 
narrower and the wider question are psychological. But the distinction of 
activity and passivity is in a great degree one of detail. The question of the 
consciousness of mental activity in general is more fundamental, though 
it is difficult or even impossible to keep this question altogether separate 
from metaphysics or theory of knowledge. But it is the more interesting 
to me, and I shall devote the larger part of my remarks to it. In part of 
what I say I do not know how far I am or am not merely painfully trying 
to realise for myself what my teachers have said already. Two of them fol-
low me in this discussion. But I prefer not to divert the discussion from 
the subject itself by any direct examination of their published statements. 
Let me begin with the narrower question, which prepares the way for 
the other. You may seek to explain activity, in its distinction from pas-
sivity, in two different ways, both of which I have entertained in turns 
and have come to regard as erroneous. You may describe it in terms of 
the muscular movements and strains, and other bodily actions in which 
mental activity like that of active attention, or inference, or desire, finds 
expression. In my own case, mental activity, especially in thinking, is ac-
companied by marked movements of the eyes, which are apt to change 
their position with each change of the thought, and whose movements, 
in fact, I use as a means of directing thought in different directions and 
controlling it. Now, these and the like movements appear to me highly 
significant, because when you try to describe mental activity in words you 
inevitably, as I shall point out later, tend to be aware also of its connection 
with certain portions of the organism. But they are not mental activity 
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itself, but only physical movements belonging to a specially privileged ex-
ternal thing. This is one error I have learned to avoid. The second is this. 
You may describe activity in terms of your ideas—you may say that it is 
the consciousness of the expansion of an idea against a limit and the like. 
Here again I acknowledge the significance of the analysis. But it must be 
understood that ideas in this account of the matter must be regarded as 
themselves “psychical events” or processes. In other words, the expansion 
in question is not a mere development of the contents of my mind. If this 
were so, you could not distinguish the consciousness of your own activ-
ity from that of an external physical activity, say, of a shot tearing a lion’s 
shoulder. I used at one time, naively perhaps, to consider that whenever 
you had ideas ABC replaced continuously by ABCD that that was also the 
only experience of activity that you could have. But I see now that this is 
impossible, and that the activity lies not in the changing presentations, but 
in the process of transition itself from ABC to ABCD. I should not, indeed, 
myself speak of a psychical event ABC developing into another ABCD, 
because that seems to imply that you do have psychical events which psy-
chically are different in quality according to the character of their content, 
as if the perception of a tree were different in quality from that of a rose, 
and I shall give reasons hereafter for repudiating any such notion alto-
gether. But quite apart from the propriety of speaking of psychical events 
as described in terms of their contents, what I have said is enough to show 
that the consciousness of activity must be found in some change of direc-
tion of the mental process itself. As mental process always has reference 
to certain objects (or, if you like to call them so, presentations) you may 
study the mental process indirectly by studying the object, and so may de-
lude yourself into the belief that the mental process is itself a presentation, 
something you can reflect on as if it were dis tinguished from yourself. 
Various attempts have been made to describe in detail the precise char-
acter of the difference between active and passive mental process. Activity 
has been called the self-realisation of an idea, as an idea—or it has been 
said that you have activity when one mental process is the outcome of 
previous mental process. The first statement applies very clearly to cases 
like desire or the effort of recollection. It does not apply so clearly to a 
simple case like that of the sight of bright sunshine which drives me out 
to enjoy it; there is an “idea” present here of something to bask in, but 
though I am conscious of bodily activity I feel myself mentally passive 
rather than mentally active. The second description applies directly to the 
active working out of an interest, and it makes clear the reason for the 
passivity of such experiences as an interesting sensation or a sudden flash 
of inspiration, but it does not apply equally well to the passivity of reverie, 
where process is the outcome of previous process, and yet no activity is 
felt. Perhaps I shall do best to describe shortly what, as helped by these 
analyses, I think I discover in my own feeling of activity—e.g., in desire, 
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or trying to remember, or in inference. My mind begins to move in certain 
directions, e.g., towards the forgotten name, but is not able to reach its 
end. It needs for success to be reinforced by connected processes in the 
mind, in virtue of which the resistance is overcome. The initial indeter-
minateness of movement is followed by a victorious and definite move-
ment. There appears thus to be present in my consciousness of activity not 
merely an incipient or nascent movement (and an “idea” as such appears 
to me on its mental side nothing but such a nascent movement), which 
becomes fulfilled, but a complexity of other tendencies. When an incipient 
movement of itself passes into definite action, I do not feel activity. But the 
more I call in the help of reinforcing tendencies, the more I do feel active. 
Hence the feeling of activity, which tends to go with the working out of 
an interest, which has not become purely spontaneous. At the same time 
there is another feature present, which is perhaps the most important and 
is itself related to the complexity of the experience. The more complex the 
group of tendencies, the more are alternative actions possible, and hence 
in the higher kinds of activity the consciousness that the action pursued is 
selected. On the other hand, the more self-contained a mental process is, 
the more it can be taken by itself, as in surrendering oneself to the pleasure 
of a warm bath, or indulging in a train of consecutive ideas, or taking in a 
sensation, the more passive I feel. Passivity seems to go with determinate 
direction, or, to use a convenient technical word, with univocal direction 
of my mind, and activity with a mental determination which admits more 
or less clearly apprehended alternatives, it goes with equivocal direction. 
Hence it is that activity and passivity are so curiously mingled in our ex-
periences: as they are in desire which is eminently purposive, fixed upon 
its end to the exclusion of other and distracting suggestions, and at the 
same time blind and enforced; or, in the kind of inference in which, as we 
say, the conclusion is forced upon us, where we feel passive in so far as 
we are constrained by the object which admits no alternative course, and 
yet intensely active so far as it is we ourselves who, in virtue of the sum of 
various tendencies which make up our interest, arrive at the result. Hence, 
too, we can readily understand why there is no clear demarcation in our 
experience between passive and active processes. 
Whether this account of the distinction between activity and passivity 
is accurate or not, in both conditions there is activity in the wider sense, 
and I have been constantly using phrases which anticipate what I have to 
say about the nature of this process-consciousness, to which I now pass 
on. I can only describe mental activity in general in metaphorical terms, 
because of its extreme simplicity and its uniqueness. But the best term 
seems to me to be movement. In all my mental conditions, whether will, 
desire, inference, perception, sensation, I am aware of these movements, 
and these movements have what I must call direction and differ in direc-
tion. What happens in desire I have already indicated. When a whole in-
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terest is at work, my mind moves by several converging lines of tendency. 
As I pass from stage to stage of a train of ideas, I feel the change of direc-
tion from one thought to another. The simpler the condition the more 
difficult is the process to describe, but the process is there and verifiable. 
Sometimes I can only detect it through helping myself out by reference to 
my external movements. Thus I can verify that in enjoying a hot bath my 
mind goes on moving in the initial direction, and this direction is differ-
ent from that of taking in a prolonged sound. Or I may be conscious in a 
sensation of the mental activity which is a suggestion of the name, as blue 
or yellow. Or, again, in perceptual process my activity is mental prepara-
tion for handling the object perceived, for responding to it in appropriate 
ways, anticipating the next stage in the action. Always I am conscious of 
moving from one point to another, which either may or may not be in the 
same direction. 
In speaking thus of movement and change of direction, and I may add 
of rate of movement, I am of course obliged to use anticipatory terms 
derived from physical objects, describing not merely the mental activity 
as I am aware of it, but as it is connected with bodily processes which oc-
cur in the organism and more particularly in the brain. I make it clearer 
to myself by locating it in time or space in a picture of my brain. Tenny-
son says “as when a great thought strikes along the brain and flushes all 
the cheek.” The second phrase describes only a consequence, but in all 
my thoughts, little or great and of all kinds, I verify the description that 
they strike along the brain. Now that I know what my brain is, I feel my 
thought occurring there, or, if not there, in some other part of my body. It 
is only as thus understood in connection with the bodily organism that I 
can say my mental activity is a movement with direction. But in this sense 
it is a movement, and does occur in time and space. In other words, my 
mental activity is always qualified by what, on the analogy of local signs, 
I must call signs of direction. When I change my thoughts from one topic 
to another, I have an experience which I can only compare to the shifting 
of the pieces of glass in a kaleidoscope when it is turned, and this experi-
ence is not the same as the movements of the eyes in which, with me, it is 
habitually expressed. Movements like these or like catching the breath, or 
the flushing of the cheek of which the poet speaks, may be present in vari-
ous degrees, but these movements I can distinguish perfectly well from the 
movements, simple or complex, which I have described as mental, chang-
ing their direction with the subject matter, but always when made definite 
and explicit referred to the brain. 
Now what makes one thought-process different from another is, I find, 
nothing but this difference of mental direction. It is not the object or con-
tent of the thought. When the object is different the direction of my activ-
ity is different, but the object has nothing to do with my mind. Moreover, 
I must go on to add that when I say I am conscious of this activity, I mean 
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that the activity so described is consciousness, and that I can find nothing 
else in consciousness except these activities. I sympathise very much with 
the spirit of certain recent inquiries which result in the declaration that 
consciousness does not exist, but I think the doctrine erroneous. I have no 
doubt that the thing called my consciousness exists, and that it is mental 
activity. But it is not different in quality according as I am conscious of 
blue or green, or the sun or the Pythagorean theorem. These things are not 
consciousness, but things to which consciousness refers, upon which it is 
a kind of reaction. All these things are different according as they are co-
lour, or figure, or the like, but my consciousness is one and the same thing 
working only in different directions. 
The most difficult and interesting thing to determine upon this psycho-
logical borderland is the place of sensation. That sensation belongs to the 
objective side of what is called (I take the phrase as I find it) the subject-
object relation, would be readily admitted. But my language conflicts with 
a view widely entertained that a sensation itself is still psychical, and not 
as I am maintaining by examples, physical. I cannot in my examination of 
experience separate the sensation of green from the perception of a green 
leaf, except in respect of complexity. If I resolutely divest my mind of the 
last traces of the figment of an inner sense, which represents the objects of 
experience in some supposed subjective condition, then I find in a sensa-
tion nothing but mental activity directed upon what is called the content 
of the sensation, which content is nowhere found except in the external 
object. It seemed to me at one time that we might describe consciousness 
as a sort of thrill, and sensations as qualitatively distinct thrills of con-
sciousness. But this now seems to me an erroneous description. It is not 
the quality of consciousness that differs, but its coefficient of direction. 
Accordingly green, red, smell, hunger, and the like are but objects, doubt-
less of an exceedingly simple sort, which it is the business of metaphysics 
to describe. But these sensations, as we know them, I mean as sensations 
of red, green, have no psychical character, red, green. There correspond 
to them of course on the side of the organism various specialised mental 
processes. But the mental process has no character in it of colour, or smell, 
or sound. It has only a direction which varies with the object that excites 
the conscious activity. Sensations then are, so far as they can be called 
psychical, nothing but the simplest signs of direction. But it is only their 
simplicity which gives them any special claim for consideration. To every 
object perceived, imagined, desired, and the like, there correspond more 
or less complicated signs of direction. 
I will add two corollaries which will put the thesis I am explaining in 
a different way:
(1) What I have called mental activity is, in the usual language of psy-
chology, conation, and what I am saying is tantamount to the assertion 
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that the conative side of “experience” is the only thing which is mental. As 
for pleasure and pain, I am content as at present advised to regard them as 
modalities of the conative process. My thesis then, founded as I think on 
self-description, is that consciousness is conation and nothing else. 
It may be as well to add one or two verifications of this summary 
description. The first is the law of association, which merely means that 
when the mind starts moving along one of a set of connected directions 
it goes on to move along the others. The second is the influence of feeling 
upon the course of thoughts, as, for example, in the selective influence of 
prejudice, where the effect of the presence of the feeling is not to call up 
certain thoughts but to begin the appropriate movements. In constructive 
creation the common phrase that a man’s mind has struck into a new line 
is more than metaphorical. The passion or interest with which the worker 
is inspired seems to direct him into a new mental path, and it is mainly 
when the antecedent motions are concealed from him that he attributes his 
new thoughts to outside influences to which he is passive. My last instance 
shall be that of split-off consciousness. Where an organism for some rea-
son or other ceases to work completely as a whole, certain stimuli may fail 
to produce the nervous changes which are the condition of mental activity 
and yet at the same time may very well excite activity or consciousness in 
connection with other portions of the same system. 
(2) It follows, secondly, that all consciousness is self-consciousness. 
There is no difference between these two things as if besides consciousness 
there were also a consciousness of consciousness. That way madness lies, 
for there is no reason why you should stop at consciousness of conscious-
ness and not go on to a consciousness of that. On the other hand, we 
certainly have a consciousness of self when we take self to be the whole 
thing, body and mind, taken together, a composite thing. The self as de-
scribed contains not only my mental activity but the body in which that 
mental activity is located, and which it comes to be aware of in the same 
way as it is aware of all external things, and it may go on to include all the 
things about which we occupy our minds. But all this embodiment of the 
self is but the privileged thing with which our mental activity is connected. 
Other things through their intimacy of relation with this body may seem 
at times to enlarge the bounds of our personality; and the habitual objects 
of our thoughts and desires enter in the same way into our personality. But 
whether it is our body, or psychology, or politics, which we regard as the 
chief constituent of our personality, what makes the personality mental 
is never these things but the mental activities which have them for their 
objects. The conscious self is always the reaction of consciousness upon 
its objects. We never have a superadded consciousness of this conscious 
part of the self. 
So far I have been following, as I think, observation. It is a matter of 
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observation that consciousness is mental activity, and it is a matter of ob-
servation that such consciousness is located, however vaguely, in the body. 
What I now add goes beyond observation. I have been considering con-
sciousness as a property of a certain highly developed organism. It consists 
of reaction, of course unique in kind, of this organism upon objects which 
affect it. It is strictly comparable to life, also a unique phenomenon. Life 
is a set of reactions, running, pouncing, digestion, breathing, and the rest, 
upon certain stimuli. It varies in its direction according to the stimulus and 
the part of the organism which is employed. But in so far as these func-
tions are vital, we have to say that the body exhibits a new quality not 
found in lower material systems, and the new quality is life. Suppose, now, 
your living being is also a conscious one (I do not know where, if at all, the 
difference in organic structure between a conscious and a living organism 
is to be found, but suppose that it has a brain), such an organism exhibits 
not only life but a fresh form of reaction, which is consciousness, condi-
tioned, of course, by the lower forms of reaction, just as life is conditioned 
by physical and chemical processes. Conscious process is thus simply a 
phenomenon found in certain organisms, a new quality of such structures, 
but as distinctive as life. 
As I conceive the matter there are in the world among physical objects 
certain physical objects whose structure is so developed that certain of 
their functions are not purely physiological but are consciousness. These 
functions, which constitute consciousness, are situated in the brain or 
other part of the neural system. These conscious reactions upon other ob-
jects than consciousness itself are what we call the consciousness of these 
objects, which is the stirring into life of consciousness in connection with 
those objects. How much consciousness shall know of them depends on 
the organism of which it is a function or—to vary the language—which 
uses it1 as an instrument. There is nothing in the nature of the case why a 
still higher organism should not exhibit an order of existence higher than 
mere consciousness and conditioned by it. The existence of consciousness 
as part of the life of the body is a fact revealed to consciousness through 
its more intimate relations with the body. I can thus find in consciousness 
nothing but a phenomenon, a part of the whole world of phenomena. 
There are psychical things in the world as well as physical. A psychical 
thing is mental activity. But I can find in it no mysterious indescribable 
activity such as Berkeley and some of his successors have found, but some-
thing definitely describable. 
I have got on to the edge of metaphysics, just where what is called the 
theory of knowledge begins. But to go further would be to raise difficul-
ties outside the psychological problem. I draw back, therefore, to psy-
chology, in order to explain why in this discussion I made no difference 
1 This should have read “which it uses,” but I leave the text unaltered because of Mr. 
Ward’s subsequent reference.
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between three things which are sometimes sharply distinguished, namely, 
activity itself, activity-consciousness and the consciousness of activity. As 
to the first of these phrases, it may be thought that consciousness may be 
an activity and yet there need not be a consciousness of it. This is really 
impossible. If consciousness is itself an activity and not merely dependent 
on some other activity (e.g., physiological) that activity is conscious. The 
other distinction between activity-consciousness and consciousness of ac-
tivity does not seem to me to possess the importance sometimes attached 
to it. It is convenient to distinguish an explicit from an undeveloped expe-
rience and you may designate the explicit consciousness by of. You may 
speak of change-consciousness and the consciousness of change, the latter 
being definite change. Consciousness of activity is nothing but the dim 
activity-consciousness standing out clear and distinct. On the other hand 
(and I suppose this is what is intended), if it is implied that I can yet be 
conscious of my mental activity in the same way as I am conscious of a 
bee, I believe the foregoing to have shown this to be erroneous. External 
things are related to consciousness which reacts upon them, but they are 
not consciousness. On the other hand, consciousness is not related to con-
sciousness. I cannot attend to my attention as I attend to what I write. I 
can only when possessed by psychological interest contrive to make the 
different features in attention distinct. When I appear to turn a conscious-
ness like desire or attention into an object like a bee it is only because I am 
considering it by help of the expression of it or the object (or content) of 
it. This might be expressed by saying that consciousness or mental activ-
ity can never be a presentation. I agree with this, but I think that the fact 
is improperly described. I should say simply that consciousness is not a 
physical thing. 
I I .  J A M E S  WA R D
I FIND in Professor Alexander’s opening paper passages which embody all 
the main features of mental activity as I understand it, and yet his position 
and mine are, I fear, radically different. I agree that, though we distinguish 
between activity and passivity, activity in a certain wider sense pertains to 
all experience,—that activity, namely, which is implied in consciousness. I 
agree further that the conscious or mental activity is in itself one and the 
same, working only in different ‘directions.’ By this I mean that it is what 
we call attention widely understood, attention now to sensory presenta-
tions, now to motor, now to presentations, now to representations and so 
on. When this ‘direction’ is determined for me, I am said to be passive, 
when it is determined by me, I am said to be active. I admit that the two 
are so far inseparable, in that I can never wholly determine the objects to 
which I attend; we have no experience of creative activity. But I should still 
hesitate to say that there is no clear demarcation between the two. I admit 
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also that activity in the narrower sense is always conative, but I do not 
find that “consciousness is conative and nothing else.” Nor can I see how 
Professor Alexander’s previous exposition has led up to such a thesis. It is 
true that when attention is non-voluntarily determined the subject is never 
wholly indifferent and so the situation as either pleasurable or painful 
entails at once a conative attitude. But the receptive, affective, and reac-
tive constituents of such a total psychosis are still distinct, and Professor 
Alexander has himself distinguished them.2 Finally I fully recognise “the 
extreme simplicity and uniqueness” of mental activity on which Professor 
Alexander also insists. But there we part. 
“Because of this extreme simplicity and uniqueness,” Professor Alex-
ander continues, “I can only describe mental activity in general in meta-
phorical terms.” I hold, on the contrary, that what is simple and unique 
can neither be described nor defined in any terms. We may indicate it and 
designate it; and since in any case it cannot be absolutely isolated, we may 
succeed in analysing more or less completely the complex in which it oc-
curs, or the conditions on which it depends. And when, nevertheless, Pro-
fessor Alexander tells us that mental activity is best described as “move-
ment” it does not take long to see that the fitness of the simile is really 
due to the fact that he has in view precisely that kind of literal movement 
to which we have already metaphorically transferred the idea of activity. 
Movement pure and simple, mere change of position, is a kinematical con-
cept and suggests neither activity nor passivity. Movement, in Newton’s 
sense again, or momentum, implies complete inactivity or inertia, just as 
truly as does rest: only when there is some acceleration, some change, that 
is to say, either in rate or direction, do we talk of physical action. The his-
tory of this concept of physical causation, from the cruder anthropomor-
phism of pre-scientific thinking down to its dynamical interpretation in 
the present day, shows plainly that the notion of action was first imported 
into it from the sphere of conscious life and that it has been gradually but 
at length completely eliminated. I take it that nobody nowadays attributes 
activity to colliding bodies or to an electric discharge. We might as well 
say that the moon lights the sun as suppose that physical action throws 
any new light on mental activity. 
It is true, however, that we talk freely of movements in connexion 
with mental activity and that in two senses, which Professor Alexander 
very properly distinguishes. There are certain literal movements connected 
with circulation, respiration and the like—determined probably through 
the sympathetic system of nerves—of which we are more or less dimly 
aware. But these we recognise as but the collateral consequences of men-
2 The distinctness of the second, however, it must be allowed, Professor Alexander recog-
nises in a very halting fashion, as “modalities of the conative process.” But till Professor 
Alexander has explained himself further I can only take this to mean that affection and 
conation, though distinguishable, are not actually separable: this I admit. 
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tal activity. There are also other literal movements due to the so-called 
voluntary muscles, which are the direct outcome of mental activity, in-
tentional movements. Still they are not themselves instances of mental 
activity but rather its effects, objects or end: in the language of Professor 
Alexander, they are the content upon which mental activity is directed. 
And this brings us to the second and metaphorical sense of movement, 
as when, for instance, we talk of movements of attention. The source of 
this figure is doubtless to be found partly in the pre-eminence as regards 
cognition which the sense of sight has attained for us: so we talk of the 
mind’s eye, of the field and focus of consciousness. Partly it is to be found 
in the pre-eminence, as regards action, which belongs to the hand: so we 
talk of mental grasp, apprehending, comprehending, perceiving, conceiv-
ing, etc. But mental activity, whether collateral or intended, is at any rate 
correlated to actual motions “in the organism and more particularly in the 
brain.” And this fact seems to play hide and seek with us in a strange way 
throughout Professor Alexander’s exposition: at any rate the transitions 
are so “kaleidoscopic” that I fail to see their logical connexion. If, never-
theless, I venture on a few remarks, I do so mainly in the hope of eliciting 
further explanations. 
To begin them, in one place we find Professor Alexander saying: “al-
ways I am conscious of moving from one point to another.” This seems to 
suggest the activity of attention as I should understand it, “my conscious-
ness as one and the same thing working only in different directions,” to 
use his own words. But alas! it seems there is here a double sense that 
keeps the promise to our ear and breaks it to our hope. For presently we 
find Professor Alexander saying: “Now that I know what my brain is, I 
feel my thought occurring there . . . It is only as thus understood that I can 
say my mental activity is a movement . . . But in this sense it is a movement 
and does occur in time and space.” Why should what is felt as occurring 
in the body yield the experience of mental activity: what is it that singles 
out one kind of bodily occurrence as unique in this respect from the rest? 
The metaphorical sense of movement seems to have vanished and we have 
an objective physical movement, somehow apprehended as activity, in its 
stead. And yet this language would perhaps not seem so decisive3 if we 
did not interpret it in the light of what is said later of consciousness as “a 
property of the organism,” as “a reaction of this organism upon objects 
which affect it,” as “simply a phenomenon found in certain organisms,” 
which use it “ as an instrument,” etc. There is much beside in the details 
of Professor Alexander’s exposition which to me is hopelessly bewilder-
ing, but it would take far more time than I can claim to dwell upon these. 
I trust I have said enough to indicate my main difficulty. Professor Alex-
ander tells us he has got “to the edge of metaphysics, just where what is 
3 For in his second paragraph Professor Alexander has expressly rejected William James’s 
view of activity as “an error he has learned to avoid.”
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called the theory of knowledge begins,” and there he decides to stop. In 
other words, he has led us into a bog and there he proposes to leave us. 
Thus in Professor Alexander’s world there are physical things and there 
are psychical things and there are “composite things”—“body and mind 
taken together.” Apparently they are all phenomena, though in what sense 
this most ambiguous term is understood is not clear. It would seem that 
the Pythagorean theorem along with blue and green is a phenomenon, 
though whether like the latter it is to be handed over to metaphysics for 
description does not appear. On the whole, if ‘phenomenon’ implies de-
grees of reality—the superiority lies on the physical side. For not only does 
Professor Alexander sympathise—and I take it the sympathy is entirely 
intellectual—with the “spirit” that has recently got so far as to declare 
that the psychical things do not exist:4 he regards them as in any case but 
properties of certain physical objects whose structure is sufficiently devel-
oped. But how, if two things are “taken together,” does one become the 
property or quality of the other? Well, of course they are only phenomena. 
And yet though phenomena and properties of objects, psychical things, 
i.e., consciousnesses or mental activities, are not presentations. Naturally 
then we should expect to be told that they do not strictly admit of descrip-
tion, and Professor Alexander, as we have seen at the outset, practically 
said as much. 
But yet he ends by saying that they are “definitely describable.”5 Or, 
rather, he says this just as he reaches “the edge of metaphysics,” but im-
mediately he has drawn back into psychology he unsays it again. “When 
I appear to turn a (moment of) consciousness, like desire or attention, 
into an object, like a bee, it is only because I am considering it by help of 
the expression of it or the object (or content) of it.” But the former is not 
“mental activity itself,” and the latter “has nothing to do with the mind.” 
So after all “I cannot attend to my attention as I attend to what I write.” 
Perhaps I am reading my own meaning into this when I say that I agree 
with it entirely; for I certainly cannot reconcile it with other statements 
that Professor Alexander has made, least of all with his saying that “con-
sciousness is nothing but a phenomenon.” 
Finally, I think that the advance from activity-consciousness—which, I 
4 A parallel case, I suppose, would be found in those physicists who sympathise with the 
hypothesis recently advanced that ions are only electric charges and that mass does not 
exist.
5 At the same time, Professor Alexander animadverts on the mysterious indescribable 
activity which Berkeley and some of his successors are supposed to have found. Unfor-
tunately, no references are given to Berkeley’s works, and his deluded successes are not 
named. So far as I know, Berkeley never attempted to describe activity at all: he only 
insists that volition is the only activity of which we have any experience. Cf. Works, Fra-
ser’s edition, 1871, vol. i, pp. 170, 310. 
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suppose, is what Professor Alexander means by “mere consciousness”—to 
the consciousness of activity is much more than a convenient distinction.6 
In fact, the demand for a psychological account of this advance is pre-
cisely what Mr. Bradley has been urging these many years. And the very 
thorough and masterly exposition of his own view of it, in my opinion 
more than anything else, now requires and deserves examination. Profes-
sor Alexander refers to it somewhat incidentally, and so far as I follow his 
criticisms I agree entirely. To put it in my own way—in psychology, Mr. 
Bradley appears to be what I have called a presentationist. In his articles 
on the “Definition of Will,” for example, he starts from ideo-motor ac-
tion, and talks of the self-realisation of an idea in a thoroughly Herbartian 
fashion, oblivious of the fact that if an idea verily is a self and shows its 
activity by expanding, invading, and what not, we have the whole prob-
lem of activity again on our hands. But presentation as a process implies 
the subject-object relation to which apparently Mr. Bradley confines the 
term consciousness. But he holds that there is a pre-relational stage of ex-
perience as feeling. What he has written on this topic strikes me, I confess, 
as obscure; but at the same time I feel strongly that obscurity must beset 
every attempt to penetrate beyond a consciousness in which relations are 
recognised, and ascertain how such a consciousness begins.7 But our only 
hope of success in such adventures lies, I think, in the principle of conti-
nuity. Experience in which there is neither subject nor object seems to me 
unmeaning; so likewise a feeling which no one feels. There can, of course, 
at first be no reflexion: the subject we must suppose, feels and acts, acts 
and feels, and there is, we must also suppose, a changing something that 
affects it when it feels and changes when it acts.8 
But we cannot suppose that the subject at the outset has any so-called 
“internal perception” of itself or of its states; for that, it is abundantly 
evident, implies a long course of intellectual construction. Surely, however, 
the absence of self-consciousness is no proof of the absence of a self. Let 
us now turn to an account which Mr. Bradley has given of feeling as he 
understands the term. “I take feeling,” he says, “in the sense of the im-
mediate unity of a finite psychical centre. It means for me, first, the gen-
eral condition before distinctions and relations have been developed, and 
6 Don’t talk of a consciousness of consciousness, says Professor Alexander, for that way 
madness lies, but he is prepared to entertain the idea of a higher organism that should 
“exhibit an order of existence higher than mere consciousness and conditioned by it.” 
“Consciousness of consciousness” is not a very exact expression, but otherwise why is 
one position more sane than the other ?
7 Cf. the discussion, “Consciousness and Experience,” Mind, N.S., vol. ii, pp. 211 ff. 
8 It seems useless for the psychologist to debate the question as to which was first, the 
active or the passive phase: in fact, a sharp separation of the two is unwarranted, for we 
know nothing of either pure passivity or pure activity. Metaphysically we may say, Am 




The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2
where as yet neither any subject nor object exists. And it means, in the sec-
ond place, anything which is present at any stage of mental life, in so far as 
that is only present and simply is.”9 But we have a right to ask: What gives 
a “mass of feeling” unity and a centre in the absence of a subject, and 
what exactly does “mental life” imply? Relations and distinctions do not 
constitute their terms or fundamenta, how, then, could they be developed 
in the absence of these? Elsewhere, in discussing unity, Mr. Bradley asks: 
“Why and how can we call it a relation, when it is not a relation actually 
for us?” He continues: “It would never do for us simply and without any 
explanation to fall back on the ‘potential,’ for that, if unexplained, is a 
mere attempt at compromise between ‘is’ and ‘is not.’ But if the ‘potential’ 
is used for that which actually is, and which under certain circumstances 
is not manifest, the ‘potential’ may cease to be a phrase and may become 
the solution of the problem.” Two and two simply are not four, but they 
are the ground of putting two and two together. So mental activity that is 
“only present and simply is” is not the apprehension of an agent acting, 
but it is the ground that makes such apprehension possible and is besides 
its necessary presupposition. 
Like Professor Alexander, Mr. Bradley regards mental activity as a phe-
nomenon. Herein lies the radical difference between us. He asks: “What is 
the content of activity as it appears to the soul at first in distinction from 
what it is as it is . . . for the soul later on,” and complains that he has 
“failed throughout to get an intelligible reply.” It never occurs to him that 
he has possibly asked an unintelligible question in assuming that all expe-
rience consists of appearances. I do not suppose that Mr. Bradley intended 
to lay any stress on the different language that he has employed in speak-
ing of activity as it appears to the soul at first and activity as it is for the 
soul later on. But at any rate I think it would be more correct to transpose 
the terms. Later on, the subject of experience may have what we loosely 
call an internal perception of itself acting and feeling, but in this percep-
tion and distinct from its object the subject immediately acts and feels; and 
that it was true of its experience as long as that experience was entitled 
to the name. This percept we may call presentational, the immediate act 
of feeling we cannot. The phrase a “feeling of” is not, it is admitted, very 
exact. We may talk of an “apprehension of” with perfect propriety, but in 
immediate experience the subject, it seems to me, can only be said to feel 
and act. Later on, largely through intersubjective intercourse and reflex-
ion, it may come not simply to be a self, not simply to act and feel, but 
to know itself as having acted and felt. “Wherever you meet a psycholo-
gist,” says Mr. Bradley, who takes this experience as elementary, “you 
will find a man who has never made a serious attempt to decompose it or 
ever resolutely faced the question as to what it contains.”10 “Whereever 
9 Appearance and Reality, p. 459.
10 Appearance and Reality, p. 116.
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you meet a psychologist,” I have replied, “who essays to resolve himself 
and his experiences wholly into content or phenomena, there you find 
a man who, because he can’t see his own eyes, seems to think he hasn’t 
any. Out of ‘psychical machinery’ he tries to develope its own presupposi-
tions, and smuggles into it what is really distinct from it and is its own 
motive-power.” The psychology I am trying to defend, Mr. Bradley calls 
a “preposterous psychology.” That epithet, I reply, is more appropriate to 
a psychology that can only help itself along by means of metaphors that 
imply and presuppose the very fact it is trying to explain. 
I I I .  C A RV E T H  R E A D
IT is a paradox that consciousness and activity are the commonest things 
in the world, and the most familiar to all of us, and yet we cannot agree in 
describing them. It is another paradox that the commonest cause of mis-
understanding has long been recognised to lie in the ambiguity of terms, 
and yet we make very little progress in agreeing upon definitions. Even 
if we sometimes seem to be agreed upon the use of an important word, 
presently a new interest awakens, or an old interest acquires new life; and 
then, if its adherents think it would be strengthened by using that word 
in another sense, they make no scruple about altering it: like that sort of 
Economist who hopes to add dignity to labour by calling it “capital.” 
Something of this kind is at present the matter with “consciousness.” For 
a good while this term, when used without qualification, has stood with 
many writers for the whole of noetic experience: here and there the more 
venturesome may have extended it to cover the supposed anoetic experi-
ence of man, or animals, or what-not; but for our present discussion we 
may leave them out. “Consciousness,” as denoting all noetic experience, 
content, or matter, as well as form, has been a term in common use; but 
now Realism or, more particularly, perceptive Realism has come into fa-
vour; and it seems to be thought that the doctrines of perceptive Realism 
require for their effective statement such a limitation of the term “con-
sciousness” as to exclude from it the content of experience altogether, or 
to admit as little as possible; so that it shall mean not much more than the 
form or process of experience. Strict limitation of it to form or process is 
difficult. 
For my own part, whilst strongly sympathising with the new Realism, 
so far as it asserts the objectivity, stability, substantiality of the world as 
it is known to us, I see nothing in this doctrine incompatible with the use 
of the term “consciousness” as equivalent to noetic experience, content 
and form. There is, in fact, no opposition between empirical Realism and 
Berkleyan Idealism. It seems to be supposed that consciousness must be 
the same thing as subjectivity; but it has been explained over and over 
again that Object and Subject stand for a distinction within conscious-
Carveth Read
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ness; and this seems to me to be true. To say that the sky is consciousness 
is a paradox; but to say that the sky as known is not consciousness is a 
contradiction. Now, what is the sky except as it is known? Any object 
directly known, or that can be brought into the focus of attention, I call 
either a phenomenon or a representation. If it is perceived in space it is 
an object in the full sense of the term, or a phenomenon; if it is an image 
of such an object, and not in space (that is, not definitely modified by my 
own movements) it is a subjective object, or a representation. But all that 
region of experience which is never an object of direct attention, always 
a matter of marginal awareness, is not a phenomenon nor yet a represen-
tation; and this comprises all feeling and conation. There is also a kind 
of experience, namely, meaning, that clings to all objects and is normally 
marginal, but may usually, in some measure, be brought into focus if we 
have an interest in doing so; it can be brought into focus so far as it can 
be resolved into images. Phenomena, then, are objects in consciousness; 
but consciousness is not a phenomenon, for it is not in space; nor a rep-
resentation, for it is not even in time. It has no ascertainable limits of any 
kind, and both space and time are constructions within it. The subjectiv-
ity of experience is equally profound and inexhaustible. There lie all the 
meaning and all the value of direct cognition. It responds to every modi-
fication of cognition. It is the commentary upon everything that is seen 
or thought of. And if we pause upon any object and call the meaning of 
it into the light of attention, our subjectivity is in no way impoverished, 
for this new object has its own meaning and its own value. To treat the 
known object or phenomenon as something independent is a gratuitous 
surrender to common-sense and to the less intelligent students of physical 
science, who have never advanced a single argument to justify their naive 
assumption on epistemological grounds. It is true that the world or the sky 
is not merely my consciousness; but everyone’s who will look. It belongs 
to generic consciousness; and it may be asked what becomes of it if we do 
not look, or if we all fall asleep. Heaven knows. For me, as a matter of 
belief, it then has its own being, as it is not known to man. But so far from 
gaining objectivity under that condition, it is reduced to a bare idea. There 
certainly is no science of it. Where is the chemistry or the physics of any 
world but the waking world? 
Prepositions are most confusing vocables: they are always trying to 
put asunder what God has joined together. We often hear that the world 
is present to consciousness, that it exists for consciousness. A sense of the 
inadequacy of merely human speech leads others to add the prepositions 
together, and to declare that it is present to and for consciousness. But all 
these phrases have the fault of separating consciousness as an abstraction 
from the actuality of experience. There are not two things, one of which 
can be to or for the other. There is only one thing, the known world. 
The least pernicious prepositions in this connection are in and of. One is 
207
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2
tempted to speak of the content of consciousness; but consciousness is not 
a bag. I feel inclined, for this reason, to object to the word “content” in 
this use of it, and to urge that the phrase “matter of consciousness” is bet-
ter. But, waiving that, I shall urge that what is sometimes called the “con-
tent of consciousness” is consciousness itself, and so are all the changes 
that occur in that content, the processes, and the laws or forms of them. 
It is, I think, peculiarly difficult to reconcile any other view with physi-
ological psychology, which treats conscious processes as functions of the 
neural system, more particularly of the brain. For the best ascertained 
doctrine of that study is that there are localised areas in the brain, the 
excitement of which gives rise to the various kinds of sensations, that is, 
to “content.” The simpler lines of communication between these areas, 
corresponding with the complication of sensations, may also be said to be 
known. But what it is in the brain that corresponds to the perception of 
objects in space, and to other important processes, such as reasoning and 
volition, may still be described as “clotted hypothesis.” However, it is an 
indisputable deduction from this theory, so far as it goes, that the body 
itself is a phenomenon in consciousness—if consciousness is a phenom-
enon, the body is an epiphenomenon—; and that space is a consciousness-
construction, so as to abolish any difficulty that may be raised to the con-
ceiving of the sky as consciousness. Coleridge commented on the danger 
(in the direction of heresy) of saying that “God is everywhere”: rather, he 
urged, we must declare that “all things are  present to God.” Now cut out 
the prepositional phrase with its illusory separativeness, and that is true of 
the world of every mind according to its capacity. 
That sensations and sense-qualities are consciousness may be seen from 
this, that they are inseparable from feeling. Objective themselves, they are 
never known without this subjective reaction: which may be different, 
or similar, for different sensations, or for the same sensation at different 
times; but is never wanting. This variability of our feelings enables us to 
distinguish the sensation from them, but not to separate it from them. A 
similar connection holds between sensations and conation. And in this 
way we may interpret the “subject-object relation.” It is not a relation 
between independent things, but corresponds with one of the contrasts 
of focal and marginal knowledge. In perception things are focal and ideas 
are marginal; in reflection ideas are focal and things are marginal; so that 
percepts and ideas may both be considered as objects; but both in the at-
titude of perception and of reflection, feeling and conation are marginal, 
and are always subjective. We cannot separate these elements of experi-
ence and call some of them consciousness and others not: consciousness 
and experience are identical. 
Now, as to Activity, it seems to me to be, in its most general sense, the 
same thing as change of experience. All change of experience is activity of 
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consciousness; and we may say that activity of consciousness is measured 
by the number of distinguishable changes that occur in an unit of time. 
These changes are both objective and subjective. If I watch the traffic in 
Oxford Street, there is the procession of vehicles and of animals of various 
species, with their noises and odours; the ideas they excite of how— 
every man hath business and desires,
Such as they are,
and the purposelessness of all their purposes; and back of all this (as they 
say in America) there is a subjective crowd of feelings and impulses. The 
physical factors of this scene impress me with a sense of force, which 
makes me keep out of their way; and at the same time I attribute them 
to causes. The causes lie beyond my present experience; but can only be 
thought of as if I witnessed them. Under that condition they can be con-
ceived very definitely as previous changes amongst similar objects; but the 
force of them cannot be definitely conceived, except by identifying it with 
the causes of what is happening and to happen next. Hence the whole 
physical activity is reduced to changes, preceded by changes, and to be 
followed by others in a definite order. 
Do the changes that meanwhile go on amongst my ideas and in the 
subjective crowd of feelings and conations require any other analysis? 
They all seem to have their antecedents, though their relation to those 
antecedents is much less easily reducible to order under definite concepts 
than are events in the physical world. Some of them give an impression of 
force, such as the occasional conations involved in walking under condi-
tions that do not permit of an easy rhythm being established, turnings of 
the eyes or head, various impulses and inhibitions, and perhaps an effort 
to think of something else and far away. But in all this I find nothing but 
changes, antecedent changes, consequent changes, and the sensations of 
conation, which, some of them, obviously, are strain and pressure sen-
sations easily localisable, whilst others have the same general character, 
though not so definitely localised. Throughout, the subjective activity is, 
like the physical, nothing but change of experience. 
The consciousness of activity is, then, in the first place, a consciousness 
of this activity of consciousness in its totality. This is, for the most part, 
identical with the activity of consciousness, the content in all its processes. 
It is possible, indeed, to have an occasional awareness of such activity in a 
peculiar way, a momentary reflection of it, highly symbolic in presentation 
but rich in meaning, an epitome of experience, which I take to be one of 
the things that are sometimes indicated by the term “self-consciousness.” 
But this momentary reflection enters, of course, as one change into the 
stream of changes; and its natural position is marginal; for if it reaches 
the centre of the stream the whole direction and character of the activity 
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is diverted. 
But “consciousness of activity” is naturally a narrower notion than 
“consciousness of the activity of consciousness”: it means consciousness 
of self-activity—of the psycho-physical organism in thinking, observing, 
running; for, as a matter of experience, when I am running my mind runs; 
and when I am thinking my body thinks. It is true that when a man is 
running his mind may do a good deal besides running; and that when 
thinking he may sometimes almost forget that he has a body. But the at-
titude and behaviour of his body, its health or discomfort, influence all his 
thoughts, and it is the psycho-physical whole that constitutes himself, his 
individuality in relation to other individuals. 
It may be said: “But, surely, all activity of consciousness is an activity 
of the psycho-physical organism, and, therefore, self-activity”; and there 
is a sense in which that is true. Still, metaphysics is an affair of distinc-
tions; and good metaphysics draws the right distinctions. In this case we 
must distinguish within the activity of consciousness that region in which 
the self is relatively active from that in which it is relatively passive. The 
expanse of the sky or the traffic of the street are passive experiences, as 
near to the abstract physical as anything can be; but when I save myself at 
a crossing from the thunder of a brewer’s wain, or reflect with scorn how 
all such trumpery is doomed to fly over the back side of the world, these 
are experiences of self-activity, or activities of the psycho physical organ-
ism; and the poetical reflection on trumpery comes as near as anything can 
to the abstract mental. But no abstraction has real existence. 
Consciousness of activity usually involves some effort and choice, as 
Professor Alexander has said; and although unable to identify it with cona-
tion, which seems to me to be a factor of the marginal content, I agree that 
conation is a character of it. Conation is not a presentation in the same 
sense that feeling is not, namely, in as much as it is marginal. But to sepa-
rate conation from the matter of consciousness is possible only on condi-
tion of limiting such matter to objects (things and images); and excluding 
the meaning of them and the feelings and reactions they excite. Objects 
and presentations thus segregated, however, are entirely unknown; they 
have no significance and (strictly) no existence. Consciousness of activity 
is that portion of the activity of consciousness which is determined by in-
terest in an end. This implies conation, and the liability of having to make 
an effort; but the activity bears no proportion to effort; for it includes cog-
nition, which may be extensive and varied, in happy hours, with very little 
effort; and at other times (alas!), in spite of the utmost exertion, activity 
may be small. 
Thus far I had written before receiving Professor Ward’s paper. Hav-
ing very few leisure hours in the week, I foresaw that if I should wait to 
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begin my own paper until his came to hand, it would be impossible to get 
through my own task quickly enough to leave the next man a reasonable 
time for reflecting on the course of the discussion. It was fortunate that 
I did so: for otherwise I might have felt embarassed to find much to say 
beyond the assenting to Professor Ward’s criticisms. There is, however, 
one point at which he has agreed with Professor Alexander, which to me 
seems questionable, namely, whether conation is resolvable into strain 
sensations. He has not enlarged upon this; but it may not be erroneous 
to assume that he agrees with the views of Professor Stout in the British 
Journal of Psychology (July, 1906). Professor Stout there argues that if 
conation were identical with motor sensations, “the intensity of conation 
would be simply identical with the amount of motor sensation connected 
with it. But this is not so. Conation may be as strong in giving the finishing 
touch to a house of cards as in lifting a heavy weight.” In every bodily ac-
tion, however, there is a great deal more than conation, namely, the special 
adjustments required by it, which may call forth very different degrees of 
effort. Conation is distinguished from particular voluntary actions as be-
ing something common to them all. To abstract this common character is 
difficult: but so far as it can be done it appears to me to be probably true 
that the intensity of conation is proportionate to the motor sensations in-
volved; or, more correctly, to the motor sensations and images; for, to the 
best of my judgment, “felt tendency” consists of the images or memory of 
former conations by which we anticipate the action now proposed. The 
difficulty of forming an opinion upon this point is due to the marginal 
position of the experience to be analysed; you can only watch it out of the 
corner of your eye. It is the same kind of difficulty as one finds in trying to 
discriminate qualities of pleasure. 
The consciousness of activity, then, I take to be the consciousness of 
changes of experience so far as they are brought about by the interest of 
the psychophysical subject, or empirical self. In Psychology and Episte-
mology this is as far as I can get; but I had supposed that the Aristotelian 
Society was concerned in some measure with Ontology; and I should have 
been glad to hear its opinions upon the good old-fashioned doctrine that 
all activity is activity of the soul: a belief which, for my own part, I can 
neither verify nor relinquish. 
I V.  G .  F.  S T O U T
I AGREE substantially with Dr. Ward in his criticism of Professor Al-
exander’s paper and Mr. Bradley’s views, and the points which he urges 
seem to me sufficient as a basis of discussion without my attempting to 
add much new matter. I shall therefore only make one comment on Pro-
fessor Alexander’s general position. I fail to see the logical connexion be-
tween his statement that “consciousness,” or mental activity, is nothing 
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but a phenomenon and his positive account of the nature of conscious-
ness. He seems to me first to concede everything that is meant in asserting 
that consciousness is not a phenomenon and then to make a complete 
change of front by affirming that it is nothing but a phenomenon. The 
term  phenomenon may be taken in two senses. It may be taken to mean 
an appearance in distinction from that to which the appearance appears. 
Now, from this point of view, Professor Alexander clearly recognises that 
activity or consciousness is not phenomenal. It is, according to him, di-
rected to objects, but is not itself an object; for there is “no consciousness 
of consciousness.” In the second sense, a phenomenon is so called, inas-
much as it is regarded as the appearance of something other than itself. 
It comes before the mind as something to be interpreted by developing 
its implications and connexions within a systematic order of inter-related 
elements. From this side, also, Professor Alexander virtually admits that 
consciousness is not phenomenal, as sensations and material things are. 
Sensations, he tells us, are known only as elements of these spatial and 
temporal complexes which we call physical objects. And, I presume, he 
would admit that physical objects are known only as belonging to the 
spatial and temporal context of the material world. But mental activity, 
he seems to say, is not an element in this systematic order of relations. It 
is not an object nor an element of objects, but quite disparate in nature 
from anything objective. Even though it is only found in connexion with 
living organisms at certain stages of organic development, yet it cannot, 
in Professor Alexander’s view, be itself a constituent element of these or-
ganised bodies. For, if he said this, he would be regarding consciousness 
as one special item among others distinguished from the and related to red 
or as green or as red or green may be distinguished from and related to 
each other, or to the physical conditions on which they depend. But this 
is irreconcilable with his whole position and, in particular, with his state-
ment that “all consciousness is self-consciousness.” For this implies that 
consciousness is not a special objective item co-ordinate with others, but 
rather an inseparable aspect of all knowledge, whatever may be its special 
object. It cannot, then, be in this sense that consciousness is phenomenal. 
What then does Professor Alexander mean by a phenomenon? 
Professor Bead introduces what he has to say on activity by a discus-
sion of the nature of consciousness. This part of his paper I find it difficult 
to follow. In the first place, it contains what looks like an explicit incon-
sistency. We are told that “what is sometimes called the ‘content of con-
sciousness’ is consciousness itself”; and it is plain from the context that 
under “content of consciousness” Professor Bead includes whatever is in 
any way known or thought of, so that he must regard “phenomena and 
representation” as contents of consciousness, and therefore as identical 
with the consciousness of them. But in seemingly point blank contradic-
tion to this position, we are also told that “consciousness is not a phenom-
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enon, for it is not in space; nor a representation, for it is not even in time.” 
I do not find the difficulty removed or even mitigated by the statement that 
there are other contents of consciousness besides phenomena and repre-
sentations in space or time. For, if we adhere strictly to the identification 
of consciousness and its content, this only means that, besides these, there 
are other kinds of consciousness. Nor am I helped by the further statement 
that space and time are themselves contents of consciousness. For, abid-
ing by the identification of consciousness and its content, all that can be 
logically deduced from this is that some consciousness forms part of other 
consciousness. It would seem that further explanation is required here. 
Again, if I seek for Professor Read’s positive reason for this identifica-
tion, I find that he contents himself with alleging an inherent self-contra-
diction in any other view. “To say that the sky as known is not conscious-
ness,” he urges, is “a contradiction.” But it is so only if we already assume 
that “being known” and being consciousness are indistinguishable. Every-
one admits that knowing is consciousness. The real question is whether 
what is known is simply identical with the knowing of it. This seems to me 
no more self-evident than it is self-evident that bread as digested is simply 
identical with the digesting of it. Doubtless, there is essential correlation, 
but every relation must have two terms, and the fact that one term a enters 
into the relation is not distinguishable from the fact that the other term b 
enters into it. 
Again, I do not find Professor Read’s appeal to physiological psychol-
ogy at all helpful. The psychological doctrine which he regards as espe-
cially important and relevant is that the body itself is a “phenomenon in 
consciousness.” But, according to his own account of what a phenom-
enon is, this ought to mean merely that the body is something known and 
known as existing in space. We scarcely need physiological psychology 
to inform us of this. And how can it strengthen Professor Read’s argu-
ment? Apparently he is here resting his case on the assumption that what 
physiological psychology teaches is, not only that the body is known, but 
that it is known as being merely a complex of sensations, and the further 
assumption that sensations are mental existences inasmuch as they exist 
only in being experienced by an undivided mind, and again on the addi-
tional assumption that there is no possible distinction between sensations, 
so regarded, and the knowing of them. But all these suppositions are dis-
putable, and two of them, the first and the last, appear to me to be false. 
Neither our own body nor any other body is known to us merely as a com-
plex of sensations. The knowledge of material things includes, throughout 
its whole development, the thought-reference of a content derived from 
sensuous presentation to what Kant calls a “transcendental object.” And 
even if we confine ourselves to mere sensations, yet the knowing of these 
sensations, involving, as it does, recognition, discrimination, identifica-
tion, comparison, etc., seems to me distinguishable from the existence and 
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qualities of the sensations which are recognised, discriminated, identified, 
or compared. I cannot, of course, discuss these large questions further in 
the present paper. What I wish to bring out is merely that Professor Read 
is making, consciously or unconsciously, highly disputable assumptions. 
There is one view put forward by Professor Read in his preparatory 
remarks which has a specially obvious and direct bearing on the topic of 
our present discussion. I refer to his distinction between phenomena on 
the one hand, and feeling and conation on the other. According to Profes-
sor Read the difference is that phenomena are objects of direct attention, 
whereas we have only a marginal awareness of feeling and conation. I 
am not at all sure that our awareness of feeling and conation always is 
marginal. Certainly this hardly seems to apply to my dissatisfaction with 
a toothache. But I waive this point in order to deal with another which 
seems more essentially relevant. The question I wish to raise is this. Sup-
posing that feeling and conation were as definitely and directly objects 
of attention as “phenomena” are, would they cease to be subjective and 
themselves become phenomena? To me it seems clear that they would not. 
For there would still remain the ultimate distinction founded on the rela-
tion of Subject and Object. Being dissatisfied, attending, desiring, hoping, 
and fearing, all imply something with which we are dissatisfied, to which 
we attend, or which we desire, hope, or fear. This something is what we 
call the object of these processes, and the processes are contrasted with 
their objects as subjective. The distinction, as we know it, is quite inde-
pendent of the special manner in which we may be supposed to know it. 
Professor Read is comparatively brief in his direct treatment of Activ-
ity. I select for comment three points—his distinction between activity in 
general and self-activity; his view of the relation between activity and ef-
fort; and his view of the relation of activity to motor sensation. As regards 
the first point, he proposes to call all “change of experience” activity of 
consciousness. My objection to this is very simple. Whatever licence we 
may allow ourselves in the use of terms, we ought, at least, to refrain from 
applying them in such a way as to obliterate the very distinctions they 
are intended to express But Professor Read’s general activity would also 
include all that we mean by passivity. It is like proposing to include under 
the same term, husband—both husbands and wives. Unless we deliber-
ately intend to confuse ourselves, we must confine the term mental activity 
to what Professor Read calls self-activity. When the “mind runs,” it is pro 
tanto active; but when it is tossed in a blanket, it is pro tanto passive. Yet 
there may be the same amount of change in both cases. 
As regards effort, Professor Read holds that “in spite of the utmost 
exertion, activity may be small.” This can only mean that what we call un-
successful activity is pro tanto not activity at all. I submit that this is a very 
inconvenient restriction of the use of the word, and not at all consonant 
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with ordinary usage. Surely it is better to say that we are active in making 
an attempt, whether the attempt is successful or not,—that we are active 
in seeking, whether or not we succeed in finding. Activity is to be regarded 
as the presupposition of the distinction between success and failure. 
Professor Read’s view of the relation of motor sensation to conative 
consciousness seems to be as follows. By no means all motor sensation is 
felt as conation; but some of it is,—a vague residuum, difficult to isolate 
by abstract analysis. Now, I simply put one question. How are the muscle, 
joint, and tendon-sensations which are identical with or proportionate to 
conative consciousness distinguished from other muscle, joint, and ten-
don-sensations? The difference in their nature is far more marked than 
that between those connected with movements of the arm, leg, or scalp. 
On what physiological conditions can the distinction be surmised to 
depend? 
V. R e p l y  b y  S.  A L E X A N D E R
MR. WARD’S fundamental difference from me on questions of theory of 
knowledge has led him to certain misapprehensions of my meaning. These 
I desire to correct, gratefully acknowledging criticisms which compel me 
to speak more accurately, though not to change my mind. 
First of all, he objects, I declare mental activity to be simple and unique, 
and yet afterwards to be definitely describable. In calling mental activity, 
or consciousness, unique, I mean, that it possesses a character which we 
must accept as a new fact in the universe, like redness or life. But as I may 
describe red as a colour, I may justifiably connect mental activity or pro-
cess with process in general. And I may go on to describe other properties 
which I find out about it, and this I have attempted to do. The mere fact 
that we can say that mental activity has direction and has rate is enough 
to show it to be describable. Again, and this I lay stress on, though mental 
activity as such, as having the peculiar character of consciousness, can 
only be indicated, we have it occurring in various complexities: it is simple 
in sensation, more complex in perception, extremely complex in volition. 
And I take the object of Psychology to be to describe and distinguish these 
various grades of complexity. 
Next, and this is my answer to his second charge, one of the properties 
I discover in mental process as such is that it has a definite place in space. 
Mr. Ward says that I first say it is only metaphorically movement, and then 
go on to say that it is literally a movement, and a movement to which I 
have transferred the idea of activity; and he then points to the history of 
physical activity as having got rid of this idea of activity. This is really quite 
a misapprehension. When I speak of physical movement I mean physical 
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process as it occurs in the physical world without imputing to it activity, 
without any theory about it at all, and when I say that I feel mental activ-
ity occurring in connection with movement in my brain, I mean only that 
it occurs in that portion of space, and is experienced by me as occurring 
in my brain. I see no more difficulty in this than in a well-known proposi-
tion, that mind is situated at the synapses of the neurones; only of course 
I cannot discover this last by inspection, whereas I do discover by inspec-
tion that mental process is connected with some portion, however vaguely 
felt, of my brain. Mr. Ward asks, why should what is felt as occurring in 
the body yield the experience of mental activity? I venture to plead that we 
should never ask why should or should not things be so, we should only 
ask if they are so, and if we find this is the case, make our account accord-
ingly. To me the matter is one of fact, and I can find no mistake in my own 
description. I need not again allude to what I have already said: that in lo-
cating my mental activity in my brain I am using my acquired knowledge 
of brain, and not direct inspection. But apart from this, when I say that 
mental process is located in movements of the brain, I am saying no more 
than I say when I say that the tree under which I am writing is planted 
at the edge of the lawn. When, therefore, Mr. Ward accuses me of kalei-
doscopic transitions (I forgive him this indulgence of his wit), he has not 
quite seen that I am trying to describe whatever I can find to say about my 
consciousness of activity without making any presuppositions of any sort. 
It is a further step, not of inspection but of theory founded upon it, when I 
go on to simplify by declaring not only that mental activity is found in the 
movements in the brain, but that it is essentially a movement in the brain 
with a new property of consciousness. There is no greater difficulty in this 
than in saying that a body has life. Life is not merely mechanical, and yet 
it is a property of something which is mechanical. 
At every point that I come into conflict with Mr. Ward it is not upon 
psychological but upon epistemological ground. He complains of me that 
I have led the discussion to the edge of the bog and stopped there. Well, I 
had to stop somewhere, and I thought, and think, it all important to be so 
prepared by description of experience as to be able to find a path through 
the bog. This path I think I dimly see; I also think I see Mr. Ward out of 
the path. I wish that the hand I can offer him were not so weak, or that I 
had any hope of his accepting it. But I can hope to remove misapprehen-
sions. In the first place I have used the unfortunate word phenomenon. I 
have made up my mind that I shall never use the word phenomenon again 
without carefully defining its meaning. How Mr. Stout can say that I de-
scribe the mind as if it were not a phenomenon passes my comprehension. 
I have said that consciousness is a property of a certain sort of brain. How, 
then, can it be other than one thing among a number of other things? 
To suppose that mind to be a phenomenon must be an appearance to 
something else is to suppose that the only phenomena are physical things. 
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But, in fact, I meant by the word almost nothing at all. When I speak of 
phenomena I only mean things which are or claim to be definitely verifi-
able or inferable facts, as opposed to something that is merely symbolical. 
Again, when I say that it is the business of Metaphysics to describe what 
sensations are, I mean only that it is its business to explain the differ-
ence between an object so far as it is sensed, or perceived, or imagined, 
or conceived. All these things—sensations, perceptions, conceptions—are 
for me objects and part of the real world. I was under the impression 
that many thinkers (and I thought Mr. Ward was one of them, probably 
mistakenly) do not regard mental activity as merely a natural fact, but as 
something on which in some way natural facts depend. In the next place, 
when I somewhat incautiously speak of mind as a thing, and also of the 
thing made up of body and mind, I do not mean that mind may exist apart 
from body; on the contrary, mind is the property of a certain kind of body. 
Next, Mr. Ward refuses to assent to my proposition, that the only things 
mental are conation and feeling. There is, he urges, a receptive constitu-
ent in the psychosis. Now, here I venture to repeat my description. I take 
green. There is, of course, a receptive attitude, but it is a conation, though 
a passive one. There is nothing in green, as green, which is mental. When 
I have the sensation green, my consciousness works in a particular direc-
tion, and that is all. As to feeling, I admit, of course, the incompleteness 
of my position. But feeling and willing stand on quite a different footing 
from presentation, and what I mean is, that if you want to know of what 
stuff the mind is made, you must look to conation; and at present it seems 
to me that pleasure and pain belong to the stuff of mind, and that they are 
properties of conation like its direction. 
But now, this being so, my epistemology at present is only this; that 
the cognition of the external world is a reaction upon the external world 
in which mental activity, varying in direction and complexity, is evoked. 
Of course, you cannot have mental action without things to evoke it. Nei-
ther can an animal have life without air to breathe. But the relation of 
cognition is, I think, precisely of the class of organic reactions; the only 
difference is in the terms of the relation. The reagent, which is conscious 
of the physical world, is the one which has the property of conscious-
ness. I admit and insist that things are related to the mind, and the mind 
to things. But the relation is one of reaction. You cannot, therefore, say 
the physical things in any sense depend upon the mind. But now, when I 
have recognised that mind is one sort of thing among things, then I am 
prepared to see that its activity is of the same genus as physical activity. 
The naive mind thinks physical process is one of conscious volition. We 
have got rid of that. But have we got rid of the fundamental fact of conti-
nuity in change? This I find in its simplest form in mental activity. I find it 
also in physical process. And I believe that the same thing is true of all the 
so-called categories: they are found both in physical things and in mind, 
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and are most easily recognisable in mind. At any rate, as regards the par-
ticular category of causality, I reject the teaching of Hume and accept that 
of Locke, and I may observe by the way that according to the description 
which I have given of mind, mind is nothing but that part of things which 
Locke calls Ideas of Reflection. 
Of course, I know that in supporting the beliefs of the common mind 
I am guilty of the philosophical paradox of declaring that the mind which 
knows things is only one among the things which it knows (and the other 
things which possibly it never can know, but which other existences might 
know). This is the paradox to which Lady Welby, with her usual penetra-
tion, has referred in the appended note.11 That it is no paradox at all is 
with me, at present, an intuition, and I am trying continually, without sat-
isfying myself, to express it in terms which shall be convincing to others: I 
mean, which shall enable them to put themselves at my point of view and 
see with my eyes. All I can say at present is this. Here are two things, A 
and B; B is physical, A is also physical, but has mind. When B calls forth 
a mental reaction in A, A is conscious of B, and at the same time aware of 
itself. Let A be myself. I know things and am aware of myself. But myself 
is my awareness, the thing of which I am aware is not myself. To use a 
phrase which I have learned from Mr. Stout in conversation, the “of” in 
the phrase “I am aware of myself,” is the “of” of apposition, as in Locke’s 
phrase, “the idea of a sensation”; when I am aware of the tree, the “of” 
is the “of” of reference to something upon which I react. But just because 
there is awareness in A, B is said to be presented to A. Now A, the feeling, 
11 Lady Welby sends to the meeting the following note:-
“On the occasion of the symposium on ‘the Nature of Mental Activity,’ I venture to 
suggest the need of a previous question, which I cannot discover to have been definitely 
asked with reference to modern knowledge, still less satisfactorily answered. The ques-
tion is, Who or What is to consider and pronounce upon the subject? I few answer, Man, 
what in this context, do we mean by ‘Man’? Do we mean Someone able, for the purpose 
in hand, to dissociate himself entirely from the matter under consideration, so as to arrive 
at a trustworthy, because an impartial, judgment,–that of a third party? That is, assuming 
an attitude apart from mental activity, do we propose, as beings infra- or supra-mental, 
to discuss the nature of what, for present purposes, is other than ours? I imagine tha vari-
ous theories are to be criticized, and others formulated or adumbrated. Does this involve 
mental activity or no?
“There are, of course, many cases when what belongs to us, and can only in a secondary 
sense be identified with us, is and must be discussed by us. But how do we propose to 
discuss and decide on the nature of that which alone discusses and decides? Is there not 
something ‘circular’ in this process? 
“It may be objected that, from this point of view, the psyche cannot discuss psychology. 
Well, everywhere there is surely needed some kind of ultimate reference or arbiter, some 
relatively independent critic? If so, this ought to be clearly defined, and named as distinct 
from, while including, ‘mind.’
“For, as we are, does not our use of ‘mind’ throw us back into the same perplexity which 
the discussion is to remove? Do we not need a yet anonymous third factor: a speaker, in 
fact, who can detach himself from ‘mind’ in discussing its ‘nature?’”
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perceiving, thinking thing, talks; and it feels itself, and it knows B, and 
describes B by words. Afterwards, it applies to itself the words which it 
has first used about B, and then it is said to describe itself. It just puts into 
words the two parts of the world of which it is aware. But the things in the 
world are there independently of B’s awareness of them, and for all I know 
there may be things in the world of which A never can be aware, for want 
of the means to respond to them. Mr. Ward thinks this notion as insane as 
the consciousness of consciousness. But the difference is this, that I can-
not stop at two terms of the last series, and when I go on to three terms 
my head begins to spin. Carry me along to four or five terms and I am in 
Colney Hatch. I apprehend no such danger in forecasting another kind of 
being to whom my consciousness might lie open as a book, in the same 
way as life lies open to me, to my consciousness. I admit the strangeness 
of the conception, that things in the world should exist in their own right, 
and that yet there is one among them, my mind, which knows the others. 
But the strangeness disappears with familiarity. It is the business of mind 
to know itself and other things. 
Of course, I am well aware of all the questions which are thus left 
over, to be settled by Metaphysics, or theory of knowledge. The problems 
of memory, of the existence of the past, of error, of imagination; how I 
can by dint of my mental activity call up in imagination objects which yet 
are not myself; how my memory brings before me things which have no 
present existence. I have no brief answer to these problems. If I had been 
required to answer them, I should not have undertaken the discussion. But 
I see no reason why in Philosophy, any more than in any other science, we 
should refrain from dealing with one portion of what we know to be true, 
just because we have not complete comprehension of the whole. I recog-
nise no difference of method between Philosophy and the other sciences. 
I see that we have scientific knowledge when we use the utmost effort to 
depersonalise ourselves so as accurately to reflect the things about us. We 
depersonalise ourselves in Philosophy by describing the facts we find in 
the whole of our experience, and not asking what must be, nor seeking 
for logical connection where we only find juxtaposition, try to confine 
ourselves to what we see. 
V I .  R e p l y  b y  C A RV E T H  R E A D
FIGURE to yourselves my astonishment at finding that a series of propo-
sitions that seemed to me self-evident may be regarded as altogether ob-
scure by another mind that I had been accustomed to trust. 
Phenomena and representations, I say, are contents of consciousness, 
and, therefore, identical with the consciousness of them. They all occur in 
space or time, or in both; and therefore consciousness is not a phenom-
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enon, for it is not in space or time. On the contrary, space and time are 
constructions or arrangements of phenomena or representations in con-
sciousness. This is intuitively clear. If it be objected that, at any rate, con-
sciousness is the totality of related phenomena, together with the marginal 
commentary upon them, I reply that this what I have said: all things are 
present in consciousness, for I certainly assume that there is no conscious-
ness of nothing. 
Whether the sky as known is consciousness? Again, the affirmative is 
self-evident to me. What is known is identical with the knowing of it so far 
as we can know it. It is quite useless to seek amongst phenomena for any 
simile for what is called the relation of consciousness to its object, because 
there is no such relation; there are not two terms. I see no analogy between 
the digesting of bread and the elaboration of cognitions. 
My appeal to physiological Psychology was made in reply to Professor 
Alexander’s position, that consciousness is “simply a phenomenon found 
in certain organisms”: on the contrary, I say, on the physiological theory 
the body is a phenomenon in consciousness. But I did not refer to Profes-
sor Alexander directly: knowing well what was in store for him. Professor 
Stout says my deduction is not good, because “the knowledge of material 
things includes, throughout its whole development, the thought-reference 
of a content derived from sensuous presentation, to what Kant calls ‘a 
transcendental object.’” But we must distinguish the knowledge of a thing 
as such from our knowledge of it in analysis. Physiological Psychology 
knows nothing of material things; and I am justified in saying that it re-
solves the body as known into the rawest material of consciousness. A 
material thing as known is, in my opinion, referred to a transcendental 
object, but only by what I have called an “indicative or orectic judgment,” 
because the transcendental object is never a knowable term. I agree, of 
course, that the raw materials of sensation are very different from an elab-
orated phenomenon. 
I also admit that the line between focal and marginal consciousness is 
far from clearly marked, and that in this connection toothache has often 
given me trouble. In fact, all pains give trouble to psychologists, as ap-
pears from their differences of opinion as to whether pain is feeling or sen-
sation. I incline to regard it as sensation and as capable of being directly 
attended to. But whether feeling and conation would become phenomena 
if they were direct objects of attention, I do not know. The case reminds 
me of Poincaré’s frequent assurances of what experience would be like if 
the world were entirely different from what it is. I have no courage for 
such excursions. But I may observe that, if we try to bring forward a cona-
tion so as to study it, it ceases to be the present conation; for that is now 
the effort to bring it forward; and this effort is marginal. 
Carveth Read
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All change of experience is activity of consciousness, because there is 
no such thing as passivity, just as there is physically no such thing as rest. 
But the couple—active, passive—is not thereby made useless: it has a rela-
tive application. I have shown this; and have concluded that conscious-
ness of activity is that portion of the activity of consciousness which is 
determined by interest in an end. That is what we mean by our activity. 
Interest in an end often excites great efforts (for example) to think; yet 
the resulting activity, measured by changes in the ideational and sensuous 
content, may be small. I congratulate every Aristotelian who has not had 
this experience when trying to think of something to say. 
Probably the intensity of conation is proportionate to the muscle 
sensations involved. In finishing a house of cards these sensations (I say 
“muscle” for brevity) are such as the fixing of the eyes, holding the breath, 
scalp-strain, circulation, etc.; and there is not very much else; for the limbs 
employed are small and their contractions slight. In a football scrimmage 
all these sensations are present, but they are completely masked by mas-
sive sensations from the whole of the trunk and limbs. That is to say, to 
the common footballer they are masked, but they cannot entirely escape 
the eye of the psychologist.
Carveth Read
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V I I .  M E N TA L  AC T I V I T Y  I N  W I L L I N G  A N D  I N 
I D E A S
S. A L E X A N D E R
LOCKE, as it will be remembered, divides the objects of thought or ideas, 
so far as concerns their origin, into ideas of sensation and ideas of reflec-
tion, as well as a third class of ideas which are common both to sensation 
and reflection. The ideas of sensation come to us ultimately from sensible 
experience. The ideas of reflection are those which we have from reflect-
ing upon the operations of our own minds. Now, I take it that we may 
conveniently say that while ideas of sensation are the subject matter of the 
physical sciences, the ideas of reflection are the subject matter of psychol-
ogy. Locke’s simple enumeration, though so well known, is well worth 
recalling, because it makes a clear theoretical distinction between objects 
open to external inspection and objects open to internal inspection. It 
requires, of course, qualification to make it correspond with psychology 
as at present understood. In the first place, though these processes are 
described as being such as are open to reflection, it does not follow that 
simple inspection will teach us everything that there is in them or that can 
be known about them—we may have to have recourse to indirect meth-
ods as well. I do not mean merely that we may need to use experiment, 
which by itself offers no theoretical difficulties, but that we may need in 
order to discover the nature of our mental processes to direct our atten-
tion, in the first instance, to the contents or subject matter, the ideas of 
sensation, upon which those processes are employed. We may need to get 
at our mental processes from a study, as Mr. Stout says, of the presented 
objects. In other words, the operations of our mind may call for all man-
ner of other helps than simple introspection in order to reveal them to 
introspection, and much may be learned about their conditions which is 
not open to introspection at all. But it remains true that the study of mind 
is, in Locke’s language, a study of the processes which the mind performs 
as distinct from the ideas of sensation which evoke these mental processes. 
There is a second and far more important qualification of Locke’s con-
ception which must be insisted on. Locke distinguished his ideas from the 
real things of which they were copies. His ideas of sensation and of reflec-
tion are mental objects only, dependent in some obscure way on the mind. 
This was part of his philosophy and Locke wrote as a philosopher and 
not as a psychologist. But it need be no burden to our psychology. Let us 
substitute for Locke’s ideas of reflection and of sensation mental processes 
and physical objects and we have the result that psychology is the study of 
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mind as consisting of mental processes, and physical science is the study of 
physical objects. We may, if we choose, call physical objects ideas in order 
to indicate that they are related to mind so far as we know them. But let 
us not substitute fictions for facts by supposing that a physical object, be-
cause it is related to a mental process, gives rise to an idea of itself which 
is not physical but mental. 
This simple, perhaps over-simple, statement that the world which we 
know consists of two kinds of things, one, our minds or mental processes, 
and the other, physical objects, is only what is yielded by an unbiassed 
description of facts and therefore to question it would be left for philoso-
phy and is not a presupposition of psychology. Take an act of will. I will 
to catch a train. The train is a physical object and so is catching the train. 
But there is a process of willing to catch it and that is mental. Take an act 
of thought. I think about the movements of the planets in ellipses. Those 
movements are physical. Thinking about them is mental. Take an atten-
tive act of perception, say, of a house. I can distinguish here two separate 
things, the house, which is physical, the attentive perceiving of it, which 
is mental. There is no doubt in these cases that there are two things pres-
ent, one mental and the other physical, which are related to each other. 
But then, on the other hand, there is imagination which may turn out to 
be mere imagination, and there is error which is not real. And straightway 
we say that in these cases, consequently, besides the mental process of 
imaging, there is not a physical imagined object but only a mental idea of 
it, and therewith we have the doctrine that besides mental processes such 
as we are familiar with in attention and willing and inference and desir-
ing, there are also presentations which are essentially mental and different 
from physical things. And in accordance with this, our simple sensations, 
green, hot and the like, are described as psychical states and sometimes 
even those who say that psychology describes mental processes declare 
sensations to be a particular kind of mental process, that there is a mental 
process green, and another mental process blue, and the like. 
Now there is a theory familiarly connected with the name of Avenar-
ius of how this so-called introjection comes into existence. Whether that 
theory is correct or not I do not inquire. For I believe it to be the case 
that many who admit to the full the fallacious character of introjection, 
continue to speak of presentations as if they were elements of the mind’s 
fabric, instead of being merely particular ways under which non-mental 
objects exist in relation to the apprehending mind. And therefore it does 
not seem superfluous to disregard the theory of the origin of introjection 
and to urge that the whole method of supposing that besides mental pro-
cesses of conation and affection there are also presentations, depends on 
what I respectfully plead is a hasty interpretation of facts. Locke himself is 
a sinner. For under the head of ideas of reflection he includes our memo-
ries or our imaginations. Now a remembered event or a remembered per-
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son or an imagined event or person is as much physical as the perceived 
event or person. The object apprehended is presented in a different form, 
but in itself, so far as we can tell from immediate experience, the imaged 
tree is as much a physical object as the perceived tree. True, the object may 
be vitiated by elements introduced into it by the mind. But why not take 
the facts at their face value, and, difficult as it may be, explain afterwards 
how they come to be vitiated? The stick bent in water is a physical object 
as much as the straight stick out of water. It is only subsequently that we 
learn why it appears bent, being itself straight. That does not make the 
bent stick mental. With one eye slightly displaced by pressing on it, I see 
two candles. The two candles are two physical objects. Afterwards I can 
see why they are only two appearances of the one real candle. That does 
not show that the two candles are mental, but only that the apprehend-
ing organ has distorted the real object. When what is thought to be pure 
water turns out to be full of bacteria, we do not say that the pure water 
was mental, but only that the water was not really pure. Sensation offers 
more difficulty, artificial as it in some degree is. But it, too, submits to the 
same natural method of description. Blue and green and sweet are not in 
any sense mental processes. No mental process is blue or sweet. But when 
we experience blue or sweet we can distinguish the physical object blue or 
sweet from the act of mind which we describe as having those particular 
sensations. We cannot even say that there is a special qualitative modifica-
tion of consciousness through which, as through a veil, the blue or sweet 
is apprehended. The consciousness is one thing, the blue is another, and 
it is physical. Try to think of your consciousness as being affected bluely, 
in the same way as you think of how you pass from step to step of a dif-
ficult demonstration; or as you think of carrying out an impulsive process. 
You cannot do it. And you cannot do it because there is no such affection 
there. The blue is outside your mind. Let me not be told that I am confus-
ing the sensation blue with the physical property of blueness. Of course, 
the object of the sensation blue is not the same as, or, to say the least, less 
complex than, the permanent quality of blueness apprehended by percep-
tion. And let me not be told that the facts of adaptation, or contrast, or 
colour-blindness all show that sensations, the objects sensed, are purely 
mental affections. This is to break the recognised canon of those who 
copy manuscripts, that in case of doubt the more difficult reading is to be 
preferred. The reading I defend is, perhaps, the more difficult, but yours, 
though perhaps easier in these special cases, is contrary to the obvious 
reading of the vast mass of psychological facts. The variations of sensible 
appearances, such as those mentioned, merely mean that objects reveal 
themselves differently to organs which are variously constructed or vari-
ously disposed. But in describing our direct experiences, we are not inquir-
ing into what the object really is, or in what sense we attribute reality to 
the object. When a colour-blind person confuses green and red they are 
the same to him, but they are different to the normal eye and really differ-
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ent. Nor let me be told finally, that to call a sensation like blue physical is 
to exclude the study of it from psychology and to disturb the traditional 
boundaries of our science. I do not think so. Psychology is still the most 
convenient place for the study of these sensations, unless that place be 
disputed by physiology. What is true is, that physical science confines itself 
to the study of the primary qualities of matter and treats of the second-
ary qualities only so far as they are conditioned by the primary qualities. 
Does this amount to a denial that the secondary qualities in their second-
ary form are physical ? You might as well say that life is not a physical 
property because it cannot be completely identified with mechanical and 
chemical changes expressible in terms of extension, motion, and number. 
And if you insist in denying blue, as such, to be physical, I reply that it 
was shown ages ago, for equally good reasons, that the primary qualities 
must be denied to be physical. But this belongs to metaphysics, and in de-
fining the subject matter of psychology we do not start with metaphysics, 
but with the simplest statement of the facts we are to study. Metaphysics 
has its say afterwards, and I do not doubt that it does not disturb what is 
contained in the simple statement of facts, though it may put those facts 
into clearer relation with one another. 
The conception which results from these considerations is that instead 
of the triple analysis of mind into cognitions, affections, and conations, 
we are left with the proposition that consciousness consists of conations 
with feeling. If we take the more perfect analysis of mind into presenta-
tions, attention, and feeling, the element of presentation drops out of the 
account. It is no part of the psychosis itself. It is only included in so far as 
conations contain a reference to objects which are not mental. The stuff of 
which mind is made consists of conations and feeling. In a previous com-
munication made to the Society, I stated roundly that mind consisted of 
conations, affection being treated as a modality of conation. I still prefer 
this form of statement, according to which pleasure and pain are features 
of conation and indicate the furtherance or hindrance of it. But I believe 
it is true that next to nothing is known about feeling. Only quite recently 
the doctrine has been revived that pleasure and pain (but not emotions) 
are mere sensations. If that doctrine were to be established there would be 
nothing left for mind to contain, except conations. But if not, and I am not 
convinced that it is so, and if it is still true that affections are a special form 
of mental experience not expressible as conations, I am still content. Con-
sciousness would then consist of conations and affections. But I do not feel 
assurance that this is the case, and I prefer to abide, for the present, by the 
view which I have indicated; which, vague as it is, is a well accredited view 
and has the merit of insisting that feeling is at any rate closely dependent 
upon conation. Conation I take to be not merely a fact which is true about 
consciousness, but something which is experienced as consciousness. If 
we use the word activity as equivalent to mental process without distin-
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guishing between passive and active process, consciousness is, in its main 
tissue, mental activity. The idea of reflection which we discover by simple 
inspection is this activity which is what we call consciousness. Attention, 
impulsive action, volition, active thought, passive association, are some 
of the familiar forms of this activity. Examining further the peculiar fact 
called consciousness, we discover that it occupies time and occurs in time, 
and moreover that it has direction, its direction varying with the physical 
object to which the activity is related, so that the activity works in a dif-
ferent direction in desire and in aversion, in willing to lift the arm or to lift 
the head, in perceiving a tree and in perceiving a table, in seeing green and 
in tasting sweet, and in seeing green and in seeing blue. The word direc-
tion may appear to be used metaphorically, but a little further examina-
tion shows that mental process occurs in space however vaguely located 
in it. By saying that it is in space I mean that simple inspection, partly of 
myself, that is introspection, and partly of nature, that is extrospection, 
shows that my mind when it works, works in a direction of space; in the 
same sense as a railway runs along lines, or as a tree is planted on the edge 
of a garden. The consciousness exists in space just as greenness is spread 
over a leaf. What the precise spatial direction is, is something as to which 
we only become clear when later knowledge shows that the locality of the 
mind is the brain itself. Anyone who carefully analyses a complex mental 
activity will verify for himself this experience, which whether he takes it 
literally, as I plead that we should, or only metaphorically, can best be de-
scribed as a complex and highly differentiated system of directions, here 
beginning, there inhibited, here pressing on and changing to a different 
topic, there taking on thoughts that have emerged from another direction. 
The mind is thus a continuum of such awareness. According to the direc-
tion of the awareness the object or presentation changes, or to say the 
same thing, as the object changes the awareness alters its direction. But 
the object is never mental; it is never even the contents of the awareness. 
It is something else on which the awareness is directed. There is another 
thing also from which the awareness itself must be distinguished, namely, 
the motor reactions in which consciousness perpetually finds expression: 
movements, gestures, words, and the like. These motor presentations are 
new physical objects, and the kinaesthetic or verbal consciousness is but 
the awareness of these objects. But very often the outward expression is 
the best or the only guide to the discovery of the inward process, for ex-
ample, the fixating processes of perception enable us to become aware of 
the actual perceptive process so far as we can be aware of it. 
This leads me on to say in the next place that in like manner we can 
often most easily, or sometimes only, detect the mental process by inves-
tigating the object upon which it is directed. We can study the process of 
presentation by studying the actual object presented. And this is why it is 
often pedantic to speak in terms of the activity when it is most natural for 
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us with our outwardly directed gaze to speak of the object. But it remains 
true that it is only for the sake of the activity that the presentations are 
interesting. Accordingly the phrase presentation-continuum, so valuable 
and fertile in the second portion of the phrase, covers two different things. 
There is a continuum of processes of presentation awarenesses, or con-
sciousnesses as I call them, and there is a continuum of the physical world 
of objects presented. Psychology is concerned with the continuum of the 
acts of presentation. 
Consciousness or awareness is a new fact in the world which makes 
it the topic of a new study. But unique as it is in its character it admits of 
scientific description, for it varies in complexity. Psychology has to trace 
these varying grades of complexity. I propose in the remainder of this ad-
dress to test the value of the description I have given of mind by two in-
quiries, one into the process of willing, the other into the meaning of ideas 
in the sense which Mr. Bradley has made familiar. 
The characteristic features of willing are best observed in its contrast 
to impulsive action. In the familiar language of psychology, the impulse 
is awakened by a perception and tends to an end, but it is not excited by 
the idea of the end, is purposive without being purposed, and yet is not 
merely reflex action. Volition is directed towards an end, entertained as an 
idea. There is another feature in volition which may be deferred, its con-
nection with the self as contrasted with the relative isolation of impulse. 
In the previous description free use was made of the idea of the end, which 
was declared to be merely implicit in impulse and explicit in volition. It 
is not denied that in an impulsive action we may have an image as such 
of the end, but it is maintained that the impulse is not discharged by the 
image. The end, if present in idea, is merely a qualification of the provok-
ing object. The breast is qualified as a thing to be sucked, but there is no 
explicit idea of sucking it which is afterwards realised. But it is just this 
which characterises volition as a conative action. Now if we are to under-
stand impulse we must put aside the reference to the idea and look to the 
impulsive activities themselves. It is this which Mr. Stout has done with 
such conspicuous success in his chapter in the Manual, and his account of 
perceptual process as founded upon the analysis of impulse has, if I may 
be allowed to say so, seemed to me one of the finest and most enlighten-
ing chapters in psychology that I have read, and has, indeed, been the 
source of such thinking as I have been able to give to the subject. It is so 
enlightening because he uses the analysis of impulse to explain the two 
distinguishing features of perception, its unitary character or wholeness as 
distinct from a mere train of ideas, and, secondly, the presence of ideas in 
the form not of images but of “tied” or “complicated” ideas. Turn to what 
we can easily observe, the activity of impulse, and we see at once what is 
the activity of this part sensory, part ideal, and all the while unitary, pro-
cess which perception is. In an impulse we have the felt series of activities 
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running down their prearranged course to a single result, and at the same 
time, corresponding to the tied idea in perception, in each step in the pro-
cess there is the preparation for the next. The activity of a tied idea is thus 
the preparation of the mind, while presently occupied in one activity, to 
proceed in some connected direction. Now volition is a stage in advance 
of this. What is it that mentally corresponds to entertaining the end in 
idea? Self-observation showed and experiments confirmed that the idea 
of the willed object need not be present in the form of an actual image.1 
Still no one would call it a volition where in some form the object willed 
was not distinguished from the present condition of the agent. Take the 
will to lift the arm. It is safe to say that in nine cases out of ten there is no 
image of the arm being lifted. But as I understand it, the activity to which 
corresponds the idea of lifting the arm is present, felt as a direction, but 
inchoate and disconnected with the system of mental movements which 
is the consciousness of present reality. Now the will to lift the arm takes 
place when this disconnected mental movement coalesces with and forms 
part of that dominant system. I take the consciousness of willing an end 
to be this felt coalescence or continuity of a hitherto disconnected mental 
activity, and the consciousness of this effective coalescence is the sense of 
decision or of consenting to the act. The fiat of the will, which some writ-
ers love to regard as mysterious, is nothing but the snapping together of 
the temporarily imperfect and disconnected system with the general trend 
of the mind’s activity. By calling the idea of the end an inchoate activity or 
a direction not completely realised, I mean to indicate the ideal character 
which volition shares with perception or impulse as contrasted with reflex 
action. By calling it disconnected I mean to indicate the special features 
of volition in contrast with impulse itself. Now it is plain that the process 
thus described may manifest itself in different ways. I may look at an ob-
ject in a shop window, and the inchoate mental activity of possessing it 
may be set going and so work itself out as to coalesce with my perception 
and make me will to buy it and go into the shop. Or the inchoate activity 
may be suggested in my mind by anticipation in the form of an expecta-
tion. I may think of how happy it would be to have money, heigh-ho! and 
then an offer of employment being given me I accept it as the realisation of 
my expectation. Or I may have a third case. The ideal activity may remain 
ideal. It may take the form of an image and yet the will take place as in the 
case of resolve where the future action is willed, and though necessarily 
only an image it is realised so far as the future can be realised. 
I am happy to refer for support of this analysis to an important experi-
mental investigation by Dr. Ach.2 Dr. Ach’s work belongs to a class of ex-
perimental studies whose distinctive feature is the elaborate and systemat-
1 See, in particular, the recent study of E. S. Woodworth in the volume of studies dedi-
cated to Charles Garman. 
2 Ueber die Willensthütigkeit und das Denken, Göttingen, 1905. 
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ic self-observation which is made by the patient. Of this group of writings, 
besides Dr. Ach’s work, the others with which I am acquainted are Dr. H. 
J. Watt’s “Experimental Contributions to a Theory of Thinking,”3 and 
Dr. Buehler’s recent work, to be mentioned later. Here I refer more par-
ticularly to Dr. Ach’s experiments. They are experiments in reaction time, 
some of them of the usual type and others of a different sort. In each case 
the patient was asked to say what happened in his mind. Three periods are 
distinguished in each experiment, the preparatory period between the usu-
al signal and the stimulus, the main period that of the experiment proper, 
in which the patient reacts to the stimulus, and the subsequent period in 
which he describes what his state of mind was in the two previous periods. 
The experiment was preceded by instructions as to what the patient had to 
do. Now it appeared from the patient’s testimony that in the preparatory 
period the patient took up a certain mental attitude and entertained in his 
mind a certain intention corresponding with the instruction given. This 
attitude produces in his mind “a certain determining tendency” which 
in fact anticipates the solution of the problem offered by the experiment. 
Probably many who have thought about the difference between sensorial 
and muscular reaction time have represented the case to themselves in this 
same way. The difference in the attitude produced by setting the different 
problems determines the character of the response. With regard to the 
details of the patient’s state of mind in the preparatory period, these are 
very various: he may entertain a picture of the end to be aimed at or more 
often the end is present merely as some imageless object, an “awareness,” 
Dr. Ach calls it. But the sensible accompaniments may be very different. 
I had best quote the passage in full. (Page 211) “Normally in the condi-
tion of expectation (in these experiments) where the effect of practice is 
not too marked the following complex content is present simultaneously 
as awareness: (1) the coming stimulus (a white card) which has a definite 
place in so far as the patient knows that where he is looking the definite 
change, that is, the appearance of the white card, will take place. (2) The 
patient is aware that thereupon a specific known change is to take place 
on his side, that is, the movement of reaction has to follow. (3) Besides this 
there is a relation between these two specific changes (the appearance of 
the stimulus and the movement of reaction) in the consciousness that as 
soon as the stimulus appears the reaction has to follow. (4) There is a time 
component of the awareness consisting in the knowledge that the stimulus 
will appear in a certain time, e.g., between a second and a minute. Besides 
the immediate content of expectation there are also the concomitants of 
sensuous attention, such as strain sensations in the upper part of the body 
and in the organ of vision, over and above the visual perception of the ap-
paratus. Occasionally special components of the awareness complex may 
appear in the form of images, especially at the beginning of the prepara-
tory period or in the first experiments on any particular day” (e.g., images 
3 Experimentelle Beitrage zu einer Theorie der Denkens, Leipzig, 1904.
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of the movements to be performed or what Dr. Ach calls “intentional 
sensations” in the limb, or words in which the object of the experiment is 
repeated). “But there is an extraordinary number of experiments in which, 
apart from the concomitants aforementioned, the whole content of the 
expectation is present only unimaginatively as a knowledge, and this pres-
ence of the content of knowledge is what I call awareness.”
The details of the main period itself need not be stated at such great 
length. They show how the determining tendencies work, settling the 
character of the reaction, the effect being most evident in the more com-
plicated cases where, for instance, a patient is asked to add or subtract 
two numbers shown to him, or, of two syllables read in a series before, 
to name the preceding or the succeeding. Sometimes, but exceptionally, 
we have the instruction persisting and reinstated as an idea. Sometimes 
the intention declares itself by blending apperceptively with the stimulus, 
as when a plus sign corresponding to addition was represented and the 
two numbers shown placed on the sides of it. Or the two numbers might 
be seen closer together for addition, or separated for subtraction. Or the 
determining tendency may strengthen certain reproductions suggested by 
the stimulus, namely, those which are appropriate to the intention. Or it 
might be that there was no awareness of the end at all and the determined 
object appears in consciousness immediately in connection with the stimu-
lus without any intermediary. 
Now I have quoted these reaction experiences for this reason. The pa-
tient’s mind being directed to the problem, he has the experience of willing 
in so far as the reaction which he performs is felt to be continuous with 
the attitude with which he approached the performance of it. Though I 
have not described at length the details of the main period, they show suf-
ficiently that in consequence of the instruction the solution is half made 
beforehand, and when the stimulus comes the response is often of quite 
an immediate character. This was true even in simple reaction times (e.g., 
p. 46, one of the patients always thought the action was willed). And it is 
still truer in cases of so-called “choice reaction” where a different move-
ment is assigned to each of a certain number of stimuli, and in the more 
complicated problems to which I referred above. Dr. Ach sums up in these 
words: “The individual knows whether a psychical event takes place in 
the direction of a previous determination or not. If so, the process is char-
acterised for the individual by its content as being willed. Such course of 
mental processes thus referred to the efficiency of determining tendencies 
we described as a willed action, or as one which takes place with the con-
sent of the individual. The conscious experience of such an event is specific 
in quality, and the individual can in a special case say at once whether the 
action were willed or not (p. 230).” 
One can see at once what likeness there is between this and Mr. Brad-
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ley’s account of willing as the self realisation of an idea. But it appears to 
me preferable because it explains the operation in terms of the process 
itself and not in terms of its contents or object. The account which I have 
given of willing is substantially one with Dr. Ach’s, but it differs in certain 
respects. I have all along spoken of the consciousness in willing as belong-
ing to the processes or mental tendencies themselves, not properly to the 
object which we are conscious of, whether imaged or imageless. Now Dr. 
Ach, speaking of certain extreme cases mentioned at the end of the last 
paragraph but one, describes the determining tendencies which make the 
determined idea, that is, the solution of the problem, appear spontane-
ously, as working in the unconscious, meaning by the unconscious merely 
that of which we are not conscious. The awareness is of the mental con-
tent, and this awareness he speaks of as a function of the determining 
tendencies. Now I find a considerable difficulty in this attempt to separate 
awareness from determining tendency. To say that awareness is a function 
of the tendency looks to me very like the notion that awareness belongs to 
a sort of mental content (an imageless one), whereas I have been trying to 
indicate that the contents we are aware of are not mental. Consequently I 
suggest that the determining tendencies in themselves, so far as they oper-
ate mentally at all (for of course there may be physical determinants which 
are not in the strict sense mental), are always in consciousness. When I 
have an intention the determining tendency is the consciousness of what 
we intend, though what we intend may be purely imageless. They represent 
the conscious side of the experience, the other side of it is not mental at all. 
When, in the extreme cases mentioned, the result follows immediately, the 
determining tendency is still felt in the felt transition from the stimulus to 
the result. The intention does not appear separately. But it works in con-
sequence of the previous mental attitude whereby the problem is already 
half solved before it is put. It is present in the transition to the particular 
result, so far as the result is felt to be an answer to the instructions. In 
other words, the very awareness of the intention is the direction in which 
the mind is working. In desire, and the like, this direction is very definitely 
present in consciousness. It appears to me that the stinging consciousness 
of direction which we have in desire is only an extreme form of the general 
case, not merely the case in which you happen to be aware of the tendency 
as such. In fact, if you want to realise that the so-called content of a men-
tal process is not itself mental, go to desire and watch that. 
There is one other point on which I do not feel satisfied. The feeling of 
consent, the fiat of the will, is not I think exhausted by describing it as a 
sense of identity with a previous determination. It involves that, of course, 
but you may have that sense of continuity in the stages of an impulse. You 
need, in addition, that the tendency shall consciously be present as a ten-
dency, i.e., as different from the present general character of your mental 
direction, and then when that tendency coalesces with your general men-
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tal direction, that is yourself as a whole, it is felt to be the act of consent, 
the stress is laid upon the snapping to of this determining tendency, i.e., 
the intention, or awareness of what is to be done, with the pervading self. 
And in speaking of the self I do not think we need to think of the self as be-
ing present in the form of the impression or image of the self as part mind 
and part body, the so-called self which is object, but only as the consistent 
and systematised complex of directions of consciousness. In many cases, 
doubtless, we are apt to call up these special contents of the self. In fact, 
in all difficult and critical cases of willing we may compare the proposed 
action with all our normal objects of desire, the expectations made and 
the like, but the really mental side in the self-experience is never our body 
or the various objects upon which our actions are directed, but only the 
conscious direction of ourselves upon them. And consequently it is more 
or less a matter of varying circumstances whether in contemplating a fu-
ture course of action these contents are present to our consciousness or 
not. What is present is the more or less consistent and systematised system 
of directions. 
I pass on now to the topic of ideas, in the sense of universals, or of the 
ideal content so familiar to us from Mr. Bradley’s writings. There is urgent 
need, I think, for an accurate statement of what goes on in the mind when 
it has an idea of this sort. I dare say that many persons besides myself 
have felt puzzled in their study of Mr. Bradley in dealing with these ideas, 
because at times they seem to be mere qualifications of reality, and yet are 
spoken of as working, or even as realising themselves, that is to say, as 
being psychical existences. Mr. Bradley himself has taken all precautions 
against misunderstanding. He has explicitly denied that ideas can ever 
be floating ideas cut off from reality. “Every idea has its own existence 
as a fact.”4 And again, in speaking of the will.5 “In the course of the act 
itself [e.g., of acting on the idea of avoidance or injury] the idea’s content 
will in its process further particularise itself [the idea, that is, will become 
an image or a perception], but before the act the genuine content of the 
idea may be general.” What difficulty I feel after these statements turns, I 
suspect, upon the implication that a universal idea must necessarily have 
a psychical existence, that it cannot exist except as being also an act of 
mind, whereas I should distinguish the act of mind directed towards a 
universal idea from the universal idea itself. This difficulty is not so much 
psychological as metaphysical, it seems to depend on the doctrine that all 
reality is necessarily psychical, which I do not accept. But at any rate, for 
psychology, it seems to me, it would clear up our minds to insist that when 
we speak of ideas there is some definite mental process corresponding to 
them which ought to be described, and that it is not enough to speak of 
the idea as working without explaining its mechanism. It is not enough to 
4 Mind, N.S., No. 60, p. 445.
5 Mind, N.S., xi, p 461. 
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insist that an idea is different from an image which is particularised. The 
idea as universal is just as particular a system of mental directions as the 
image with which it is contrasted. The what always is a that, but it is a 
that of a different sort. The same difficulty seems to me to arise in regard 
to the very helpful distinction drawn by Mr. Stout between the content of 
an assertion and its intent. The intent is after all only another sort of con-
tent. It is the content not of what I presently have in my mind, but of what 
I am tending towards or willing. And obviously the same thing is true of 
Locke’s contrast between idea and reality. When he speaks of an idea as 
conforming or not to reality, the reality is itself an idea, and the question 
is not of the difference between an idea and something disparate, but of 
one idea and a different and fuller one. 
Thus the idea as a universal, as a meaning, is not an image, but it is 
apprehended in a particular mental process. What then, in the language 
of mental process, is the universal? Here, again, it is easier to describe the 
process by referring to its object than to describe it itself. Any such de-
scription must be hypothetical. But I do not think the answer in this case 
is very remote. Contrast a conceptual process with an imaginative process. 
In the imaging as compared with the perception the activity is dim, it is 
indistinct, fragmentary, and unstable. But as contrasted with the conceiv-
ing act it is relatively full and complete. But conception, though partial 
and unrealised, may be definite and distinct, and it has the property of 
working itself out into examples which supply it with fulness. Moreover, 
the processes in conception are common to many perceptions or images. 
It consists, then, of the directions, or to use Dr. Ach’s word, tendencies, 
which represent the prevailing determinant structure of an indefinite num-
ber of individuals. I thus take it to be a conscious disposition, so far as 
that conscious disposition can exist by itself, that is, be apprehended as 
such, as a body of general mental directions, or since disposition is a word 
which suggests other meanings, it would be better to speak of the idea as 
a scheme of mental directions. With this account we can understand how 
conceptions keep passing over with their examples; the mind not only 
works in the scheme, but the scheme is amplified or modified by special 
elements of mental direction, which, combined with the scheme, make up 
the fulness of mental action corresponding to a concrete individual per-
ception or image. We can see also how one such mental scheme may be so 
connected with another as to complete one another and make a more defi-
nite and precise system, though one which is still an object of thought and 
not of perception. Finally, we can understand what goes on psychologi-
cally in the act of judgment: how in the complex activity present in per-
ception, the scheme or form corresponding to the predicate is, by an act 
of attention prompted by the interest of the moment, made to stand out 
separately in consciousness while retaining its connection with the whole. 
I take the rediscovery of ideas, in the sense of universals, to be one 
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of the most important results of recent philosophical and psychological 
work. One can only wish, parenthetically, that the word idea could be 
used with some more definite uniformity. It began with Locke as the name 
of any object we can occupy our minds about, and a psychological pro-
cess is as much an idea as a tree or a triangle. It became with Hume an 
image. And now in the revolt against the tyranny of images idea has come 
to mean, through Mr. Bradley’s influence, a notion or meaning. But I turn 
from this complaint to refer to another set of valuable experimental in-
quiries by Dr. Karl Buehler,6 who has by a set of ingenious questions got 
his patients to go through real operations of thinking and to record their 
own observation of the processes they went through. These experiments 
have been subjected to some severe criticism. But it can hardly be denied 
that they are of great value as a systematic beginning of inquiry into the 
higher mental processes. Dr. Buehler does, indeed, seem to me to overlook 
the extent to which others before him, like, for instance, Mr. Stout or Mr. 
Bradley, have recognised the existence of imageless thinking. But here we 
have, in the first place, a great deal of careful self observation, and we 
have in the second place not only the demonstration on a large scale that 
thoughts are a specific kind of mental objects, and thinking a specific sort 
of mental process, but the results show the extraordinary variation which 
may exist in the thought according to circumstances. Thoughts may, in 
the first place, exist without corresponding images, though it is not shown 
that they may exist except in conjunction with other individual mental 
contents, for example, the words of the answer, or at least the words of 
the question. But the thought may be of the vaguest description: a mere 
awareness of something or other, or reference in a certain undefined direc-
tion, or again, it is shown that in remembering we may, without calling 
up an image, have a thought of an object once experienced or the thought 
of having once experienced it; there may be thoughts of relations between 
objects or the thought of my own relation to some object, and the like. 
For all this I must refer to the work itself. But in all forms they vividly 
confirm what has been suggested above, that a thought is a kind of schema 
or rule upon which an individual presentation can be constructed. And, 
indeed, Dr. Buehler refers aptly enough to Kant’s account of a schema 
in contrast with an image as being a rule of construction. One result ap-
pears to me of particular interest. In certain experiments of memory the 
patients had the thought of an object experienced before; in others they 
had the thought merely of having experienced before something or other 
bearing on the question. And in some of these cases the object reference 
appeared so slight that the remembrance of the process of experiencing it 
was all that was present and active. Now it may be said that, as a general 
rule, whenever the mind is active it is active upon some object, and that 
in general while we are always conscious of ourselves as a mental process 
6 Thatsachen und Problems zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgänge (Archiv für die ges. 
Psych., ix and xii, 1907-8). 
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the practical interest makes the object the more important of the pair of 
terms self and object. In some cases we forget ourselves in the object, but 
these experiments seem to indicate that we may also have what amounts 
to a complete absorption in the self in the mental process itself, while the 
correlative object seems almost to vanish or to be replaced by a shadow. 
If the above description is correct, an idea, or notion, or concept, or 
thought, is a very definite form of mental process, a kind of scheme of 
mental direction. The physical object upon which it is directed is the uni-
versal. I do not see that there need be any difficulty in describing the uni-
versal as physical. Dr. Buehler, indeed, uses the language of presentation 
and protests that the universal can be nothing but a mental object. But 
unless Plato has lived and written in vain, why should not ideas be reali-
ties? And even more important though not more real realities than sen-
sible things? The very fluidity of our mental conceptual directions, their 
perpetual extension and amplification so as to take on the clothing of 
circumstance, what is it in the mind but the response of our minds to that 
real existence of the universal in the real particulars which it connects, and 
connects them much as the diverse mental conations are unified in the one 
continuum which is the mind. 
I have been trying to exemplify in two important cases the truth of 
the proposition which seems to me a bare statement of fact, that what is 
mental in the world is conation (feeling being for the present barred), and 
that our conations are the operation of one and the same thing, conscious-
ness, in different directions; and that such conations are relative to certain 
non-mental or physical things of which they are said to be consciousness, 
to which they refer but which are incorrectly described as their contents. A 
few words may be added, though they must be incomplete, as to the posi-
tion of sensations, and also all other mental processes, e.g., images, so far 
as they involve sensory elements. The safe rule is to interpret the obscure 
by what is patent, and I have urged that the so-called and miscalled con-
tents of sensation are really physical. But the mental process of sensation 
is like all other mental process, conation, recipient and passive, but a pas-
sive form of activity. Of course, the mental activity of sensation is different 
in direction according to the character of the sensation, and the difference 
betrays itself, like all psychical difference, in difference of outward or in-
ternal physical movement or in words. It shows itself according as the 
conation is pleasant or painful in mental continuance along the direction 
of the sensation or in flying from it. I ventured on a previous occasion to 
suggest that we might describe them as signs of direction, meaning that 
as the mind moved in one direction rather than in another, the direction-
consciousness varied. This would not be making consciousness green or 
sweet, but would only be doing justice to the fact that the movement was 
not a mere physical movement in time and space, but had a mental char-
acter as well. It is best, however, to describe sensations as merely the sim-
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plest mental movements, and not run the risk of suggesting, as the phrase 
signs of direction is apt to do, that there are differences of quality in the 
consciousness according to the character of the sensation. It is, indeed, 
unthinkable that consciousness itself is green or sweet, and when it is 
urged that green and sweet not only are mental, but are actually localised 
in the body, the answer is that the so-called localisation of sensations actu-
ally furnishes the disproof that the sensational object is mental. For when 
green is felt in the eye it is the seeing of green that is localised there, but 
the green itself (except, of course, in entoptic phenomena) is in the green 
leaf. The sensations which are localised in the body are mainly the organic 
sensations where the object sensed is a physical object; or sensations like 
heat which can belong to both body and external things, or like touch, 
where the two objects, body and external things, are in contact. 
I set out with a proposition that the proper object of psychology is 
the various conations or mental movements which, in their continuity, 
constitute the mind. To every such movement there corresponds an ob-
ject, and while, in many cases, it is easier to describe the mental opera-
tion by its object, and, in some cases, it is difficult to do otherwise, it is 
always the operation at which we aim. That object which is commonly 
called a presentation I have insisted upon regarding as physical. Now it 
may be said that this is a presumption and is introducing epistemology 
into psychology. It may be said that, in psychology, we know nothing of 
the real physical object, but only of presentations, that in the perception 
of a tree it is not the real tree with which we are concerned, but only the 
presented tree. Now, I should be quite content if the psychologist never 
spoke of anything but presentations, but he is constantly and inevitably 
speaking of physical objects in distinction from them. He distinguishes the 
blue thing from the blue sensation, the things in nature from our thoughts 
about them, and the like. If he goes on to deny that the sensation or image 
or thought is a physical object, he introduces into the foundation of the 
science a distinction between a mental content or object and a physical 
object, and it is really he, so far as any given psychologist is open to the 
imputation, who makes an epistemological assumption, and then, having 
made it, hands over to epistemology the solution of the difficulty which 
he has himself arbitrarily created. Every science, indeed, makes a certain 
postulate for convenience, but these postulates must not be mistaken, or 
be likely to be mistaken, from the start, but only such as can be modified 
by suitable qualification. Now, for psychology, it is sufficient to take what 
is obvious prima facie fact, that the experience called the perception of a 
tree contains two elements, one mental and the other physical, and that 
psychology studies the mental element, and the physical only so far as it 
presents features with which an operation stands in relation, so far that is, 
as it is sensed, or perceived, or imaged, or conceived. Making this presup-
position, which is a bare unembarrassed statement of facts without any 
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theory, he leaves over for metaphysics or theory of knowledge to inquire 
into the relation of these separate aspects of physical reality to reality 
itself. Suppose that philosophy discovers that these objects you talk of, 
percepts, sensations, images, concepts, are not the same physical reality 
which physical science investigates with another purpose, well and good. 
Metaphysics will then have afterwards to make a separation between psy-
chological objects and physical objects. I do not myself suppose that any 
such result would happen, but we have no right to start by pre-judging a 
case. Except for metaphysics, no one would ever think of saying that the 
objects psychology is concerned with are only mental and not real objects. 
There is a difficulty which I admit remains. If your mental object is 
physical, how can you know yourself? In psychology at any rate you make 
your own mind an object and your own mind, you will say to me, is con-
fessedly mental and not physical. I must ask to defer the answer to this 
question. Self knowledge is a very real thing, but you may know other 
things than physical objects. 
I know that in suggesting a certain difference of psychological view, so 
far as I am really doing so, for I do not feel at all sure that I am, I incur a 
certain danger. Sweeping assertions produce upon the expert in any sci-
ence the impression that the speaker is just beginning to think about the 
subject. And in my case this is probably true. In reality, I am only trying 
to clear up my own mind and suggesting a solution of my own difficulties. 
I should feel very uneasy if what I had said implied that any single part 
of psychology, as now understood, had not all the value which it has at 
present. Nothing upon my view is lost, only in certain cases a difference of 
interpretation, or perhaps only of emphasis, is suggested. At any rate, the 
best way in which I can repay the Society for the honour which they have 
done me in electing me as President is to say what I am myself thinking 
about. If what I say is mistaken or superfluous, someone will, I hope, be 
found to correct me. 
appendix on self-knowledge
In the foregoing paper I have spoken of mental activities as directed upon 
objects which are not mental, or, to use other words, are external or physi-
cal. The question at once arises if this is knowledge how can there be self-
knowledge? For the object before me when I know myself is not external 
but is mental. It would follow then that either there is no such thing as 
self-knowledge, or else that in knowing myself I so far turn myself into an 
object, into something which occupies the same relation to me as physical 
objects do. 
Both positions seem impossible. I certainly do know myself. But, sec-
ondly, it is clear that if I treat myself as an object this is altogether incon-
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sistent with the account which I have given of the process of knowing an 
external object. For there the essence of the process is that knowing is a 
particular kind of reaction upon the external object. The object evokes in 
me those conations which I call sensational processes, perceiving, think-
ing, and the like. But there can be no such reaction of the self upon itself. 
The mind does not stimulate itself to reaction. 
The answer to these difficulties is complex. In the first place we must 
distinguish between the self or mind and the self as we ordinarily speak of 
it, as a compound of mind and body. I have knowledge of my body in the 
same way as I have knowledge of external bodies, and the same thing ap-
plies to the knowledge which is supplied to me by the organic sensations: 
for example, hunger and thirst belong to the bodily self and are located in 
it. But we commonly think of ourselves as including not merely our bodies, 
but our thoughts about certain objects, especially objects of interest to us, 
and our desires and volitions as directed towards these objects. Our moral 
selves, to take the most obvious instance, include as elements the objects 
to which we devote ourselves, for example, politics or mathematics, which 
are as much external to us as the tree. Thus the self as an ordinary object 
of experience is a number of objects which are habitually and intimately 
connected with our minds and form with them a single whole. So far the 
knowledge of the self presents no difficulty and a very real addition was 
made to psychology when this particular object of experience was singled 
out and the growth of our knowledge of it was described. 
But in the self so described it is the element of mind, of consistent and 
organised conation, which constitutes the more important element in the 
complex, and it is this mental element which is in question when we are 
considering how and whether self-knowledge is possible. In other words, 
it is not my capacity for friendship in so far as the direction of my interests 
towards friends is concerned that offers any difficulty of description, or 
that constitutes the real core of myself. It is the directions of these inter-
ests themselves. Human beings excite my capacities for friendship. I can 
largely describe these capacities by reference to their objects; precisely as 
is the case with my ordinary knowledge or volitions directed upon exter-
nal objects. But it is not my immediate environment of my own body and 
the things and human beings which lie next to me, which constitute the. 
selfhood of myself, it is the purely mental element which the self involves. 
In order to remove the difficulty of the original question, we have in 
the next place to recognise that knowledge is a very ambiguous term. It is 
used loosely to cover all kinds of apprehension and sometimes it is used 
to denote that kind of knowledge in which we have the objects set over 
against ourselves. Now the mind has knowledge of itself, but not in the 
same sense as it has knowledge of external things. When the mind knows 
an external thing it is itself knowledge, itself consists in that moment in the 
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act of knowing. We have to distinguish two senses in the phrase knowl-
edge of something. The “of” may be the “of” of reference. Knowledge of a 
tree is an act of mind of a certain sort directed upon the tree. Or the “of” 
may be (I have the phrase from Mr. Stout) the “of” of apposition. The 
knowledge may consist of what it is said to be knowledge of. The differ-
ence may be illustrated by Locke’s phrases, idea of sensation or of reflec-
tion, meaning an idea coming from sensation, or consisting in a sensation, 
or a reflection, as the case may be, as contrasted with his phrase the idea 
of heat, in which heat is the object referred to. Now my self-knowledge is 
knowledge consisting in myself. Myself is only those acts which are other-
wise described as self-knowledge. 
This is evident from considering that in any case of knowledge of the 
external object we can distinguish the external object or cognitum, from 
the act of knowing which is conational, the cognitio, and which is a spe-
cial form of conation that does not aim at alteration of an object. In every 
such act the self is present in the form of a certain more or less compli-
cated direction or system of directions of consciousness. I cannot know 
something not-myself without that object’s moving myself into activity. In 
thus having knowledge of an object I also have the knowledge which con-
sists in my action and is therefore self-knowledge. To me, therefore, I my-
self cannot be a cognitum. I can only be a cognitum to a being who stood 
outside both me and physical things, in the same way as I myself stand 
outside physical things and life. Life is an individual thing to the liver. But 
I can contemplate another being’s life though I cannot live it. Now it is as 
impossible for me to contemplate my own mind as for an animal to live 
another animal’s life. There is no reason, however, in the nature of things 
why a race of beings should not arise or be now in existence who can con-
template minds. Such beings would be of a higher order of mind and for 
them minds would be objects of knowledge. 
It might be supposed that if I never am an object to myself, but only 
am myself, there can therefore be no science of the mind. In fact, consid-
eration of the difference between self and external objects has led to re-
markable views as to the nature of psychology. One party has declared in 
the face of all the acquisitions of psychology, of its constant and uninter-
rupted development, that there is no such science. Another answer is the 
following. Reality, it is urged, is experience, something in which you can-
not separate mind and things. You have physical science in so far as you 
attend only to the physical aspect of experience and consider it by itself. 
You have psychology in so far as you attend only to the psychical aspect 
of experience by itself. Both the physical and the psychological sciences 
deal with abstractions and they are in the strict sense untrue. The only real 
truth is given in metaphysics, which considers the two elements unified. 
There is a third modification of this way of thinking. It is maintained that 
psychology never describes the mind as it actually exists, but creates an 
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artificial object which it pretends to find given in the same way as it finds 
physical phenomena given, and such descriptive psychology is little more 
than a substitute for the physiological description of the bodily processes 
which underlie mental action. Psychology studies not mind itself, but an 
artificial symbol of it. 
A thorough treatment of these propositions would require a theory 
of knowledge and of metaphysics. They all arise from the unexamined 
postulate that reality is experience. They imply that physical science and 
psychology are only true till they are connected and then they are seen to 
be untrue; instead of maintaining as might reasonably be done that they 
are both true and that their connection is a further truth. But we need not 
go into the whole question. For the distinction between the two kinds of 
knowledge drawn above is enough to convince us that psychology does 
describe the mind itself and is a science. The objection arises from an ap-
parent prejudice, that in order to be the subject of scientific treatment an 
object must be like an external object, capable of standing outside the 
mind which observes it. This is plainly an assumption.
In fact, science is only the orderly description and classification and ex-
planation of things. Amongst things there are two classes, physical things 
and ourselves. In so far as we describe physical things we are making 
physical science. In so far as we describe ourselves we are making psychol-
ogy. Self-knowledge is that knowledge which constitutes the science of 
psychology. Knowledge of external things is that knowledge which consti-
tutes physical science. In this way instead of raising questions as to the le-
gitimacy of science because of difficulties about the nature of knowledge, 
we may with convenience describe the different kinds of knowledge as the 
respective subject-matter of the different sciences. Or perhaps the gist of 
the matter may be stated thus. Let the subject matter of knowledge mean 
that which exists in reality and can be described. Then knowledge includes 
two things, the first is physical objects, the second is knowing, knowing 
being used as a general term for all mental life. 
When, therefore, in pursuit of psychology we describe ourselves, we 
do not erect ourselves into presentations. We only formulate our condition 
in words, with a psychological interest. Psychology is in fact the extension 
of one of the commonest incidents. When I say I feel cold, or I do not want 
to fight, I am describing my mind. Does anyone maintain that in these 
expressions I am making my mind into a presentation? The description 
takes the place of an interjection. Instead of shivering, or crying out with 
the pain of cold, I may say cold. And afterwards when I have an apparatus 
of language which corresponds to the analysis or dissection of things into 
their components I say I feel cold. Nor would anyone say that in saying 
I feel cold, or I do not want to fight, I am describing not my mind itself 
but a mere appearance of it. I am describing it as it really is in a particular 
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phase of its existence. Now psychology is nothing but an extension and 
systematisation of such statements as this. Just as physics is nothing but an 
extension of such propositions as the stone is heavy, so psychology is an 
extension of such propositions as I feel cold, or I do not want to fight. The 
difference between the science of psychology and the mere exclamation 
which expresses my mental state consists in two things: first, in the organ-
isation and analysis of these descriptions, with the consequent attempts at 
explanation; secondly, in the difference of interest. In general in describing 
our mental reactions upon things we are concerned with the things rather 
than with our reactions; our interest is practical not introspective, but the 
material of introspection is always present. It is not so markedly present 
in the experience I see a tree, it is present more markedly in I am cold, it is 
present very markedly in, I do not want to fight. But whereas we are con-
tent in daily life to describe these introspective experiences merely in such 
a way as to affect other people’s actions, in psychology pure and simple 
our interest in them is theoretical. 
Psychology, then, describes mental process with a psychological inter-
est. What this means is that the problem is now different from the mere 
description of how we feel. The influence of the problems set before the 
mind in determining the character of the mental response has been il-
lustrated already from reaction time, and is abundantly illustrated in Mr. 
Watt’s paper. Now the scientific interest is an interest in careful minute 
description, in classification, analysis, and explanation. When we describe 
our mental states with that interest their details stand out, their likenesses, 
their connections, their antecedents, their causes. The psychological habit 
has its germ in any mere description of self, but it is powerfully aided by 
the experience of scientific description of physical things. When we have 
learned to treat external things scientifically we go on to treat minds scien-
tifically, and we not only apply to our mind the methods learned in respect 
of things, but we use of them the words and concepts we have been ac-
customed to use of things. This is but saying once more how knowledge of 
minds and things are reciprocally affected by one another. It is a familiar 
truth that while the most important categories we employ in respect of the 
external world, such as causality, substance, and the like, are experienced 
by us most easily in our own mental life, we repay the debt by describing 
our mental life in terms of the external world, apprehension, comprehen-
sion, mental process, direction, and we raise with regard to mind the same 
problems as meet us in physics, what is mental causality, what is continu-
ity, and the like. 
Thus, when in psychology I pretend to describe my feelings and cona-
tions, I am not substituting for the reality an artificial abstraction, I am 
describing the actual mental reality. I am, of course, leaving out the physi-
cal realities with which those mental activities are related, but it is a pure 
assumption to suppose that I have no right to do so. Psychology is a faith-
244
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2S. Alexander
ful description of certain real events in the world. 
But this statement is met by certain obstinate objections. One is the 
ancient one connected with the method of psychology, the objection based 
on the difficulties of introspection. The other is the difficulty, a far less an-
cient and far more serious one, arising from the fact that we can remember 
and think of the self. 
In both cases the same objection appears, but in different forms, that 
in studying the mind you make it an object. Hence, it is said in the first 
place, that introspection, in the strict sense, is never possible; for if we in-
trospected our actual condition we should be dividing ourselves into two, 
making one part of the self an object to the other part. To avoid this dif-
ficulty we have recourse to retrospection, in which it is urged, not indeed 
by cautious psychologists, we palpably do take the immediately past mo-
ment and make it an object to ourselves at the present. In the next place 
it is said, and said rightly, that not only do we enjoy a present experience, 
and not only do we actually remember something we met before, but we 
remember that we did have this experience. Is not such remembered self 
an object to us like a physical event? 
Now, as to the difficulty of introspection, this is real enough. But I 
cannot think that the reason for this difficulty is rightly given. Our intro-
spection is indeed apt to be distorted by the presence of the psychological 
interest. We are practically interested in feeling cold, or disliking to fight, 
and not generally interested in the nuances of the process. But there is no 
further difficulty. It is because the event when just remembered is freer 
from these distortions that it is advisable to turn to retrospection; and also 
because when the heat of practical interest is over details may appear in 
our calmer mind which escaped us before. But our reason for retrospection 
is not that it enables us to make the mental state an object. A moment’s 
consideration, indeed, shows us that our mental state in retrospection is 
no more an object to us than it was in actual experience. It is only a part 
of a larger whole. The remembered state is a present state, just as much as 
the actually enjoyed state. You do not turn your remembered state into a 
presentation merely by combining with it the attentive attitude. It is still 
a present state of your own mind. The alleged reason, then, for the use of 
retrospection cannot be the right one. In fact, the term introspection has 
raised around itself so many prejudices that it would seem to be high time 
to state explicitly that it is but a name for mental inspection. You may in-
spect external things or you may inspect mind. In order to inspect external 
things you have to let them play upon you, and you have to adopt the atti-
tude of attention best adapted to receive the revelation of their characters. 
This is extrospection. In order to inspect your mind carefully you throw 
yourself into a certain state of mind by stimulating yourself by an appro-
priate object, and then record in words the immediately apprehended de-
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tails of the mental process. This is introspection. We introspect ourselves 
when we say I feel cold. For psychological purposes we only do it more 
carefully and under special conditions. And to complete the parallel with 
the observation of external things, just as in self-inspection, or introspec-
tion, we use retrospection, so also in the inspection of external things, or 
extrospection, we use also the memory of the extrospected object. 
I come now to the more important question of memory, ideas, imagi-
nations, thoughts of myself. These things exist. I project myself into the 
past or the future. I can perceive myself as a whole, I can think of myself 
as a personality. I can distinguish my real self from my transitory or unreal 
self. Now, when we speak of knowledge we think naturally of external 
things. But we get to know of these by perception, memory, thought, and 
the like. And so when perception, thought, imagination of anything occur 
we say we have knowledge of the thing remembered, that it is an object 
to us. Therefore, because we can remember, and imagine, and think our-
selves, it is said we also have knowledge of ourselves, we can be objects 
to ourselves. In other words, we take these varying processes, perception, 
memory, imagination, and so forth, that is to say, the possibility that we 
may be in these varying conditions in respect of anything, as the criteria of 
knowledge of objects, as indicating that what is present in these forms is 
an object. But they are not such criteria. It is true that about both external 
things and ourselves we may be in these varying conditions. But that does 
not make me and the tree alike objects of knowledge. On the contrary, as I 
have already said, the difference between the object of knowledge and the 
object which consists in knowing is not that you have memory or imagi-
nation of the one and not of the other, but simply that the one is physical 
and the other is mental. 
What, then, we must inquire, is the nature of our ideas of ourselves; 
whether that idea be one of memory or expectation? That is the real ques-
tion, whether we have an image of ourselves which is comparable to the 
image of a tree, and not the question whether we have one at all; and I 
suspect that the inquiry into the question, what our images of ourselves 
are, may throw a considerable light on what goes on when we have an 
image of things not ourselves. I may remember, then, that upon a certain 
occasion I felt pain, or that I made up my mind; or I may look forward to 
feeling pain, or I may contemplate the possibility of making up my mind 
on some future date. Now, there are certain ways of remembering myself, 
or rather certain elements in the memory of myself that I may exclude 
from consideration. I may be simply recalling a form of words stating 
that I felt so and so. Or, again, what I may be recalling may be the objects 
remembered, the circumstances in which I was, the condition of my body 
at the time. All this is but the memory of external objects. But over and 
above this I have also the personal element in the form of memory. From 
common experience and front the experiments recorded by Dr. Buehler 
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it would appear that in certain cases my memory may be of nothing but 
the fact that I did on a past occasion have an experience, without even 
any more indication of what the experience was about. Thus one of the 
subjects says, “I knew at once that I had understood the answer to the 
question before, and that it struck me as comic, but still I could not find 
it” (Archiv, Bd. xii, p. 64). Or, “I knew first that I said ‘yes’ before when I 
should have said ‘no,’ and then I arrived at the thought itself” (p. 65). Or, 
“I had at once the consciousness that I had heard something about it. Then 
came the thought itself” (p. 63). This is what Dr. Buehler calls knowledge 
of the experience, but not of the subject-matter of the experience. It might 
be taken, and erroneously taken, to mean that we have ourselves before 
us in the form of an object. 
It has been said that we may have an idea of pleasure, or an idea of an 
emotion. M. Ribot has gone so far as to say that just as there are visual 
and auditory types of memory, so there is an affective type. It cannot be 
said that his proofs are convincing. Some of the instances recorded by him, 
apparently by way of support, seem to point in the opposite direction; like 
the case of M. Sully Prudhomme, who describes his emotional memory as 
tending to the hallucinatory, that is, as being a new emotion, evoked and 
vividly evoked at the suggestion of a past memory. Before it can be estab-
lished that we have emotional or feeling memory we must show that we 
are not merely remembering the bodily accompaniments, or the attendant 
circumstances, or the provoking object, of a past emotion, and so reviv-
ing that emotion. Thus I can recall slightly the feeling of shame I felt at a 
foolish mistake which I made in my early school days. I can just say that 
it is not a present shame that I am feeling again, but all that I can say is 
not present in it is, so far as I can judge, the remembrance of the flushed 
face and uneasiness and other organic accompaniments. And even here I 
do not feel quite sure.7
Now in the case of the alleged ideas of emotions, or ideas of pleasures, 
the common account appears to me to be true, that we have a revived 
emotional excitement, or a revived pleasure or pain, called up by memory 
of all the physical circumstances. It seems to me that this ideal pleasure is 
what we mean by the idea of a pleasure. We feel our present self extend-
ing backwards to the remembered event, and the pleasurable tinge in this 
experience is the ideal pleasure. It is quite distinguishable from the plea-
sure that we feel in the same object when actually present. Ourself has a 
past colouring. It extends backwards to an experienced past, and that is 
why we call the pleasure the memory of a past pleasure. It is a pleasure 
7 The following extract from The Life of Helen Faucit, by Sir Theodore Martin, Chapter 
I, describes her memory of a terrifying interview she had as a girl with Edmund Kean, the 
actor, in his old age: “How vividly some things remain with us. I can shut my eyes and 
recall the whole scene, see and hear all that passed, and thrill again with my own fright 
and pleasure.” 
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ideally present, referred to the past of myself, which past is called up by 
the memory of the external conditions under which it occurred. There is 
no particular difficulty in this, for any experience of ourself at any mo-
ment contains the past and the future of the self felt as one continuous 
consciousness with the signs of past and future. I should say, therefore, 
that pleasures may be present in memory, but not as objects of memory. 
They attach to objects of memory and are themselves qualified by a past 
reference.8 
When we turn from this more obscure case to the case of remem-
bered acts of knowledge, we come upon a confirmatory topic of great 
importance. In the first place, let me observe that Dr. Buehler’s case of re-
membering that we experience, without remembering what, represents an 
extreme case. We may, of course, remember what we learned in the past 
without recalling the act of learning it at all. That is not, strictly speaking, 
memory, but mere reproduction; the self element has disappeared from the 
remembrance. But if we put aside this case then in general in remembering 
a past event in our lives, our interest may be mainly in the external event 
itself, as it generally is; or it may be in our own reaction upon it. Now just 
as in perception we may be, and generally are, absorbed in the object, but 
at times we may be absorbed in ourselves, the perceiving subject; so in re-
membering a past event we recall mainly that it happened without special 
reference to ourselves, or we may, in a few rare cases, remember only that 
we underwent the experience. This does not prove that we can remember 
our past condition utterly without reference to its content. It only means 
that the content is so vague and indefinite as not to be recallable. The same 
thing occurs in our apprehension of a present object—for example, a sen-
tence where the object may sometimes be present as sensuous images, or 
only in the form of a thought, that is, in the form of a mere scheme. 
But what is this memory of oneself? Contrast it with the memory of 
the past event. Here I have before my mind a certain object as past. The 
act of mind by which I apprehend it is present and is not felt as past; dif-
ficult though it may be to describe what the difference is between the act 
of mind in apprehending an image of a past object and in apprehending 
the same object present. In other words, what is past in this experience is 
not the act of mind, but the object. Suppose, now, I am remembering an 
event as happening to myself. The event is past, as I have said, and it is 
quite distinguishable from the objects which are actually present. The past 
object is before my mind, but it is not present. But my past self is pres-
ent. It is an extension backwards of myself, so far as myself is occupied 
with present objects. And that extension has got the note which enables 
us to say that it is an extension backwards in time and not forwards. In 
8 I need hardly say that this bears upon the hedonistic controversy in Ethics. It is said 
against the hedonists that we must distinguish a prospective pleasure from the present 
pleasure of an imagined object. The distinction is, I think, unreal in this form. 
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other words, we find just what we should expect to find if we understand 
mental events to be mere directions of consciousness. A past direction is 
a present consciousness. My past consciousness is ideal as compared with 
the real moment of present consciousness. But it is not an idea of that past 
consciousness. On the other hand, to repeat what was said above, the past 
external object of which we have an idea is not present, but is past. 
What are we to understand by the actual present existence of the self’s 
past, by the fact that its memory of itself is present in itself, whereas the 
past external object is not present to the self, but past to the self? The best 
way to answer the question is to refer to actual experience. The fact so de-
scribed is actually given in any broad tract of momentary consciousness. 
But if we are to understand the phenomenon by exhibiting the relation of 
this fact to cognate facts, the fact to which we must appeal is, I think, that 
of inheritance. As the skin becomes horny through toil, or as the germinal 
qualities of the father are inherited by the son (I speak in broad terms, for 
I do not raise biological issues which do not concern me), so the past of 
the self is actually present in the present self, and at the call of the object 
may rise up into distinct consciousness. I find myself here at one with M. 
Bergson, who thinks of its whole past as gathered up into the present mo-
ment of the soul’s life. 
This is, however, a difficult and debatable matter on which I do not 
pretend to feel assurance, but whatever account we are to give of the 
fact, the fact itself remains. And the result at which we arrive is that the 
remembered or imagined self is not a memory or imagination of the self, 
and yet the self is truly described as remembered or imagined. Can we go 
on to say that we have also thought about the self? If this means that spe-
cial features may be distinguished in the self and thrown up analytically 
into prominence, undoubtedly we have thought about ourself. I have not, 
however, a conception of myself in the same sense as I have a conception 
of dog. I do not compare myself with other selves, unless it be indirectly 
by taking into account along with myself my body and the objects upon 
which I am directed. But I do have a direct experience of a continuous self, 
in which I can distinguish phases, all of them given as a continuous whole. 
I have thus a perception of myself. If I choose to call this an individual 
concept I may do so, but I do so not in order to imply that it is more than 
a percept, but only to indicate that it is a percept in which features have 
been isolated out of the combination in which they are given. This is, in 
fact, only to say that the self is individual and not universal. At the same 
time, I may observe in passing that this individual concept of the self en-
ables us to understand what possibly the universal Platonic idea may be. 
I have tried to show, then, that the notion that the self can be an object 
of knowledge breaks down, so far as the difficulties of introspection are 
concerned, and so far as it is supposed that everything which can be given 
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in memory or thought must be an object of knowledge. There remains 
for consideration the supposed fission in the self, according to which one 
part becomes foreign to another and is regarded as a not-self. Mr. Bradley 
has said that any part of the self may become an object to the rest, and 
be discarded from the self. I have here to join issue on the fact. It is true 
that I may say that such and such an act of mind is not myself. But my 
attitude to it is quite different from my attitude to an external object. For, 
separated though it is from my true self, it is still felt to be continuous with 
it. In fact, it must be felt to be a part of oneself with the true self in order 
to be degraded to the rank of an unreal self. But this is precisely what we 
do not mean when in respect of any external thing we call it the object 
and ourselves the subject. There is no continuity between myself and an 
external thing in the sense in which there is continuity between my dif-
ferent mental actions. We are getting back again to the elementary facts 
where psychology joins metaphysics. It is because subject and object are 
supposed to constitute an experience, to make that unity within duality 
which alone is real, that we are disposed to accept the proposition that a 
part of the self may become a not-self and be turned into an object to the 
self from which it is cut off. As a matter of fact, there is always an external 
element present in such a state of affairs which may properly be described 
as the object, namely, the bodily condition. But directly we recognise that 
the relation of subject to object, or of consciousness to object is a rela-
tion of reaction, we recognise that they are independent of each other and 
related to one another because continuous within one universe. But they 
are not continuous with one another in the sense that we cannot justly 
conceive the external object existing without a self to apprehend it at all. 
These considerations are, however, meta physical and I am content to rely 
upon the fact that however much one part of the self is cast off from the 
main body of the self it is still retained within the self. When there does 
happen an absolute fission, as in disease, then the second self may be an 
object to the self, but the reason is that it has then become a different and 
discontinuous consciousness with a partly different body.
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i. the present discontent
WE are witnessing something like a ferment in the philosophic world. In 
various directions there are unmistakable signs of discontent with the old 
order. Such discontent is, no doubt, chronic in philosophy. Still it is more 
acute at some periods than at others. And it appears to be especially acute 
at the present time. The main causes of this discontent are not far to seek. 
One result of Kant’s Idealism and Comte’s Positivism has been an increas-
ing distrust in human knowledge, a growing suspicion of the foundations 
of science. In a sense, this was the very opposite of what these philosophers 
really intended. But then results sometimes have this disagreeable way of 
showing no respect even for the best intentions. The trouble was not with 
the professed philosophers. They shed no idle tears over Matter, Space, or 
Time. On the whole they found it rather edifying to contemplate a purely 
spiritual world sub specie acternitatis. The trouble arose chiefly with the 
physicists. Physicists, it is true, have a way of despising metaphysics. But 
it is only other people’s metaphysics for which they profess contempt. For 
themselves, they rather indulge their weakness for metaphysics, and call it 
by another name. At all events, in the hands of physicists the philosophy 
of Kant and of Comte seems to have developed into an exaggerated phe-
nomenalism. In one respect this exercised a good influence on physicists: 
it made them uncommonly modest. Compared with the boastfulness of 
Laplace and the confidence of the classical physicists generally, latter-day 
physicists are extraordinarily modest. Many of them have abandoned the 
attempt to penetrate the secret of Nature’s mechanism, they seem rather 
doubtful even about the validity of far less ambitious theories. The theo-
retical constructions of science, we have been told, are largely factitious, 
they give us no image of reality, they are little more than a mirage. The so-
called Laws of Nature are only conventional shorthand summaries of past 
experience, and carry with them no warranty with reference to the future. 
To rely on them as regards future events is simply to draw cheques on 
Nature in the uncertain and unfounded hope that they may be honoured.1 
This vein of modesty, itself the outcome of various philosophic influences, 
has in its turn called forth a similar tendency in philosophy. Pragmatism—
or at least one of the rather numerous and perplexing tendencies for which 
1 See, for instance, Professor Lamb’s Address at the Cambridge Meeting of the British 
Association (Report 1904). 
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this name now stands—is, I take it, an attempt to furnish a more aca-
demic philosophic basis for this scientific tendency. “Truth,” science la-
ments, “absolute truth is beyond us, our theories are at best but shadows, 
though, strangely enough, they work somehow.” “Why!” Pragmatism an-
swers, “your working theories are the very truths you want —the eternal, 
immaculate truths which you lament, they are mere shadows that disquiet 
you all in vain.” 
I described the scientific attitude just referred to as one of modesty. 
I am not disinclined to describe Pragmatism similarly. Some people will 
probably disagree. Perhaps the way in which the claims of Pragmatism 
are pushed may have something to do with this. Some people prefer to 
describe this attitude as one of Scepticism. I will not decide between these 
designations. It is certainly difficult to draw the line between modesty and 
diffidence.
Unfortunately for this modest estimate of human knowledge, scientific 
results have been accumulating rapidly, and their practical effects have 
been of the greatest service. Needless to say, the modest epistemologists 
themselves have rendered most valuable services in this advance—though 
as scientists, not as epistemologists. Now the natural man—even in sci-
entists and philosophers—finds it somewhat tantalising to suppose that 
“laws” so uncertain in their nature should nevertheless prove so reliable. 
Certainly, in our practical everyday life, cheques drawn at random are not 
honoured at our pleasure. There must be something definite and substan-
tial corresponding to our cheques. The low estimate of human knowl-
edge seems, therefore, excessively modest, not to say unduly sceptical. 
Our theories would not work if they were not true. They may not be the 
whole truth, but they must be true as far as they go. Perhaps, after all, we 
do know the Realities, and not merely their .shadows. Hence the present 
ferment and discontent. Hinc illæ lacrimæ. The natural man has no mis-
givings about the validity of his knowledge. May not his confidence, after 
all, be better founded than the philosopher’s diffidence? Such are the heart 
searchings of philosophy at the present day. 
ii. the naturalness of natural realism.
Schiller’s gibe at philosophy (in Die Weltweisen) is, well known. It may 
be regarded as a compliment to jesting Pilate, who would not wait for an 
answer. Philosophy moves at such a leisurely pace, and its course is so ir-
regular and uncertain, that it would be cruel to leave mankind to its mercy 
for their knowledge of the world, and the conduct of their lives. Hence, so 
Schiller tells us, Nature exercised her motherly care and endowed men—
even unreflective men—with an instinctive knowledge of things, and an 
instinctive social morality, lest the cosmic and social order should fall to 
pieces for want of a comprehensive philosophy to keep it together. Now 
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the cognitive attitude of the so-called plain man is commonly described as 
one of naive Realism. Schiller would, no doubt, have preferred to describe 
it as Natural Realism, for the reason already suggested. And so long as it is 
remembered that we are dealing, not with a philosophic system, but with 
a pre-philosophic attitude, that is to say, not with an explicit but only with 
an implicit philosophy, there can be no harm in calling it Natural Realism, 
although the name is generally reserved for a deliberate philosophic view 
which seeks to justify the unconscious assumptions of the naive realism 
of the unreflective or unsophisticated man. At all events, it is commonly 
admitted that, though more or less unconscious, the cognitive attitude of 
the unsophisticated man, or of Common Sense, is that of Natural Realism. 
Moreover, even as regards professed philosophers, whatever their philoso-
phy may be during hours of secluded meditation, no sooner do they pass 
from the privacy of their study into the fresh air of the world outside than 
they inevitably relapse into the realistic attitude of the plain man. It is in 
vain, says Thomas Reid, that even the greatest sceptic “strains every nerve, 
and wrestles with nature, and with every object that strikes upon his sens-
es. For, after all, when his strength is spent in the fruitless attempt, he will 
be carried down the torrent with the common herd of believers.”2 Hume 
admitted as much, and more. “Nature (he said) will always maintain her 
rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever.”3 In 
fact, Hume went further than that. There were times when “the privilege 
of a sceptic” weighed rather heavily on him. In one such moment, at least, 
he made a remarkable and interesting confession, which almost reminds 
one of Schiller’s reference to Nature’s motherly care. “Most fortunately it 
happens (Hume wrote) that since reason is incapable of dispelling these 
clouds, Nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philo-
sophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind or 
by some avocation and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all 
these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse with my 
friends; and when after three or four hours’ amusement I would return to 
these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that 
I cannot find it in my heart to enter into them any further.”4 These lapses 
into Natural Realism are to be met with occasionally even in the actual 
systems of philosophers who are opposed to it in every way. And Sir Wil-
liam Hamilton, as is well known, has compiled more than thirty closely 
printed pages of references in evidence of “the Universality of the Philoso-
phy of Common Sense, or its general recognition in Reality and in Name, 
. . . from the dawn of speculation to the present day.”5 
Such lapses into Natural Realism, on the part of philosophers who 
2 Works, p. 184.
3 Inquiry, Sect. V, Part I.
4 Treatise, Part IV, Sect. vii. 
5 The Works of Thomas Reid, pp. 776-803. 
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are otherwise opposed to it, seem to illustrate the old truth expressed by 
Horace, in the familiar line—
Naturam expellas furea, tamen usque recurret.
In any case it cannot be gainsaid that they are, pro tanto, so much evidence 
in favour of Natural Realism. Every philosophy which does not assimilate 
and cover the everyday attitude of its professors stands self-condemned. 
Its shortcomings have to be supplemented by Natural Realism as a work-
ing philosophy for the workaday world. Any considerable deviation from 
the Philosophy of Common Sense, any attempt to supplant instead of 
merely supplementing it, seems destined to fail. Hence the repeated efforts 
to come to terms with Natural Realism. 
The present discontent with the older order in so far as it has a con-
structive side is marked by its unmistakable realistic tendency. Some open-
ly avow a new Realism even more realistic than Natural Realism, others 
would repudiate the name of Natural Realists, and are tending more to-
wards a new Monadism or a new Pragmatism, but the realistic tendency 
is clearly present in all. The recent writings of Professor Alexander, Pro-
fessor Bergson, Professor James, Professor Hicks, Dr. Moore, Professor 
Read, Mr. Russell, Dr. Schiller and others, may be cited in proof of this 
tendency. The present writer is of opinion that the case of Natural Realism 
has generally been abandoned much too readily, that its position is more 
defensible than is commonly supposed. And the object of this paper is to 
take a general survey of the position, to defend Natural Realism as far as 
possible, and to compare it with some of the present deviations from it. 
iii. method in philosophy
Before proceeding any further, however, it is necessary to come to some 
preliminary understanding as to what is required for a philosophic de-
fence of the attitude of Common Sense. 
In some ways Descartes has exercised a bad influence on modern phi-
losophy. His de omnibus dubitandum—the method with which he thought 
that he set out on his philosophic mission—seems to have exercised a fatal 
fascination over many modern thinkers. It looks sometimes as though the 
main purpose of philosophy were to doubt wherever doubt is at all pos-
sible, as though its main object were, not to explain, but to explain away. 
Descartes’ own philosophy, of course, did not really begin with universal 
doubt. A philosophy which really begins with universal doubt also ends 
there. To make any progress at all you must have something firm to stand 
upon. Descartes, it will be remembered, compared himself to Archimedes 
looking for a fixed point in order to raise a world. He thought that he had 
found such a fixed point in himself—cogito ergo sum. But he was mistak-
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en. With such a merely thinking self for starting-point, he might perhaps 
turn a somersault, but he could make no real advance. In philosophy, as 
in science and in life, you must begin by accepting the validity of normal 
perception. That is what Descartes really did after some parleying, and a 
show of the most exacting cautiousness. He declined to give recognition to 
the world of perception, but rather eagerly admitted the existence of God, 
and then graciously admitted the world of perception on the strength of 
a divine recommendation. Such a de omnibus dubitandum looks rather 
farcical. First he strained at a gnat, then swallowed a camel in order to get 
at the gnat. 
Descartes (though, of course, not he alone) also set an unfortunate ex-
ample in yet another way, though it is intimately connected with the fore-
going. His excessive rationalism —his disdain for perception—tended to 
encourage an excessively conceptual and deductive procedure, as though 
everything could be accounted for deductively from general principles. 
This betrays itself to some extent in the form, at least, even of his cogito 
ergo sum, which, after all, was intended to be the fixed starting-point of 
his philosophy. It is owing to this excessive rationalism—or Conceptual-
ism, as I should prefer to call it in this connexion—that such undue stress 
is sometimes laid on Consistency (or the Law of Contradiction) as the 
sole test of reality and truth. Descartes, we are told by Cousin, asserted 
his own existence even, not on the ground of the direct testimony of im-
mediate consciousness, but only because his non-existence would involve 
a contradiction! Now, great as is the Law of Contradiction, it really is not 
sufficient to build a solid world upon, and although perceptual data are, 
as a matter of fact, often smuggled into such conceptual systems, yet we 
need not be surprised that these ideal worlds do seem rather thin and eery, 
unlike anything in heaven or on earth. The Law of Contradiction, even if 
you will give it a positive appearance by calling it the Law of Consistency, 
is after all only a negative principle, and not a positive basis of knowledge. 
The real root of the tree of knowledge is perception. The Law of Contra-
diction is but the pruning knife. Perception carries its own justification 
with it, and must not be doubted simply because doubt is, in a vague 
way, possible. Doubt everything, and you may as well doubt whether you 
are really doubting. Perception is not always true, nor does it give us the 
whole truth. But from it we start, and by it we are guided; and unless we 
rely on the guidance of normal perception, the very ground of knowledge 
is removed from under our feet.
iv. the epistemological implication of natural realism
“Naive Consciousness (as Lotze remarks6) always takes sensation to be 
the perception of a complete, externally existing, real thing. It believes 
6 Microcosmus, Book III, Ch. IV, § 1.
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that the world lies around us illuminated by its own radiance, and that 
outside of us tones and odours cross and meet one another in the immea-
surable space that plays in the colours belonging to things. Our senses 
sometimes close themselves against this continual abundance, and confine 
us to the course of our inner life; sometimes they open like doors to the 
arriving stimulus, to receive it as it is in all its grace or ugliness. No doubt 
disturbs the assurance of this belief, and even the illusions of the senses, 
insignificant in comparison with the preponderance of consentient expe-
rience, do not shake the assurance that we here everywhere look into an 
actual world that does not cease to be as it appears to us, even when our 
attention is not turned to it. The brightness of the stars seen by the night 
watcher will, he hopes, continue to shine over him in slumber; tones and 
perfumes, unheard and unsmelt, will be fragrant and harmonious after-
wards as before; nothing of the sensible world will perish save the ac-
cidental perception of it which consciousness formerly possessed.” This 
account of the attitude of common sense is somewhat exaggerated. Of 
course, the plain man would not, and could not, describe his outlook in 
just such terms. But it is sufficiently accurate for our purposes. 
Now the fundamental assumption underlying this realistic attitude of 
common sense is that normally the things which we apprehend are really 
there, and that we apprehend them just as they are. The plain man would 
not describe his cognitive attitude that way, but that is simply because he 
does not even suspect that all his experiences might be purely subjective, 
or that it is conceivable for a real thing to be perceived in a mediate or 
indirect way. And even the more reflective man, who has made acquain-
tance with rival philosophic theories, if he does not simply quote theories, 
or if he does not deliberately reinterpret his experience, will describe his 
apprehension of things as being of the same realistic and immediate or 
direct character as in the case of the unsophisticated plain man. Profes-
sor Alexander has done good service by insisting on the importance of 
beginning with first-hand descriptions of facts and experiences, instead 
of second-hand technical accounts with their implicit interpretations and 
misinterpretations.7 An unsophisticated description of our experience in 
apprehending things would certainly not be in terms of mediate or rep-
resentative perception, but in terms of direct or immediate perception. 
Usually when we say that we touch the ground, or see the stars, or smell 
wallflowers, we literally mean what we say. We mean that the ground, 
stars, and wallflowers are really there, and that we perceive them them-
selves, and not some sort of representations of them. 
If all human experiences had been normal this assumption would never 
have been questioned; in fact, it would probably never come to be explic-
itly realised, but would have remained implicit. But there are such things 
as illusions and hallucinations and other forms of error. And the need of 
7 See The Journal of Education for March and April, 1909.
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a theory of error has inevitably led to a theory of knowledge, an exami-
nation of the implicit assumptions of the cognitive attitude of common 
sense. The result, as we know, has been almost fatal to the philosophy of 
Natural Realism. Idealistic theories of knowledge have had it almost all 
their own way, and the predominance of idealistic metaphysics seems to 
be the logical result of the predominance of idealistic epistemology. The 
metaphysics of Natural Realism or Natural Dualism can only rest on a re-
alistic epistemology, that is, on a theory of knowledge which shall embody 
the essentials of the implicit assumptions of common sense. What the fun-
damental assumption is we have already seen. It is this, that in normal 
perception real things are presented to us, and we apprehend them just as 
they are. This is what Sir William Hamilton called Real Presentationism. 
The question, therefore, is, how far can such a theory of knowledge be 
philosophically defended? 
v.  real presentationism
Although the ontology of Natural Realism requires the epistemology of 
Real Presentationism to justify it, this theory of knowledge is also main-
tained by others who are not natural realists. Professor Alexander, for 
instance, has been insisting recently that mind is simply a system of pro-
cesses or reactions directed to various objects which are presented to it 
immediately without the intervention of any tertium quid. Dr. Moore has 
likewise maintained that cognition is essentially diaphanous or transpar-
ent, and does not in any way colour or modify the things known. If I un-
derstand them rightly neither Professor Alexander nor Dr. Moore can be 
described as natural realists, but their epistemology has much in common 
with Real Presentationism. If I may be allowed to restrict the name Real 
Presentationism to denote a theory of normal perception only, then we 
might say that the epistemology of Professor Alexander and Dr. Moore 
includes Real Presentationism and a good deal besides. What the addi-
tional elements are, and how far they are philosophically justifiable, we 
shall consider afterwards. For the present I am glad to note that there is 
this strong tendency towards Real Presentationism, as is evidenced by the 
various papers read before the Aristotelian Society by Professor Alexan-
der, Professor Hicks, Dr. Moore, and others. 
vi.  real presentationism and normal perception
As a theory of normal perception Real Presentationism is undoubtedly 
most plausible, because it is so natural. Try to give a bare description of 
what happens in any instance of normal perception, and you can describe 
it no otherwise than as the direct presentation of the perceived thing to the 
perceiver. Introduce any tertium quid into your account of the transaction, 
and its role seems to be as thankless as that of any meddling busybody. It 
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seems so unnatural to suppose that when seeing a tree it is not really the 
tree we apprehend mentally, but only some kind of a shadow introjected 
into us by the tree, or that the tree is not really there at all, or at all events 
is not really a tree, and what we are dealing with is either wholly or partly 
our own creation. This prejudice against the intervention of a tertium quid 
in normal perception is not only natural but seems to be fully justified by 
the scientific rule not to multiply entities unnecessarily. It seems reason-
able enough, therefore, to abandon all such supposed mediating images, 
shadows, and percepts to the tender mercies of Occam’s razor. For, after 
all, even if we admit such images we still assume that something is appre-
hended immediately, namely, these supposed images, otherwise we shall 
be committed to an infinite regression of such mediating shadows—the 
story of the elephant and the tortoise over again. Why not, therefore, as-
sume at once that it is the things themselves which are apprehended? 
And if we are asked for any independent evidence in confirmation of 
such a theory of Real Presentationism, we are not altogether at a loss. For 
there certainly are cognitive processes which are devoid of all imagery, 
except perhaps the most fragmentary verbal imagery. The experiments 
of Buehler and others leave no doubt on this point. Similar experiments, 
which I conducted with a number of very reliable subjects, confirm this 
general result. The fact itself was, of course, known long ago—long before 
these experiments were even dreamed of. What is called a general idea 
need not be an image, or involve any imagery; it is essentially a scheme of 
imageless mental processes. And if it is possible for the higher cognitive 
processes to take place without imagery, it seems reasonable enough to 
assume, on the direct evidence of naive consciousness, that in perception 
also we have such imageless mental activity operating immediately on ex-
ternal things. 
vii. objections against real presentationism
So long as we confine ourselves to normal perception the case for Real 
Presentationism appears to be very strong, as I have tried to show. But al-
ready at this stage certain objections may be, and have been, urged against 
the theory: (i) Perception is a mode of cognition or knowledge. As such it 
involves relativity. The object perceived is not known as it is in itself, but 
only in its relation to the perceiver. So that, after all, supposing even that 
no imagery, no “sensible species” intervene between the perceived object 
and the perceiving mind, still the object is only known as perceived, not 
as it is by itself and apart from this relationship of being apprehended, (ii) 
In the second place, we know as a matter of fact that perception is medi-
ated by physiological factors (the nervous system) and physical factors 
(air-waves, ether-waves, and odoriferous particles). Must we not therefore 
suppose that these media really make it impossible for us to apprehend 
261
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2Abraham Wolf
things directly, and as they actually are? 
viii.  the relativity of knowledge
The first of the above objections is one of a multitude of things described 
by the ambiguous expression “relativity of knowledge.” But it has the best 
claim to this title. Now it is true that we are, at present, only concerned 
with it in so far as it may affect the validity of Real Presentationism as a 
theory of normal perception. Our remarks, however, are intended to apply 
to it quite generally. 
The objection simply takes for granted the very point at issue. To be 
known is undoubtedly a kind of relationship. But then there are relation-
ships and relationships. Even in our everyday life we discriminate between 
relationships which are comparatively external and make no appreciable 
difference to the things or persons related, and relationships which are 
more intimate and do affect the related objects or persons. My relation-
ship, say, to my parents is no doubt an integral part of myself. But this 
can scarcely be said of my relationship to my next-door neighbour or to 
my hat. My hat is certainly related to me in a different way according as 
it is on my head, or in my hand, or on the peg outside. But, these actual 
relationships apart, it can scarcely be maintained that it makes any real 
difference to me or to my hat whichever of these relations happens to hold 
good. The question, therefore, whether an object which is related to an-
other is in any way altered by this relationship, depends, not on the mere 
fact of relationship, but on the character of that relationship. And to al-
lege that the object known becomes altered by the very fact that it stands 
in this relationship of being known, is an unwarranted assumption. As 
regards, more particularly, normal perception, the suggestion seems to be 
unnatural to a degree. Even normal perception, it is true, is fragmentary, 
incomplete. But to know a thing incompletely, is a very different thing 
from having a distorted, or illusory apprehension of it. Our experience in 
normal perception carries with it the highest degree of certainty, and may 
not be called in question until there are positive reasons for suspecting it 
to be abnormal. To question its validity simply on the ground of the rela-
tionship which all knowledge involves is sheer paradox: to know anything 
is to stand to it in the relation of knowing it; but just because you stand in 
the relation of knowing it therefore you cannot know it. The relationship 
between the knower and the known certainly appears to be a transparent 
relation, which does not affect the object known, nor the person knowing, 
except in so far as his knowledge is thereby increased. The burden of the 
proof lies on those who would maintain the contrary.
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ix.  the physiology of normal perception and its validity
The fact that in all perception there is physiological mediation, that per-
ception only follows on the stimulation of sense-organs and the transmis-
sion of these stimuli to the brain along complex nerve-paths, has been 
constantly used as an argument to prove that we do not know what things 
are, but only how they affect us. The physical world as it really is is quite 
different from what we perceive it to be. Not that nature as it is in itself is 
necessarily richer than it appears to us. The contrary may be nearer to the 
truth. Lotze, it will be remembered, speaks of the external world as mov-
ing and gesticulating in vain until the sentient mind comes to its rescue 
and voices its mute strivings. All the music of the spheres is hushed in the 
profoundest silence for want of a willing ear. All the rich profusion of co-
lour and comeliness in heaven and on earth is lost in darkness and gloom 
for want of a friendly eye. Except for us, or the like of us, all, or nearly 
all, the wonders and glories of nature would cease to be, and the external 
world would resume its colourless, soundless, and scentless revelry of rest-
less atoms. All the same, it may be urged, infinitely richer and more inter-
esting though this world of appearances may be, it is but appearance and 
not reality. How, then, can it be said that things are known as they are? 
The objection has been stated in its more sober form, in which it is 
more or less compatible with Hypothetical Realism. It is sometimes urged 
in a more extravagant form, in support of the contention that “the whole 
choir of heaven and furniture of earth” are only sense-impressions on our 
brains. In this form the objection rather over-reaches itself. For, on the 
same grounds, we should have to admit that the brain itself is only such 
a complex of sense-impressions on—what? Not on the brain surely, but 
at the most only on an unknown something. At best this is explaining ig-
notum per aeque ignotum; it may even be suspected of trying to explain 
the known by the unknown. For, from this standpoint it is too much of 
an assumption to speak of “impressions” at all. On the other hand, if you 
admit the reality of the brain on the strength of your perception (of other 
people’s brains), why reject the validity of your other perceptions ? 
Natural consciousness certainly seems to bear witness that in percep-
tion it is the things which we perceive and not the physiological media. 
We seem to know the things perceived long before we learn of the physi-
ological factors involved in perception. In fact, we only come to know of 
these physiological factors when we apprehend them (that is, in others, of 
course), in the same way that we apprehend other material objects. Un-
less we assume that our normal apprehension of material objects is valid, 
then we have really no case, because we are not entitled to speak of the 
nervous system. And if we do admit our knowledge of the physiological 
factors, then we are equally entitled to admit the validity of our apprehen-
sion of all objects of normal perception. In short, the burden of the proof 
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falls on those who would discredit perception, and their arguments are 
not conclusive. The physiological factors, after all, may only constitute (as 
they appear to constitute) the mechanism of apprehension, and need not, 
as such, modify the objects apprehended. We are familiar with processes 
of transmission which leave unaffected the objects transmitted. And if it is 
urged that the case is not quite analogous, we are quite content to admit 
that cognition is not like anything else, and beg opponents also to bear 
that in mind.8 The fact that even naive consciousness would admit that, 
say, a coloured surface is not like nerve-processes, and that nerve-process-
es have no likeness to the perceptions of colour, is no valid objection to 
our natural assumption that in the end it is the coloured surface that we 
apprehend, and that we apprehend it just as it is. And we might even in-
voke the aid of something analogous in mathematics; for the fact that x is 
not equal to y and y is not equal to z does not prove that x is not equal to 
z. The knowledge, therefore, that normal perception is mediated in these 
ways may well supplement, but need not invalidate ordinary perceptual 
cognition. 
Lastly, to anticipate the position which I shall endeavour to defend in a 
subsequent section, the above objection to Natural Realism—the objection 
based on the physiology of perception—implicitly rests, it appears to me, 
on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that the body is something quite 
distinct from the mind, though the mind may somehow utilise the body as 
its instrument. This kind of vivisection of the whole man is not suggested 
by natural consciousness, it is the result of philosophic reflection, and has 
permeated popular thought simply as the result of religious teaching. To 
natural consciousness man is a concrete unity, and not a dualism, except 
by way of abstraction. And so long as we do not adopt a dualistic attitude 
the nervous processes in perception form no kind of “external” medium 
on which objections to the validity of normal perception might be based.
x. the physics of normal perception and its validity 
We turn next to the objection against Real Presentationism, based on the 
physical mediation of perception. So far we have endeavoured to vindicate 
Real Presentationism against objections based on what may be called the 
relatively inner nature and mechanism of perception. We tried to maintain 
that there is nothing in the character of this inner apparatus to necessitate 
the assumption that there is anything of the nature of a veil, any tertium 
8 The uniqueness of the cognitive relationship is also apt to be obscured somewhat by 
extreme upholders of Real Presentationism. When A is known to B, A is simply present 
to B. Therefore, it is argued, when A is present to D we should, in consistency, say that 
D knows A. But, unless D is a conscious being, this is an inaccurate form of expression, 
because “knowledge” not only implies the “presence” of A to B (of the known to the 
knower), but also that unique cognitive attitude of B to A (of the knower to the known), 
which is only possible when B is a conscious being. 
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quid interposed between the knower and the known in the case of nor-
mal perception. So far as the constitution of the knower is concerned, we 
endeavoured to show that there is no cause for suspecting the validity 
of normal perception, no reason for supposing that we only see things 
as “through a glass darkly.” But now we are confronted with something 
which does seem to be of the nature of an external medium. Our normal 
perceptions, it is admitted, are mostly mediated by such physical media 
as air-waves, ether-waves, and odoriferous particles. Except in the case 
of touch, we do not come into immediate contact with the things appre-
hended; are we then justified in supposing that things are apprehended as 
they really are, or must we allow that we only know them as modified by 
these physical media? 
So far as the scent of things is concerned, there is no real mediation. 
The odoriferous particles emanate from the thing, are parts of the thing it-
self, and their contact with the sense-organ is, to all intents and purposes, 
therefore, direct. As regards sound, the most that can be maintained is 
that sound belongs not to the sounding body by itself, but to it in conjunc-
tion with the air-waves. This, however, in no way undermines the validity 
of the perception. To perceive a sounding body in conjunction with air-
waves is to perceive it in its actual setting. And although it is desirable to 
discover the separate character of each of the co-operating factors, still 
even if we fail in this it is no support for any argument to prove the relativ-
ity of knowledge. For, to know things in their actual relations is to know 
them as they really are. Similarly with visual perception. The objects seen 
are seen only through the co-operation of ether-waves. But in so far as 
this co-operation or relation is actual, they are seen as they actually are, 
whether or not we can discover the separate character of each of the co-
operating factors. 
The most, then, that need be allowed on the score of the physical me-
diation of perception is this, that things are not apprehended as they are in 
isolation, or independently of one another, but only in their mutual rela-
tions. This may sound rather like the familiar view, that we do not know 
things themselves, but only their phenomena or appearances. In reality, 
however, there is no logical connexion between these two views. Since 
things are mutually interrelated, and not disconnected, to know them in 
their mutual relations is to know them as they really are, and not simply 
as they appear to be. In short, the knowledge of things in their relations is 
a very different thing from the relativity of knowledge. 
The same argument might also be used against those who attack the 
validity of normal perception on the ground that we only know things in 
relation to ourselves. For, even so, we still know them in relation to some-
thing real, to which they are actually related, and therefore we know them 
as they really are. 
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Whilst insisting on the interrelation of things, it may be necessary to 
guard against the misconception that things consist only of relations. This 
is not at all what I mean. All relations require terms. Things must severally 
have their own separate characters before they can enter into mutual rela-
tions. And it is certainly desirable to discover the separate or independent 
character of the terms related. Nor is this task altogether an impossible 
one. It is true that we only apprehend things in their mutual relations in 
more or less complex contexts. But this does not prevent us from conceiv-
ing their several independent characters. Consciously or unconsciously we 
apply the familiar scientific rule of varying the circumstances. Properties 
which are always present under the most diverse conditions are regarded 
as the essential properties of those things, while those which are sometimes 
present and sometimes absent, according to circumstances, are considered 
to be the joint products of properties possessed by (or rather constituting) 
that thing, and certain other conditions, whose presence or absence thus 
results in the appearance or disappearance of such secondary qualities. 
This brings us to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, 
which we must now consider briefly. 
xi. primary and secondary qualities 
The difference between primary and secondary qualities is not always ad-
mitted; and even those who admit the distinction are not agreed as to the 
grounds of the distinction. But we are not concerned here with the his-
tory of the subject; we are only concerned to indicate how the foregoing 
views affect this problem. It might appear at first that on the view of real 
presentationism the distinction between primary and secondary qualities 
is untenable. To some extent this is true. If the distinction is made to cor-
respond with that of objective qualities and subjective sensations, then, 
just as from the standpoint of idealist epistemology, there is no room for 
the distinction, inasmuch as both the so-called primary and secondary 
qualities are in a sense subjective, that is, dependent on mind, so, on the 
contrary, from the point of view of real presentationism, there is no room 
for this distinction, because they are both of them objective. Neverthe-
less the two sets of qualities may be usefully distinguished even from the 
stand point of realist epistemology, though on different and perhaps truer 
grounds. 
Reference has already been made, in the preceding section, to the fact 
that in the case of touch the sense-organ is in immediate contact with its 
object, so that there is no external physical mediation such as in the case 
of sound, for instance. We have also pointed out above that, while some 
properties of things are observed in them amid the most varying circum-
stances, others are only apprehended under special conditions. Now, those 
properties of things which are apprehended immediately and under the 
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most diverse external conditions constitute the primary qualities, while 
those which are either not apprehended immediately (but only through 
the mediation of, say, air-waves or ether-waves), or are not always appre-
hended, are secondary. The primary qualities are complete in the separate 
character of the separate things, and that is why they are apprehended un-
der the most diverse external conditions. The so-called secondary qualities 
are really complexes produced partly by conditions found in the separate 
character of the things in question, and partly by other conditions found 
in other things (say, ether-waves or air-waves), and are consequently not 
always present. The importance commonly attached to the sense of touch 
is really due, I think, to the fact that in touch, as already explained, there 
is no external mediation, the contact with the object being immediate. Vi-
sual perception, on the other hand, is mediated by ether-waves, and that is 
why we like to confirm or correct visual perception by reference to touch 
when possible.
Secondary qualities as well as primary qualities are, therefore, strictly 
objective on this view. The fact that they are conditioned by conditions 
which are not always found together in any one thing is no argument 
against their objectivity. No doubt it would in some respects be wiser 
to indicate the precise permanent or primary qualities of the things con-
cerned instead of attributing to them the secondary qualities of which 
they are only partial conditions. That is, of course, what physical science 
always tries to do—with what success does not concern us at present. On 
the whole, however, the attitude of naive consciousness is justifiable. The 
secondary qualities are objective, and even if all the constituent factors or 
conditions are not usually stated or recognised explicitly, neither are they 
explicitly denied. 
What we have said of secondary qualities is equally true of, and much 
more obvious in the cases of, such qualities as “fragile,” “brittle,” “in-
flammable,” and the like, which might almost be included among second-
ary qualities. Here what is held in view is a certain result, only some of 
the conditions of which are present in the things so described. The main 
difference between these and secondary qualities is that there is an explicit 
consciousness of the requirement of other conditions than those already 
present in the bodies concerned. It is the presence of some of the requi-
site conditions and the absence of the others that really constitutes the 
“permanent possibilities” of such things. Mere possibilities are nothing; 
these possibilities, however, are realities, only considered with reference 
to certain results of which they form only a part, and not the totality of 
conditions. 
xii. real presentationism and imagination and memory
Assuming for the present that Real Presentationism has been vindicated as 
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a theory of normal perception, it remains to be seen whether it is also ap-
plicable to other modes of normal cognition—imagination and memory. 
Several attempts have been made to justify such an extension of the theory 
of Real Presentationism. But, though the case has been made to appear 
plausible, the arguments do not appear to me to be convincing. It has been 
urged that in memory and imagination, as in perception, what we have 
is still merely an apprehension of physical things—though the process of 
apprehension is, of course, peculiar. An imagined tree or a remembered 
tree is as much a physical object as a perceived tree is; only the apprehen-
sion in the former case is of a different kind from that in the latter case. 
The real point at issue, however, is not whether a remembered tree or an 
imagined one is physical or quasi-physical, but whether in remembering 
or imagining a tree all that belongs to the mental side of the relationship 
is a transparent process, such as we supposed in the case of perception. 
Now I do not for a moment deny that normal memory and imagination 
are modes of cognition whereby we are in touch with the real world. But, 
all the same, all imagery is essentially representative. A remembered tree, 
even an imagined tree, may be physical, no doubt. But an imagined tree 
or a remembered tree is not the same as an image or a memory-image of 
a tree. And the image is not physical, but mental. In all imagery (though 
it may represent something physical and may in that sense be regarded as 
quasi-physical) we have essentially mediate presentation, not direct pre-
sentation—and the medium is mental. In a sense it is, of course, possible 
to distinguish the image from our having it, and then the image might be 
regarded as apprehended in the same direct way as physical things are ap-
prehended (on the theory of Real Presentationism). But the cases are not 
really similar. The physical things exist in space, whether we know them 
or not; but where, in what limbo of footless fancies, shall we suppose 
these images and memories to spend their fleeting unsubstantial existence 
in times of neglect, when we do not apprehend them, and even at the mo-
ment when we do apprehend them? If they are not a part of the mind, nor 
a part of physical nature, what then are they? 
The conclusion seems, therefore, unavoidable, that all forms of imagi-
nation differ very materially from normal perception. In normal percep-
tion the mental process is transparent, while the content consists of the 
presented physical object; in imagination both process and content are 
mental, though the content is also representative of something physical 
(actual or supposed). 
xiii. mental activity
I fail to see any valid objection to the above conclusion. Why should we 
not accept the testimony of natural consciousness that the mind, on its 
cognitive side, consists partly of transparent activities such as we seem to 
268
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2Abraham Wolf
have in normal perception and abstract thought, and partly of content-
activities such as we find in imagination and memory. Nor can I see any 
objection to the further assumption that the two kinds of activities con-
stantly co-operate, so that perception and thought contain fragments of 
imagery. 
Certainly, if you will insist on reducing all mental activity to one type, 
then there are only two courses open for you. You either reduce them all 
to the type of imagination, and say that even in perception we apprehend 
images, and not the things directly; or else you reduce it all to the type 
of transparent process, and explain or explain away images as best you 
can. The first of these alternatives is exposed to the fatal objection that 
it makes knowledge impossible, since (on such a theory) we are for ever 
debarred from ascertaining how far, if at all, our images represent real 
things. And as there is nothing in our normal perceptual experience to 
compel us to adopt any such view, it would certainly be folly to adopt such 
a suicidal epistemology. The second alternative is not open to such fatal 
objection, but it is, to say the least, very difficult to conceive. It resembles 
to some extent the attempt to reduce all matter to some mode of mere mo-
tion—motion of a something which is neither solid, nor liquid, nor gas. 
You know what this theory of matter suggested to Professor James Ward. 
Well, the conception of mind as a system of transparent activities reminds 
me of the same story, and I hope that I shall be forgiven for adverting to 
it. It is the story of Alice’s adventure in Wonderland, when she saw the 
gradual disappearance of the Cheshire cat, beginning with the tip of the 
tail and ending with the grin, which remained some time after the rest of 
the cat had vanished. “Well! I’ve often seen a cat without a grin,” thought 
Alice, “but a grin without a cat! It’s the most curious thing I ever saw in 
all my life.” 
Professor Alexander, it is true, not only admits, but insists that “self” 
and “self-knowledge” are very real things, although the self, as he con-
ceives it, merely consists in transparent acts of consciousness, and although 
consciousness, according to him, is always conation, and has no qualita-
tive differences. Such a soul, however, is pure with a vengeance—almost 
too pure for this world! And this “self-knowledge” is simply synonymous 
with consciousness—the knowledge or consciousness of self being merely 
the knowledge or consciousness which is the self. Hence he can maintain 
that consciousness is always self-consciousness. But this only helps to con-
firm the suspicion that self-consciousness, in the usual sense of the expres-
sion, is being degraded to the level of mere consciousness, rather than 
that all consciousness is being levelled up to self-consciousness. Moreover, 
though it is with great diffidence that I venture to differ from Professor 
Alexander, it does not seem to me that his view, if I understand him rightly, 
allows sufficient scope for Psychology. If the content of mental activity is 
always physical, and the activity is always of the same quality, the distinc-
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tion between Physics and Psychology seems to be reduced to this: that in 
Physics the objects are described with a minimum of reference to mental 
activity (that is to say, only just to allow for the personal equation in ob-
servation and measurement), while in Psychology the same things are de-
scribed over again with explicit reference to the process of apprehension. 
But if the process is always the same in kind, this seems to be a distinction 
without a difference. 
The conception of mind as a system of transparent activities is, I think, 
also untenable because of its failure to account for the very possibility 
of dreams and hallucinations. It seems impossible to realise how a bare, 
transparent activity can be directed to what is not there, to apprehend 
what is not given. But this is what actually happens in all such abnormal 
experiences. What we have here is something of the nature of production, 
creation, and, at the very least, distortion. But is not this rather more than 
can be legitimately credited to the powers of merely transparent processes 
or activities, or to any system of such activities? A bare activity may, for 
various reasons, fail to operate even when an object is present; it can 
scarcely produce an object not given, or even produce a positive modifica-
tion in a presented object. 
Again, though the subject does not fall within the scope of this paper, 
it may be pointed out that feelings and volitions, as distinguished from 
cognitions, cannot by any means be treated as bare, transparent processes. 
xiv. the whole man
The difficulty to which reference was made in the preceding section, the 
difficulty, namely, of conceiving mind as merely a system of processes or 
activities, though it is considerably increased when these processes are 
supposed to be transparent, is not altogether peculiar to this specially at-
tenuated view of mind. In some form or other it lurks more or less in 
the whole of current psychology. And one cannot help sympathising with 
Professor Ward’s plea for the admission of the Pure Ego into psychology. 
There is, no doubt, something to be said also on behalf of the almost reli-
gious anxiety to keep psychology “scientific” and free from all metaphysi-
cal taint. If one could only be quite sure that this does not result merely 
in the clandestine admission of bad metaphysics! For the present, the doc-
trine of psycho-physical parallelism is the favourite fence for psychologists 
to sit on. This implicit dualism—another Cartesian legacy!—is, of course, 
not metaphysics! It is only a temporising, halting metaphysics. It has also 
something of a theological bias. I am a soul dragging about a body, or 
rather am somehow shadowed by it: together we wander through this vale 
of tears and the shadow of death; but we are silent companions, and hold 
no converse; we are ever so near, yet ever so far! 
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To natural consciousness man, the whole man, appears as a unity, as 
a concrete whole, of which mind alone and body alone are only abstrac-
tions. There may be minds without bodies, certainly—at all events we 
know nothing to the contrary. It seems also obvious that there are bodies 
without minds. But, in any case, what we find in man is a conscious body, 
or an embodied mind. Science, it is true, is necessarily abstract. And up 
to a certain point it is possible, it is necessary, and it is legitimate to treat 
of the mental aspect only, or of the physiological aspect only. But that 
is no reason why we should commit ourselves to the “parallelistic” or 
to any other metaphysical theory. A mere description of the relationship 
between body and mind as it appears to natural consciousness would, I 
venture to hold, form a more legitimate and more helpful starting point. 
And, after all, is not this apparent unity more or less assumed in vari-
ous parts of psychology? Does not the psychologist repeatedly fall back 
upon physiological explanations and suggestions? There is a well-known 
passage in Goethe’s Faust where Mephistopheles extols the helpfulness 
of words in Theology and Metaphysics, because they readily fill gaps in 
thought. Something similar is true of neuroses in Psychology, and I must 
beg forgiveness for parodying Mephistopheles: 
Yet need we not with too great scruples rack us; 
For just where all psychoses lack us, 
An apt neurosis will serve our turn. 
Now I have no objections to this method. On the contrary, I think 
it is proper and just. What I would urge is a fuller recognition of its im-
plications. It implies a more intimate relationship than mere parallelism 
between psychoses and neuroses. It implies something more like what ap-
pears to natural consciousness. 
What we seem to have in a human being is a very complex organism 
exercising mechanical, chemical, vital, and mental activities. These activi-
ties are not simply collateral or parallel activities: they are most intimately 
interrelated, each higher activity in the scale presupposes the lower, with-
out which it does not appear to function. It was this fact which gave plausi-
bility to thoroughgoing mechanical theories. But this extravagant attempt 
to explain the higher activities by reference to the lowest has deservedly 
ceased to count as a theory to be reckoned with. On the other hand, the 
extremely opposite attempt to level up the lowest to the highest, and to 
spiritualise matter appears to be equally extravagant. In the human organ-
ism, no doubt, the material processes are subservient to higher ends—the 
mechanical, chemical, and vital activities, in a sense, prepare the way for 
the mental activities. Still, systematic interconnection or organic unity is 
one thing, perfect simplicity or homogeneity is quite another thing. And 
while insisting on the advisability never to lose sight of the unity of the 
human organism, we must also beware against the specious plausibility 
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of simplifying the complex whole by making it homogeneous with one 
of its constituents, whether mechanical or spiritual. Now whatever the 
ultimate explanation of the interconnection may be, the interconnection 
itself remains a fact. And, as already remarked, the higher grade activities 
of man requisition the lower, while the lower appear to take place without 
the higher. This apparent priority of the lower and its apparently greater 
independence in no way affects the reality or the worth of the higher. The 
human organism, in short, exhibits a hierarchy of reactions to, or inter-
actions with, its environment. The lower ones may all be summed up as 
physiological responses, the highest as mental responses. There may be, 
there probably are, higher beings than man and higher activities than his. 
But this does not render dubious any part of the whole being of man. 
xv. knowledge and error 
The reason why we have been insisting on the organic unity of the whole 
man is twofold. In the first place, it helps to confirm the validity of normal 
perception. In the second place, it helps us to some extent to surmount 
the difficulties presented by memory, imagination, dreams, and hallucina-
tions. 
As to the first of these topics, namely, the validity of normal percep-
tion, we may say with Empedocles that “like knows like.” Whatever we 
are that also we can know. It is because we are bodies exercising physical, 
vital, and mental activities that we can also know beings and modes of 
being of all grades represented in ourselves. It is absurd even to pretend to 
regard our own bodies and activities on the analogy of those outside us, 
instead of treating other bodies and activities on the analogy of ours (as 
we actually do normally). We do not merely know our own bodies and 
activities, we feel them, we are our bodies and activities. And it is because 
we are these that we know the like of them—like, that is to say, either in 
part or in whole. This is the root of all anthropomorphism. Indeed, in the 
wider sense just explained, all human knowledge is essentially anthropo-
morphic. Of beings and modes of being other than ours we can at best 
only suppose or believe that they are ; we cannot conceive what they are—
except by some kind of anthropomorphism. On these grounds the higher 
anthropomorphism may, I think, be legitimately defended in matters of 
religion—but this is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
As regards the second group of topics referred to at the end of the last 
paragraph but one, some of the difficulties presented by memory, imagina-
tion, dreams, and hallucinations have already been alluded to in the two 
preceding sections. The subject now requires further consideration. 
In §12 we indicated the difficulty of bringing the processes of imagina-
tion and memory into line with real presentationism. Thus far, in fact, we 
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endeavoured to defend real presentationism only as a theory of normal 
perception. We have not yet dealt even with abnormal perceptions or hal-
lucinations (including dreams). These present considerable difficulties to 
real presentationism even as a theory of perception. The difficulty, how-
ever, is of the same kind as that presented by imagination and memory. 
For, so far as we are concerned with these subjects, memory, imagination, 
dreams, and hallucinations have the same feature in common, and pres-
ent the same problem to real presentationism, namely, how to account for 
quasi-perceptions when things are not presented to us. 
As already suggested in an earlier part of this paper, the theory of rep-
resentative perception really had its origin in an attempt to account for 
error, not for knowledge—for hallucinations and dreams, not for accurate 
perceptions. The natural explanation was that in these experiences we 
simply have images in our heads without any corresponding realities out-
side them. This explanation of common sense is, I think, quite right as far 
as it goes. The trouble arises when it is extended also to normal perception 
so as to interpose images between us and the things perceived. As regards 
imagination, memory, and abnormal perception it is, I think, no mere fan-
ciful introjection to say that there are images in our head. And one reason 
why we insisted on the intimate unity of mind and body, of psychoses and 
neuroses, was to defend this common view of common sense. 
What we have in all such experiences is not a bare transparent mental 
process, but a content-process, that is to say, an activity in which both 
process and content are mental. Whereas in normal perception there is a 
mental process directed to an external content, in all these cases there is an 
ideal content generated by inner physiological conditions. How this hap-
pens is certainly a mystery; but I can see no valid reason for denying the 
fact. At all events, this appears to me to be an unsophisticated version of 
the facts. The retina normally plays its impartial role in the apprehension 
of light when stimulated by an appropriate stimulus; but it also somehow 
generates such a quasi-apprehension of light when abnormally stimulated 
by internal conditions. And such, I take it, is the case with other physio-
logical processes. After-sensations, primary memory-images, dreams, hal-
lucinations, and constructive imagination are increasingly complex facts 
of the same general character. If it should be objected: is that all, are they 
simply the results of internally started nervous processes? I can only plead 
that they are not nearly so simple as you appear to think. And after all, 
is not this, in effect, the real assumption of Psychology? Is not this re-
ally implied in the custom, already referred to, of advancing neuroses to 
fill the gaps in psychoses?—witness the physiological “traces” by which 
memory is explained, and similar devices. The specific energy of nerves, 
and numerous pathological facts may, I think, be cited in support of my 
contention. 
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This may sound dangerously like materialism, but it would be a great 
mistake to consider it such. Mental processes, we maintain, are totally un-
like physiological processes, and they are of a higher order—they are the 
end which the physiological processes subserve. And if it is objected that, 
in that case, physiological processes cannot evolve or generate psychical 
processes, because this would infringe on the principle of the conservation 
of energy and what not, the answer is that “physiological processes,” in 
the abstract, and “psychical processes,” in the abstract, certainly appear 
to be hopelessly divorced; but whatever may be the case with such blood-
less abstractions, they are nevertheless intimately united in concrete real-
ity, and if certain theories will not fit the facts, so much the worse for the 
theories. Living man forms a concrete unity, and we only have ourselves 
to blame if we break him up into detached aspects which we cannot put 
together again. Such abstraction is necessary and legitimate up to a point, 
only we must not mistake a convenient convention for an immutable real-
ity. 
Now, the above view of “the whole man” enables us to keep fairly 
close to the views of common sense. We can accept real presentationism as 
a theory of normal perception, and we can account for memory, imagina-
tion, dreams, and hallucinations. On the view of representational percep-
tion, knowledge seems impossible; on the view that the mind is a system of 
bare activities or transparent processes of apprehension, error seems im-
possible. On the above view, both knowledge and error are accountable, 
and certainly in normal life no one seriously doubts the existence of either. 
All human knowledge rests ultimately on normal perception. The sci-
ences form a complex credit system, of which normal perceptions con-
stitute the gold reserve. In normal perception we apprehend things im-
mediately and as they are, though they may be more than we directly 
apprehend. Normal tactual apprehension is the least exposed to suspicion, 
because there is no external medium intervening between us and the things 
apprehended. Where such an external medium intervenes, our apprehen-
sion may be affected, as happens, for instance, through the refraction of 
light, when, say, a stick is partly immersed in water. In such cases a “mis-
apprehension” may be corrected by more direct forms of apprehension 
where the mediation is more or less eliminated—as by touching the stick, 
or obtaining a nearer view of a distant object. In the case of dreams and 
hallucinations we have quasi-perceptions generated abnormally by inter-
nal stimulations of the neuroses (or parts of them) actually involved in the 
corresponding normal perceptions. In normal memory and imagination 
the processes are similar in kind, only in their case we realise that there is 
no external object present at the moment to account for these experiences, 
at least in their entirety. But we need not pursue the subject any farther, 
as our scheme requires no changes in the details of the accepted psycho-
logical doctrines relating to the mental processes with which we are here 
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concerned. Some brief remarks may, however, be added on the general 
cosmology of natural realism, and its relation to monistic and pluralistic 
philosophies. 
xvi. the cosmology of natural realism
On the view of Natural Realism as defended in this paper, the world of 
reality is what it appears to be to normal perception. It is also a great 
deal more than that. How much more it is we certainly do not know; 
but by the aid of inferences based upon the data furnished by normal 
perception mankind is steadily encroaching upon the vast domain of the 
unperceived. The limits of human progress towards fuller and completer 
knowledge need not trouble us. The precise delimitation of the realms of 
the Unknowable is a task which may safely be left to the care of those 
who are engaged in compiling almanacs for the millenium. It seems a 
gratuitous and unnecessary slur on the future of our race to measure its 
hopes by a modest estimate of our achievements. But, be that as it may, 
the possibility or impossibility of a fuller knowledge need not invalidate a 
knowledge that is less complete, and which can indeed be supplemented 
without being supplanted. The reality of other modes of being that we 
know not of can only enrich, and need in no wise undermine the world 
of reality as it is apprehended by natural consciousness. And the world as 
thus apprehended consists of a vast variety of things existing in space and 
in time, and standing in the most varied relations to one another. Some 
of these realities are conscious beings, and one of these relations is that 
of knowledge. Conscious beings cannot, of course, exist as conscious be-
ings independently of (their own) consciousness, nor can the relationship 
of known to knower exist independently of (the knower’s) consciousness. 
But these obvious exceptions apart, there is no reason to suppose that 
the existence of things and their mutual relations is in any way depen-
dent on consciousness. Things are therefore independent of consciousness 
as regards their existence. They are also independent of consciousness as 
regards their character, for we have seen no reason for relinquishing the 
assumption of natural consciousness that the objects known are in no 
way modified by being known. Though all things are interrelated, if only 
because of the continua of space and time in which they exist, yet their 
relations exhibit the most diverse degrees of intimacy—varying as they 
do from the most intimate relationship of absolute dependence to that 
of extreme repugnance. The fact of interrelationship suggests a monistic 
interpretation of reality; while the looseness of many of these relations, 
and the impossibility of having relationships without more or less inde-
pendent terms to be related, support a pluralistic view. The view that the 
world consists of a plurality of more or less independent things which are 
variously interrelated in one continuous space and one continuous time, 
seems to be all that is warranted on the basis of natural realism or natural 
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consciousness. That this is no complete or perfectly satisfying explanation 
of the universe must be granted. This is attested by the almost universal 
tendency to seek such a further ground of explanation in a Deity variously 
conceived. The monistic tendency to explain away diversity is incompat-
ible with natural realism. Even the pluralistic view which spiritualises all 
things and regards all things as psychical in character is at best a gratu-
itous hypothesis, and becomes untenable if it in any way attempts to ex-
plain away the world of material things. It will never do to explain away 
the physical world as merely symbolical in some way of an inner spiritual 
life. After all, even symbols have a character of their own independently 
of what they symbolise, represent, or suggest. Lilies are lilies whatever else 
they may symbolise. And words are strokes or sounds even though what 
they represent or suggest may be neither strokes nor sounds. That there 
are material things we know. That there are animate and conscious beings 
we also know. That material things may have other properties besides 
those known to us is quite possible, in fact, highly probable. That there 
may be conscious beings altogether superior to, and very unlike human 
beings is also highly probable. To make man the measure of all things may 
commend itself to his vanity, but scarcely to his reason. Still, probabilities 
are matters of Faith. And although it is necessary to exercise faith, if we 
are to have any satisfactory explanation of the world at all, and although, 
from the nature of the case, such a faith cannot be a matter of indifference 
to us, but must profoundly interest, and influence us in various ways, yet 
it is inadmissible to subordinate knowledge to faith, to explain away the 
known in the supposed (and erroneously supposed) interests of what is 
only believed on faith. On the other hand, it may also be noted that, al-
though to profess a belief in God is often only to give a name to an as yet 
undiscovered solution of the great riddle of the universe, still that is not 
the only way of leaving the riddle, or evading it. 
xvii. the independence of truth
At the commencement of this paper reference was made to the diffidence 
(not to say agnosticism or scepticism) of science as to the possible attain-
ment of Truth. It was suggested that this diffidence was largely due to the 
influence of philosophy, and that, in a sense, therefore, science was only re-
paying philosophy in its own coin when, in its turn, it helped to give birth 
to Pragmatism. The object of this essay was to vindicate the confidence of 
common sense against these sceptical or quasi-sceptical tendencies. It may 
therefore be advisable to conclude this paper with a brief vindication of 
the common sense view of Truth as opposed to the pragmatist view. 
According to the common view Truth is something objective, and in-
dependent of our wishes or hopes, independent even of its own practi-
cal consequences. It is assumed as a matter of course that truths can be 
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known or discovered. But although our beliefs may be, and often are, true, 
it is not our believing that makes them true. It is also supposed that truths 
are eternal—once true always true. In apparent opposition to this view of 
Truth, Pragmatism maintains that the true is the “expedient in the long 
run,” that “truth happens to an idea,” that “ it becomes true, is made true 
by events.”9 Such, in brief, is the gist of the opposition. 
There is no need to enter into all the details of the controversy, it will 
be sufficient to indicate the general lines of our defence of the view of com-
mon sense from the standpoint of natural realism. In justice to Pragmatism 
it should be stated at once that the pragmatist view of truth seems to have 
been directed primarily against Absolute Idealism. One extreme, however, 
does not necessarily warrant another. And, in any case, while assaulting 
Absolute Idealism, Pragmatism has also ridden rough-shod over Natural 
Realism. In intention, it is true, Pragmatism pursues its knight-errantry 
out of chivalrous regard for the feelings of spoiled humanity. It seeks to 
restore to the plain man those pleasant things which a too exacting phi-
losophy has snatched away from him. In effect, however, what Pragma-
tism has really restored to the plain man is, not the solid fare which he had 
fondly believed was his, but a mere baby-comforter. Hence the discontent 
with Pragmatist Truth. 
The position, it is here maintained, is as follows. If we use the word 
“belief “ in the usual psychological sense, that is to say, not as equivalent 
to “mere belief,” but as denoting all degrees of assertiveness from “mere 
belief” to absolute knowledge, then we may say that a truth is a true belief 
(or, when expressed in language, a true proposition). If so, there can be no 
truth without belief. And since there can be no belief without a believer, 
there can be no truth without a believer. To this extent, therefore, truth 
may be said to depend on man, or (to use a familiar pragmatist adjective) 
to be “man-made.” This admission, however, must not be misinterpreted. 
All that it really involves is that the existence of the belief depends on man, 
but, granting the  existence of the belief, the truth of the belief does not 
depend on the believer, but is independent of him. This is what is meant by 
the “independence “ of truth. The truth of a belief depends on the things 
to which it refers, and the reality and character of the things is indepen-
dent of their being known, and is not affected by their becoming known. 
For example, it depends on me whether I look at the sky or not; it depends 
on me, therefore, whether or not I think “the sky is clouded.” But as soon 
as I have formed this thought or belief, the truth of it does not depend on 
me, but on the facts or realities called sky and clouds. Similarly, it depends 
on me whether or not I believe that “Mars is inhabited,” But once I do 
believe it, the truth of the belief does not depend on me in any way, but 
solely upon the facts referred to, namely, the existence of Mars and its 
inhabitants (if any), and this does not depend on my belief. The indepen-
9 W. James, Pragmatism, p. 201.
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dence of Reality, in short, gives independence to Truth, notwithstanding 
the dependence of Belief. Even when we realise our beliefs, we do not, 
strictly speaking, make our beliefs true, we only prove them to be true. Let 
us consider the most plausible illustration given on behalf of Pragmatism. 
“How many women’s hearts (exclaims Professor James10) are vanquished 
by the mere sanguine insistence of some man that they must love him! 
He will not consent to the hypothesis that they cannot. The desire for a 
certain kind of truth here brings about that special truth’s existence, and 
so it is in innumerable cases of other sorts.” It is barbarous to submit the 
poetry of love to the cold scrutiny of logic; but what must not one do in 
the cause of Truth! Now what are the bare facts, stated in bare prose? Ro-
meo loves Juliet. Let us suppose that he believes that Juliet reciprocates his 
affection, that he thereupon proposes and is accepted. Taking the rosiest 
view of the case, let us suppose that she accepted him because she loved 
him. Romeo’s belief, then, was true, and it was true simply because as a 
matter of fact Juliet did love him, and not because he believed that she 
loved him; she might have loved him just as much (perhaps more so) even 
if from sheer modesty he believed that she did not love him, and he never 
discovered the fact. The proposal and the consequent acceptance, then, 
at most only proved the truth of his belief, it did not make it true. But 
perhaps this is not the kind of case contemplated by Professor James. Let 
us suppose a case where the course of love did not run quite so smooth. 
Our Romeo believing that Juliet loves him woos her, but is rejected at first. 
This, of course, would simply prove that his belief was hasty and false. He 
thereupon modifies his belief. He cannot believe that she does love him 
(unless he has reason to suspect concealment); but he can still believe that 
she may come to love him provided certain conditions are fulfilled, which 
it is in his power to realise. And after sufficient wooing, we’ll say, he wins 
his Juliet. Here again his perseverance with its actual happy result only 
proved the truth of his belief, and did not make it true. Juliet might have 
been just as capable of loving him if he persisted, he might have believed 
this to be the case, but fortune might not have favoured him to put his 
belief to the test, and his belief would have been just as true, though not 
proven. That the truth of his belief depended on the nature of Juliet, and 
not simply on his belief, would, of course, have been shown even more 
decisively if Juliet flatly refused him till the end of the chapter. But Profes-
sor James seems to have no sympathy with rejected suitors. What happens 
in all such cases of beliefs made true is this: X believes, or rather hopes, 
that Y1 may, under certain conditions, become Y2, which is just what he 
wants it to be. He thereupon sets about realising the requisite conditions, 
and then his hope or belief is realised. This, however, only proves that his 
belief was true, and does not make it true; if, in spite of realising the con-
ditions which he had supposed to be adequate, the desired effect did not 
follow, that would have proved that his belief was false, it would not have 
10 The Will to Believe, p. 24. 
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made it false. But in any case a man’s action is, of course, a part of reality, 
and it is not for a moment denied that a man’s action may work changes 
in the world. What is denied is that his mere belief can affect reality. Belief 
is indeed necessary to direct human energy to the accomplishing of any 
task; but it is not the mere belief that realises the task, or which makes it 
realisable if, as a matter of fact, it happens to be beyond the power of the 
believer. In fact, the pragmatist view might almost be inverted. It is not the 
realisation of our wishes that makes our beliefs true, but, on the contrary, 
it is the truth of our beliefs (as to what can be done, and how) that enables 
us to realise our wishes. And by the independence of truth what is meant 
is that the truth of a belief is independent of mere belief, just because it 
depends on the world of reality (including human agents), which is inde-
pendent of our mere belief. 
Again, such support as these examples of beliefs followed by changes 
wrought by the believer seem to lend to the supposed “mutability” of 
Truth, results entirely from the failure to discriminate between the time in 
predication and the time of predication. When a belief having reference to 
a definite time is expressed at that very time, then there is no need to state 
this explicitly in the predicate. We therefore say “S is P” when we mean 
“S is P at such and such a time.” When the time has elapsed it is no longer 
true to say, “S is P.” But this is not because the old truth has become false, 
only because this proposition has ceased to express that truth adequately. 
The time in predication, having ceased to coincide with the time of predi-
cation, must now be stated explicitly in the predicate, thus: “S was P at 
such and such a time.” And this will always be true, if the assertion “S is 
P” was true at the time when it was asserted. 
The pragmatist conception of Truth, as is suggested by the above ex-
amples, seems to derive its chief plausibility from a confusion between the 
truth of a belief and the proof of a belief. This confusion, or rather the 
deliberate identification of the two, is shown by the pragmatist use of the 
word “verification.” Usually, of course, “verification” means the testing 
of a belief, the attempt to prove it, but the pragmatist employs the expres-
sion in the sense of making a belief true. That is why he can speak of truth 
as an event or a process. The testing or proving of a belief is a process, 
its truth is not. Now there are two main kinds of proof, according as the 
belief to be proved refers to things which can be adequately apprehended 
in perception, or not. At the present moment, for instance, I believe that 
the children are in the nursery. The truth of this belief depends entirely on 
whether they really are there or not. If I want to prove my belief I can go 
there and look. If I see them there then I have proved my belief to be true, 
but I have not made it true. What makes it true, is the children’s being 
there, and my seeing them there does not put them there. In fact, it is only 
their being there that enables me to see them there. And so with the in-
numerable variety of similar beliefs. It is ridiculous to say that such beliefs 
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are true simply because they “work,” or “lead rightly.” They are true be-
cause, and in so far as, the facts are as they are believed to be. Our appre-
hension of the facts, though it proves the beliefs to be true, does not make 
them true. On the contrary, it is only in so far as such beliefs are true, that 
they can be proved to be true by such apprehension. And it is idle to object 
that our apprehension is not conclusive, that it may be illusion or dream. 
For, as Spinoza has pertinently remarked, a man who is dreaming may 
well suppose that he is awake, but a man who is awake can never sup-
pose that he is dreaming. Some of our beliefs, however, cannot be proved 
in this simple manner. Take, for example, beliefs which are universal (not 
merely enumerative) in character. Some of these can be proved absolutely 
on rational grounds—the propositions of geometry, for instance. Others, 
such as most of the hypotheses of science, cannot be proved absolutely, 
they can only be confirmed more and more, in so far as they account for, 
or seem to represent accurately, all the relevant observations made, and 
even help us to anticipate future observations. In such cases we are dealing 
with an inverse problem, and it is of the nature of an inverse problem, that 
one cannot as a rule be absolutely sure that any one solution represents 
the actual way in which the result in question has come about. All one 
can say in such cases is that if the operative conditions were such as those 
suggested, then this result would necessarily follow; but it is just possible 
that some other conditions might have produced this result. Strictly speak-
ing, therefore, many of the so-called “verified” hypotheses are beliefs that 
“work” or “lead rightly,” rather than fully established truths.11 But even 
these are either true or false. And their truth or falsity depends not on our 
beliefs, nor on their “right leading,” but on the independently existing 
facts to which they refer. Only we cannot prove their truth by such simple 
inspection as sufficed in the above illustration. If they are true, it is not 
because they “work,” but rather they “work” only in so far as they are 
true, either altogether or in part. Again, what has just been remarked of 
scientific hypotheses applies also to beliefs which are not capable (or are 
not supposed to be capable) of verification in the scientific sense. Religious 
beliefs, as already suggested, cannot be, and as a rule are not, called Truths 
in the scientific sense. They are popularly called Beliefs or Articles of Faith, 
because, although they are believed to be true, they are not regarded as 
proved true—and that is just why it is considered to be a merit to believe 
them. Now, all that can be done in such cases is to observe what effects 
these beliefs appear to have on their professors. But our attitude changes 
to that extent from the intellectual to the moral standpoint. Beliefs which 
appear to exercise a good influence on conduct may be judged to be good. 
11 The pragmatist, it is true, denies the existence of unverifiable truths—but scarcely with 
a good conscience. Why is it insisted on that it is not always enough for a belief to be 
expedient for a while, in order to be true, but that it must be expedient “in the long run”? 
Is it not because the pragmatist realises that some beliefs are only verifiable at the mil-
lennium or thereabouts? If so, of course, there is no need to quarrel as to whether these 
should be described as “unverified” or as “unverifiable.” 
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And however much various beliefs or faiths may differ from one another, 
so long as they appear to exercise an equally good influence over their 
votaries they may be considered equally good. But the goodness of a belief 
is no proof of its truth, much less is it identical with it, and conflicting 
beliefs, though they may be equally good, cannot be equally true. Each 
belief is either true or false, and this depends neither on our choice nor on 
its effects, but on the reality to which it refers, and which is independent 
of our mere beliefs. If it should be objected that, after all, Pragmatism is 
only insisting on what has actually been urged in this very paper, namely, 
that we should consider “the whole man,” and not merely aspects of him 
divorced from one another, our answer is, so far so good, but you do not 
get the whole by confusing the parts. 
The motive underlying the pragmatist view of Truth is certainly praise-
worthy. If people could be brought to believe that their religious views, 
however diverse, may yet be equally true provided they make them equally 
good, it would certainly make for tolerance. And tolerance is a fine thing. 
But the method is a mistaken one. People of a sympathetic character will 
realise the primacy of their moral duties, and will agree to differ on mat-
ters of belief, recognising that coercion and bribery are not logical argu-
ments, and that it is folly to commit a sure wrong in the supposed interests 
of a possible truth, however strongly they may believe it. The zealots, on 
the other hand, who set themselves up as the only and supreme models of 
humanity, will scarcely be persuaded by the logic of Pragmatism. And on 
most people the effect can scarcely be salutary. The suggestion that differ-
ent beliefs may be equally true rather conveys the idea that they are really 
equally doubtful, and that at best we only make-believe. On the whole, 
surely it is a more inspiring conception, even from a pragmatist stand-
point, that Truth is neither mutable nor man-made, and that though we 
may all approach it along different roads, and fall into various pitfalls on 
the way, yet we are all seeking the same fuller and completer knowledge of 
the same real world, which we can also make better as we get to know it 
better. But, be that as it may, Reality is in the main independent of us, and 
the truth of our beliefs depending, as it does, on Reality, is to that extent 
independent of us. 
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I X .  A R E  P R E S E N TAT I O N S 
M E N TA L  O R  P H Y S I C A L ?
A  r e p l y  t o  P r o f e s s o r  A l e x a n d e r
G. F.  S T O U T
IN proceeding to inquire whether anything is physical or mental, the very 
first step which we ought to take is to give such an indication of what we 
mean by the terms physical and mental as will suffice to guard against 
ambiguity in the question itself. Mr. Alexander has made no attempt to 
fulfil this initial requirement. I must therefore attempt to supply the defi-
ciency myself, and this I shall endeavour to do in a manner which is likely 
to meet his approval, i.e., by a plain unbiassed description of fact. What, 
then, as a matter of fact, do we ordinarily mean when we say that some-
thing is physical or that something is mental? I think that there is general 
agreement that a physical thing occupies space of three dimensions, and 
also that no two things can at the same moment occupy the same por-
tion of space. Further, the spaces occupied severally by distinct material 
things are all parts of one space, each being continuously connected with 
every other by intervening tracts of space. Whatever has no place within 
this common space is not a physical thing. Again, physical things partly 
change, partly endure unchanged in time, and both their persistent states 
and their changes are constantly being determined by an immensely com-
plex system of interactions, direct and indirect, with other members of the 
spatial system. The moon, for instance, is at this moment attracting and 
being attracted by my copy of the Critique of Pure Reason, and both are 
attracting and being attracted by Mr. Alexander’s hat. Such interactions 
are interactions of things in space as such, and they are therefore always 
spatially conditioned. Even action at a distance, according to the law of 
gravitation, takes place subject to the formula of the inverse square. 
A physical thing, then, is a thing occupying space and entering as a 
factor into the spatially conditioned system of interactions—the execu-
tive order of the material world. The conception of physical existence, in 
general, is wider than that of a physical thing. Under physical existence I 
include whatever so belongs to the constitution of a physical thing, that 
change in it is eo ipso change in the physical thing, and that the annihila-
tion of the thing would eo ipso include its annihilation. Whatever does not 
conform to this condition is, at any rate, not a physical existent, whether 
or not it can properly be regarded as psychical. 
As regards the meaning of the term Mind, I am content to accept, 
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for the purposes of the present discussion, the account offered us by Mr. 
Alexander. A mind is the subject of activity in the way of conation and 
attention, and also of feeling in the way of pleasure and pain. Psychical or 
mental existence will, then, consist in whatever so belongs to the constitu-
tion of a mind, that change in it is eo ipso change in the mind, and that if 
the mind ceased to exist it would eo ipso cease to exist. Whatever does not 
conform to this condition is not a psychical existent, whether or not it can 
properly be regarded as physical. 
the question at issue
After these preliminary definitions, we may proceed to fix exactly what 
the question is which we have to discuss. The question concerns the na-
ture of certain existents; we have to decide whether these are physical or 
psychical, or both or neither. But what are the existents to be considered? 
I answer that we are concerned exclusively with those existents which are 
existentially present to the mind in perceiving material things by way of 
sense. By existential presence, I mean the way in which my toothache, for 
instance, is present to me in the moment in which I am actually experienc-
ing it—the way in which it is not present to my dentist. My dentist may 
know or believe that my toothache exists, but my existent toothache itself 
is not actually present to him as it is to me, inasmuch as I am in the act of 
feeling it. 
It is above all things necessary to recognise at the outset that what 
is thus existentially present in sense-perception is very far indeed from 
being identical with what common-sense and science ordinarily regard 
as directly observed or perceived. All our ordinary sense-perceptions—all 
that we ordinarily call “observations”—are saturated with inferences and 
interpretations and suggestions which are not recognised as such and may 
therefore be called unconscious. So far as these inferences, interpretations, 
and suggestions are not recognised as such, the perception which includes 
them is naturally taken to be direct apprehension of given fact. For in-
stance, on looking at a man, I say that I directly see or observe that he is 
pale. But the colour of a man’s face as existentially present to a percipient 
mind “varies,” to quote Dr. Venn, “vastly more according as we see it by 
daylight or candle light, or even according as he stands somewhat more 
or less in the shade, than it can possibly vary according to the extremest 
conditions of health or sickness, whilst the light remains the same. Thus 
our subjective estimate of such a simple and apparently ultimate datum as 
that of mere colour is in great part a judgment or inference.” It involves 
thought which transcends what is existentially present. Similarly our per-
ception of the size, shape, and distance of bodies continually depends on a 
highly complex system of what Helmholtz called unconscious inferences, 
based on a vast and varied system of existentially present elements which 
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can only be disentangled from what belongs to their interpretation by the 
patient work of reflective analysis—not by any plain description of facts 
as they stand out before us only waiting to be described. 
The apparent relevancy of any such plain description depends entirely 
on a wrong assumption as to the nature of the question which has to be 
answered. It is assumed that the question is a familiar one with a familiar 
answer which can at once be recognised by common-sense as obvious. 
But, in fact, the question is quite unfamiliar to ordinary thinking. The 
plain man makes no attempt, and has no motive for making any attempt 
to disengage what is existentially present or immediately experienced in 
sense-perception from the objects which he is ordinarily said to perceive 
or observe. He is convinced, and rightly convinced, that these objects are 
physical, not mental. But on this point there is no dispute, and it is quite 
futile for Mr. Alexander to press it home on us with emphatic reiteration. 
It is, no doubt, a plain unbiassed statement of facts. But the facts are ut-
terly irrelevant. The real question concerns the nature of what is existen-
tially present to the mind in perceiving physical things. To this question 
common-sense can give no ready-made answer. By the time the plain man 
has understood it accurately he has ceased to be a plain man and become 
a philosopher or psychologist; and it is only as a philosopher or psycholo-
gist that he can proceed to discuss it. If Mr. Alexander replies that he is 
not relying on common-sense, but on his own introspection, I answer that 
he appeals to common-sense to confirm his findings, and that both in his 
own analysis and in this appeal to common-sense he fails to keep in view 
the question which is really at issue, substi tuting for it one on which there 
is no dispute. 
What we have to investigate, then, is the nature of what is existentially 
present to consciousness in sense-perception, as a toothache is immedi-
ately present to me in the moment in which I am actually feeling it, and 
not merely remembering or anticipating it.
What is thus existentially present I shall sometimes call, for the sake of 
brevity, a presentation; I shall also sometimes refer to it as immediately ex-
perienced, or given in immediate experience, and in order to distinguish it 
from what are ordinarily regarded as data by common-sense and science. 
I shall sometimes describe it as a datum datissimum.
There is also another limitation of our problem which is tacitly implied 
in Mr. Alexander’s argument. What he maintains is not only that what 
is existentially present in sense-perception is a physical existent, but also 
that it forms part of the existence of the thing perceived, and not of any 
other physical object, such, for example, as the body of the percipient. He 
is bound to assume this, because it is essential to his position that percep-
tion is direct and not in any way representative. But if presentations as 
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physical facts form part, not of the thing perceived but of the body of the 
percipient, perception becomes a highly indirect and representative mode 
of knowing whatever is external to the body. Moreover, his doctrine, in 
that case, would obviously become a very difficult and speculative hypoth-
esis, and could not be plausibly offered as a plain description of facts. 
proof that presentations are not physical existents
I now proceed to give a proof that presentations do not form part of the 
physical things which we perceive in experiencing them. 
Such modes of consciousness as conation and attention and emotion 
are not only psychical but subjective. Just as the word “above” has no 
meaning apart from its correlative “below,” so “desiring” has no meaning 
apart from the correlative object which is desired, and “attending” has 
no meaning apart from the correlative object which is attended to. Such 
processes, then, as desiring and attending belong to the subjective side of 
the subject-object relation and are meaningless apart from some reference 
to the corresponding objective side. 
It is plain that subjective processes are all mental. They exist only as 
someone’s experiences. If my existence as a conscious being were annihi-
lated, all that I call my attending, hoping, fearing, willing, etc., would eo 
ipso be annihilated. The earth would continue to move round the sun, and 
corn to grow in the fields after I had ceased to exist. But it is nonsense to 
suggest that my thinking and desiring might, in like manner, endure and 
change after the withdrawal of the mind which thinks and desires. 
Subjective processes, then, are mental. But is there anything else which 
can properly be called mental? Is there anything else which only actually 
exists in being actually experienced so that the withdrawal of the mind 
which experiences it would ipso facto involve its annihilation. On exami-
nation, we find that this is so. We are bound to recognise existents which 
exist only in being experienced and yet belong to the objective rather than 
the subjective side of the subject-object relation. 
Such objective experiences may all be brought under the general head 
“presentations.” I shall here refer only to the two classes of presentations 
which are most easily and obviously recognisable—to distinct sensations 
or sense-presentations and distinct mental images. Besides these, I hold 
that there are subconscious or undiscriminated presentations, and that 
these play an immensely important part in our mental life. But I need not 
deal with these at present. 
Under the head “sensations” are included a vast variety of presenta-
tions which fall, roughly speaking, into two groups—organic sensations 
and those of special sense. Among organic sensations are included nausea, 
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neuralgia, toothache, tickling, itching, fatigue, hunger, thirst, and so forth. 
A plain description of facts as they appear to common-sense would not, I 
think, class these as physical facts. They are, indeed, generally connected 
with the thought of that physical thing we call our body, and of its vary-
ing states. None the less the pang of a toothache as it is immediately felt is 
plainly distinguishable from the bodily affection which conditions it. The 
toothache sensation, itself, is something which exists only in being expe-
rienced. If our existence as conscious beings were annihilated it would 
eo ipso disappear, whatever might happen to our body. So, too, a tickly 
feeling is not ordinarily supposed to be physically inherent either in the 
feather which tickles us or in the body as a perceived object. 
The case is not so clear, at first sight, when we turn to presentations 
of special sense, including what are called sound sensations, smell sensa-
tions, colour sensations, touch sensations, and temperature sensations. It 
may be plausibly suggested that in the case of these sensations all that we 
are aware of consists merely in qualities of bodies existing and persisting 
independently of our awareness of them. On this view, when I look at a 
green field sprinkled with buttercups, the qualitative difference between 
green and yellow as existentially present to my mind is simply a difference 
between colour qualities inherent respectively in the buttercups and the 
grass, as these might have existed independently of my awareness of them 
and independently of any relation to sentient minds. Now, it must be ad-
mitted that, in some sense, we do perceive grass as green and buttercups 
as yellow. It must further be admitted that in strict propriety of language 
these adjectives can be applied only to external objects as such, and not to 
any qualities of our own experience,—not to psychical qualities. It does 
violence to ordinary usage to speak of a green sensation or a coloured 
sensation,—still more so to speak of a green or a coloured experience. But 
all that this shows is that if there are qualities existentially present to con-
sciousness which do not belong to the external object, these are not what 
we name when we call the grass green or the buttercups yellow. In any 
case, it is easy to show that what we call the colour of the external thing 
cannot be simply identified with any quality which is existentially present 
to consciousness when someone looks at it. If a buttercup is seen by the 
margin, instead of the centre of the retina, or if it is seen by a colour-blind 
instead of by a normal person, or if it is seen by twilight instead of by 
daylight, or if contrast effects come into play, the quality immediately pre-
sented in viewing it is changed; but, none the less, the buttercup remains 
a yellow buttercup. 
What we mean in calling it yellow is that a person with normal eyes 
under certain normal conditions would, in viewing it, have a visual pre-
sentation of a certain quality, and also that persons with abnormal eyes 
or viewing it under abnormal conditions would have immediate visual 
presentations of correspondingly different qualities. If, under certain ex-
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ceptional conditions, a buttercup yielded the same sensation as it does 
under normal conditions, it would not be yellow, but some other colour. 
In general we may say that the greenness of grass and the yellowness of 
buttercups are not existentially present to the percipient consciousness. 
They are judged or believed or supposed or unconsciously inferred to ex-
ist, but they are not existentially present in immediate experience, as my 
toothache is when I am actually feeling it. 
But it follows from this analysis that, in the visual perception of grass 
as green in distinction from buttercups as yellow, there must be corre-
spondingly diverse qualities which are immediately experienced, and not 
merely judged to exist. It is these qualities which I deny to the buttercups 
and grass as forming part of their physical existence. And I have already 
incidentally given a proof of this thesis in pointing out that the immedi-
ately experienced quality may vary when things seen remain unaltered. 
If the quality were really inherent in the body seen, a change in the one 
would be a change in the other. 
I may elucidate my general position by a comparison of actual seeing 
with dream-visions. Whether we actually see or only dream that we see a 
green meadow sprinkled with yellow buttercups, in both cases we think 
of the existence of particular grass and particular buttercups, and believe 
that these exist. In actual seeing these physical things do exist as we be-
lieve them to exist; in mere dreaming they do not. But this consideration 
is, by itself, entirely irrelevant to the question at issue. For whether we be-
lieve rightly or wrongly, what we believe to exist is in both cases, equally, 
a physical thing. The point which is vitally relevant is this. Besides the 
belief in the existence of external objects which are real in the one case and 
unreal in the other, there is present both in dreaming and in actual seeing 
something which actually exists, in the same sense, in both. In actual see-
ing, we may call this the visual appearance or visual presentation of the 
thing seen. In dreams we may call it the dream-picture, or image, or ap-
parition. The dream apparition is not merely believed to exist or supposed 
to exist, it does actually exist and is existentially present to consciousness 
in the same way as a felt toothache while we are feeling it. We cannot say 
that it merely appears to exist; for its appearance and its existence are not 
separable. The appearance of an apparition is not separable from the real-
ity of the apparition. 
The dream apparition then actually exists. But it is certainly not a 
physical existent. If it is physical, it must either be a physical thing or a 
state or quality of a physical thing. That it is not itself a physical thing is, 
I think, self-evident. It does not occupy any portion of the common space 
in which bodies exist. The impenetrability of matter forbids us to suppose 
that it exists in a place already preoccupied by any other body. Are we 
then to suppose that it occupies some vacant space intervening between 
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other bodies? But such occupancy either means nothing or it means that 
the dream apparition is capable of excluding other bodies from the space 
in which itself exists and of otherwise acting on them, and being acted on 
by them in the executive order of the material world. Now, it is plain that 
this is not so. The dream apparition does not set other things in motion 
and it is not set in motion by them. It does not attract the earth and it is 
not attracted by the earth. Further, if it were a physical thing, it would 
occupy space in three dimensions; there would actually exist another side 
to it opposite to that which is pictured, and between the two sides there 
would be either empty space or filled volume. I need not dwell on the 
absurdity of such suggestions. But if the dream apparition is not itself a 
physical thing, its physical existence must consist in its being a state or 
property of a material thing. And an actual and particular property or 
state can only have being as belonging to a correspondingly actual and 
particular thing. Now, in the case of the dream apparition, there is no such 
actual thing. We interpret the presentation as indicating the existence of 
a particular meadow with buttercups. But this particular meadow is not 
actually present to our senses. 
The dream apparition is not then a physical fact. But it is perhaps 
precipitate to infer that it must therefore be a mental fact. This is a point 
which I shall consider later from another side. At present it is enough to 
say that if we follow the plan of merely describing facts recognised as ob-
vious by common-sense, dream apparitions must be regarded as existing 
only in so far as they are existentially present to the dreamer. Their begin-
ning to appear to him and ceasing to appear to him are the beginning and 
cessation of their existence. If he were annihilated they would eo ipso be 
annihilated. A change in them is a change in his experience and in nothing 
else. If, then, we appeal to facts as generally recognised, we must regard 
dream apparitions as psychical or mental existents. 
But, in this respect, we can draw no essential distinction between 
dream presentations, visual, tactual, auditory, motor or olfactory, and the 
presentations connected with the perception of actually existing physical 
things. In seeing green grass we have an immediate experience which is 
essentially of the same nature as in merely dreaming that we see it. The 
visual apparition is often less distinct and vivid in the dream. But this 
is only a difference in degree, and even this difference is perhaps absent 
where dreams are very lively. The same conclusion is forced upon us when 
we consider that dreams are derivative occurrences. The material, so to 
speak, of which the dream apparition is composed, is a modified repeti-
tion, revival, or copy of the sense-presentations which we have previously 
experienced in perceiving external objects. The two kinds of existence 
cannot therefore be radically disparate in their nature. 
Everything which I have said about dream apparitions applies equally 
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to those which occur in hallucinations. It also applies equally to what, 
in plainly describing facts, we call mental images. The existence of such 
images is plainly distinct and separate from that of bodies interacting in 
space. Their waxing and waning in distinctness and vividness, their com-
ing and going, their subtle and peculiar changes of quality, etc., are events 
that cannot be identified with events happening in the external world. But 
images are continuous in their existence and history with sense-presenta-
tions. They are revivals, reproductions, or continuations of sense-appari-
tions. This is especially evident in the case of what are called after images. 
If we look at a window for a few seconds and then close our eyes, the 
visual presentation continues to exist. It would continue to exist—actu-
ally to exist not merely to appear to exist—even if the window were an-
nihilated when we ceased to look at it. Plainly, therefore, its existence is 
distinct from that of the window or of any part or property of the window.
Before proceeding further, I shall here turn aside to say a word about 
terminology. In general, the distinction between sensible qualities of things 
presupposes correspondingly differentiated qualities of sensation. Ordi-
nary language, being framed with almost exclusive reference to things 
perceived, has not provided us with ready-made terms for naming these 
modifications of our sensibility. Hence we have to make good the defi-
ciency, as best we may, by circuitous description or by technical terms. 
Thus, though we cannot properly speak of a sense-presentation as green 
or yellow, we may distinguish between sensations of green and sensations 
of yellow. Similarly, though we may not call a sensation coloured, we may 
say that it is a sensation of colour, or a colour-sensation—not a coloured 
sensation, but a colour-sensation. Further, we are at liberty to speak of 
sense-presentation as having colour-quality, e.g., the colour-quality green 
or the colour-quality yellow. 
special reasons for denying that presentations are physical
The general argument against the physical existence of presentations may 
be reinforced and driven home by a multitude of special considerations. I 
have only time to mention a few chief points. The first of these is the law 
of specific energies, according to which the general nature of a sense-pre-
sentation depends not on the nature of the stimulus, but on the structure 
of the sense-organ and its nervous connexions. Light and colour sensa-
tions arise from pressure on the eye, from severance of the optic nerve, 
or from a narcotic in the blood as well as from vibrations of the ether. 
The points of the skin peculiarly sensitive to cold yield this sensation and 
no other, however they may be stimulated. A heat stimulus, applied to 
such a point, will not occasion a heat sensation, though it may give rise 
to one of intense cold. Such facts seem irreconcilable with the view that 
sense-presentations have.an independent physical existence which is, so to 
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speak, merely revealed or uncovered, as if by removal of a screen, when 
the sense-organ is affected. Indeed, there seems little distinctness between 
Mr. Alexander’s position and that of the prosecutor in an action for as-
sault who swore that he saw his assailant by the light produced by a blow 
which he received in the eye. 
In the second place, the sense-presentations involved in the percep-
tion of physical things are incessantly varying, while the things remain 
unaltered. This holds especially for the extensiveness of sensations. The 
feel due to the application of a pencil point to the skin is bigger or smaller 
according as this or that part of the skin is touched by it. It is bigger when 
the pencil point is applied to the tip of the tongue or the drum of the ear 
than when it is applied to the back of the neck. Now such differences can-
not be identified with any difference in the size of the surface in contact 
with the skin or in the extent of skin which it touches. For these may re-
main the same throughout. I might, of course, give abundant further illus-
tration from visual experience. But there is, I hope, no need to do so. The 
general argument is this: If anything x exhibits variations which are not 
shared by y, x and y must be distinct existences. But sense-presentations 
are incessantly undergoing variations which are not shared by the physical 
things that we perceive by means of them. Hence the sensations must have 
an existence distinct from that of the perceived things. 
Finally, I would refer to the point, first made by Protagoras and ac-
cepted by Plato, that, when several individuals perceive the same external 
object, each has his own sense-presentations, which, as such, are incom-
municable to the others. This is peculiarly evident where the sensation-
qualities are contrary, so that it would involve a contradiction to regard 
them as inhering in the same thing. The wind, which makes one man 
who is in health feel warm, makes another, who is feverish, feel cold. 
There would be a contradiction if these contrary qualities were supposed 
to inhere simultaneously in the same thing. But A’s feeling cold is in no 
way incompatible with B’s feeling warm, just because the qualitative op-
position is between qualities belonging to distinct existences, to A’s sense-
presentation on the one hand and to B’s on the other. If we suppose the 
sense-presentations to be like instead of contrary in quality, it is plain that 
this can make no essential difference to their mode of existence. They still 
remain the private and incommunicable experiences of distinct individu-
als. A experiences his own sensations and not B’s, however similar the 
sensations of A may be to those of B. 
how mr. alexander deals with the difficulties of his position
Mr. Alexander to some extent recognises the difficulty of treating presen-
tations as physical. But I cannot discover that he ever shows any sign of 
appreciating the precise drift of the objections which he has to meet. Thus, 
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against those who urge that mental imagery must really be mental and 
not physical, he seems to have nothing to say except that a “remembered 
person or an imagined event or person is just as physical as the perceived 
event or person.” This is certainly true; but it is totally irrelevant. The real 
question relates to the image which is imaged, not to the object or event 
which is remembered. The event has ceased to exist and the object may 
have ceased to exist at the time when it is remembered. But at that mo-
ment the memory-image is actually existing and is existentially present to 
consciousness. It cannot, therefore, be identical with the remembered ob-
ject or event. Similarly, if I imagine a castle built of diamonds, what I think 
of is a possible physical object. But, in thinking of it, I may use an image; 
and this image is not something merely possible, but something actually 
existing. I do not make the castle which I think of as a possible existence 
and I do not make the possibility of it, so far as it is possible; the image, on 
the contrary, is something produced by me. Finally, the possible castle, if it 
actually existed, would be built of actual diamonds; but my actual image 
is not formed of diamonds or of any other assignable physical material. 
Similarly in the case of error: if anyone believes that a stick seen in water is 
bent, then, if the stick is really straight, he commits an error concerning a 
physical object: he believes that a certain physical object is physically bent 
whereas in reality it is straight. He treats one physical possibility as actual 
whereas it is another physical possibility which is actual. But, after this er-
ror is corrected, the difference between the visual apparitions, as presented 
when the stick is seen in water and out of water, still remains unaffected. 
This is not an error capable of correction, but an ultimate matter of fact, a 
matter of fact not concerning any physical object, but sense-presentations. 
Mr. Alexander says that in such cases the apprehending organ has dis-
torted the real object. I submit that this is not a plain unbiassed descrip-
tion of facts, but a palpable falsehood. When I have double vision of a 
candle flame, the candle flame itself is not thereby doubled or, in any way, 
physically altered. What happens is, to use Mr. Alexander’s own language, 
that there are “two appearances of the one real candle.” If he urges that 
the appearances are themselves physical objects, I refer again to my previ-
ous argument. 
I must also point out that this distortion hypothesis inevitably places 
him in the very position which he is most vitally interested in avoiding. 
His central aim is to show that perception is a direct revelation of the 
thing perceived as it is in itself. But the view to which he is driven by the 
logic of facts is that perception directly reveals only what he calls “the 
particular ways in which non-mental objects exist in relation to the appre-
hending mind.” He has been driven into representationism in the very at-
tempt to escape it. This is most obvious when he says that “the object may 
be vitiated by elements introduced into it by the mind.” What can these 
elements be and whence can the mind derive them? The mind, according 
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to Mr. Alexander, merely consists in the activity of conation and attention 
and in feelings of pleasure and pain. But the vitiating elements introduced 
into the physical object by the mind are not activities of conation and at-
tention or feelings of pleasure and pain. 
mr. alexander’s reason for denying presentations to be psychical
So far I have only considered Mr. Alexander’s treatment of objections to 
his theory that presentations are physical. I have yet to consider his posi-
tive ground for denying that they are mental. 
So far as I can discover, there is only one reason assigned by him 
throughout his paper. Sensations cannot, he maintains, be psychical be-
cause they are always objects of consciousness and not modes of being 
conscious in relation to objects. “Try,” he says, “to think of your con-
sciousness as being affected bluely, in the same way as you think of how 
you pass from step to step of a difficult demonstration. You cannot do it. 
And you cannot do it because there is no such affection there. The blue 
is outside your mind.” This argument would no doubt be conclusive, if 
it were admitted, at the outset, that being mental or “inside the mind” is 
identical with being a mode of consciousness in the strict sense in which 
Mr. Alexander, very properly, uses that term. Presentations certainly are 
not specific qualities of conation or attention; neither are they modes of 
cognition, if by this is meant the mental act or state of our being aware 
of something in distinction from the something of which we are aware. 
But the real question is whether mental existence is confined merely to 
consciousness in this sense. Mr. Alexander, in assuming that an individual 
mind consists merely in conation and attention, assumes precisely the very 
point at issue. His argument is, therefore, a mere petitio principii. There is 
nothing in it which has any bearing on my contention that there are cer-
tain existents so connected with conation and feeling as to form with these 
part of the single system which we call an individual mind. 
Further, even if we admitted the validity of the argument, it would 
not prove that presentations are physical. It would only prove that they 
are not mental. The third alternative of their being neither would still re-
main open. And in view of the difficulties of regarding them as physical, I 
should myself hold this to be far the most natural conclusion. 
positive reasons for regarding presentations as psychical
Perhaps it may be thought that I have not myself sufficiently considered 
this third alternative. I shall, therefore, now attempt to supply this lacuna 
by offering positive reasons for asserting the psychical nature of presenta-
tions, independent of those which I have adduced for denying that they 
are physical. 
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In the first place, I have to point out that the existential presence of 
presentations does not merely consist in their being objects of conation 
or attention or any other subjective state or process. It does not merely 
consist in our being aware of them in any sense in which we can distin-
guish between the awareness, on the one hand, and that of which we are 
aware on the other. For example, we ordinarily localise sounds, as coming 
from this or that direction, through the peculiar nature of the auditory 
sensation as determined by differences in the intensity and tone-phase of 
vibrations which affect the two ears. But we do not attend to the peculiar 
presentation which fulfils this function. In order to fulfil its function it 
must be existentially present, but it does not exist for consciousness as 
an object. Similarly, though we are constantly aware of the position and 
motion of our limbs by means of muscle, joint, and tendon sensations, 
yet we rarely attend to or in any way objectify them. Again, the blind 
man with his stick is incessantly forming precise and definite judgments 
on the objects with which the stick comes in contact. The judgments are 
determined by the varying pressure sensations due to the contact of the 
other end of the stick with his hand. But the blind man need not attend 
to these sensations so as to discern their subtle variations. He need not be 
aware of them in any sense in which we can distinguish awareness and its 
object. Similarly, to quote Lotze, in sewing “we seem to be immediately 
percipient at the point of the needle, and we feel how it raises the texture 
to an elevated point before making its way through with a sudden dart.” 
Again, our ordinary perception of the size, shape, distance, and direction 
of physical things is constantly determined and specified by a multitude of 
sense-experiences which themselves escape notice and are not in any way 
objects of mental activity. 
These sense-experiences can often be discerned, and not only their pres-
ent but also their previous existence can be recognised when attention is 
directed to them. But, ordinarily, attention is not directed to them except 
by the artist and psychologist. In like manner, it sometimes happens that 
we are quite inattentive to words as articulate sounds or as visible char-
acters. We then attend only to the meaning they convey. To quote James 
Mill:—“A friend arrives from a distant country, and brings me the first 
intelligence of the last illness, the last words, the last acts, and the death of 
my son. The sound of the voice, the articulation of every word, makes its 
sensation in my ear; but it is to the ideas that my attention flies. It is my 
son that is before me, suffering, acting, speaking, dying. The words which 
have introduced the ideas, and kindled the affections, have been as little 
heeded as the respiration which has been accelerated while the ideas were 
received.” 
It would seem, then, that the existential presence of presentations to or 
in the mind does not essentially consist in their being objects to a subject. 
I can discover no possible alternative except the simple identification of 
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their existential presence with their present existence. And this can only 
be made intelligible if we ascribe psychical existence to them in the same 
sense as we ascribe it to conation and feeling. Conation and feeling are 
not merely known through experience as a tree may be. They are them-
selves experiences. The difference is comparable to the difference between 
jumping a jump and jumping a ditch. We may have experience of a tree; 
but we cannot experience the tree as we experience a painful emotion. 
Similarly, though we are, as Locke says, conversant with external objects 
through sensation, yet we cannot sense the external object as we sense the 
sensations. A heat-sensation is an experience which we experience; the 
heat of the fire is not an experience, but only something which we know 
by experience. 
To clench this point, we may refer to a class of case, of the utmost im-
portance, which is entirely neglected by Mr. Alexander, the cases in which 
we have sympathetic insight into the experience of others through our 
own analogous or related experiences. For this, it is by no means neces-
sary that we should take note of or know anything about the workings of 
our own mind which gives us the key to the minds of others. For example, 
the spectator of a football match may feel a sympathetic excitement which 
he reveals by imitative movements. Now neither the movements nor the 
mental excitement which they express need be noticed by the man himself. 
His attention may be wholly absorbed on watching the game, so that he 
is entirely heedless of his own mental states and processes as such. Yet his 
sympathetic excitement supplies him with a means of entering into the 
experience of the players. Itself unnoted, it yet specifies and determines his 
apprehension of the objects in which he is interested. Now what I have 
called his sympathetic excitement is very complex. It contains conation 
and feeling; but it also contains, as part of the same continuous whole, 
pressure sensations, together with muscle, joint, and tendon sensations. 
All these elements seem to be existentially present in the same way, and it 
seems quite arbitrary and indefensible to affirm that in this respect some 
of them are fundamentally disparate from the others, conation and atten-
tion existing in the mind, the sensations merely as objects for the mind.1 
Sensations cannot be merely objects if they are capable of being men-
tally presented without being objects at all. A fortiori they cannot be mere-
ly objects if they are capable of entering into the constitution of properly 
subjective states. Now, if there is any truth whatever in James’ theory of 
emotion, sensations do enter, at least as contributory factors, into such 
states as anger and fear. If, then, we admit such sensations to be primarily 
1 I have not time to follow Mr. Alexander in the discussion of self-knowledge given in 
his appendix. I would here remark, however, that his treatment of this topic is marred 
by his isolation of the problem of self-knowledge from that of the knowledge which one 
mind has of others. This obscures for him not only the knowledge of self, but also the 
knowledge of external objects. 
297
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2G. F. Stout
subjective modes of consciousness, we must admit that sensations may be 
subjective also. Doubtless all emotion involves conation and feelings of 
pleasure and pain, and it is ultimately to these elements that its subjective 
character is due. But these elements are so blended in a continuous unity 
with organic sensations in the total emotional state that it seems quite ar-
bitrary to contrast them as subjective with the organic sensations as objec-
tive. A fortiori it seems arbitrary and indefensible to rank the organic sen-
sations as physical in contrast with pleasure-pain and conation as mental. 
Sensations, then, may be, in the proper sense, subjective. On the other 
hand, there seems to be good ground for asserting that pleasure and pain, 
at least, if not conation, may be objective. Ferdinand delighted in the pain 
of carrying logs in the service of Miranda. His delight was a subjective at-
titude: it was a being pleased with something. But the painfulness of the 
muscular effort and fatigue were rather part of the object which he was 
pleased with than of the subjective state of being pleased with it. Similarly, 
in psychological experiments in pain-sensations, the person experimented 
on, in his anxiety for the success of the experiments, may feel pleased 
when a stimulus causes pain and displeased when it does not. His being 
pleased with the pain is then a subjective attitude; but the pain at which 
he is pleased seems to be primarily an object of the subjective state, and 
not part of it. In general, I submit that the painfulness of wounds, scalds 
and burns, of neuralgia, headache, and cramp would, in a plain unbiassed 
description of facts, be ranked as presentations, and not as modes of being 
conscious in relation to presentations. But no one, I presume, will maintain 
that pain is ever a physical fact or that it is ever anything but a mental fact. 
Hence it would seem that presentations may be mental and not physical 
facts. Further, it seems arbitrary to make a fundamental distinction, in this 
respect, between other characters of a pain-sensation and its painfulness. 
The two are so blended that if the pain is admitted to be mental, we can 
scarcely avoid admitting that the whole sensation is mental. 
can retentiveness be explained if presentations are physical? 
In conclusion, I would draw attention to a difficulty in Mr. Alexander’s 
doctrine which I am inclined to regard as more serious than any other. 
How, on his hypothesis, can he give any intelligible account of the admit-
ted facts of retentiveness, association, and reproduction. If the immediate 
experiences involved in the perception of physical objects are mental in 
their nature, they may have a subsequent mental history separate from 
that of the physical objects. Hence, they may persist or be reproduced by 
association or otherwise. And if we also assume, as I do, that it is the es-
sential function of immediate experience to specify and determine the di-
rection of thought to objects transcending immediate experience, we have 
a fairly satisfactory theory of psychical retentiveness. But if the immediate 
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experience in perception is part and parcel of the physical existence of 
perceived things, I fail to see how retentiveness is possible at all. The mind 
on this view is merely an activity which skips or hops from one external 
object to another, but its own nature remains unmodified by the external 
things to which it is successively directed. When it leaves one thing A and 
passes to another B, its previous connexion with A is entirely cut off. How, 
then, can it renew this connexion with A independently of actual percep-
tion by means of the senses? 
Perhaps Mr. Alexander might fall back on his peculiar theory that sub-
jective activity is localised in the brain, and might say that its various di-
rections correspond to the various directions of revivable brain-processes. 
But this does not help me; it only adds to my bewilderment when I try to 
work out the details. If, for example, the brain motion is forward in the 
direction of the face, it would follow that I cannot ideally recall the cor-
responding object when I have my back turned to it instead of my face. 
Spatial direction, taken literally, as Mr. Alexander proposes to take it, is of 
no use. If it be taken metaphorically, Mr. Alexander ought to tell us plainly 
what the literal fact is which the metaphor is meant to illustrate. 
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preliminary and explanatory
I BEGIN with certain preliminary remarks, designed to prevent misunder-
standing. They are suggested by Mr. Stout’s paper,1 which I do not propose 
to answer directly, but by what I consider the more satisfactory method of 
carrying my inquiry a stage further in view of acknowledged difficulties. 
(1) The method of description which I use is apt to be misunderstood. 
It consists simply in the attempt to exclude philosophical presupposi-
tions, and to state what is actually present in a given experience, so far, of 
course, as that experience has characters of metaphysical significance. The 
“object” or “thing” described will have different characters according to 
circumstances. Thus, if there is a green leaf before my eyes, the object may 
be merely the sensation green, or it may be the quality greenness, or, to 
go a stage further in description, it may be the permanent thing called a 
green leaf with all its characters of extension, colour, and the like. The de-
scription now includes thinghood in the proper sense. But nothing enters 
into the description which is not present in the experience as its contents. 
Hence, while it may be very important to discriminate in a given case 
between what has been called the content and the intent, the intent is 
for description another and special part of the content. Such a method is 
open to the difficulty that it proceeds slowly and begins with very simple 
and general description. But it will not overlook in its proper place any 
genuine element of what can be observed. For instance, it is plain that the 
object of sense-perception is saturated with interpretation. This raises no 
difficulty for the method, but it raises a serious problem, if, as I maintain, 
the first result of the method is to declare that the object of sense-percep-
tion is never mental but external. How, in that case, can the interpretation 
which is supplied by the mind be, as it is, a constituent of the object? This 
is one of the questions upon which I hope to throw light. 
(2) As analysed by this descriptive method, a perception, say the per-
ception of a tree, is resolved into the fact that there are two things, the act 
of perceiving, which is consciousness, and the external or physical thing, 
tree. This analysis is misunderstood to be an appeal to common-sense, and 
the same thing is, I suppose, intended when it is described as naive real-
1 “Are Presentations Mental or Physical?” Proc. Arist. Soc, 1908-9, pp. 226 foll. I shall 
refer to this for shortness by the writer’s name alone.
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ism.2 By naive realism is meant the bare assertion without evidence, or the 
assumption that there is an external thing of which we are conscious. But 
the descriptive method makes no assumption, and is therefore not naive 
realism. Nor does it appeal to common-sense, which, as Mr. Stout rightly 
says.3 has never entertained the question at issue, and cannot therefore 
furnish an answer. The doctrine is, indeed, as remote as possible from 
common-sense, and it demands some effort of thought and imagination, 
at least on my part, stoutly as I uphold its truth, to keep the truth in ques-
tion from slipping away from me. The appeal cannot be to introspection, 
for introspection informs me only of myself as the act of human mind, but 
is conveyed to it from some mind outside and superior to it. There is no 
implication in my use of the word of any mind as the source of external 
objects. But I speak of these objects as revealed, in order to indicate their 
externality or non-mentality. I can find, at present, no better word.
(3) To every object of which there is consciousness there corresponds 
some mode or affection of consciousness. What I have asserted, proceed-
ing as I think on the basis of description and not on the basis of theory 
or argument, but of simple observation, is that these modes of conscious-
ness have no quality-differences. I treat them as modifications of mental 
activity varying subtly with each object. At one time, if I may be allowed 
the apparent egotism of relapsing into the history of my own mind, I 
entertained the hypothesis that there might be qualitative thrills of con-
sciousness; that we might feel a blue thrill or a green thrill, or a sweet or 
a fragrant thrill, much as we feel a thrill of pleasure or pain; but I aban-
doned this hypothesis because it left no way open to the understanding 
of objects. But needing now, with better reflection, to describe these non-
qualitative differences of consciousness, I describe them as differences of 
direction. This terminology is connected with certain statements which I 
do not withdraw, but the fuller treatment of which I must reserve for some 
later occasion, when I can again discuss the relation of consciousness to 
the body, and what I should now speak of as the two meanings of the self, 
as subject and as person. Meantime I am content with the statement that 
the varieties of cognitive conation are non-qualitative. 
In reducing mind to conation and feeling, I denied the existence of 
presentations. In doing so, I had in mind presentations of an objective 
character, such as commonly go with a doctrine of representative percep-
tion. I had not in mind presentations in the sense in which Mr. Stout uses 
that word. In this sense, presentations are not modes of cognition, if by 
this is meant the mental act or state of our being aware of something in 
distinction from the something of which we are aware; in which case they 
would be equivalent to or covered by my non-qualitative modes of con-
2 F. C. S. Schiller, “Solipsism,” Mind, No. 70, pp. 178, 179.
3 Stout, p. 229.
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sciousness. Nor are they specific qualities of conation or attention, those 
supposed thrills of conation to which I have alluded. They are a class of 
psychical existents, experienced as conations and feelings are experienced; 
and they, being immediate experience, “specify and determine the direc-
tion of thought to objects transcending immediate experience.”4 “They 
form with conation and feeling part of the single system which we call an 
individual mind.”5 It is an uncommon advantage to me to have the issue 
as between myself and Mr. Stout raised thus explicitly. But I find insuper-
able difficulty in realising these mental existents to myself, and I cannot 
regard the arguments for them as cogent. I have suggested an alternative. 
And the best way of procedure is for me to make clear that the difficulties 
which he believes make my account unworkable are capable of another 
interpretation. The two alternatives are these:—On one view there are 
besides physical things and mental conations, also mental existents called 
presentations as defined; on the other view there are only mental activities 
and external objects, and on this view it is held that there is nothing to 
correspond to presentations, but on the one hand modes of conation, or 
on the other modes of external objects. 
(4) In maintaining that all objects of our cognition were physical, I 
went beyond my record. I was engaged with the cognition of physical ob-
jects and omitted such objects as numbers, for instance, which it would be 
dogmatic at present to call physical. My purpose was to indicate that the 
objects of cognition were non-mental, and that would have been enough 
for clearness. The vital question is whether they are independent of mind; 
and to indicate this I shall use the term non-mental or else external. At the 
same time it will, I hope, become clear that (in the case of physical things) 
sensations, images, etc., that is not seeing or imaging, but sensa and im-
ages, are physical. I do not think there is ground for complaint6 that no 
definition was given in advance of the physical or the mental; the very 
object of the inquiry being from one point of view to determine precisely 
how much is included under either designation. It helps little to say that 
physical is whatever is or essentially belongs to physical things as under-
stood by common-sense. For instance, are we to say that no two physical 
objects can occupy the same space, which would immediately exclude co-
lour and taste, which may occupy the same space, from being physical, or 
only that two physical bodies cannot? 
(5) Mind has been described on the strength of the method as consist-
ing of acts of consciousness. This might be misunderstood to mean that 
consciousness was a pure activity floated off by itself in disconnection 
from matter.7 The acts of consciousness in question are of course thought 
4 Stout, p. 246.
5 Stout, p. 241.
6 Stout, p. 226.
7 Mr. Wolf’s article on “Natural Realism” in Proc. Arist. Soc., 1908-9, § 13, pp. 163-5.
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of as functions of the body. It was even explained that the consciousness 
was, by its own witness, located in the body. 
In pursuing the method, I have done little more than sketch an outline, 
and many topics have been left over which seem, at first sight, inexplica-
ble. I propose to address myself to the most obvious of these difficulties:— 
(a) The familar facts, known sometimes under the name of the rela-
tivity of sensations, which are commonly taken to imply that sensa-
tions are mental. 
(b) The nature of images and the assertion that they are non-men-
tal. 
(c) The problem of how the mind can interfere so as to interpret or 
distort things (supra, p. 1). 
It will be found that these three topics cannot be kept entirely apart 
from one another. 
sensations
The proposition maintained is that sensations are non-mental. It will be 
convenient to repeat one distinction and to add two others. The repeated 
distinction is that between the sentience and the sensum. The sentience is 
mental, but it is held not to vary in quality. The sensum, which I shall com-
monly call sensation, is non-mental. The other distinctions are (1) that 
between the appearance and reality, and (2) that between illusion and real-
ity. These two distinctions do not coincide. Appearance is contrasted with 
reality as part or aspect with whole. An appearance is a reality though not 
the whole of the reality of which it is said to be an appearance. An illusion 
is not a reality, or, in order to anticipate a little, it is not the reality which 
it purports to be. With these preliminaries I may proceed. 
The general principle of interpreting the varying and perplexing infor-
mation of the senses follows easily from the method employed: i.e. from 
considering the relation of mind to its object as merely a particular case 
of any two objects related to each other. Take the effects which a physical 
body produces on another physical body. The first body remaining the 
same, its effects will vary: first, according to the conditions which sur-
round it, and, secondly, according to the constitution of the affected body. 
A body will affect a photographic plate in the sunlight but not in the dark. 
A squirt of water will drench a body, or barely touch it, or not affect it 
at all, according as the squirt is one, or two, or three yards distant from 
the body. In these cases the first body actually undergoes a difference in 
relation to the second. But there is a second class of cases. A steel point 
will scratch lead but make no impression on a diamond. A ball will bury 
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itself in sand but rebound from a wall. The pressure is the same but its ef-
fect is different, because of the response of the patient. Now, suppose the 
patient to be a conscious body. The external appearance revealed to the 
patient will be different, either if the stimulus acts under conditions which 
alter the stimulus, or it will be different according to the character of the 
organisation. In the first kind of cases, the different appearances are all 
actually present, and there is no error. In the second case, some of the ap-
pearances, while remaining external, may be illusory. Which appearance 
is true and which is false will depend on whether the instrument which 
receives the revelation is fitted to receive it or not. In many cases there is 
no error but only defect, either want of apprehension, as in stimuli below 
the threshold, or inability to apprehend difference of stimuli, as in the case 
of the colour-blind. 
Let us begin with the latter class of cases, taking in particular the cases 
of perfectly normal variations, which are therefore ordinarily, with much 
plausibility, treated as meaning that the sensed appearance must be men-
tal. On the periphery of the eye, colours disappear and are replaced by 
shades of grey. The periphery is a defective instrument in respect of co-
lour. The colours exist in the object, but are not revealed to the eye at the 
periphery. The only visual revelations are those of brightness. If our eyes 
were all periphery, as they are in the exceptional cases of totally colour-
blind persons, we should never know of the existence of colour. Similarly, 
what is red at the centre of the eye changes to a yellow at the intermediate 
zone of the retina. This zone of the retina does not distinguish colours 
with sufficient fineness. We know this to be a defect, because we have in 
the centre of the eye a more perfect instrument. Here, as in the former 
case, some real appearance is revealed, but, so far as red is confused with 
yellow, the full “subtlety” of nature is not revealed. What normal persons 
are in respect of this region of the eye colour-blind persons are habitually. 
Whatever colour it is that such persons see, their defect is that they do not 
apprehend two colours as distinct which are distinct to the more perfectly 
and appropriately endowed individual.8
Considerations partly the same and partly different are introduced by 
the familiar case of the water which appears at the same time hot and cold 
8 Whether we are to regard failure to appreciate difference of stimuli as being erroneous 
from defect or as total error raises problems which I do not wish to discuss at present. 
When two degrees of loudness are heard as identical, it seems most natural to say that 
part of the louder degree is heard but not the remainder or the whole. Colour-blindness 
is more difficult. Luckily, the difference of colour theories does not concern us. Whether 
there is missing the red-green substance and the patient sees a yellow or blue, or only 
the green substance, say, is missing and he sees red and green as red, there still remains 
the theoretical question: is the colour which he sees, whatever it is, actually a part of the 
physical stimulus, or is it wholly illusory? I the first case, there is complete error, the pa-
tient’s organization falsifies the revelation. But neither interpretation affects the general 
interpretation given above, but only the interpretation of this special case.
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to the two hands respectively. In respect of the two hands, the sense organ 
is different, for the physiological zero has been raised or lowered in the 
two cases by dipping the hands in hot and cold water respectively. If we 
treat the two sensations as differing only in degree, we must remember 
that degree can only have reference to some point from which the scale 
is reckoned. This being so, the water not only is felt but is hotter to one 
hand and colder to the other; and this is the only meaning of the sup-
posed contradiction, which is no contradiction. If we consider the differ-
ence of hot and cold as a difference of quality, the case is the same as the 
varying quality of the sensations which the same object may produce in 
different individuals. The meaning of this familiar fact is that individuals 
with different senses apprehend differently. The sensum revealed is still 
non -mental, but it is only to the appropriate sense-organisation that it is 
revealed without defect or error. It is, of course, the variation of the sense-
apperances to different persons, or to the same person at different times, 
which leads us to set up, more particularly in respect of scales of degree, 
but also in respect of qualities, artificial scales like that of the thermom-
eter, which are relatively independent of the interference of the sensuous 
organisations of persons.
The specific energy of the senses means that the sensation is the same, 
however disparate the stimulus. Consequently, when the eye is struck we 
see light, though there is actually no excitement by light and when a cold 
point on the skin is stimulated by a piece of hot metal we feel it cold. The 
meaning of this fact is that to each kind of external object there corre-
sponds a particular reaction on the part of the instrument, by which the 
revelation is received. When the mind is set going in that manner, is set 
to work in that direction, the corresponding non-mental object is present. 
When the stimulus is disparate, the object presented is illusory, but it does 
not cease to be external. The illusory character of the appearance is the de-
fect of our quality. With an organ adapted to see red we can see only red, 
no matter how the organ is set a-working. How it is possible that under 
such conditions there should be an external and illusory object present, 
raises a metaphysical question which I defer till I speak of images and their 
external character. It will then be clearer that the paradoxes connected 
with the specific energy of the senses are but the price we pay of a little 
error for the sake of a great deal of truth; and that, instead of disproving 
the general interpretation which is here advanced, they confirm it.
 I pass to the cases where difference in the appearance arises 
from change in the situation of the stimulus without necessarily carrying 
with it error. Such are the cases of the stick bent in water, the intersection 
of parallel lines at a distance, the diminution of the visual magnitude and 
in some cases the alteration of its colour as it recedes. Here the visual 
characters of the object are altered by the conditions which surround it. 
There is no disturbing affection of the perceiving organ. The visual instru-
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ment is not altered, as it might be if provided with spectacles. Look at a 
stick through a transparent tank of water, and it still looks straight. The 
stick itself must be partially immersed in water. Nor is it enough to say 
that what we see is not the stick itself, but the stick and the water. We need 
not notice the water. The fact observed is simply that the same stick looks 
straight in air and bent when half in air and half in water. The bending is 
the appearance of the stick, and it is not even an illusory one. The stick’s 
visual character changes. The stick under these circumstances has the same 
visual character as a bent stick in air, and for a well-understood optical 
reason. There is illusion only if we deny that the bent and the straight ap-
pearance in the two different sets of conditions belong to the same stick; 
or if we were to say that the stick which is bent to the eye is bent to the 
touch. But it is true that the occasional discrepancy of vision and touch 
and the varying deliverances of vision confirm us in the belief in the more 
primary character of the appearances as revealed to touch. Similarly, there 
is no illusion in seeing the mountain blue in the haze, but only in think-
ing that it is also blue without the haze. Again, the visual magnitude of 
objects is really affected by distance. This only seems paradoxical if it is 
forgotten that magnitude is a matter of comparison, that there is more or 
less of it in reference to the standard which is the zero. A line a yard long 
looks half a yard at a certain distance; but the yard measure by which we 
measure it would at the same distance shrink to half its apparent length 
and still cover the given line. Two rails with a 4 foot 6 gauge meet to the 
eye. At the same distance a 4 foot 6 rule would also vanish to a point. The 
distance being constant, magnitudes retain their proportions. Under the 
microscope, a blood-corpuscle looks a quarter millimetre broad, but the 
millimetre scale is enlarged to sight in the same proportion. What these 
facts do teach us is that, taking touch extension as primary, we come by 
experience to correlate the varying visual characters under their circum-
stances of distance and surroundings with the tactual extension. But it is 
always the same real occupation of space which reveals itself in these vari-
ous ways to touch and sight. 
By way of throwing light on these problems, I will make two ridicu-
lous suppositions and ask what would happen if they were true. Suppose, 
first, that all ordinary objects had first to be half immersed in water before 
we could see them, carried about with themselves transparent bags filled 
with water which extended half-way up their length. And suppose next 
that we could only see things when they were removed at least a hundred 
yards. The laws of optics are supposed unaltered. In the first case, straight 
sticks would look bent, and sticks bent to a proper angle straight. In the 
second case we should look microscopic to each other, and feel between 
five and six feet high. In the first case there would be an embarrassing dis-
crepancy between the language of touch and sight. In the second case we 
should learn to co-ordinate our minute visual pictures with tactual ones 
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as we do now, and should say we saw a man five feet or six feet high. But 
our eyes would be useless except for moderately large objects. I imagine 
that the result of natural selection in such a world would be to furnish us 
in the first case with eyes which would twist the visual appearance, and in 
the second case with eyes of a proper magnifying power. 
Where the surrounding conditions affect not the object itself but the 
organ, there is inevitable distortion and illusion. Such is the case of the 
candle-flame seen double by pressing aside one eye or arming it with a 
prism. The distortion of the object consists here not in any mistake in its 
own features but in its dislocation in space. With both eyes open the can-
dle is seen by the abnormal eye in a different place from the same candle 
as seen by the normal eye. That there is only one real candle is shown 
by closing each eye alternately, when each appearance can be touched in 
turn. It is in reference to the place as seen by the normal eye that the other 
percept is displaced, and regarded as illusory so far. The illusory percept 
is seen in its place for the same reason as a disparate stimulus is sensed as 
the appropriate sensation. But the further treatment of the external char-
acter of both this and the percept of the normal eye is better deferred to 
the next section. 
For the same reason, I do not deal here with such normal illusions as 
the familiar illusions of geometrical figures. In all these there seems to be 
an element of interpretation whatever the source of the suggestion may be. 
It is therefore necessary to make clear that images are external. 
images
Imagination, whether reproductive or constructive, has certain features 
which distinguish it from the corresponding process of perception, which 
features it is the business of psychology to expound. In particular, memory 
differs from perception in its relative incompleteness and inaccuracy, and 
in the possible introduction of new features not present in the original. 
This character I omit for the moment, because it is the subjective element 
in images, and I do not wish to complicate the question. It is the subject 
of the next section. 
The imaging of an external or physical thing is of course mental. What 
is here maintained is that the image itself is non-mental, or external, or 
I am prepared to say physical. The truism or paradox which I advance 
is here at its acutest, because an image is entertained in the absence of 
the object perceived. In calling it external, or physical, I mean that it has 
the characteristics of physical objects. The village of Headington, where I 
once lived, is present to me in all the form and colouring of the original. It 
is in three dimensions, and I imagine myself walking down its street, and 
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hear the greetings of the children. In dreams the object which I see I can 
also touch in dream and experience the same resistance as I should were 
I touching it sensibly with my hand. But this statement provokes at once 
an objection and a question. The objection is that while I can think of the 
physical street I imagine only its image. In other words, the content of the 
image is only mental, but it may direct me to the physical object which 
is thought of. I have already alluded to this matter.9 The contents of the 
image are here characterised by thingbood. It is true that not everything 
enters into an image which requires the action of thought. When thought 
enters, the content of the thought is present as well, and in the same sense 
as the content of the image is present. That thought, as distinguished from 
the mental act of thinking it, is also non-mental, but it is different from 
the mere image as such. I suppose that it is this which is really at the root 
of the controversy between Mr. Stout and myself, and makes us seem to 
be at cross-purposes. I think of a thing in its absence. There then arises 
the question referred to, how can I image, or think, (or perhaps I may add 
in view of what was said above with respect to disparate stimuli) sense, 
objects in their absence? This is the metaphysical problem to which I must 
address myself. 
If we start from imagination, and especially if we start from construc-
tive imagination, it is impossible not to be impressed with the spectacle 
of our mental or personal activity, and we naturally think of images as 
mental products: and proceeding to perceptions, we go on to treat sensa-
tions and percepts, and I should add thoughts, as mental too. But if we 
begin as I do with perception, we analyse it into the togetherness of the 
mind and some non-mental thing or object which is revealed to the mind. 
When I face a table and it stimulates my body in a certain way or evokes 
a certain form of mental action, the table is revealed to me in perception. 
When I turn my back, the table no longer evokes that form of mental ac-
tion and I no longer have the percept of the table. Suppose now that, for 
some reason or other, it may be by a process of association, it may be by 
some chemical stimulus, the brain and the mind with it are set going in 
the same or a similar fashion, and I image the table, that experience is an 
experience of the table in precisely the same sense as in perception. While 
before the experience meant the togetherness of the mind as perceiving 
and the percept table, so now the experience means the togetherness of 
the mind as imagining and the image table, equally non-mental. And in 
both cases the fact is avouched by the experience itself. Fully realise that 
perceiving a thing means that mind and the thing are together in the same 
sense, as the table and the floor are together, and you understand that the 
imagination of the table means that the mind and the table are together; 
but the table in its imagined form, with imperfections and added elements. 
The mental action has been evoked in the two cases by different means: in 
9 See p. 1. 
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the one case by the direct action of the object, in the other indirectly. I put 
aside the question whether the brain processes in perception and imagina-
tion are the same in kind and different only in intensity, or are separate 
processes of which imagination is the outgrowth of perception. It is at 
any rate continuous with it. There is identity enough to account for the 
identity of the objects, and difference enough to account for their differ-
ences. By togetherness I mean copartnership in one universe. I am ready to 
substitute the more elegant and convenient word compresence, provided 
that it is understood without reference to time. It must not be taken to 
mean coexistence in time with the act of apprehension. Clearly the object 
remembered is prior to the memory of it, and it may have ceased to exist 
before we remember it. But equally, a sensation, that is a sensum, is prior, 
on my showing, to the sentience of it, and by a measurable interval. In 
this sense all sensation is of the past, is, to use an inaccurate expression, 
memory. But I do not pursue these topics, partly because it is not necessary 
for my present purpose, partly because I have no present clear answer to 
the difficulties as to the nature of time which they suggest; I mention them 
only to show that I am not unconscious of the problem. 
The difference between perception and memory may be illustrated by 
a comparison. In perception we are in face of an object. Memory or imagi-
nation is like turning us round when we have our backs turned. When 
we are thus turned round we cannot but see, and what we see is the same 
object as before. This is only a simile. In imagining we are not turned 
round. But we become aware of the object with which we are together, or 
compresent, in the one universe, in the form in which it can be presented 
in imagination. It is convenient, especially for a visualiser like myself, to 
take advantage of this comparison with the action of turning round so as 
to see. I can say, therefore, that in all our experiences there are on the one 
side the various acts of experiencing, differing with each appearance of 
objects, and on the other side objects appearing of which we have vision, 
a vision which is limited or comprehensive according to the mental action 
which is engaged. But always the vision is of something not ourselves, 
non-mental. Absence in time or distance in space is no bar to this vision 
of things. 
But it will now also be clear why images of physical things are not only 
non-mental but also are themselves physical. The memory of my friend 
is a physical appearance of a larger and completely physical thing, my 
friend: blurred indeed by time, like all memories, and falsified perhaps by 
my personal interpretations and interests. He may no longer exist. Does 
he cease to have been physical because he has ceased to exist? Remem-
bering him is not physical. Neither is dreaming physical. But the dream-
apparition is physical. Physical is what has physical properties. Mental 
is what has mental properties. One physical property is to be in space. 
The dream appearance is in the dream space and that space is the space 
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which we live in, but seen in a dream. Dreams are full of illusion, and so 
far they are not true and are not verifiable. But in the dream space bodies 
do move and attract inversely as the square of the distance, so far as they 
are dreamt of as doing so, just as in waking life they are thought of or 
present themselves to thought as doing so, and doing so independently of 
the thinker or the dreamer. Whether Mr. Stout sees this statement, or only 
“pleases to dream” that he sees it, the statement is the same and equally 
physical. This is, indeed, not the language of common-sense, to which it 
would be unmeaning, and it may even seem to some to be the language of 
madness. But it does not appeal to common-sense but to fact. 
Imagination is continuous with perception and grows out of it. The 
image and the percept are the same contents or, as I prefer to say, the 
same objects appearing in different forms. The one is physical in the same 
sense as the other. Hence the image of memory or imagination is tested 
or verified by reference to the percept. There is good reason for the pre­
eminent use of sensory objects as standards. For in sensation the object 
acts directly upon our bodies. But if it is true that images are continuous 
with sensation it is no less true that sensation is continuous with images. 
For sensory experience is enlarged by imagination and anticipated by it. 
It is in this-interplay between sensation and idea that the distinction of 
images and perceptions becomes established. Both to sensation and to 
imagination, objects are revealed as objects with certain characters. But 
when images fail to be verified they are distinguished as being only images. 
And it is in this way that we come to correct one part of our experience 
by another; and to acquire a body of truth, by the use, on the one hand, 
of successful dealing with sensible objects, and, on the other hand, of the 
thwarting of personal or preconceived expectations by contact with sen-
sory fact. Practical necessity and disappointment are thus the two means 
by which the spirit leads us; into truth. But this process implies, or can 
at least be explained, if we hold that in our various mental actions it is 
physical things which form the contents of our minds, or the objects of 
those mental actions, differently presented according to the circumstances 
of our minds, but the same things continuously brought within the ken of 
our vision.
subjective elements in experience
Imagination is thus as much a vision of physical things as perception or 
sensation. In both cases the mind declares the togetherness of itself and 
the object. Only in the case of images, the central action is provoked not 
by the object itself but internally by some other mental, that is cerebral, 
excitement. No difficulty is now offered by the association of ideas, which 
might otherwise be unintelligible.10 The principle of association is, shortly, 
10  Stout, p. 246. 
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this. The mind on some occasion has been set going in a complex of ac-
tivities, which are also brain activities. When, on some later occasion, one 
part of the complex is re-excited, say by some sensed object, the remainder 
of the complex is re-excited, and its corresponding object is revealed, in 
image. From this point of view, the question whether it is mental events or 
objects which are associated becomes indifferent. Both are associated, but 
if a choice must be made it is the events, i.e. the mental actions, which are 
more strictly so described. The value of the famous saying that association 
marries universals is that it is the type or scheme of mental action, form-
ing thus with another type or scheme a total scheme of action, which is 
the fundamental feature in the process. In other words, for association it 
is indifferent whether the suggesting object is precisely the same as before 
or not. 
In getting to know the world of which we are a part we depend on 
two factors, the direct action of things outside us upon our bodies, and 
our own mental actions which bring us face to face with things not-our-
selves. The object is always impersonal, but by our own personal action 
we are continually receiving impersonal revelations. Association of ideas 
comes suitably under this head because it is by personal expectations so 
produced that we anticipate sensible experience. But it is but one case of 
the all-pervasive principle of interpretation. Things are saturated with our 
suggestions and inferences, varying from fully conscious suggestions to 
sub-conscious ones. These interpretations come from us, but they form 
part of the object itself. The meanings of things are not merely some-
thing which we entertain, but apart from the question whether they are 
correct or not, they are part of the constitution of the things and we act 
on that understanding. How they can be, as we loosely say, supplied by 
the mind requires no further explanation. The difference between what 
is revealed in sense and what is added in interpretation is solely a matter 
of the method of the revelation. We are always by one method or other 
seeing things themselves, or, to vary the metaphor, handling or manipulat-
ing them. This is true even when the suggestion is unconscious. We treat 
the object as possessing certain added characters corresponding to the 
unconscious mode, whatever that may be, of the mental activity, which 
characters are fully revealed if the activity passes into clear consciousness. 
Nay, the suggestion may be a totally unconscious one, a mere state of our 
body, and affect our reaction upon the object. 
The best illustration is to be found in the difficult and subtle facts of 
un-understood nascent desires which impel us to the pursuit of their ap-
propriate object. At first the desire is felt for something or other, we know 
not what, and we are aware of a certain class of objects as surrounded by 
a dreamy halo of possibilities. When the object which is suited to gratify 
the desire comes within our sensible vision, the real and proper object of 
the desire becomes, from vague, definite and filled with detail. 
314
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2S. Alexander
It is but a step from this to constructive imagination or hard thinking 
of a hypothesis, the most obviously subjective of all our mental processes, 
and where it might seem most paradoxical to assert the revelation of an 
external reality given as the contents of the experience, though not nec-
essarily exhausted by them. The creative impulse, backed in imaginative 
production by passion, and in scientific invention by more or less warmth 
of curiosity, squeezes out the result from our minds; working in complex 
wholes of mental activities, in view of the materials which correspond to 
those activities, modifying these complexes by here a touch added and 
there a touch removed, till by a sort of intra-mental natural selection that 
complex is arrived at which satisfies the creative impulse. In all this labour 
of expression the mind is still handling outside objects, using the materials 
of its experience and building them into a new structure of art or science. 
Whether some totally new feature of things may thus be discovered is a 
question which I need not raise for fear of accumulating difficulties. But 
it is always external materials that are being handled, and the new prod-
uct is itself, whether it is a statue, or a poem, or a thought, also external 
and presented from without. It is well known that discoverers or creators 
themselves describe their works as coming to them from without, which 
we are in the habit of ascribing to their personal powers. This humility 
of great men is prompted by their sense of what is literally true. Scientific 
discoverers, to take their case more specially, who proceed by the inven-
tion of hypotheses, are minds so gifted as in response to the world to body 
forth from their own minds imagined or conceived combinations which 
are afterwards attested by sensible things. 
I have taken extreme cases, but I need not pursue these difficult, and 
perhaps dithyrambic, flights in order further to elucidate the commonest 
feature of our mental life: that in the learning of the world there is this 
constant interplay of mind and things, that we discover in things such 
wealth of properties as our minds are fitted by nature or previous experi-
ence or happy particular endowment to appreciate. What to the empty 
mind is a bare colour or taste is to another full of meaning, is symptom-
atic or significant. The mobile intellect of one apprehends what the dull 
wits of another can only perceive after demonstration by the discoverer 
or not at all. But the stores of experience which the mind brings with it to 
the apprehension of things are themselves non-mental and physical, and 
the mental actions themselves are but instrumental. And I repeat that, in 
seeing or manipulating things, the mind is but declaring that these things 
exist together with itself or are copartners or compresent with itself in the 
universe to which both mind and things belong. 
It is, we have seen, because in our various mental actions we are han-
dling or are in view of the same physical object that we are able to con-
nect sensory and ideational appearances of things, experiences which are 
themselves physical, though all partial, into one connected and continuous 
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whole which we call the thing whose appearances are thus revealed. We 
may now add that it is just because it is physical, non-mental appearances 
that we handle or see that different individuals can collate their different 
experiences of the same thing. They can do so because the appearances 
which they apprehend are in all cases external to all the minds alike. Each 
mind may see different appearances. We see things from a different angle, 
partly because we are literally in a different spatial position with respect 
to them, partly because the different history and aptitudes of our mind 
dispose us to see things differently, so that a different selection from the 
fulness of the object is revealed to us. Each of us has his own special inter-
pretation of things. But since our perceptions, images, ideas, notions are 
physical appearances of the same physical thing, I can control my ideas 
and sensations and the rest by yours. In this way we arrive at true or sci-
entific knowledge. The result of intercourse of different persons with one 
another is to depersonalise the world of individual experience and give us 
truth. 
personal elements in experience: illusion and error
We must distinguish, next, between the mental or subjective and the per-
sonal elements in knowledge. All knowledge that goes beyond the purely 
sensational stage depends in the manner explained upon the character of 
the instrument. But we need a word to describe the special ways in which 
the special features of the instrument, and consequently the objects which 
it indirectly brings to view, determine the appearance which is revealed. 
These special features of the instrument I may call personal, in distinction 
from mental or subjective. I call them personal because in the end they rest 
on congenital or acquired dispositions of the body or in particular of the 
brain. But they are of two kinds. The first kind are helps to knowledge, 
and indeed the necessary means of acquiring it; the second kind are hin-
drances, and are the source of illusion and error. 
The first kind are those which arise from our different situations, in 
virtue of which things present to us their different sides. The table presents 
one corner to you, another to me. Both corners are actual, and if I put my-
self at your place I shall see your corner. There are the merely individual 
differences which are collated to form fuller knowledge of the object. It 
is particularly the work of thought to take the scattered appearances of 
things, whether in my own experience or in the experiences of several 
individuals, and use them so as to connect them into a whole, or, better, 
so as to gain the vision of the whole. The particular appearances remain 
true, but thought discovers their unifying and explaining law. Science de-
personalises in this sense by reducing the desultory and disconnected into 
continuity and coherence. Each appearance, though personal so far as it is 
vouchsafed to a certain individual, contributes to the common knowledge, 
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and at the same time is intelligible to other individuals. This familiar state 
of things may be compared to the use of language. Each person uses his 
own turn of phrase and his own intonation. But each is intelligible to all 
the rest, provided he speaks within the limits set by the genius and the us-
age of the language. The language exists as the common body of ordered 
expression, which passes between such persons who speak it correctly. It 
is impersonal only in the sense of being more than the work of any one 
person. Thought is in this sense impersonal. 
But if the speaker uses words or phrases incorrectly, or introduces fal-
setto into his speech, he is an eccentric, and the correct use of language 
rids persons of this mistaken habit, which renders them unintelligible, and 
their speech incommunicable. The personal features in acquiring knowl-
edge, which correspondingly are excluded and not used, are ignorance 
or defect, and illusion and error. Strictly speaking, ignorance and mere 
defect, whether the defect is the absence of a sense, as in deafness, or the 
inability to appreciate difference, as in colour-blindness, are on a differ-
ent footing from illusion. For the absence of certain appearances need not 
falsify the rest, and what a person knows (say about the moon) may be 
true, though he has not the whole of lunar theory. (This may at least be ac-
cepted provisionally.11) Illusion arises in such cases, and it generally does 
so arise, so far as a person takes his defective knowledge for complete, and 
believes that green and red things have the same colour. So far as this is 
the case, science and education seek to remove the disability, if they can. 
Strictly speaking, illusion and error arise when there is not merely defect, 
but incongruity between the object actually present or intended, or sup-
posed to be present, and its appearance, so that the appearance is not a 
true appearance. Illusion may perhaps again be distinguished from error 
by its unconsciousness. The picture seen in the stereoscope seems solid; 
this is only an illusion, for we do not suppose we are looking at an actual 
solid thing. If we do we are in error. There is something of pretence about 
error in the strict sense, the person in error is self-deceived. 
These minuter distinctions do not, however, concern us here. Let us 
use error generally. Wherever it occurs it is due to the intervention of the 
personal factor between the mind and the object. It occurs wherever some 
objective appearance is presented to the mind which does not belong in 
fact to the object intended. The question then is how, if all objects are non-
mental, physical, is illusion possible? 
The answer is that everything which is illusory in the illusion does 
actually exist in correspondence with the mental activity through which it 
is revealed, but that the personal character of that activity dislocates the 
real object from its place in things, and refers it to a context to which it 
does not belong. When I fancy a horse’s body and complete it with a man’s 
11 See later, last section.
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head, the head exists in reality, but not upon a horse’s body. When hot 
metal touches a cold point of my skin, and I feel it cold, it is the coldness 
of a cold thing which I feel; there is illusion, so far as I refer the coldness 
to the metal touching me which I see, or, if we prefer, supplement the cold 
sensation which I really feel by the touch and other properties of the metal 
which is touching me. When my eye is struck and I see sparks, I see physi-
cal and sensory light, but displaced to the points of space in which I see the 
sparks. There is further misinterpretation in supposing them to be sparks. 
When I see the plane figures solid in the stereoscope, it is not the solidity 
which is illusory, but again the supplementing of it by the other physical 
properties of the scene depicted. In the same way, the painter produces 
the illusion of a man actually present by suggesting the properties of his 
subject which he does not paint, but which really belong to the subject. To 
multiply examples would only be to repeat the pages of works of psychol-
ogy which describe illusions. Intellectual error exhibits the same features 
of taking up or seeing real and actual parts of the world, and repiecing 
them together into combinations determined by the inappropriate char-
acter of the total complex of mental activity. An erroneous proposition 
always deals with actual realities, but it pretends that one actual reality 
has a property which is also real, but belongs to some other actual object. 
In other words, error arises not from unreality, but from misdescription. 
Let it not be supposed that, in speaking thus of real sensations wrongly 
connected with other objects, I am treating a sensation or other appear-
ance as something that may be floated off, and can exist in independence 
of its substantial basis. On the contrary, the cold sensation which is felt 
by the cold point of the skin when excited by a hot body is a sensational 
object precisely of the same sort as we experience in a cold body that acts 
upon the skin. That body itself is a more or less complete continuity of 
its own appearances, and the cold felt is in both cases cold belonging to a 
body. What is meant is that, owing to a visual obliquity of the mind, two 
sets of physical appearances are wrongly correlated, much as in actual 
bodily vision when you look with the two eyes at an ink-spot on the win-
dow you may see a chimney-stack and a church-spire in the same place. 
Error therefore involves the same metaphysical difficulty, and is ex-
plained in the same way as constructive imagination, and for that mat-
ter memory also, so far as it involves, as it does, construction as well. 
In imagination we take pieces of our world and put them together into 
new combinations. Sometimes these combinations are verified as having 
actual existence. When they have not, but are believed to have it, there 
is illusion. It is experience which decides. Exactly at what point in error 
the dislocation of things is found is very various. Sometimes we have two 
very complex realities dislocated, as when I fancy a snow mountain to be 
made of diamonds, where the wrongly allocated diamonds are themselves 
complex wholes. In the end, and with the highest-degree of incoherence, 
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such as we may get in certain dreams, or in simple cases like that of the hot 
metal felt as cold, we may have dislocation of simple sensational objects. 
And what imagination and illusion imply is that corresponding to each act 
of sentience set going in the mind there is an actual sensum; that the last 
elements of the world we bring before us in imagining whether correctly 
or in illusion are real and actual. To each sentient act in any of its intensi-
ties there corresponds a sensation or sensum with its appropriate degree. 
But the forms of combination of the parts of the world are not neces-
sarily entirely false in illusion. On the contrary, imagination and error 
always follow, up to a certain point, the combinations found in reality. We 
all of us know some man to whom, like Titania, we attach by illusion a 
donkey’s head. But we obey nature so far as to complete the trunk by some 
head or other. Laws of combination of parts are, in fact, as much actual 
realities as the parts themselves, and they are more important. Why, then, 
it may be asked, if you maintain that to every elementary image there 
corresponds an actual object somewhere, why do you not maintain that 
to every illusory form of combination there corresponds somewhere an 
actual form of combination? You would then suppose with Empedocles 
that hippogryphs and centaurs, and all the monsters which the imagina-
tion of man has invented, did actually exist at some anterior epoch in the 
world’s history, though, as they have failed to survive, no traces of them 
remain. It is not necessary to make so violent an assumption for which 
there is no sufficient evidence in fact, because we have evidence that we do 
physically handle things and recombine material things into fresh wholes, 
partly respecting and partly disregarding the combinations which we find 
in nature, but treating wood as wood and not as clay or water. We alter 
the arrangement of things to suit our purposes. What we do in imagina-
tion and error is analogous. But instead of acting on the world we so act 
upon ourselves as to place ourselves where we see things in an order and 
combination different in the case of illusion from the actual. Error is the 
mental distortion which presents us things awry. It is the mental misma-
nipulation of things, or, to use our usual language, the wrong mental vi-
sion of them. And the cause of error is the personal tendency of the mind 
which it owes not to individuality, but to abnormality. It may be perverse-
ness of the senses, or of intellect, or it may have its origin in feeling, the 
impulsion of prejudice or affection, or any of the faults of will or passion 
which interfere with the undisturbed contemplation of what is outside 
us. Every inappropriateness in the action of the mind distorts its vision of 
things. The man who is in error is wry-necked so that he cannot see nor-
mally. To borrow a word from the title of one of R. L. Stevenson’s stories, 
he is thrawn; and the object of science and philosophy, as Plato said long 
ago, is to twist him round so that he can see. 
To have truth is to have your mind working so as to be in presence of 
objects in the order and arrangement in which they exist. It is therefore 
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impersonal. The mind makes itself receptive of things and passive with re-
gard to them. It does so by depersonalising itself in the two ways indicated 
above. It uses the personality which sees correctly the partial aspects of 
things, depersonalising it by thought so as to remove its partial character. 
But it excludes the personal factors which induce error. Science supple-
ments defects of mind by instruments which extend and make precise the 
vision. In order to adjust the varying deliverances of the senses, which are 
affected by the merely personal differences of individuals, it invents stan-
dards and methods of precision. For the more glaring causes of error it 
seeks to remove all passion but that which makes us strain all our powers 
to be passive to the influence of things. Error is the want of impersonality. 
It is, therefore, if we call by the general name of will those dispositions of 
our mind which keep us in tune or out of tune with the world, an intrusion 
of a defective will so as to blur the recognition of the things presented to 
us and thereby declared to be together with us. At the same time to ex-
clude the defects of will is the highest exercise of will. The impersonality 
which is the condition of knowledge is the extreme cultivation and refine-
ment of personality. 
By excluding the personal elements which are introduced into the ap-
pearances of things, science and education continue the work which has 
been already accomplished by the course of evolution. Our mental instru-
ments have been fashioned in conformity with our surroundings through 
the pressure of practical needs and the sanction of failure and extinction. 
The normal eye sees the colours which are in nature, because a long his-
tory has selected the eyes which act so as to make the distinctions of co-
lour which are useful for practice. Error represents the deviation from the 
normal method of mental action, for which normal action the appear-
ances of things are not discoloured by personal interference. The cautions 
of scientific method, the training in scientific impersonality, remove the 
deviation con tained in error and make the mind a mirror of actual things. 
sensations, perceptions, images and thoughts
My object has been to develop in the face of certain difficulties the truth 
that the objects of apprehension are non-mental, and, by doing so, to en-
deavour to put the reader into the point of view from which the original 
analysis of perception into the togetherness of two things, of which one is 
a mind and receives the revelation of the other, becomes convincing. The 
appearance of the object, always except in simple cases, contains elements 
introduced into it by the mind, and these elements may, and if they are 
personal do, vitiate it. But these elements are still non-mental, and the 
inquiry has shown how this is metaphysically possible. There is no room 
here for the charge of representationism, as has been supposed12 But over 
12 Stout, p. 240.
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and above the metaphysical consequences or implications of the method 
adopted, which do not fall within the scope of this paper, there are two 
questions raised by this inquiry upon which some remarks seem called for, 
though they must be tentative and provisional. There is, I hope, no shame 
in confessing that when I venture out into what Locke calls “the vast 
ocean of being,” I soon get out of my depth. 
Sensations, percepts, and the rest are different partial appearances of 
non-mental objects. Objects present differences of character, like those 
of colour, or chemical valency, or organisation for breathing, which are 
the interest of particular sciences. But the differences we have been con-
sidering are differences revealed to our minds in virtue of or in response 
to the various general attitudes which the mind assumes; and they may 
thus justly be described as the “particular ways in which non-mental ob-
jects exist in relation to the apprehending mind.”13 They are metaphysi-
cal distinctions, to which correspond the psychological differences of the 
activities by which we know them. It is for metaphysics to say what is the 
relation of the sensum to the perceptum or the cogitatum, all these being 
appearances of the object to which they belong. In particular, we want to 
know how sensation can be a character of things, and in the next place 
how thought can be another character. That there is something contrary 
to our common habits in treating sensation as an element of things must 
be admitted. But the difficulty arises from assuming that the simplest ele-
ments in the constitution of things must be qualities. Now qualities are 
permanent, and it would seem therefore that sensations, being less than 
qualities (for no one doubts that the sensation green is less than the quality 
greenness), sensations must belong not to the thing but to the apprehend-
ing mind But if sensations are declared, as by me, to be real appearances 
of things, what kind of appearances are they? 
Let us recall the surface distinctions between these various grades of 
reality. Sensations have a pungency which images miss, but they are rela-
tively momentary, and transitory, and isolated. Percepts are pungent and 
intrusive, like sensations, but they exhibit relative coherence and com-
plexity, and especially they exhibit permanence, and carry us by the use 
of prior experience into the past. This difference must not, however, be 
exaggerated into disparity. A persistent sensation from a permanent ob-
ject gives us a sensation of identity, so far as identity, that is numerical 
identity, can be sensed. And it can be sensed just as change can be sensed; 
and Hume, however much he may have failed to justify his statement, was 
surely right, when in his famous chapter on the continued existence of 
things, he referred the broken perception of things to the measure of direct 
experience of identity. We can therefore have sensation of identity, but it 
merely means persistence of sensation. When we come to perception, we 
have revealed to us, even in the simple perceiving of sense qualities, like 
13 Quoted by Mr. Stout, p. 240, from my previous paper.
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green or sweet, something which belongs to the past as well as to the pres-
ent. The intermediate stage between the mere persistence of an identical 
sensation and the perception of a quality which has permanence is found 
in the after-sensation, which gives us sensational persistence (identity) 
combined, it may be, with diversity, though in the absence of the stimulus, 
and with corresponding changes in the intensity of the sensation. They are 
metaphysically, as well as psychologically, a link between sensed qualities 
or percepts and sensed sensa, which are less than qualities. 
The contrasts of images and percepts need not be repeated here. On 
the other hand, thoughts have a distinctive character, which has made 
many separate them completely from the lower appearances. The thought 
(not, of course, the thinking) shares with the image its want of pungency, 
but differs from it in being relatively precise as compared with the shad-
owy haziness of the image, while, as compared with the sensation or per-
ception, it is highly permanent, and coherent, or organised. It is, in fact, 
the law of construction of the object, to which the percepts and images 
conform. 
What, then, does sensation mean as a character, not a quality, of an 
object? and, secondly, how can it be one character of an object along with 
percepts and thoughts? It is a safe rule of method to turn for guidance in 
difficulty to what we know best; and the thing we know best is our own 
mind, which we know not by observing it from without but by living 
through its life from within, and describing it in words. Now in ourselves 
we become aware of the difference between the isolated or relatively iso-
lated act, the complex and permanent disposition or habit, and, finally, 
the still more permanent and organised character, which runs like a thread 
through all our conations and gives them unity and coherence in all the 
complexity and diversity of their direction. Our activities are felt by us and 
known in the only way in which they can be known, as a continuum of 
activities, within which these, distinctions of relative fixity and complex-
ity and, it may be added, of pungency as well, are felt. The difference so 
much brought into prominence of late of the pungent emotional act and 
the persistent disposition or sentiment is an illustration, from the region of 
feeling proper. And it would not be difficult to refine upon the differences 
in the conative life which correspond to those established in the objects 
of cognition. What, then, prevents us from following the clue given into 
our hands by our own minds in order to guess the real nature of sensa-
tions and thoughts? If mind is the outcome of a higher physical organisa-
tion, and minds are, as they declare themselves to be, things in a world 
of things, we may take our experience of mind and, discounting what 
mind owes to its special prerogatives, apply our self-knowledge to make 
physical things clear. We shall not attribute to physical things mind, nor 
life, if the things are not alive; not even a lower grade of life or mind. But 
with this reservation, we can understand how the simplest elements in the 
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process by which things mark their place in time are sensations, which are 
the isolated acts in which the permanent qualities express themselves, as a 
habit expresses itself on occasion in an act. They are, to use a Leibnizian 
metaphor, fulgurations of the quality. To such a conception we oppose our 
habitual notion of qualities of material things as being somehow arrange-
ments and notions of whatever constituents we regard as ultimate. But it 
cannot be too often repeated for those who are likely to forget the lesson, 
that extension and motion or material substance are in themselves on the 
same immediate footing as colours and smells; that they, too, are made 
up of sensa and percepta and thoughts, and exhibit the same problem of 
presenting these features in their combination. If sensations are thus the 
elementary activities in the “life” of a physical thing, percepts represent 
their more permanent habits in action upon a body to which or to whose 
mind they are revealed, images are these same habits as acting in the past 
or projected in anticipation into the future, or revealed with or without 
distortion by foreign elements; while thought is the law of combination of 
qualities and of their action. 
If we ask how sensations and thoughts are alike appearances of things, 
the answer is found or hinted by following the same guidance. As habit 
grows out of act and expresses itself in act, so thought lies at the basis of 
sensation, is revealed after a process of sensational experience, and is con-
tinuous with sensation. The sensum may be revealed separately, but it is a 
sensational appearance of a thing which has as its law of construction and 
action that which is revealed to thinking. The sensation and the thought 
are equally aspects or appearance. Without law sensations or perceptual 
qualities would be isolated and incoherent. Without sensation law would 
be without pungency, it would not sting, it would not be realised in the 
direct action of thing on thing. We should have a world of things which 
would be entirely cut off from each other and owe the whole of their 
“life” to impulsion from within. Sense and thought are thus equally real, 
though thought, taking in as it does the whole range of a thing’s existence, 
and comprehending, let me add, the existence of many things of the same 
species (which obey the same law of construction or action), possesses in 
the constitution of things a far greater significance than sense. If I am right 
in assuming that for Plato the “ideas” are such laws of construction and 
of action, the error we may be compelled to put down to the account, even 
of Plato, is not that he assigned to “ideas” a real existence in fact (whereas 
as some think they have only validity and not being); for they have an 
undoubted existence in fact, and are the most important of all facts that 
we know. His error consisted in denying sense existence to be also real, 
and confusing their insignificance with want of reality; or to say the same 
thing in other words, in declaring “ideas” to be the one reality because 
they were the most significant features of it. 
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appearances and reality
It remains to add such remarks as are possible here upon the reality of ap-
pearances, as that distinction has been understood in this paper. The real-
ity is the continuous totality of its partial appearances, which appearances 
are themselves real in turn. How, it may be asked, is, in the first place, 
such a totality possible at all? and, secondly, how can a partial appearance 
be regarded as real, if it is only partial? Both questions are answered by 
making use of the clue which has been used already. In ourselves we live 
through a connected and continuous whole of life. And in ourselves the 
single activity does not cease to be actual because it is partial. The first 
fact indicates how there may be a whole which has varying appearances. 
And the appearances so spoken of are, it will be observed, actual features 
of themselves which things present to other things because of the angle 
from which they are seen. A column of soldiers has really a different ap-
pearance on the front and on the flank, and that difference shows itself in 
the different action of the front and the flank upon the enemy. A sewing 
needle used to sew up a dog’s wound pierces with the point and tears at 
the sides, and it is therefore humanely replaced by the surgical needle, 
which cuts at the side as well as piercing. The table not only is seen differ-
ently according to the position of the observer, but it is different and, as 
language puts it so expressively, it looks different. There is no further need 
to labour the point. When it is urged that a partial appearance cannot be 
real, what is meant is that it cannot be true. Its partial character falsifies it. 
The answer is that an appearance is not falsified by being partial unless it 
is illusory. An illusory appearance is, we have seen, actual but dislocated, 
and it betrays its illusory character by failing to cohere with the whole to 
which it belongs. Its falsity is not due to its partial character but to its in-
truded element of personality. A partial appearance remains real and true, 
though incomplete. A woman does not cease to be a woman because she 
is a mother. A king is not less a man because he is king. Connection with 
a larger whole does not necessarily remove the characters which a thing 
possesses before entrance into the whole. Accordingly a partial appear-
ance can only be regarded as false if it is taken by itself as being what it is 
as in the whole, as if, for instance, the king were treated as being a king 
apart from society, or as if we treated the triangularity of a pediment as 
involving a base of thirty-two feet, because a particular pediment happens 
to have a base of thirty-two feet; or contrariwise, if it is regarded as pos-
sessing a property incompatible with the extra qualities which it acquires 
in the whole, as if a person’s youth were apprehended as fixing a limit to 
his growth. Any appearance to be an appearance of a thing and not an il-
lusion or error must be precisely what it pretends to be. But so understood 
it remains in the whole, just what it is when taken by itself; but it may in 
its connection with the whole receive new determinations which He out-
side the appearance as it was taken when it appeared. 
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But these remarks are perhaps either too few or too many for a diffi-
cult subject. They are intended merely to indicate-further in what manner 
appearance as I have used the term is understood.14 Nor, to revert for a 
moment to the idea of a continuous totality, do I suppose that that idea 
can be fortified against attack by a simple reference to the fact that in our-
selves we live through such a totality. The answer can be made satisfying 
only when the alleged contradictions involved in the notion of a continu-
ous whole can be removed, or accounted for, as I do not doubt they will. 
It seemed impossible in a paper of this kind to avoid some treatment of 
these topics, however imperfect. But I hope they will not serve to divert 
the attention of readers from what is the main purpose of the paper, to 
expound the metaphysical truth of the non-mental character of the objects 
of cognition, and in particular of images.
14 This interpretation does not, of course, originate with me. 

T .  P E R C Y  N U N N
&
F .  C .  S .  S C H I L L E R
A r e  S e c o n d a r y  Q u a l i t i e s 
I n d e p e n d e n t  o f  Pe r c e p t i o n ? 
P R O C E E D I N G S  O F  T H E  A R I S T O T E L I A N  S O C I E T Y
V O L U M E  X
1 9 1 0
E D I T O R I A L  N O T E
Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller (1864-1937) was a German-British phi-
losopher. His philosophy is often aligned with the pragmatism of Wil-
liam James, though Schiller himself referred to it as “humanism.” He ar-
gued against both logical positivism  and absolute idealism (most notably 
against Bertrand Russell and F.H. Bradley, respectively). Schiller gained 
a first class degree in Literae Humaniores from Balliol College, Oxford. 
From 1893-1897 he was an instructor in philosophy at Cornell University, 
and in 1897 returned to Oxford to become fellow and tutor of Corpus, 
where he stayed for more than thirty years. He was treasurer of the Mind 
Association for many years, and in 1926 was elected a fellow of the British 
Society. He was an early supporter of evolution and a founding member of 
the English Eugenics Society.
Schiller was president of the Aristotelian Society from 1921 to 1922.
For Nunn’s biography, please scroll up to page 159.
The following paper - “Are Secondary Qualities Independent of Percep-
tion? A Discussion Opened by T. Percy Nunn and F.C.S. Schiller” - was 
originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New 
Series, Volume X (1909-1910), pp. 191-231.
328
X I .  A R E  S E C O N DA RY  Q UA L I T I E S 
I N D E P E N D E N T  O F  P E R C E P T I O N ?
A  d i s c u s s i o n  o p e n e d  b y 
T.   P E R C Y  N U N N  &  F.  C .  S.   S C H I L L E R
I .  T.  P E R C Y  N U N N
IT is important to make as clear as possible the sense in which I give an 
affirmative answer to this question. I will, therefore, begin by contrasting 
with certain well-known views the view which I wish to defend. 
(a) The first of these is the Lockean view, which not only has great his-
torical importance, but is still the creed of the average physicist and physi-
ologist. It has its most condensed and vigorous expression in the following 
passage of the Essay: “The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of 
the parts of fire or snow are really in them, whether any one’s senses per-
ceive them or no; and therefore they may be called real qualities, because 
they really exist in those bodies. But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness, 
are no more really in them than sickness or pain in manna. Take away the 
sensation of them; let not the eyes see light or colours, nor the ears hear 
sounds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell; and all colours, tastes, 
odours, and sounds, as they are such particular ideas, vanish and cease, 
and are reduced to their causes,  i.e., bulk, figure, and motion of parts.” To 
which pronouncement it must be added that “the ideas of primary quali-
ties of bodies are resemblance’s of them, and their patterns do really exist 
in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary 
qualities have no resemblance of them at all.” 
(b) The next is the Berkeleyan view that “those arguments which are 
thought manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the mind 
. . . may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, 
figure, and motion”; and that “the absolute existence of unthinking things 
without any relation to their being perceived . . . is . . . perfectly unintel-
ligible. Their esse is  percipi, nor is it possible that they should have any 
existence out of the mind or thinking things which perceive them.” 
(c) The third is the view which may be collected from two valuable 
papers for which this Society is indebted to Professor Stout.1 Mr. Stout 
accepts Berkeley’s contention that our “simple ideas” of primary and sec-
ondary qualities are psychical existents and as such have exactly the same 
status; but he also agrees with Locke in holding that they have a relation 
1 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1903-4 and 1908-9. They will be quoted as 
“first paper” and “second paper” respectively.
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to extra-mental realities. These extra-mental or “physical” existents in-
clude the secondary equally with the primary attributes of matter, which 
are in each case “correlated but not identical with intrinsic characters 
of sensation.” “The correlation is essentially of the same kind for both. 
Sensation enters into the constitution of the ... attributes only in so far as 
certain features of sense-experience represent something other than them-
selves, and it is only because this representative function is logically inde-
pendent of the actual occurrence and fluctuation of sense-affections that 
the primary qualities can be validly thought of as existing in the absence 
of percipients. We are justified in thinking of matter as extended and mov-
able in space before the existence of sentient being. But we have exactly 
the same justification for thinking of it as hot or coloured. Finally, the 
positive and specific nature of the primary qualities no less than that of the 
secondary is derived from corresponding sensations.”2 There is, however, 
a real and important difference between the two kinds of attributes: “The 
executive order of the material world can be expressed only in terms of 
the primary and not in terms of the secondary qualities of matter. . . . The 
system of uniformities of co-existence and sequence and of quantitative 
equivalences and correspondences which constitutes the order of physical 
nature in its causal aspect can be formulated only in terms of extension, 
motion, and tension.”3 
As against these views I propose to maintain (1) that both primary and 
secondary qualities of material bodies “are really in them, whether any 
one’s senses perceive them or no”; (2) that they exist as they are perceived; 
by which I mean that although (in Mr. Bradley’s phrase) “the qualities 
impart themselves never except under conditions,” yet these conditions 
do not affect the character of the qualities perceived; and (3) that sensa-
tions as mental entities exercising a “representative function” need not, 
therefore, be postulated.4 
the arguments for the psychical nature of sensations
The assumption of mental or psychical existents (as distinguished from 
the psychical processes whose occurrence constitutes a cognition) is the 
fundamentally important element in each of the doctrines which I have 
2 First paper, p. 147. 
3 First paper, p. 153.
4 In two notable Presidential Addresses Professor Alexander has lent his great ability and 
prestige to the defence of these same positions. Some of the following arguments can 
hardly fail to recall those which he has used with so much effect. For this reason it may be 
advisable to point out that I have an independent right to use them. They will be found to 
be either abstracts or obvious extensions of arguments brought forward in papers which 
I read to this Society in 1906 and 1908, and in a book (now out of print) on the Aims of 
Scientific Method (1907), all written before I was aware that Mr. Alexander was a sup-
porter of similar views.
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quoted. It will be well, therefore, to examine briefly the chief grounds 
for this assumption. They are to be found expressed most clearly in Mr. 
Stout’s papers. 
The first and most inclusive ground is that there are (apart from cona-
tion, attention, etc.) elements in experience whose being consists “only 
in being experienced.’’5 A toothache is regarded by Mr. Stout as so obvi-
ously a case of this kind that it is sufficient merely to call attention to it. 
“If our existence as conscious beings were annihilated it would eo ipso 
disappear, whatever might happen to our body.” Dream apparitions and 
hallucinations are almost equally easily disposed of. “Their beginning to 
appear to [the subject] and ceasing to appear to him are the beginning and 
cessation of their existence. If he were annihilated they would eo ipso be 
annihilated.” Such cases as the yellowness of buttercups or the greenness 
of grass are less obvious and demand argument. The proof that here also 
we are concerned with elements that exist only in being experienced is (in 
brief) that “the immediately experienced quality may vary when things 
seen remain unaltered.” For example, I do not impute to the buttercup the 
changes produced by contrast of colours or by the oncoming of twilight. 
In this first group of cases, the elements of experience under consider-
ation “belong to the objective rather than the subjective side of the sub-
ject-object relation,”6 and, as we have seen, the proof that they are psychi-
cal lies in the supposed fact that they “exist only in being experienced.” 
In another group of cases Mr. Stout bids us observe that sensations “are 
capable of being mentally presented without being objects at all.”7 Thus I 
may be “quite inattentive to words as articulate sounds . . . [and] attend 
only to the meaning they convey.” Or the “sympathetic excitement” in-
volving a whole complex of sensations of which he is “entirely heedless” 
may yet be the means by which the spectator of a football match enters 
into the experience of the players. “Sensations, then, may be in the proper 
sense subjective.” On the other hand, pleasure and pain, which are nor-
mally subjective, may, on occasion, be objective. Thus Ferdinand experi-
enced (subjectively) delight in the (objective) painfulness of carrying logs 
in the service of Miranda. Painfulness and sensations of sound, pressure, 
etc., may, then, alike appear either on the subjective or the objective side 
of the subject-object relation. We must assign them, therefore, to the same 
ontological status. “But no one . . . will maintain that pain is ever . . . any-
thing but a mental fact.” It follows that sensations are mental facts also. 
A discussion of these arguments will be the best introduction to an 
alternative doctrine. They all appear to involve the same major premise: 
“Anything which exists only in being experienced must be psychical.” It 
5 Second paper, p. 231-6.
6 Second paper, pp. 231.
7 Second paper, pp. 243-6.
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is true that in the second argument we are not told why nobody would 
maintain pain to be anything but a mental fact, but there seems to be no 
reason available except that its existence is dependent upon its being ex-
perienced. For Mr. Stout admits that a thing need not be psychical simply 
because it is not physical, and the form of his argument shows that he 
cannot here mean to maintain that a thing must be psychical if it can once 
be found on the subjective side of the subject-object relation. If, then, for 
the sake of argument, we grant this major premise, everything turns upon 
the truth of the minor premise: “Pain, sensations of colour, etc., exist only 
in being experienced.” 
It has already been noted that Mr. Stout offers no evidence for this 
statement in the case of pain. Yet to me, at any rate, it is by no means 
self-evident, and there seem to be considerations to urge against it. In the 
first place the painfulness of a toothache may present itself as a thing to be 
reckoned with as much as St. Paul’s Cathedral, although my experience of 
it, like my experience of St. Paul’s, may be transferred to the subject side of 
the subject-object relation if (for example) my interest is engrossed by the 
utterances of an eloquent preacher in the pulpit. It seems as fair to deduce 
from this that the pain is, like St. Paul’s, something outside my mind, with 
which my mind may come into various relations, as it is to deduce that 
the sensations due to the presence of St. Paul’s have, like the pain, merely 
a fleeting psychical existence. Again, experience of the toothache and of 
the cathedral depend in each case upon the fulfilment of certain physical 
conditions, and I am no more bound to suppose that the pain is snuffed 
out of being when I cease to feel it than I am to suppose that St. Paul’s is 
annihilated when I cease to see it. Indeed, there are occasions when the 
presence of the appropriate physical conditions gives me a positive reason 
for supposing that the toothache was “there all the time” though I did not 
feel it. When these physical conditions are, after an interval, restored, the 
“same pain” returns. On comparing notes with an acquaintance in whose 
body the same physical conditions exist, I find reason to believe that we 
both suffer the “same pain.” It is conceivable that the pains in these cases 
are the “same” in a sense identical with the sense in which one person 
at two different times, or two different persons at the same time may be 
seeing the “same” cathedral. The pain may from time, to time be drawn 
into individual experience from the kind of “cosmic reservoir” that has 
been suggested8 as a possible source of the abnormal knowledge present 
to the trance-consciousness of Mrs. Piper. Hallucinations of pain—that is, 
experiences of a certain pain in the absence of the lesion which normally 
conditions them—could, on such a hypothesis, be explained, like telepa-
thy and the other forms of telaesthesia that are believed to occur, as direct 
experiences of the object unmediated by the ordinary physical machinery. 
This explanation is easier than one which assumes a pain to be a psychi-
8 By Professor James, Proc. S.P.R., LVIII, p. 4.
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cal element normally called into existence only by the existence of certain 
physical conditions. 
I can see only one positive argument against the continued being of a 
pain outside experience. It might be contended that the pain of a tooth-
ache and sensations of colour and extension are of the same order of exis-
tence; that the latter are psychical because they are merely fleeting “repre-
sentatives” of abiding physical realities like St. Paul’s Cathedral; and that 
the former must, therefore, be a fleeting psychical existent. It is obvious 
that this argument would have no cogency for one who did not accept 
Mr. Stout’s view of the representative function of sensations. Moreover, 
it would from any point of view destroy the force of the contention that 
sensations of colour, extension, etc., must be psychical existents because 
they are on the same footing as pains which are undoubtedly psychical. 
The argument cannot be worked both ways at once. 
It would be impertinent to suggest that Mr. Stout’s thought has fol-
lowed this circular course. But in the absence of any reasoned support 
of the statement that pains exist only in being experienced I feel that the 
case of the “presentations of special sense” is the keystone of the deduc-
tive bridge over which Mr. Stout would lead us to the recognition of these 
psychical existents. His argument here is, as we have already noted, a 
modification of the one used by Locke to prove that secondary qualities 
are psychical and by Berkeley to prove that both primary and secondary 
qualities are purely psychical. A hot body yields different sensations of 
hotness at different distances; a buttercup gives different colour sensa-
tions when viewed by the margin of the retina instead of by the centre, or 
by twilight instead of by full daylight. But these differences do not imply 
changes in the hot body or in the buttercup. The sensations must, there-
fore, be psychical entities which exist only in being experienced. 
The validity of this conclusion obviously rests upon the truth of a defi-
nite assumption: that the hot body cannot at the same time own all the 
hotnesses that can be experienced around it, nor the buttercup at differ-
ent times the various colour qualities that may be “existentially present 
to consciousness when some one observes it.” Of this proposition, as of 
the proposition that pains exist only in being experienced, I venture to 
say that it is not self-evident, that certain considerations weigh against 
it, and that Mr. Stout has adduced no counterbalancing considerations 
in its favour. Upon Mr. Stout’s theory there are extra-mental qualities of 
the buttercup “correlated but not identical with” the various sensations. 
These sensations, each under a specific set of conditions of perception, 
“represent, express, or stand for something other than themselves”9 which 
is the actual extra-mental secondary quality of temperature or colour. Mr. 
Stout is emphatic that in exercising their representative function the sen-
9 First paper, p. 144. 
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sations really mediate knowledge of the extra-mental realities. The plain 
man “is convinced and rightly convinced that these objects are physical 
not mental.”10 But when we inquire into the nature of the qualities which 
the sensations represent and the grounds for the conviction that they are 
physical Mr. Stout’s reply is disappointing. It would seem that the reason 
why I say that I see a yellow buttercup when as a matter of fact the qual-
ity immediately presented is not yellow is that this quality represents to 
me the quality that would be presented under certain normal or standard 
conditions of perception. But, unless this normal presentation is identi-
cal with the physical secondary quality, how can it be said that the latter 
is “represented” by the actually occurring quality? For if one thing is to 
stand for or to represent another we must have direct knowledge both 
of the thing represented and of the symbol. But we are told that “what 
we call the colour of the external thing cannot be simply identified with 
any quality which is existentially present to consciousness when some-
one looks at it”11 It is true that we are also told, both of primary and 
of secondary qualities, that they are “derived” from the corresponding 
sensations; but, in face of the statement quoted in the last sentence, this 
“derivation” cannot mean such a relation between the physical attribute 
and a sensation that to have the latter immediately present to conscious-
ness is ipso facto to know the former. One is bound to conclude that the 
only representation which Mr. Stout has exhibited to us is the mutual rep-
resentation of sensations. Any one of these may not only be itself experi-
enced but in that experience may stand for, express or represent a definite 
series of others. But if at the same time we hold that a given sensation by 
this representation mediates knowledge of an extra-mental thing then it 
seems impossible to avoid identifying with this thing at least one member 
of the series for which the given sensation stands. That is, there is in each 
of these series at least one member that cannot be thought of as a fleeting 
psychical existent. Since there is no evidence to attach this prerogative to 
one rather than to another of the series it is safest to identify the physical 
attribute with the whole of them. 
origin of the belief in psychical sensations
It is not difficult to point to motives that have done much to secure for the 
belief in the psychical nature of sensations the position of an orthodoxy. 
The first is the motive of “economy of thought.” For practical purposes 
it is necessary to simplify in thought the limitless complexity of actual 
phenomena. Thus we come to think of one of the innumerable hotnesses 
that can be perceived in and about it as the real “temperature” of a warm 
body; the sensation which a buttercup yields under certain standard con-
ditions of perception becomes “the colour” of the flower. Other hotnesses 
10 Second paper, p. 229.
11 Second paper, p. 232.
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and other colours tend to lose their substantive character and are reduced 
to the status of signs of these. This process of simplification is not confined 
to common thought. The progress of science, while it reveals wider and 
deeper complexities in Nature at every stage, shews also that a conceptual 
simplification of its data is constantly becoming a more essential condi-
tion of theoretic success. The existence and importance of this tendency 
in physical science has no doubt had great influence in determining the 
philosopher’s cultivation of the same tendency in his department. Allied 
to this inveterate pragmatic habit is a prejudice not unlike the prejudice 
that has led some people to reject the idea of immortality on account of 
the appalling number of souls that would share it! Under its influence we 
are concerned at the enormous number of qualities with which Realism 
would endow the commonest body. By supposing these qualities to enjoy 
only a temporary existence in the mind of an observer we seem to effect a 
great economy of material and to clear Nature of the suspicion of reckless 
prodigality. 
In the next place there are certain experiences—my pains and plea-
sures, my memories and imaginations—which in some sense often belong 
to me alone and are not, like my perceptions of the physical environment, 
shared with other people. The objects of these experiences come, there-
fore, to be thought of as psychical, as part of my mind. But error and il-
lusion in the province of sense offer other examples of experiences whose 
essence it is to belong to me alone. When reflexion begins to work upon 
these experiences it readily follows the same method as in the province of 
physical phenomena. Just as the physicist seeks to reduce the whole of his 
universe to matter in motion, and to carry out this purpose feigns “con-
cealed masses” in movement where no movement is, in fact, verifiable; 
so the psychologist, starting with the belief that he has good reason to 
consider the objects of his errors as well as his feelings and images as parts 
of his “mind,” comes eventually to think of all the facts of experience in 
terms of hypostatised “states of consciousness,” even in cases where there 
is no pretence that these pieces of consciousness which have extra-mental 
objects are verifiable. In other words, the “mind” as we have it in ortho-
dox psychology is largely a methodological postulate—an expression of 
the need which a special science feels to reduce all its data for theoretical 
purposes to a common denominator. 
the alternative view
The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that the premises upon which 
the proof of the psychical nature of sensations rests are merely plausible 
assumptions or pragmatically useful postulates. They present, therefore, 
no insurmountable barrier to those who feel impelled to take another road 
than the one they mark out. 
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This road starts from the recognition that in perception the object an-
nounces itself as having a certain priority to and independence of our 
act and that this announcement is itself the sufficient certificate of the 
object’s extra-mental status. It is important to observe that Mr. Stout also 
admits,12 under the name “immediate inference,” an element in sensa-
tional experience which guarantees that we are dealing with extra-mental 
realities. This element is, in fact, implied by the statement that sensational 
qualities are the data of perception. If our sensations “could be known 
in pure isolation from aught else they would not be data.” “An isolated 
datum is a contradiction in terms.” There is no difficulty in accepting this 
principle. Divergence appears only in its application. For Realism as here 
conceived, the further truth which the sensation “reveals” is its own extra-
mental existence. For Mr. Stout the further truth is the existence of an 
extra-mental reality correlated but not identical with the sensational qual-
ity. No doubt sensational experience often guarantees the extra-mental 
existence of something more than the qualities which appeal to the special 
senses. Through sensational experience the subject may be brought into 
cognitive relations with the “thinghood” or real extra-mental nexus that 
unites the sensational qualities. But I can find no warrant for the statement 
that while the sensational experience gives adequate data for immediately 
inferring the extra-mental existence of “thinghood” it gives no reason for 
inferring also the extra-mental existence of the sensations themselves. It 
is apparently because Mr. Stout holds the opposite opinion that he feels 
entitled to object to Mr. Alexander’s appeal to the facts as irrelevant to the 
problem under discussion.13 To meet this objection I urge that the char-
acter of extra-mentality announces itself in and with reference to “that 
which is existentially present to my mind in perceiving physical things” 
as well as in the physical things which it is the means of my perceiving. 
It announces itself in the colour of the buttercup even when my eye has 
become so trained that the colour quality actually presented is no longer 
accepted as merely a symbol for a normal quality; it announces itself in 
all the hotnesses that I can feel at different distances from a fire, though in 
this case there is no normal quality of which they can be the symbols. In 
neither of these cases, nor in any comparable case, can I find in the experi-
ence itself any indication that I am dealing with temporary existents in my 
mind which “represent” the physical thing outside my mind. 
The path which I propose to follow from this starting point is de-
termined by a postulate offered as a substitute for the postulates of the 
orthodox view. That in the perception of a physical thing the subject is 
in relation with no psychical intermediary “on the object side” but with 
the thing or certain features of the thing itself—this seems not only to be 
a datum of the experience, but also to be part of the plain man’s view. 
12 First paper, p. 159.
13 Second paper, p. 229. 
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Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said when the object of the cognitive 
relation is an isolated quality—such as a smell or a colour—which is not 
a representation of a thing in the ordinary sense of the word at all. Care-
ful introspection and the plain man agree in pronouncing the object to be 
extra-mental—to be an entity capable of entering into the subject-object 
relation, but to be in its own character unaffected by the presence or ab-
sence of that relation. The postulate in question lays down that in philoso-
phising, though I may rectify and add to the plain man’s view, I must not 
contradict or explain away any essential positive features of it. I venture to 
make it clear (repeating what I have said elsewhere) that by the plain man 
I do not mean any particular species or variety of the genus Homo, but a 
being included in the wider self of each of us. The plain man is the original 
stock upon which the psychologist, the physicist or the metaphysician is 
grafted; and it is he who, while he supports and nourishes this more or 
less desirable parasitic growth, still conducts those activities that form the 
common core of human life from China to Peru. To say that the positive 
features of his view of the world must be preserved is to express the belief 
that his vitality supplies everywhere the data upon which departmental 
activities—such as those of science and philosophy—operate, and that if 
those activities lead to results contradictory to the plain character of the 
data from which they start, they are pursuing a course which must end in 
futility if not unintelligibility. 
The systematic application of the principle that what is existentially 
present to the mind in perception is something extra-mental—something 
that would be as it is in perception even if it were not perceived—soon 
leads to results which do not form part of the plain man’s view, simply be-
cause they are matters of departmental interest. These may be approached 
by other results which probably do form part of his view. Thus every one 
holds that there are things which “have” one colour by day and another 
by artificial light. In such cases neither colour is taken as a symbol of the 
other; they are accepted as co-ordinate substantive features of the thing, 
each presented to perception in the appropriate circumstances. It is easy 
to see that the yellow buttercup is simply a pragmatically simplified case 
of the same kind. The buttercup actually owns all the colours that may 
be presented under different conditions, though in actual experience most 
of them are liable to be degraded to the position of symbols of those pre-
sented under normal conditions. 
But more difficult cases soon present themselves. Imagine a number of 
persons spread along the circumference of a large semicircle while a mo-
tor car from which a whistle of constant pitch is sounded moves rapidly 
along the road which forms the diameter. Then, as is well known, not 
only will each person at a given moment hear a note different from the 
notes heard by his companions, but the note heard by each is different for 
different positions of the car. Moreover the occupants of the car will hear 
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all the time a steady note which, except momentarily, is heard by none of 
the bystanders. Are we to maintain that all these diverse notes are being 
simultaneously “emitted” by the whistle? With a proper interpretation 
of the word “emitted” I believe that we can and must answer, Yes. The 
experience of hearing a note seems to me to contain as part of itself the 
announcement that the note is extra-mental—that it is, so to speak, there 
to be heard. Since this is true of each of the notes—none of which presents 
itself with a certificate of superiority over the others—I accept the conclu-
sion that the creation of this multiplicity of notes to be heard is part of the 
phenomenon which is called blowing the whistle. If, for example, the note 
happens to be so high in pitch that it lies outside the limits of A’s audition, 
while B, who is standing beside him, continues to hear it, then it seems to 
me just as certain that the note is really there for A to hear if he could but 
hear it as it might be in another case that there was a pin on the floor for 
him to see if only (like the sharper-sighted B) he could distinguish it. 
I have said that in connexion with this case the word “emitted” must 
receive a proper interpretation. It refers naturally to the pragmatically 
simplified view in which the whistle is thought of as yielding its note under 
certain standard conditions—namely when whistle and hearer are both 
stationary. This view must be rectified by the aid of the science of acous-
tics. The thing that is really sounding is the air, the whistle being concerned 
merely in setting up a definite type of aerial wave-motion. (If we substitute 
a bell for the whistle, bell and air together constitute the sounding thing.) 
If at any point a given number of “air waves” reach the ear in a second 
then there is correlated with that “frequency” a definite note to be heard. 
The air vibrations do not con stitute the “reality” of which the note heard 
is merely an appearance or mental effect. The same thing can be said of 
the phenomena that occur along the line from the tympanum to the cortex 
of the brain. Both kinds of phenomena are undoubtedly events that hap-
pen, but they happen as well as the occurrence of the note, and are merely 
the ordinary accompaniments of its perception. I insert the word “ordi-
nary” here because I hold that hallucinations can be interpreted quite as 
fairly as evidence of the independent status of sounds as of their psychical 
character. As in the case of hallucinations of pain auditory hallucinations 
may at least in some cases be due to the setting up of cognitive relations 
directly between the subject and a sound without the intervention of the 
usual physical and physiological machinery. If (as seems possible) auditory 
hallucinations are occasionally veridical this evidence would, I think, be a 
good deal strengthened. Moreover, as we shall see later, normal psychol-
ogy has been thought to give evidence for the view that we may have sen-
sations unmediated by material events of the ordinarily appropriate kind 
or by stimulus of the ordinarily appropriate organ. 
The case of the hotnesses perceived round a body of high temperature 
is still more complicated, for here the condition of the part of the body 
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that acts as perceiving organ partly determines the object to be perceived. 
As the condition of this organ changes during the observation the hot-
nesses observed will change also. These facts are not to be interpreted as 
proving that the hotnesses existentially present to the mind are psychical, 
but they do show that the plain man’s view of a hot thing requires rectify-
ing and supplementing. Not only must the thing be thought of as owning 
an indefinite number of hotnesses disposed spatially about it; it must also 
be recognised that the disposition of these hotnesses depends in part upon 
the hotnesses belonging at every moment to neighbouring bodies. Both 
of these ideas are in principle familiar to physical science as well as to 
metaphysics. Physical bodies are not isolated reals, each wearing its own 
qualities without any regard to the condition of any other body. In certain 
cases, capable of empirical determination, bodies reciprocally “take note” 
(in Lotze’s phrase) of one another’s condition, and express this notice in 
their own states. Again a thing must not be thought of as limited by a 
precise spatial boundary. It may be necessary to think of it as filling an in-
definite part of the material universe. The thing need not on that account 
cease to be a definite real complex of primary and secondary qualities 
which could be conceived to be with drawn from the universe as a whole. 
With this corrected view of the scope of the word «thing» we can at-
tack the interpretation of other cases of perception. If I look at a distant 
ship through a telescope or at an insect through a microscope I “see” 
the objects by means of sensations that I could not acquire by the naked 
eye. No special question of the relation of the sensations is thought to be 
raised here, because the information given is congruent with information 
afforded to other senses or to the naked eye under other conditions. But if 
I look at a straight stick in water I obtain sensations which are not congru-
ent with those given to another sense or to the visual sense in the absence 
of the water. 
All these cases are really in equal need of the application of the wider 
concept of the “thing.” There are relations between the ship or the insect 
and the lenses of the instrument which, on a sufficiently strict view, must 
be thought of as making a difference to the object observed. It just hap-
pens that the difference is perceptible only from the point of view of the 
observer at the eye-piece. In this respect the case differs from what would 
happen if we directed a rod of iron towards a coil conveying an electric 
current: for the difference here would be observable from many points of 
view. There is, nevertheless, in the cases considered, an equally genuine 
difference made in the thing; for the disposition of its visual characters is 
changed. The case of the stick in water is complicated by the fact that the 
change in the disposition of the visual characters produces effects which 
in normal cases would belong to a bent stick. There is, however, no reason 
on this account to doubt the pronouncement of the experience that the 
visual qualities characteristic of the modified thing before us have a real 
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extra-mental status. 
error and illusion
At this point it will be convenient to direct the discussion to the question 
of Error, which is generally supposed to offer peculiar difficulties to such a 
theory as the one here outlined. If in sensational experience you are merely 
reading off the facts about extra-mental realities, how (it is asked) can 
sensations ever lead you astray? Yet the existence of error and illusion is a 
fact that we constantly have occasion to acknowledge. 
Without professing to have a completely satisfactory answer to this 
objection, we may do much, upon the view I am defending, to limit the 
field of its application. Many of the stock examples can be shown not to 
be cases of error or illusion in any sense that constitutes a stumbling block 
to a realist theory. Thus, if I identify the note of an engine whistle as up-
per C when the note “really” emitted is C sharp, my “error” may be due 
either to my ignorance that the engine was moving away from me at the 
rate of 44 miles per hour, or to my ignorance that this circumstance would 
make any difference to the sound heard. But although, owing to my hav-
ing insufficient data before me, or to my lack of knowledge of their rel-
evance, I may entertain a wrong belief about the whistle, my failure does 
not falsify the guarantee of extra-mental reality that my perception of the 
sound gives. We may deal similarly with the mistakes in matching colours 
made by a normal person in artificial light or by a colour-blind person in 
daylight. There is no error or illusion here, in the sense of an attribution 
to the things of colours that they do not really own. The full extent of 
the mistake consists in ignorance that the colours which agree when seen 
under the given conditions of perception would not agree under other 
conditions of perception. In the case of the colour-blind person there is the 
additional circumstance that physiological conditions may never permit 
perception of the colour which in the pragmatically simplified concept of 
the thing is thought of as its “true” colour. In the same way there is no dif-
ficulty in the case of the water which appears warm to A and cold to B. To 
me it seems true, not only that both the warmth and the coldness are re-
ally experienced, but also that, under the appropriate conditions, both are 
there to be experienced. Error need consist in no more than one observer’s 
ignorance that the other observer is not necessarily in cognitive relations 
with the same extra-mental reality as himself. Unlike Mr. Stout, I can find 
no more “contradiction” in the simultaneous attribution of the warmth 
and coldness to the same water14 than in the simultaneous attribution to it 
of warmth and acidity. Only empirical experience can decide what quali-
ties it is possible, and what it is impossible, for a body to wear together, 
and we must admit that experience shows that warmth and coldness sim-
14 Second paper, p. 238.
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ply are not among the qualities which exclude one another. It is true that 
I may not think of the same part of the water as having more than one 
“temperature.” But the temperature, thought of as the “real” state of hot-
ness or coldness of the body, is a concept of merely pragmatic validity. It 
is a symbol for the totality of the experiences of hotness and coldness ob-
tainable from the water at the moment in question, each under its proper 
conditions of perception. Obviously there would be a contradiction in 
supposing this totality to have simultaneously two different expressions, 
but there is no contradiction in supposing its single expression to consist 
in a variety of details. It may be added that the use of a thermometer 
to determine temperatures rests upon the fact that with some substances 
(though not with all) there is a one-one correlation between their volumes 
under a given pressure and the totalities which are properly to be thought 
of as the temperatures of the substance. 
In the case of the “straight staff bent in a pool” there is, again, no il-
lusion with regard to the visual appearance. It does not merely appear to 
be bent: it is bent. Error here can only take the form of inferring a cor-
relation between visual and tactual and other experiences which does not 
exist. This error may spring either from ignorance that the staff is partly 
in water, or from ignorance of the visual aspects belonging to a straight 
staff in these circumstances. The staff in water is (as was said before) not 
really the same thing as it was out of the water. Certain characters of the 
new thing are identical with those of the old, but its visual characters are 
changed. They are not reduced to a chaos, but a fresh set of experiences 
would be necessary to give a posteriori knowledge of the correlation be-
tween them and the other characters. I can see only one serious objection 
to this account. It is that the visual characters of the staff under water are 
not in the same place as the tactual characters. At first sight this fact is 
undoubtedly a difficulty to a realist who believes—as a realist probably 
must do—that even if there are divers mutually exclusive spaces, yet the 
visual and tactual characters of a physical thing must be in one and the 
same space. It is, however, not insurmountable. There are many familiar 
instances in which different characters of a body occupy different parts of 
the same space. For example, the magnetic characters of a piece of iron 
are not all found in the same place as its chemical characters. We may thus 
legitimately suppose that in the case of another special form of physical 
thing—a straight staff in water—the visual characters and the tactual oc-
cupy different positions. This explanation covers also the important cases 
of the object seen through a magnifying glass or telescope, and the still 
more common case of an object seen by reflexion in an ordinary mirror. In 
all these we have visual characters which are undoubtedly corre lated with 
tactual characters but occupy different parts of the same physical space. 
It is pertinent to note in this connexion that it has been thought pos-
sible to explain some well-evidenced cases of apparitions only on the hy-
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pothesis that the visual unaccompanied by the tactual and other charac-
ters of a dead or absent person were really occupying a definite position 
in space before the observer.15 Whatever value such an explanation has in 
these cases it is instructive to find it proffered from the point of view of 
empirical science by a thinker whose aim is, not to construct a metaphysi-
cal system, but merely to understand a certain group of facts. 
more difficult cases of illusion 
The foregoing cases of error and illusion offer, I think, no real difficulty 
to the theory of this paper, because, though they imply incomplete knowl-
edge and (therefore) false inferences, they do not involve internal discrep-
ancy in the content guaranteed by perception. There is no evidence to 
contradict the statement which the facts give us about themselves. Any 
such evidence consists merely in deductions from presumptions for which 
no proof has been offered—presumptions which may, like Euclid’s last 
axiom, be denied without resulting inconsistency. Our theory has a hard-
er task when it faces genuine cases of perceptual illusion—that is, cases 
where sensational experience seems to guarantee the existence of things 
that nevertheless can be proved not to exist. A realistic theory cannot live 
upon the principle that there is an element in sensational experience which 
pronounces authoritatively that we are dealing with extra-mental data, 
but that sometimes when this pronouncement is given the data are not 
extra-mental after all The demonstration of the occurrence of such cases 
would necessitate either the withdrawal or the radical modification of the 
theory. 
Before examining instances which threaten the realist with these un-
pleasant alternatives I wish to draw attention to certain considerations of 
importance. The first is the consideration pressed by Mr. Bradley when 
he was entering upon the discussion of the same problem. Realism is not 
bound to explain the whole of the facts of error and illusion. “A general 
doctrine is not destroyed by what we fail to understand. It is destroyed 
only by what we actually do understand, and can show to be inconsistent 
with the theory adopted.”16 Why error and illusion are “permitted” (to 
use the old phrase) is a problem that no system of philosophy has solved. 
It must suffice if we can show that their phenomena can be described in 
terms that do not imply a contradiction of our main theory. 
The second consideration is that although the full explanation of error 
and illusion is more interesting to Realism it is not actually more impor-
tant than in other philosophies. No matter what form a system gives to 
the concept of Reality the specific quality of perceptual experience is an 
15 Myers, Human Personality, Chap. VI.
16 Appearance and Reality, Chap. XVI.
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element which it is illegitimate to disregard. We may minimise its value, 
but an explanation of its existence and distribution is an indis pensable 
part of a theory of experience which promises to cover, even in outline, all 
the ground. But such an explanation of the distribution of the sensational 
quality demands a better account of error than is given (for example) by 
either of the prevailing philosophies. In Absolutism as represented by Mr. 
Bradley we learn that the existence of error and illusion causes no diffi-
culty, because every affirmation made by a finite mind about a finite sub-
ject suffers from the need of supplementing and rearrangement in which 
error consists. But although in this way Absolutism avoids the necessity of 
treating error it has not explained it. The difference between the relations 
to reality of the judgment “It is raining” when in one case it is raining, and 
in another it is not, is the specific difference that calls for explanation. To 
show that the two judgments merely represent different degrees of untruth 
is to avoid, not to proffer an explanation of this difference. 
Similarly with Pragmatism. The sensational quality has become at-
tached (we may suppose) to certain types of presentations as the mark 
of a peculiar relevance to universal human purposes. I may act success-
fully upon the perception that a friend is approaching in a way and for 
purposes not possible if I merely called up a visual image of his approach. 
If my reaction to the perception does not lead to the normal satisfactory 
results the perception was erroneous. This idea, when expanded, leads to 
a very illuminating psychological description of error and illusion, but it 
leaves quite unexplained how a feature of such immense epistemological 
importance as the sensational quality can be misplaced, and attempts no 
estimate of the metaphysical significance of the misplacement. It is impos-
sible to judge of the adequacy of a system of first principles before it has 
come to grips with this dangerous and treacherous problem. The special 
disadvantage from which Realism suffers is not that success here is more 
vital to it than to its rivals, but that it must be gained at an earlier moment 
in its career. 
It may be added that perceptual error seems to offer in Mr. Stout’s 
theory precisely the same difficulties that it offers to the theory proposed 
in this paper. The differentia of sensational experience is that it presents 
me with data from which I may infer immediately the presence of an ex-
tra-mental existent or physical body. But how can this account be true if 
sometimes (as in hallucination) when sensational data are given the infer-
ence is incorrect? It would be equivalent to an admission that although 
“Some Q’s are P’s” is an immediate inference from “All Fs are Q’s,” yet in 
certain cases the conclusion does not follow. Either the immediate infer-
ence must always hold good or else there is no inference at all, but merely 
such a “coefficient of correlation” between the presence of certain sensa-
tions in my mind and the spatial presence of certain physical things, that 
in most cases, when I have the sensations, it is a safe shot to guess that 
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the physical thing is at hand. But if there is merely this external relation 
between sensation and thing we are obviously brought back to the old 
puzzle of how we know anything about the thing at all. 
It is clear, again, that Mr. Stout’s theory does not escape the difficulties 
presented by illusion (as distinguished from hallucination). He does not 
maintain that my immediate inference from sensational data assures me 
merely that an extra-mental reality is present. He conceives it as going at 
least some way towards the specification of that reality. That is clear from 
the statement that we know  (i.e., immediately infer) the circular body 
to remain unchanged, though we may have a vast number of different 
views of it. If, then, Mr. Stout “recognises” a person as a friend, and sub-
sequently finds that he has addressed an entire stranger, he is confronted 
with exactly the same difficulty as the realist who rejects intra-mental sen-
sations. The very being of sensations is to yield immediate inferences of a 
certain class—a class which must be taken to include the recognition of 
different human forms when we meet them. Nevertheless, here is a case in 
which the immediate inference is wrong. How can this result be reconciled 
with the original view of the relation between sensation and extra-mental 
reality? 
A large number of ordinary cases of perceptual error can be brought 
in part under the heading of inadequate discrimination. It is universally 
known that attention, and above all practice, may make an immense dif-
ference to the number of data which I can discriminate from one another 
in any sense-field. We must infer from this fact that, although the experi-
ence guarantees the extra-mentality of the data as far as discrimination 
goes, it always fails to discriminate, and so leaves unasserted, some fea-
tures of the object which (we may believe) are yet there to be sensed. The 
difficulty of discrimination is greater as the intensity of the sense-qualities 
diminishes, until at length it may become impossible to recognise with 
certainty that the sense-quality is really present. It becomes impossible, for 
example, to discriminate between a very feeble illumination and a visual 
image. It is probably untrue to say here that the experience’s pronounce-
ment of its own character is illusory; it is the nature of the pronouncement 
itself which is in doubt. When in this case there is a strong external bias in 
favour of one pronouncement rather than the other a genuine illusion may 
occur. This was the case, for example, with M. Blondlot and the N-rays. In 
such cases the observer does not really ascertain the verdict of the experi-
ence at all; he substitutes for the actual data a construction more or less 
different from the data, but either wholly or in part suggested by them. He 
proceeds to use this substituted experience without further inquiry, just as 
if he had consulted its verdict upon the character of its contents. There are 
in normal psychology many instances of this tendency which approach il-
lusion more or less closely. As is well known, a young child, in drawing a 
profile picture of a man on horseback, will not only give the animal credit 
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for all the limbs which he knows it to possess, but will treat the rider with 
equal generosity in respect of his eyes and his legs. Yet the intention of 
the artist was to picture man and beast as he actually saw them. It is by 
no means uncommon to find unsophisticated children of a considerably 
greater age who, if they have a tendency to left-handedness, will produce 
of an animal with his head towards the right a picture showing the head 
turned to the left. They mean to draw the animal as they see it, and, until 
the discrepancy is pointed out, are not aware of its existence. Doubtless 
they have constantly substituted for the sensational data an imaginary 
construction suggested by them, a construc tion better adapted than the 
original to guide the work of the pencil. Through the very fact that it is 
used as the guide to action it is temporarily believed in, though careful 
inspection at once shows that it is only a substitute for the real sensational 
data. Most of the common cases of perceptual misinterpretation receive a 
similar explanation. The sensational data actually guarantee the presence 
of certain extra-mental characters, but before these have been adequately 
discriminated the object is replaced by a mental construction whose ele-
ments are more or less congruent with the actual data, and whose con-
nexion with our previous experience and our interests qualifies it to direct 
action effectively. The details of this construction are not examined from 
the point of view of their character, but it is assumed that they have the 
sensational character attached to the original data until the results that 
follow from this unconscious assumption cease to be compatible with it. A 
more careful examination of the data follows and at once dispels the illu-
sion. It should be noticed that this tendency to replace original sense data 
by a mental construction (or “hypothesis”) which forms a readier guide 
to practical or theoretical activity is in another form the characteristic of 
physical science. In the opinion of some critics of science the practical suc-
cess of the mental construction here also leads to something very much 
like illusion.
Hallucinations form a more difficult subject of inquiry, but it is pos-
sible that the difficulty arises largely from our lack of reliable introspective 
knowledge of them. In some cases, for example, the sensational quality 
may be absent from the data, and we may have merely another case of a 
construction of intra-mental origin which comes to determine action as 
if it had been based upon sensational data. In other cases—such as many 
well-attested apparitions and hallucinations of sound (e.g., the daemon 
of Socrates and the “voices” of Joan of Arc)—the evidence at least war-
rants the speculation that real sensational visual and auditory characters 
are directly cognised without the help of the ordinary mediating machin-
ery. In yet other cases the theory of Dr. Boris Sidis17 may prove a way of 
escape from the difficulties of the situation. Upon this theory we must 
distinguish in normal perception between the primary sensations which 
17 Psychological Review, Vol. 15, pp. 44 and 106.
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result from the actual stimulus of a sense-organ, and form the core of the 
perceptual experience, and the fringe of secondary sensations, reminiscent 
of former experiences, which form the “complication” of the former. In 
an hallucination there is no primary sensation, but a fringe of secondary 
sensations is excited, and therefore gives the whole abnormal experience 
a character which is taken as sensational. If Dr. Sidis’ distinction between 
primary and secondary sensa tions can be maintained, it would follow that 
only the former could be regarded as evidencing the physical presence of a 
quality. The latter, though nearer in quality to primary sensations than to 
images, must yet, no doubt, be distinguished from the former by careful 
discrimination. They may, for example, be somewhat analogous to after-
images and the light seen on pressing the eyeball—phenomena which are 
quasi-sensational in character, and may by inadvertence be thought to 
give the guarantees of genuine sensation, yet can with attention be easily 
discriminated from such sensations. 
There are other forms of illusion and error which in a complete re-
view would demand treatment. Possibly, enough has been said to indicate 
ways in which in the most important cases the existence of error can be 
reconciled with the theory that sensational experience carries with it a 
guarantee of the extra-mentality of its content. A more detailed consider-
ation would probably prejudice the case for this view by the importation 
of elements of weakness due not to the nature of the view itself but to the 
inadequacy of the apologist. 
the difference between primary and secondary qualities 
In conclusion, I should like to speak very briefly about the view expressed 
by Mr. Stout that the important difference between primary and second-
ary qualities is that “the executive order of the material world can be 
expressed only in terms of the primary and not in terms of the secondary 
properties of matter.” While, on the whole, this statement is no doubt true, 
and does correctly describe the difference between primary and secondary 
qualities, yet it is not true absolutely, and the recognition of exceptions 
should do much to rehabilitate the reputation of secondary qualities in the 
eyes of those who tend to regard them as merely subjective consequences 
of the causal action of the primary qualities. As I have tried elsewhere to 
show18—following the most competent critics—no attempt to present all 
physical phenomena as cases of matter in motion has been really success-
ful, and the concept of temperature and the properties of temperature are 
still essential elements in the description which science gives of the ex-
ecutive order of the world. This consideration taken with others suggests 
that the real source of the supremacy of the primary qualities in physical 
science is the readiness with which their determinations submit to correla-
18 Aims of Scientific Method, Chap. IV, esp. pp. 112-122.
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tion with the number series, and to the peculiarity which makes it possible 
in their case to adopt the device called measurement. Only in the case of 
temperature has it hitherto been found possible to submit to numbering 
and measurement concepts based upon secondary qualities. Hence it fol-
lows that among these qualities temperature alone enters into the formu-
lation of the executive order of the world. 
 
I I .  F.  C .  S.  S C H I L L E R
LITTLE did I anticipate a year ago that my incautious willingness to be 
second to Dr. Nunn would commit me to a discussion of all the fundamen-
tal issues which are raised in his most lucid and forcible paper, which im-
presses me as the most effective presentment of the case for Realism which 
I know. I feel keenly, therefore, that the proper respondent in this discus-
sion was indubitably Professor Stout,19 and not one to whom the terms 
idealism and realism have long ceased to convey any definite meaning, 
the first because it has become too ambiguous, and the second because its 
champions have not yet succeeded in expressing what it means, though it 
is clear that of late they have really been thinking furiously, in a way that 
contrasts most pleasingly with the intellectual paralysis of idealism. And 
I am the more reluctant to act as the antithesis to Dr. Nunn’s thesis that I 
have really no quarrel with Realism as such. I am quite willing to believe 
it, if in any of its forms it will only tell me clearly what precisely it wants 
me to believe. Hitherto I have not been told; but Dr. Nunn is so clear-
headed that a discussion with him may go far to clear up my perplexities 
as to what Realism really means. 
i.
Let me begin therefore with a string of questions, and ask him to tell us 
what he means by his terms, especially those he has not defined. 
(1) First of all, what does independent mean to a realist? Until its 
meaning is ascertained, the meaning of Dr. Nunn’s thesis must remain 
conjectural. I hope, therefore, that the question is not as unanswerable as 
it has proved to be to the idealists, to whom I have now for some years 
addressed it in vain.20 The question moreover is particularly pertinent to 
Realism and indeed even vital For unless an intelligible sense can be as-
signed to independent, it collapses on the threshold of its career. 
19 Who, however, may I hope be present to deal with that part of Dr. Nunn’s paper 
which is addressed to him.
20 Cf. Studies in Humanism, p. 95; Arist. Soc. Proc, 1909, p. 87 f. Mr. O. C. Quick 
(Mind, No. 74, p. 223) quite rightly notices the popular use of the term, and admits its 
ambiguity, but goes on using it. Surely as soon as an ambiguity has been detected, techni-
cal philosophy should insist on discrimination.
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More particularly it would be instructive to elicit Dr. Nunn’s answer 
to the question whether independence does, or does not, exclude relation. 
If (a) it does, does not the independent inevitably become unthinkable? If 
(b) it does not, how are relations which destroy independence to be dis-
tinguished from those that do not, and will Realism kindly publish a list 
of relations which are compatible with  independence? I should venture 
to anticipate that the second alternative will have to be the one adopted, 
but that the distinction between the two sorts of relations may not be al-
together easy to establish. 
Still greater difficulties, however, seem to lurk in the question of the 
relation of independence to cognitive activity. Of course the crudest form 
of realism will at once answer that it denies all cognitive activity. Reality 
imposes itself on the mind (if there is a mind) vi et armis. But Dr. Nunn’s 
realism is by no means crude, and his opinion is the more valuable to 
elicit. Let me ask him, therefore, whether he thinks it possible to hold that 
into what can properly be called independent “fact” there has entered any 
human contribution or construction, due e.g. to attention, habituation, 
discrimination, selection, etc. If (a) he answers No, he will have to give 
us an example of such an absolutely independent fact; and I fear that so 
skilled a psychologist may find it extremely difficult to find a fact wholly 
purged of every taint of “mental” activity. If (b) he answers Yes, he will 
have once more to indicate the point at which “facts” begin to depend on 
human activities. 
(2) What does Dr. Nunn mean by extra-mental? And how is it related 
to transcendent? Does he mean to use it in a common-sense way or in a 
metaphysical? Is it something which transcends experience in general or 
only extends beyond the experience of the moment? Would he admit that 
in the latter case it only means “in space,” and may comfortably remain 
immanent in experience and transcend only the limits of the “mental,” as 
psychology has found it convenient to define it? In short, is he conceiving 
“extra-mentality” from the standpoint of the metaphysician, of the plain 
man, or of the psychologist? 
I inquire chiefly because, in the past, realisms have been extremely 
confused on the subject. But I cannot say that Dr. Nunn’s paper makes 
its standpoint entirely clear to me. I am puzzled, in particular, to under-
stand why, if he holds (as it seems to me, rightly) that “mind in orthodox 
psychology is largely a methodological postulate” (p. 200), he should not 
conceive “extra-mentality” as an equally relative postulate. Surely if this 
aperçu pursued, the meaning of “extra-mentality” will be found to vary 
according as it is taken from the standpoint of the “plain man,” of the 
psychologist, and of the metaphysician, so that what is quite properly 
taken to be “in space” by one, e.g., a hallucinatory sound by its victim, is 
as properly labelled as subjective by the psychologist, without thereby fall-
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ing out of the totality of reality, as the metaphysician loves to conceive it. 
(3) I would next inquire whether Dr. Nunn’s realism does not owe us a 
further account of “the subject-object relation.” Does he, or does he not, 
hold that the existence of this relation suffices of itself to constitute the 
object’s “reality” in a realistic sense? 
If (a) he does, of what nameable thing can reality be denied? How can 
anything be too fantastic or illusory to be an object to some subject? More-
over, does not the “proof” of Realism become child’s play, and conduct us 
to the humorous conclusion that the same fact, namely, the existence of a 
perceived world, is appealed to by Idealism to prove the “dependence” of 
all reality on a knower and by Realism to prove its “independence”? 
(b) If, on the other hand, we recognise that this formal objectivity of 
every object of thought as such is not sufficient to constitute its reality in 
the realistic sense nor what common sense means by “reality,” is not Real-
ism confronted with a further problem of great complexity and enormous 
vital importance? 
The various kinds of formal objects or reality-claims have still to be 
sorted out, and its proper index of reality has to be assigned to each. 
Discriminations must be made between the “reality” of a dream, of a hal-
lucination, of a memory, of an image, of an after-image, of a “primary” 
quality, and of a “secondary,” of a “thing,” of a fiction, of conflicting ex-
periences, of a physical, of a metaphysical, and of a religious hypothesis, 
etc. These discriminations are, in point of fact, made with considerable 
precision by the “plain man,” and by the working methods of the sciences, 
though in certain directions both require further refinement. But the real-
ist’s undiscriminating haste to affirm the reality of the objects of thought 
seems as a rule to overlook all this. And can he suppose that all the dis-
tinctions which, with infinite pains, men have effected were made without 
good reason, out of sheer perversity) or for the mere fun of the thing? If 
not, where would be the gain, either to ordinary life or to science, or in the 
end even to philosophy, in obliterating all this work and simply replunging 
all discriminated objects into the rag-bag he labels “reality”? 
It may be that some of the words used in these vital discriminations, 
such as “mental” and “psychical,” are not the best available; but what 
does this matter so long as they are useful for classifying objects, and if 
they are, are their defects worth making such a fuss about? 
(4) I have already indicated that I have some difficulty in ascertaining 
from what standpoint Dr. Nunn is speaking, and on what plane his discus-
sion moves:— 
(a) At times he is clearly speaking for the “plain man,” whom he rightly 
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describes as a delightfully pragmatic creature (p. 203). But surely, on this 
plane, what is “outside “ “me” is simply “in space.” The plain man’s mind 
harbours no antithesis of “mind” and “matter,” but is glad when it can 
distinguish even “soul” and “body”; while, as for what “extra-mental” 
means, the plain man knows as little as I. 
(b) Dr. Nunn accordingly soon involves him in perplexities, and sub-
jects his plain humanity to psychological sophistication. The plain man 
is a thinker only in order to be a doer, his thought is full of “pragmati-
cal simplifications” which ignore irrelevant differences. Dr. Nunn cannot 
stomach his rough and ready ways. Rather than let him say that the motor 
car’s whistle sounds differently to different people, he insists that it may 
be said to “emit” the same sound, if only the word “emit” is “properly in-
terpreted” (p. 204). And subsequently it appears also that the plain man’s 
view of the scope of the word “thing” has to undergo serious “correction” 
(p. 206). Clearly Dr. Nunn’s realism is not the pragmatic realism of the 
“plain man” which we all practise. 
(c) Lastly, what about the metaphysical plane to which Realism usually 
aspires to soar? Dr. Nunn mercifully says little about it, but it is implied in 
calling his doctrine “realistic.” 
How many planes, therefore, are necessary to Dr. Nunn’s flights? His 
vehicle does not seem to be a monoplane, but whether it is a biplane or a 
triplane one would like to know. This doubt would not have arisen if he 
had only told us whether his question concerned only the psychological 
distinction between “primary” qualities conceived as “independent” of 
the act of perception and “secondary” qualities conceived as (in various 
ways) dependent on it, or something simpler or profounder. As it is, the 
simplest answer to his question, and the one which seems to be strictly 
adequate, seems to be that, for some purposes, the distinction is valid be-
cause it is convenient, while for others it is not because it isn’t.
ii.
I fear that my initial questions have become more explicitly critical than I 
at first intended, and will therefore pass next to the point in which I found 
Dr. Nunn’s realism most interesting and most manifestly superior to all 
the other realisms on record. He has found out what apparently real-
ists have never before been able to apprehend, viz., why the plain man is 
not a metaphysical realist, but prefers to favour the idealist by declining 
to project all his experiences of objects into the objects themselves. It is 
practically necessary to distinguish, to simplify appearances, and to keep 
the number of “qualities” ascribed to objects within manageable limits. 
It is practically necessary to distinguish between experiences which may 
be treated as socially “common” and those which are non-transferable. 
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And it is vitally necessary to distinguish between truths and errors and to 
guard against the latter. These vital needs have indis putably contributed 
very extensively to fix the place where the line has been drawn between 
what philosophers call the “objective” and the “subjective” portions of 
experience Dr. Nunn, moreover, recognises also that Science shares to the 
full this pragmatic procedure of ordinary life (pp. 199 and 215).
A few steps further in the same direction and he would have seen 
that herein lay the solution of his whole problem and the conclusion of 
a tedious and unprofitable controversy which has distracted philosophic 
attention from more urgent matters. He need merely have added to the 
perception that our procedure is thoroughly pragmatic the declaration 
that it is thoroughly right, both because it is inevitable, and because it is 
successful. 
This declaration, however, he does not make, and, instead, he seems 
at times to disparage our procedure as “of merely pragmatic validity” (p. 
208), and as a “prejudice” (p. 199) indecisive of the question at issue. 
Nevertheless, elsewhere he does not disdain to avail himself of this 
same method. He argues (p. 195) that a toothache, as a thing to be reck-
oned with, may be just as “real” as a cathedral; he prefers to believe in a 
cosmic reservoir and universal provider of toothaches rather than in their 
“subjectivity,” because it is “easier” (p. 196);21 he considers it “safest” not 
to risk the substitution of a standard perception for the whole series of 
sensations (p. 199). And above all, he thinks it possible to ascribe many 
errors to “inadequate discrimination” (p. 213).22 This last pronouncement 
clearly implies both the relevance to purpose which humanism regards as 
the essence of all reasoning, and the need for attending, selecting, reject-
ing, and constructing, without which there do not arise any “objects” for 
thought to be concerned about. 
But at present I cannot see how Dr. Nunn can reconcile these discrep-
ant attitudes. 
If all our activities of attending, discriminating, selecting, ignoring, and 
constructing are condemned as invalid, after the fashion of the cruder re-
alisms, all thought and all science go by the board, and with them the pro-
cedures by which in fact we live and know. To such a realism, therefore, 
life, as actually conducted, becomes wholly irrational and incomprehen-
sible. For the methods of “knowing” are essentially methods of vitiating 
21 One need not, of course, object either to the criterion of truth here implied, or doubt 
the correctness of Dr. Nunn’s introspection; but he, for his part, should equally recognise 
that for other minds it may be “easier” to conceive toothaches as “subjective,” and that 
in consequence the whole dispute reduces itself to a competition between relative conve-
niences of thought. 
22 I have italicised the terms which imply the humanist attitude towards objects.
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“objects.” If, on the other hand, these normal and indispensable proce-
dures are recognised as valid, their validity cannot be based upon their 
form. It is vain to justify them as being self-evident in point of form, and 
infallible in point of fact. For it is too clear that they are not, and that they 
always involve a risk. It is always possible that we may attend to the irrel-
evant detail instead of to the essence of any problem. It is always possible 
that we may reject what is vital, and select what is unimportant. Nothing 
blinds men to the most obvious facts so surely as the preconceptions of 
a false theory, nor prepares them better for the observation of the most 
latent facts than the stimulus of a good hypothesis. But in neither case can 
our success or failure be ascribed to the logical form of our procedure. If, 
therefore, our procedure is admitted to be logically legitimate (and if it 
is not, logic must despair of comprehending any human reasoning what-
ever), it can only be legitimate because, in fact, it is successful. But if it is 
legitimate because it works, why should it be illegitimate to legitimate by 
their working the conceptions we have reached in this fashion? 
The hesitation of so many philosophers frankly to admit this, although 
they dare not explicitly deny it, I can ascribe only to the fact that they 
have not yet fully realised what enormous amounts of pragmatic postula-
tion have gone to the making of the assumptions on which the plain man 
acts, and how complete would be the downfall of the whole fabric of life 
if the use of these assumptions could really be prohibited. Probably also, 
in spite of their efforts to rise to the plane of a truly critical philosophy, 
they are constantly relapsing into the common-sense attitude, and taking 
for granted an ordered world of “things” and “persons” acting on each 
other. Yet, though for practical purposes we all assume this, no critical 
theory of knowledge can regard this world of discriminated realities as 
an original datum. Observation of our actual cognitive procedure clearly 
shows that there can be neither “things” nor “persons,” neither “effects” 
nor “causes,” until the chaotic flow of happenings has been set in order by 
successful discriminations. Every sort of distinct perceptual object, there-
fore, alike whether it be a “thing” or a “person,” seems to be manifestly 
man-made, i.e., relative to the human interests which singled it out, and 
preserve for it its status as a “reality” which it is expedient to take into 
account. 
Either, therefore, “Realism” must recognise the reality of human ac-
tivity, and content itself with the pragmatic preference of “realities” that 
work and acquiesce in the degradation of those that don’t to an inferior 
order of reality (appearance, illusion, error, fancy, subjectivity, etc.), or 
it must set out on the quixotic attempt to resolve the cosmic order into 
chaos. 
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iii.
The reason for the obscurity and confusion of Dr. Nunn’s attitude towards 
the pragmatic procedures of our science is probably to be found in the fact 
that he has not fully grasped the all-important distinction which human-
ism makes between the claim and the validity of an experience, without 
which no critical theory of knowledge is possible. 
(1) He allows himself to be imposed on by the formal claim to objec-
tivity which all experience makes, and assures us that “sensational expe-
rience carries with it a guarantee of the extra-mentality of its content” 
(p. 217), and that “in perception the object announces itself as having a 
certain priority to and independence of our act and that this announce-
ment is itself the sufficient certificate of the object’s extra-mental status” 
(p. 201).23 
But (2) he also admits that this “guarantee” seems to be often decep-
tive, in “cases where sensational experience seems to guarantee the exis-
tence24 of things that nevertheless can be proved not to exist A realistic 
theory cannot live upon the principle that there is an element in sensation-
al experience which pronounces authoritatively that we are dealing with 
extra-mental data, but that sometimes, when this pronouncement is given, 
the data are not extra-mental25 after all” (pp. 210-11). After all then the 
“guarantee” seems to be worthless, and Realism is not viable. The heroic 
equanimity with which Dr. Nunn accepts this result is admirable.26 
23 Italics mine. He also represents Professor Stout (p. 212) as having committed himself 
to a similar position. Professor Stout will doubtless speak for himself; but as I understand 
him his view is really more complicated, and does not assert the inerrancy of this self-
advertising claim. 
24 As a formal or as a physical “object”? 
25 As physical objects.
26 In the discussion Dr. Nunn assured me that this criticism rests on a misapprehension. 
I accept his correction of course, while regretting that my interpretation will not stand, 
both for my sake and for his. I had not grasped that on pp. 211-16 he had conceived him-
self to be successfully vindicating the value of the sensational “guarantee,” and supposed 
him to be merely making tu quoques and pleading extenuating circumstances. It appears, 
however, that what Dr. Nunn really holds is not that the sensational guarantee should 
be retained though it may be deceptive, but that in cases of inadequate discrimination, 
hallucination, etc., it is not given. This, however, would seem to make matters distinctly 
worse. For (1) it does not appear how Dr. Nunn’s realism is entitled to regard any objects 
which depend on human processes of discrimination as guaranteed to us or as otherwise 
than vitiated by this fact (cf. pp. 224-5). (2) It renders it all the more imperative that Dr. 
Nunn’s realism should possess some trustworthy, or at least applicable, method of dis-
criminating between the cases when the “guarantee” is given by “sensation,” and cases 
when it is not, but appears to be, i.e., between a real and an apparent guarantee. For the 
merely verbal device of saying that in cases of “hallucination” there was no sensational 
guarantee is ex post facto, and will not serve the purposes of actual knowing. We want to 
know whether what presents itself as a perception has, or has not, the sensational guar-
antee which is infallible.  A guarantee which is technically infallible, but always capable 
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But I wish he felt more keenly (a) the logical monstrosity of this claim 
and the atrocity of its attempt to bluff him, (b) the extent of its de facto 
falsity, (c) its deadliness to all realism, (d) the vital need of finding a rem-
edy for its ravages in practice. 
(a) Surely a self-proving claim, which relies only on the vigour of its 
self-assertion, is the very acme of logical impudence. Whatever claims are 
made, and wherever they appear, they must be tested before they can legit-
imately be believed. A theory of knowledge that succumbs to such claims 
cannot but be utterly uncritical. For such a claim is intrinsically nothing 
but a psychical fact: its logical value remains to be determined. In no such 
cases, whether the claims are called intuitions or a priori principles, obses-
sions or delusions, sensations or hallucinations, can a reasonable and cir-
cumspect theory of knowledge accept assertion as a substitute for proof. 
Hence no pragmatic logician will for a moment tolerate such a claim: he 
will insist inexorably that untested “truths” are only “claims,” that claims 
may be false, and that their real value will have to be established by their 
“consequences.” 
(b) In point of fact, false claims to physical reality are numerous.  In 
the moment of experience, dreams, hallucinations, and illusions, nay, 
after-images and fancies, may put forward precisely the same claim to 
“objectivity” as “true perception,” and it may be impossible to deter-
mine whether an experience is a true perception or not. Even after subse-
quent experience this may often be quite difficult. The controversies about 
ghost-seeing and revelation prove that, as to some of these cases, mankind 
has never come to an agreement, and possibly never will, especially as it is 
quite conceivable both parties may be right, and that some of the disputed 
cases may be genuine, while others are not. Hence it is not, strictly speak-
ing, too much to say that every perception, just because we perceive in 
the light of a past experience which may be inadequate, is to some extent 
fallible, and needs further experience to confirm and guarantee the trust 
we place in it. 
(c) Is it not, then, fanciful to imagine that any uncorroborated and 
untested process of perception can guarantee any absolute metaphysical 
“extra-mentality”? Why, it cannot even by itself guarantee its pragmatic 
veracity! We cannot tell whether it is a true perception or not. Perception 
of being superseded by a bogus imitation which guarantees nothing, is practically useless. 
(3) Whatever then enables us to decide whether or not we are truly perceiving what we 
seem to perceive will clearly go beyond perception and be the truly ultimate guarantee of 
truth. (4) I cannot see that Dr. Nunn’s realism is entitled to make any distinction between 
reality and appearance at all. It has annihilated this distinction by calling all appearances 
undiscriminatingly “real,” and indeed its insistence on the primary reality even of the 
“unreal” constitutes its essential originality (cf. p. 221). The truth is that Dr. Nunn ought 
not merely to refuse to offer even the lame explanations of error he attempts, but ought 
logically to deny the possibility of its occurrence.
F. C. S. Schiller
354
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2
is always built up by present interest out of past perceptions, and this is 
the condition alike of “true” and of “false” perception. A pure sensation 
is a mere figment of theory, which no one can remember to have expe-
rienced. What is the use, then, of foisting upon us a criterion of reality 
which is fallible and cannot be worked, and habitually deceives us, if we 
are not critical of its pretence to infallibility? 
“Realism,” apparently, can only assert that all objects claim to be real, 
and that some of them may really turn out to be so; but if this be all, is 
it not still worlds away from constituting a theory of knowledge and a 
knowledge of the world? 
(d) As human beings who, in order to live, have to cope with an un-
ceasing flow of appearances, it is our right and our duty to demand of phi-
losophy some means whereby we can actually make distinctions between 
truth and error, some procedure whereby we can attain the one and avoid 
the other. If no philosophy can satisfy our demand, our verdict about phi-
losophy must be that it is only a game of make-believe which it amuses a 
few cranks to play. If some philosophies fail to help us, we are entitled to 
account them wrong and to refuse to listen to them further. If any philoso-
phy prides itself on its indifference towards this discrimination and glories 
in the assertion that everything is at once true and false, and that the pur-
pose with which we judge it either does not matter, we must regard it as an 
insane aberration of the human spirit. If, lastly, any philosophy remains, 
which has not so far failed, it is surely worth examining. 
It is not part of my function on this occasion to show that in point of 
fact the humanist philosophy does triumphantly solve all these puzzles, 
and give a meaning to the distinction of primary and secondary qualities 
which is consonant with common sense and common science. But I may 
point out that Dr. Nunn’s criticism of the humanist treatment of the prob-
lem of error is too brief to be other than extremely misleading. It would 
hardly occur to a humanist to conceive the essence of error as a “mis-
placing” of a “sensational quality.” The “misplacing” he would regard 
as a tautologous metaphor for an “error,” and the “sensational quality” 
as a convenient (or inconvenient) abstraction. How a “sensational qual-
ity” may be “misplaced” in the absolute he would be content to leave an 
unprobed mystery; but how it could occur relatively to a human purpose 
he could easily explain by reference to the almost infinite ambiguity of 
an experience which is ever demanding further discriminations to effect 
more accurate adjustments of action. Nor would anything seem more ob-
vious to him than that the more important a function was the more surely 
would it serve to sift the capable from the incapable, and, conversely, the 
better it sifted the more important it would be. From palaeolithic times 
ordinary men have known that the fisherman who did not learn to al-
low for the refraction of his harpoon missed his fish and that the hunter 
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whose arrow missed the heart of his lion lost his life, and that therefore 
“errors” of perception were vitally important: but apparently it has taken 
philosophers all this time to understand that it is precisely this vital import 
of sense-perception which has brought about the relatively considerable 
agreement which exists with regard to it among men. 
In conclusion, let me say that the extent of my criticism is by no means 
the measure of my dissent from Dr. Nunn, but rather of my appreciation 
of his paper and of his attitude. I thoroughly agree with him that philoso-
phy must face the concrete problems of cognition as it has never done 
before. And I hope eventually to convince him that the truest philosophy 
is that which deals with them most conveniently and fruitfully.
F. C. S. Schiller
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IT seems to me that Psychology has a special subject-matter of its own; 
and that this special subject-matter may be defined by saying that it con-
sists of all those among the contents of the Universe, and those only, which 
are “mental” or “psychical” in their nature. And the chief thing which I 
wish to do in this paper is to consider which among the contents of the 
Universe are “mental” or “psychical” in their nature, and how these are 
distinguished from those which are not. It seems to me that the Universe 
contains an immense variety of different kinds of entities. For instance: 
My mind, any particular thought or perception of mine, the quality which 
distinguishes an act of volition from a mere act of perception, the Battle 
of Waterloo, the process of baking, the year 1908, the moon, the number 
2, the distance between London and Paris, the relation of similarity—all 
these are contents of the Universe, all of them are or were contained in 
it. And I wish to ask with regard to them all, which of them are “men-
tal” or “psychical” in their nature and which are not. For this purpose, I 
wish to have some common name, which I can apply to any one of them, 
without implying anything more, with regard to that to which I apply it, 
than simply that it is or was something, that it is or was a content of the 
Universe. And I propose to use the word I have already used—the word 
“entity”—in this extremely wide sense. When I speak of an “entity” I 
shall mean to imply absolutely nothing more with regard to that which I 
so call, than that it is or was—that it is or was contained in the Universe; 
and of anything whatever which is or was, I shall take the liberty to say 
that it is an “entity.” It is by no means clear to me that all “entities”—all 
the contents of the Universe—can rightly be said to “ exist” or to be “phe-
nomena”; and though all of them are, no doubt (in certain senses of these 
words), “objects” and “realities” and “things,” yet there are other senses 
of these words in which many of them are not “objects,” not “real,” not 
“things.” It is for this reason that I prefer the word “entities” to any of 
these words which are, I think, sometimes used as its equivalents: the 
words “existents,” “phenomena,” “objects,” “realities,” “things.” And I 
may, therefore, put the main question of my paper in the following form: 
What kinds of “entities” are “mental” or “psychical” entities? And how 
are those which are “mental” entities distinguished from those which are 
not? 
I shall divide my treatment of this question into two parts. I shall, first 
of all, (1) try to classify those kinds of entities which seem to me to be 
undoubtedly “mental,” and to consider what it is that distinguishes these 
from all the other contents of the Universe. And I shall then (2) consider 
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certain entities or supposed entities, with regard to which it seems to me 
doubtful whether they are “mental” entities or not, and shall inquire in 
what sense, if any, these could properly be said to be “mental.” 
i. entities which are undoubtedly mental
I wish here to define as clearly as I can those kinds of entities which seem 
to me to be undoubtedly mental, and to consider how they differ from 
those which are not mental. 
To begin with, then: I see, I hear, I smell, I taste, etc.; I sometimes feel 
pains; I sometimes observe my own mental acts; I sometimes remember 
entities which I have formerly seen or heard, etc.; I sometimes imagine 
and I sometimes dream; I think of all sorts of different entities; I believe 
some propositions, and think of others, without believing them; I take 
pleasure in certain events, and am displeased at others; and I sometimes 
resolve that certain actions shall be done. All these things I do; and there 
is nothing more certain to me than that I do them all. And because, in a 
wide sense, they Are all of them things which I do, I propose to call them 
all “mental acts.” By calling them “acts” I do not wish to imply that I am 
always particularly active when I do them. No doubt, I must be active in a 
sense, whenever I do any of them. But certainly, when I do some of them, 
I am sometimes very passive. 
Now I think we may say that, whenever I do any of these things, I am 
always “conscious of” something or other. Each of these mental acts con-
sists, at least in part, in my being conscious of something. I do not mean to 
say that, in the case of each of them, I am conscious of something in one 
and the same sense. For instance, when I actually see a colour, I am cer-
tainly conscious of that colour in a very different sense from that in which 
I am conscious of it when I remember it half an hour afterwards and do 
not any longer see it. And I am not sure that there is anything whatever 
in common to these two senses of “consciousness.” But still I think the 
name can certainly be rightly applied to what occurs in both these cases; 
and that similarly we are, in some proper sense of the word, (Conscious 
of something whenever we do any of the acts I have named. And I do not 
know how to explain what I mean by “consciousness” except by saying 
that each of these acts I have named is an act of consciousness. But still I 
hope that this is a sufficient indication of what I mean. And I think it is 
at least sufficient to enable us to say with certainty that certain other acts, 
which I have not named, resemble these in being acts of consciousness. 
“Consciousness,” then, for all I know, may be a name for several very 
different kinds of entities. But in all the cases I have named there is, I 
think, one thing clear about it: namely, that in every case there is always a 
distinction between that of which we are conscious and our consciousness 
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of it. I do not mean to say that the two are always “separable”; nor yet 
do I mean to say anything with regard to the relation in which they stand 
to one another; I only mean to say that they are always distinct entities: 
and that they are so seems to me to be certain for the following reason. 
Let us consider any one of the mental acts I have named—seeing, for ex-
ample. There is nothing more certain to me than that I do constantly see 
one colour at one time, and a different colour at a different time, and that, 
though the colours are different, I am conscious of them both in exactly 
the same sense. It follows, then, that since the colours are different in the 
two cases, whereas what I mean by my consciousness of them is in both 
cases the same, my consciousness of a colour must be something different 
from any of the colours of which I am conscious. And the same result fol-
lows, whichever of the mental acts I have named be considered. I am quite 
certain that I do at different times remember different events, will differ-
ent actions, etc., and though what I remember, what I will, etc., may be in 
each case different, yet what I mean by “remembering” or “willing” may 
be in each case exactly the same. There is, therefore, always a distinction 
between what I am conscious of and my consciousness of it. And the latter 
of these two distinct entities is the first kind of entity which seems to me 
to be undoubtedly mental. Whenever anybody is conscious of anything in 
the sense or senses which I have tried to indicate, then his consciousness, 
as distinguished from that of which he is conscious, is, I think, undoubt-
edly a mental entity. 
“Consciousness,” then, is undoubtedly a name for a mental entity or 
for several different kinds of mental entities. Every act of consciousness is 
a mental entity. But what exactly do we mean by saying that it is “men-
tal”? 
The first and most important thing we mean by this is, I think, just 
simply that it is an act of consciousness. “Mental,” in one of its senses and 
its most fundamental sense, is, I think, merely another way of saying that 
the entity said to be mental is an act of consciousness. So that, in this sense 
of the word, that which distinguishes mental entities from those which are 
not mental would be simply the fact that the former are acts of conscious-
ness, whereas the latter are not. And, in this sense, it is quite plain that 
many entities are not mental. A red colour, for example, is certainly not 
an act of consciousness in the sense in which my seeing of it is. It may, 
indeed (as some people seem to think), be an “appearance” of an act of 
consciousness; but, if so, then certainly the appearance is very different 
from the reality. This sense in which to be a mental entity is to be an act of 
consciousness is, I think, the most fundamental sense of the word “men-
tal”: it is the one from which all others are derived. Had we not noticed 
the difference between acts of consciousness and entities which either are 
not or do not seem to be such, no one would ever have thought of divid-
ing entities into mental or non-mental, or of speaking of “mind” at all. 
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But though this is the most fundamental sense of the word “mental,” there 
certainly are others derived from it, and important ones too, which might 
allow us to say that entities, which are not acts of consciousness, neverthe-
less are mental. And I must go on to speak of these. 
The first of these is a property which might be thought to belong to all 
mental acts, and to be a further characteristic, in addition to the fact that 
all of them are acts of consciousness, which distinguishes them from enti-
ties which are not mental. And this characteristic is one which is, I think, 
certainly very often meant by the word “mental”; when it is said that an 
entity is “mental” or “in the mind,” it is, I think, very often meant that it 
has this characteristic. The characteristic I mean is the one which we ex-
press by saying that a given mental act is an act of the same person or of 
the same mind as another mental act. All the mental acts, of the existence 
of which we are most certain, do seem to have this characteristic. Each 
of them is the act of some one mind, and is related to a certain number 
of other acts by the fact that they are all of them acts of the same mind. 
In fact, all the mental acts we know best seem to be divided into groups, 
each group having the characteristic that all its members are acts of the 
same mind. Thus, for example, a certain number of the mental acts in the 
Universe have been mental acts of mine, a certain number have been the 
mental acts of King Edward VII, and so on in millions of other instances. 
That many mental acts have this characteristic, and that it is a most im-
portant characteristic, seems to me as certain as anything can be. Thus, 
for example, I am quite certain that a certain number of mental acts really 
have been mental acts of “mine”; that what I mean by saying that they are 
all “mine” is a most important characteristic that they have; and that it is 
one which distinguishes them from the mental acts of other people. That 
this is so we all of us constantly assume, and no philosopher has, I think, 
ever succeeded in avoiding the implication that it is so. The language we 
use constantly implies that one respect in which two mental acts may dif-
fer from one another is by the fact that one of them is the mental act of 
one person and the other the mental act of another person; and that one 
respect in which two mental acts may resemble one another is by the fact 
that both of them are mental acts of the same person. And that something 
important is meant by this language seems to me to be quite certain. As 
to what exactly is meant I confess I cannot be sure; and I shall presently 
have to say what I can about the matter. For the present, I wish only to 
insist that something true is meant when it is said that two mental acts 
are mental acts of the same person; that, for instance, there is some sense 
in which my mental acts are all mine. And hence that, if it is said to be a 
characteristic of all mental acts that they are the mental acts of somebody 
or other—that they all belong to some mind, though different ones to dif-
ferent minds—these words would express a characteristic which might 
belong to all mental acts, and which, if it did, would be a characteristic 
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in addition to, and distinct from, that which is expressed by saying that 
they all are acts of consciousness. This characteristic, it seems to me, is 
one which is often meant when it is said that a given entity is “mental” 
or “in the mind”: it is meant that the entity in question is related to some 
mind in the same way in which his mental acts are related to him—by that 
relation which is expressed by saying that they are all his. And if this be 
used as a positive criterion of what is mental, I can find no objection to it. 
That is to say, if it be said that any entity which has this relation to any 
person or to any mind is “mental,” I should be prepared to admit it. It 
does seem to me, for example, that if any entity were related to me or to 
my mind in just that way in which my mental acts are related to me, we 
might quite properly say that such an entity was “mental,” and was “in 
my mind” in the same sense in which my mental acts are “in my mind.” 
Whether any entities, except mental acts, are or can be related to me in 
this way, is a question which I shall presently consider. But, if any are re-
lated to any mind in this manner, then I should say we might properly call 
them “mental.” Here, therefore, we have a sense of the word “mental” 
which might possibly include other entities besides acts of consciousness. 
But if this characteristic be also proposed as a negative criterion of what is 
“mental”—if, beside saying that anything which does possess it is “men-
tal,” it be also said that nothing which does not possess it, is so—then, the 
assertion seems to me to be very doubtful For it seems to me possible that 
there may be acts of consciousness which are not the acts of any mind—
which are not related to any other acts, in the peculiar way in which the 
mental acts of any one person are related to one another. That there might 
be acts of consciousness, isolated in this way, seems to me possible; and if 
there were, then certainly they would be “mental” entities, simply because 
they were acts of consciousness. That there are any such I don’t feel at all 
sure; but the mere possibility that there should be seems to me a sufficient 
objection to saying that nothing can be “mental” except what belongs to 
some mind in the sense in which my mental acts belong to mine. 
The second characteristic I wish to mention is one which cannot, I 
think, be said to be a “meaning” of the term “mental,” but which may 
be and has been proposed as a criterion of what is “mental,” and which 
is certainly a very important characteristic. It has been suggested, namely, 
that any entity which can be directly known by one mind only is a mental 
entity, and is “in the mind” of the person in question, and also, conversely, 
that all mental entities can be directly known only by a single mind. By 
“direct knowledge” is here meant the kind of relation which we have to 
a colour, when we actually see it, or to a sound when we actually hear it. 
And the suggestion that all mental entities have the characteristic that they 
can be directly known, in this sense, only by one single mind, is, I think, 
certainly plausible for the following reason. It certainly is a very remark-
able difference between my own mental acts and those of other people, 
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that my own are the only ones that I ever know directly. I certainly never 
have been conscious of anybody else’s thoughts or feelings or perceptions 
in that direct manner in which I am conscious of a colour when I actually 
see it; but of my own mental acts I am very often conscious in this direct 
manner. I am, of course, conscious, in a sense, of the mental acts of other 
people; I do know some of them, in a very real sense, and know a great 
deal about them; but certainly I am never directly conscious of them, I do 
not know them directly, in the sense in which I often know my own. This 
is, I think, certainly a very remarkable distinction between my mental acts 
and those of other people. And the rule seems to be a nearly universal 
one: it seems to be nearly universally true that each of us can only know 
directly his own mental acts—never those of any other person. No one, 
for instance, that I know of, except myself, has ever known directly any 
mental act of mine. There is, therefore, plausibility in the suggestion that 
this may be a universal characteristic of mental acts: it certainly belongs 
to all of those which we know best, and know most about. But yet I think 
it is doubtful whether it belongs to all mental acts. There seems to be no 
reason why it should: no reason why one person should not ever be able 
to know directly the mental acts of any other person; at best it seems only 
to be a fact that no one ever does. And, moreover, there seems to be a 
certain amount of evidence that it does actually occur in very rare cases. 
Dr. Morton Prince’s “Sally” seems to have claimed that she knew directly 
some of the mental acts of B I; and if we admit her claim, and if also we 
admit (and for this also there is much to be said) that Sally was a different 
person from B I, this would be an instance of the direct knowledge by one 
person of the mental acts of another. I think, therefore, that it is doubtful 
whether it really is a characteristic of all mental acts, that they can be di-
rectly known by one mind only. And as for the converse proposition—the 
proposition that any entity which can be directly known by one person 
only must be mental, and must be “in” that person’s “mind,” it seems to 
me more doubtful still Even if it were true that all undoubtedly mental 
entities can only be known by one person, namely the person “in” whose 
“mind” they are, there would seem to be no reason whatever why some 
non-mental entities should not possess the same characteristic. And, sup-
posing any entities, except mental acts, do possess it, we should, I think, 
certainly need other and independent evidence that they were “mental,” 
in order to be entitled to call them so. On this ground alone, we certainly 
should not be so entitled. 
So far, then, my conclusions have been as follows: I started with mental 
acts—acts of consciousness—as being undoubtedly mental entities. And I 
considered three characteristics, which might be held to distinguish them 
from entities which are not mental. The first was the mere fact that they 
were acts of consciousness; and this is a characteristic which, of course, 
does belong ex hypothesi to all of them; but also it is a characteristic 
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which can, ex hypothesi, belong to no entity except an act of conscious-
ness. This, I said, seemed to me to be the most fundamental sense of the 
word “mental,” but I admitted that there were others. The second charac-
teristic was one which does seem to belong to most mental acts, namely, 
the characteristic that they are all of them acts of some person or other—
all of them belong to some mind; and I admitted that any entity which did 
belong to a mind, in this peculiar sense in which my mental acts belong to 
mine, would be mental. I admitted this, then, as a second sense of “men-
tal”; but I urged that possibly some mental acts were not mental in this 
sense—were not the acts of anybody: so that there might be entities which 
were undoubtedly “mental” in the first fundamental sense, and yet not 
“mental” in this second one. The third characteristic was also one which 
does seem to belong to most mental acts and does perhaps belong to all; 
namely, that they are entities which can be directly known by one person 
only. But in the case of this characteristic I urged that there seems no rea-
son why it should belong to all mental acts—no reason why one person 
should not sometimes be able to know directly the mental acts of another; 
and also that there is a certain amount of evidence for believing that this 
actually does sometimes occur. And as for the contention that every entity 
which possesses this characteristic is “mental,” I urged that, if this is true, 
we certainly must have some other reason for saying that all such entities 
are mental beside the mere fact that they possess this characteristic. This 
characteristic alone would not entitle us to call them so; for it certainly 
is not one of the characteristics which we mean by “mental,” even if it 
should turn out to be a criterion of what is mental. 
I have, therefore, so far recognised two different senses of “mental,” 
and only one sort of entities—namely, acts of consciousness—which are 
undoubtedly mental. All acts of consciousness are mental in the first sense, 
and nothing else can be. Whereas in the second sense it is not quite certain 
that all acts of consciousness are; and also it is abstractly possible that 
some entities, which are not acts of consciousness, should be. 
But I have now to recognise two other sorts of entities which seem to 
me to be undoubtedly mental; and two new meanings of “mental” cor-
responding to them. 
The first sort of entity is as follows:—
Different acts of consciousness may differ from one another in vari-
ous respects. And some of the differences which there are between them 
seem to me to he undoubtedly mental differences. These differences which 
I call mental differences are the second sort of entity which I recognise as 
undoubtedly mental. But in order to make plain what sort of entities these 
undoubtedly mental differences are, I must contrast them with two other 
kinds of differences which there are, or might be, between different men-
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tal acts. The first kind is a kind of difference, which there undoubtedly is, 
between different mental acts; and far more mental acts differ from one 
another in this respect than in any other; but it does not seem to me to be 
a “mental” difference. The second kind is a kind which might be as uni-
versal as the first; but, in this case, I am not sure that any mental acts do 
differ in this possible respect at all There remains, as a third kind, the sort 
of difference which does seem to me to be an undoubtedly mental entity: 
some mental acts do undoubtedly differ from one another in this third 
way, and also the difference is undoubtedly a mental one. 
The first kind of difference is the difference which merely consists in 
the fact that one act of consciousness is a consciousness of one entity, 
whereas another act of consciousness is a consciousness of a different en-
tity. For instance, when I see a blue colour, I am conscious of a different 
entity from that of which I am conscious when I see a red one. And my 
seeing of the red certainly does differ from my seeing of the blue, in respect 
of the fact that whereas the one is a consciousness of the red, the other is 
a consciousness of the blue: the mere fact that one is of the red and the 
other of the blue is a difference between them. So, too, when I remember 
the Crystal Palace, and remember St. Paul’s Cathedral, there is a similar 
difference between the two acts of memory: the one is a consciousness of 
the Crystal Palace and the other of St. Paul’s Cathedral, and the two acts 
do certainly differ in respect of the fact that one is of the one entity and the 
other of the other, whether they also differ in other respects or not. There 
is no kind of difference between mental acts more universal than this. We 
are all of us, in the course of our lives, conscious of millions of different 
entities, and our consciousness of each differs from our consciousness of 
all the rest, in respect of the fact that it is a consciousness of the entity of 
which it is, and not of any other different entity. But this kind of difference 
does not seem to me to be itself a mental difference. I confess I cannot tell 
why. It certainly is a sort of difference, which can only obtain between 
mental acts: since nothing but a mental act can differ from anything else, 
in respect of the fact that the one is a consciousness of one entity whereas 
the other is a consciousness of a different entity. But, nevertheless, it does 
not seem to me to be a mental difference; and, though I cannot tell why, 
I can illustrate by analogous examples the sort of reason why I think so. 
For instance, one area in space may be occupied by one kind of object, 
and another area by another kind; and these two areas will then differ in 
respect of the fact that one is occupied by the one object and the other by 
the other. Yet we should not say that this difference between them was a 
spatial difference; although it is a difference between spatial entities, and 
a sort of difference which can only obtain between spatial entities, since 
nothing but a spatial entity can be “occupied by” anything, in the sense 
in which a spatial area is occupied by the object which is in that area. Or, 
again, one physical event—for instance, a particular arrangement of par-
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ticles in one part of the brain—may differ from another physical object, in 
respect of the fact that the one is a necessary condition for a mental act of 
one kind and the other a necessary condition for a mental act of another 
kind; and yet we should not say that this difference was itself a physical 
difference between the two. It seems to me that there is, for similar rea-
sons, an objection to saying that the difference between two mental acts, 
which merely consists in the fact that one is a consciousness of one entity 
and the other of another, is itself a mental difference. 
But the second sort of difference, which there might be between mental 
acts, would, if there were such a difference, undoubtedly be a mental one; 
only I am not sure that there is any such difference, and therefore cannot 
reckon it among entities undoubtedly mental; I shall presently discuss it 
among cases of doubtful mental entities. It seems, namely, to be held by 
some philosophers that any mental act which differs from another in re-
spect of the fact that whereas one is the consciousness of one entity, the 
other is a consciousness of a different entity, must or does always also 
differ from the other in some other respect—in some internal respect: that 
wherever there is that difference of relation, which consists in the fact 
that two mental acts have different objects, there must also be some other 
qualitative difference between the two—beside the difference of objects, 
also a difference of “content.” If there were such a difference as this be-
tween mental acts, I should say it would certainly be a mental one. But I 
am not sure that there is any such difference. I am not sure that, in any 
case whatever, two mental acts which differ in respect of the fact that one 
is a consciousness of one entity and the other a consciousness of a differ-
ent entity, need, for that reason, differ internally or qualitatively in any 
respect at all. 
But it seems to me quite certain that some mental acts do differ inter-
nally or qualitatively from others; and that differences of this third class 
are undoubtedly mental differences. I said, to begin with, that every men-
tal act consists, at least in part, in the being conscious of something. But 
some of them, I think, plainly consist also in something else. I sometimes 
merely think of a given proposition, and then, I think, I am merely con-
scious of it; but I sometimes believe it, and then, besides being conscious 
of it, I am conscious of it in a particular way—my consciousness of it has 
a quality, which seems to me undoubtedly mental, which differentiates an 
act of belief from a mere act of consciousness. So, too, I sometimes merely 
think of a possible future action; but sometimes I will that action: and here 
again there seems to me to be a real mental difference between the two 
cases. I should say then that the quality which distinguishes an act of will 
from what is not an act of will, or an act of belief from what is not an act 
of belief, is undoubtedly a mental entity. And there are, I think, a limited 
(though still a large) number of other mental qualities of this kind: for 
instance, that which distinguishes the being pleased with an object from 
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the mere apprehension of the same object without being pleased with it; 
that which distinguishes the desiring of an object from the apprehension 
of it without, desire; that which distinguishes the disliking of an object 
from the apprehension of it without dislike, etc. Such differences between 
mental acts seem to me to be certainly different in their nature from my 
first sort of differences—those which merely consisted in the fact that, 
whereas one mental act was a consciousness of one sort of object, another 
was a consciousness of another. For one thing it seems to me that, even 
where there is no difference in the object, there may be a difference in the 
mode of consciousness: that, for instance, I may at one time apprehend 
one and the same proposition without believing it, and at another time 
believe it. And these differences, which I may call differences in the mode 
of consciousness, seem to me also to differ from the second sort of differ-
ences I mentioned, in respect of the fact that whereas the latter were sup-
posed to be internal differences corresponding to a difference of object, 
these do not so correspond: I may be conscious of two different objects in 
the same way, and of the same object, at different times, in different ways. 
Moreover, whereas I cannot be certain that there are any internal differ-
ences corresponding to a difference of objects I am certain that there are 
differences in the mode of consciousness. I am quite certain that there is 
an internal difference between willing an action and merely thinking of it; 
between liking an object and merely seeing it: but not certain that there is 
any internal difference between seeing a red colour and seeing a blue one, 
or between seeing a colour and hearing a sound. 
I recognise, then, as a second kind of undoubtedly mental entities, the 
qualities which distinguish one mode of consciousness from another. And 
these qualities, it seems to me, are “mental” in some new sense. They are 
not themselves acts of consciousness, but are, in some sense, qualities of 
such. In what sense exactly, I cannot discover. It seems obvious to say 
that they are mental, because they are qualities of a kind which can only 
belong to acts of consciousness: nothing but an act of consciousness can 
have the quality of being a volition, or being a belief. But then it is also 
true that nothing but an act of consciousness can have the property of be-
ing a consciousness of blue, or a consciousness of red. And in what way 
such a property, which I call a “property,” differs from these other proper-
ties, which I call “qualities,” I cannot define. Assuming, however, that the 
difference is understood, we may, I think, say, that to be “mental,” in this 
third sense, means to be a “quality” (as distinguished from a “property”) 
which can only belong to an act of consciousness. 
Finally, a third kind of entity, which seems to me undoubtedly mental, 
may be defined as follows. A number of mental acts may be related to one 
another, in one or other of the hundred different ways, which may be ex-
pressed by saying that they form a “unity.” And any collection of mental 
acts, which does in any sense form a “unity,” may itself be said to be a 
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“mental entity.” For instance, a process of reasoning is not itself a “mental 
act”; it consists of a number of different mental acts, combined together 
in some particular way: and yet it is undoubtedly a “mental entity.” Any 
such collection of mental acts is, therefore, a mental entity; and is so in the 
sense that it is a collection of mental acts having some sort of unity. Here, 
then, is a fourth sense of “mental”: namely, the “being a collection of acts 
of consciousness, as distinguished from being a single act of consciousness. 
I recognise, then, three kinds of undoubtedly mental entities: (1) An 
act of consciousness; (2) certain “qualities” of acts of consciousness; (3) 
any collection of acts of consciousness which has some sort of “unity.” 
And I cannot be certain that there are in the Universe any entities, deserv-
ing to be called “mental,” except these. These, it seems to me, are marked 
off by very sharp and important lines of division from all other entities. 
And the certainty that these are, and are “mental,” seems to me very much 
greater than in the case of any other sorts of entities which are sometimes 
said to be so. 
ii. doubtful mental entities
Under this head I want to consider two kinds of cases: namely, firstly, 
cases where it may be supposed there is an entity, which, if there were any 
such entity, would undoubtedly be a mental one, but where it seems to me 
doubtful whether there really is any such entity as the one supposed; and 
secondly, cases of entities which undoubtedly are and which some people 
suppose to be “mental,” but where it seems to me doubtful whether they 
are mental or not. 
(1) The first entity I wish to consider under this head is the mind itself. 
It might be thought that, if any entity deserves to be called “mental,” 
the mind itself undoubtedly does deserve it; and that, so far from being 
reckoned among doubtful mental entities, it ought to be reckoned as the 
clearest and most undoubted case of a mental entity. And, in fact, I do not 
doubt that the mind is a mental entity. I do not doubt, for instance, that I 
have a mind; that there is such a thing as my mind; and that it is a mental 
entity. But all that I mean when I say this, is that I am quite sure that when 
I or other people talk about “my mind,” we are talking about something 
which really is and which is mental; that “my mind” is the name of some 
entity or other, and that a mental one. What I do doubt about, in the case 
of my mind, is what sort of an entity it is: in particular, whether it is an 
entity of one of the kinds which I have already described; or whether it is a 
new kind of entity different from any of these, and which is also “mental” 
in a different sense from that in which any of them are “mental.” 
There is a view (and I think Hume held it, for one) that my mind 
merely consists in the sum of all those mental acts, which are related to 
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one another in the way which we describe by calling them all “mine”; in-
cluding, of course, any other entities (if there are any), beside mental acts, 
which may be related to my mental acts in this same way in which they 
are related to one another. And I cannot be sure that this view is not a true 
one! I am, in fact, much more sure that there are such things as my mental 
acts, than that there is any entity distinct from these, which could be called 
my mind. And if this view were a true one, if my mind does consist merely 
in the sum of my mental acts, it would, of course, merely be an instance 
of the third kind of entity, which I recognised as undoubtedly mental: it 
would be a collection of acts of consciousness, having some kind of unity. 
In favour of this view I have to urge the difficulty that I find in dis-
covering any entity, other than my mental acts, which could be my mind. 
And, also, it alone seems to me to allow any proper sense to the phrase 
we are tempted to use when we say that such and such an entity, such and 
such a mental act, for instance, is “in the mind.” If my mind is merely the 
collection of all my mental acts (and perhaps some other entities), each of 
them could be properly said to be “in” it, in the sense of being one among 
the collection. Whereas, on any other view, I do not see how any mental 
act, or anything else, could be properly said to be “in” the mind at all. 
But, on the other hand, there seem to me to be certain arguments 
against this view. We certainly talk, also, as if it were my mind which 
hears, my mind which thinks, my mind which wills; as if, in short, my 
mind were some entity, of which my mental acts are acts; as if it were 
identical with the Ego, the “me,” the subject, which is conscious whenever 
I am conscious. And though a meaning can be given to these expressions, 
on Hume’s view of the mind, it does not seem to me to be the meaning 
which they actually have. On Hume’s view, we should have to hold that, 
when I say that I, or my mind, am seeing this paper or thinking these 
thoughts, what I mean is simply that my seeing and my thinking are, each 
of them, one among the mental acts which constitute me or my mind. And 
it does not seem to me that this is what I do mean. It seems to me that, 
when I say that I am seeing this room now, and saw another yesterday 
(and I am sure that I really am, and really did), I mean to assert quite a 
different sort of relation between me and my seeing, than that the latter 
is a part of me—one member of a collection of acts which constitutes me. 
Moreover, even on Hume’s view, there still remains the difficulty of 
saying what kind of relation it is that all my mental acts have to one 
another, which constitutes them “mine.” That they most certainly have 
some relation to one another, which we express by saying that they are 
all “mine,” I have already urged; some relation which distinguishes them 
from the mental acts of other people. And, if we consider what this rela-
tion can be, this consideration also seems to me to point to the falsity of 
Hume’s view. What I seem to know, when I know that all my mental acts 
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are mental acts of mine, is that they all have a peculiar relation to some 
other entity which is me. I seem to know that their relation to one another 
consists in the fact that they all have the same relation to this other entity: 
I do not seem to be directly aware of any other relation which they all 
have to one another. 
I think, therefore, there is something to be said for the view that I 
am an entity, distinct from every one of my mental acts and from all of 
them put together: an entity, whose acts they are; which is that which is 
conscious when I am conscious; and that what I mean by calling them all 
“mine,” is that they all of them are acts of this same entity. But even if 
I am such an entity, it does not follow that it is a mental entity. There is 
still another hypothesis, against which I can find no conclusive arguments: 
namely, that this entity which hears and sees and feels and thinks is some 
part of my body. I cannot see anything conclusive against Locke’s view 
that matter may be capable of being conscious; and hence that it may be 
my body which is conscious whenever I am conscious. If this were so, 
then, I should say we could not identify myself with “my mind.” I myself 
should not, then, be a mental entity: I should be my body. Whereas any-
thing that is properly to be called “my mind” must, I think, be allowed 
to be “mental.” But we might combine this with Hume’s view by saying 
that “my mind” was the collection of my mental acts; and that what made 
them all “mine” was not any direct relation they had to one another, but 
the fact that they all had a common relation to my body. 
The view, therefore, that “my mind” is a mental entity, distinct from 
any one of my mental acts and from all of them, seems to me to be only 
one among several possible alternatives, against none of which I have ever 
seen or can find conclusive arguments. But it does seem to me to be one 
possible alternative and if it were true, then, we should have to admit that 
there is another mental entity, distinct from any of those I have hitherto 
recognised, and “mental” in a different sense from any of them. Every 
mind would, then, be a mental entity of a new sort; and it would be “men-
tal” in the sense that it was something, not the body, of which certain 
mental acts were the acts—that it was that which is conscious whenever 
anyone is conscious. 
(2) The second hypothesis I wish to consider is the hypothesis, pre-
viously mentioned, that any two mental acts which differ in respect of 
the fact that, whereas one is a consciousness of one entity, the other is 
the consciousness of a different entity, also differ in some other respect—
have some mental difference, some internal difference, some difference of 
“quality” or of “content.” If this were so, the quality which differentiated 
one from the other would undoubtedly be a mental entity, and a mental 
entity in the same sense in which the quality which differentiates belief or 
volition from mere apprehension is a mental entity. 
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Here, too, there seem to me to be arguments upon both sides. On the 
negative side—in favour of the view that there are no such entities—there 
seems to me to be the fact that I am quite unable, by introspection, to dis-
cover any such entities. When I consider what happens when I see a blue 
colour, or see a red colour, or hear a sound, I am quite unable to discover 
that there is any difference between the three cases except that in the one 
case what I am conscious of is blue, in the other red, in the third a sound 
instead of a colour. My consciousness of all three seems to me to be exact-
ly the same in its nature. And so, too, when I think of St. Paul’s Cathedral, 
or think of the Crystal Palace, all that I am able to be certain of is that, in 
the two cases, I am conscious of different entities—not that, in each case, 
my consciousness has a further difference—a difference of quality. 
But on the other side, too, there seems to me to be some evidence. 
The argument which appeals to me on this side is that drawn from the 
causal connection between mental acts. Nothing seems to me more certain 
than that my consciousness of one object may (in some sense) have differ-
ent effects from my consciousness of another object, even where I cannot 
discover any difference between the two except the fact that the one is a 
consciousness of one object and the other of a different one. For instance, 
I am quite sure that the sight of one object does cause me to remember 
some sorts of things, whereas the sight of another object will cause me 
to remember different things. But how, it may be said, can this be if the 
consciousness of the one object does not differ at all in quality from that 
of the other? , It might be attempted to answer this by saying that it is the 
different objects, and not my consciousness of them, which produce the 
different effects. But it seems to me pretty certain that this is not always, 
if ever, the case. What produces the effect is something which exists now, 
and the object does not by any means always exist when I think of it. For 
instance, if I happen to think of the Battle of Waterloo, this thought may 
lead me to have other thoughts which I should not have had if I had not 
thought of the battle; but it is (in some sense) my thought which exists 
now, which causes these other thoughts, not the battle itself, which does 
not exist now. I think, therefore, that it cannot be the different objects 
which produce the different effects; and therefore there seems to me some 
force in the argument that there must be some internal difference in my 
consciousness of the one and of the other, although I can discover none. 
But there does seem to me to be one possible alternative: namely, that 
in each case it is neither my consciousness of the object, nor the object 
itself, which produces the effect, but the whole fact—the fact that I am 
conscious of the object. This fact—the whole fact—is, it seems to me, cer-
tainly a different entity both from the object, and from my consciousness 
of it, if we mean by the latter merely what I have hitherto meant— namely, 
what is left over when we subtract the object from the whole fact. And 
the whole fact—the fact that I am conscious of one object—is certainly 
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always different from the fact that I am conscious of another object, even 
though my consciousness of the one may be exactly similar, internally, to 
my consciousness of the other. But I do not feel sure that this hypothesis 
will remove the difficulty; and therefore I reckon possible qualitative dif-
ferences between mental acts, corresponding to every difference in their 
objects, as possible mental entities. 
(3) The third question I wish to consider is one which was discussed 
at considerable length in both the two last papers of last Session, by Dr. 
Wolf and Professor Stout. It concerns those entities, which are often called 
“sensations” or “sense-presentations,” but which I shall call, by prefer-
ence, “sense-data.” By sense-data I understand a class of entities of which 
we are very often directly conscious, and with many of which we are ex-
tremely familiar. They include the colours, of all sorts of different shades, 
which I actually see when I look about me; the sounds which I actually 
hear; the peculiar sort of entity of which I am directly conscious when I 
feel the pain of a toothache, and which I call “the pain”; and many oth-
ers which I need not enumerate. But I wish also to include among them 
those entities called “images,” of which I am directly conscious when I 
dream and often also when awake; which resemble the former in respect 
of the fact that they are colours, sounds, etc.; but which seem, as a rule, 
like rather faint copies of the colours, sounds, etc., actually seen or heard, 
and which, whether fainter or not, differ from them in respect of the fact 
that we should not say we actually saw or heard them, and the fact that 
they are not, in the strictest sense of the words, “given by the senses.” 
All these entities I propose to call sense-data. And in their case there is, 
of course, no question whether there are such entities. The entities meant 
certainly are, whether or not they be rightly described as “sensations,” 
“sense-presentations,” “sense-data,” etc. Here the only ques tion can be, 
whether they are “mental.” And, in fact, many philosophers seem to have 
held that they are so. Professor Stout, for example, held that they all are; 
Dr. Wolf, that some of them, namely “images,” are and the rest not. I want 
briefly to consider in what sense, if any, these entities could be “mental.” 
But it is necessary here to distinguish two questions. Of some of these 
entities we certainly are sometimes directly conscious. But Professor Stout 
held, and I daresay others would agree with him, that they often exist in 
the mind, even when we are not conscious of them. I wish, therefore, to 
distinguish the two questions—(a) in what sense those sense-data of which 
we are directly conscious may be mental, and (b) in what sense those, if 
any, which are alleged to be in the mind, when we are not directly con-
scious of them, could be so. 
(a) Some philosophers, I think, have held these entities to be mental, 
because they failed to distinguish between them and our consciousness 
of them—failed to distinguish, for instance, between a blue colour which 
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I see, and the direct consciousness which I have of it when I see it. For 
instance, I think it is plain from many passages in Hume that he failed to 
distinguish these two sorts of entities. In fact, he often confused an act of 
consciousness with that of which we are conscious. And we might, there-
fore, say of him that he thought sense-data to be mental, partly because he 
mistook them for acts of consciousness. But it is, I think, clear that they 
are not acts of consciousness, whatever they are. They are not, therefore, 
“mental” in my first and fundamental sense. 
A second view which might be held, and has, I think, often been im-
plied, is that they are what I have called “qualities” of conscious acts, and 
“mental” in this sense. But I think it is clear that this is not a true view 
either. It seems to me clear that the relation which a blue colour has to 
my consciousness of it, when I actually see it, is quite a different relation 
from that which the quality which distinguishes a volition or a belief from 
mere apprehension has to the act of consciousness which is a volition or 
a belief. When I am conscious of a blue colour, my act of consciousness is 
a consciousness of that colour: I am conscious of the colour. But when I 
will that an action should be done, this act of consciousness is not a con-
sciousness of the quality which makes it a volition. I think, therefore, it 
is clear that sense-data, when I am conscious of them, are not qualities of 
my act of consciousness, in any sense in which what is a quality of an act 
of consciousness must be “mental.” 
A third view seems to be that these sense-data are mental in the sense 
that they have to my mental acts and to one another exactly that relation 
which my mental acts have to one another, and which I describe by calling 
them all “mine.” This view is, in short, that sense-data are “mental,” in 
the second sense which I recognised above: that the sense-data of which 
I am directly conscious are “in my mind” and related to my mind in ex-
actly the same sense in which my direct consciousness of them is so. And 
against this view I have only to say that it does not seem to me to be so. I 
cannot persuade myself that a blue colour which I see is related to me in 
exactly the same manner in which my seeing of it is related to me. It seems 
to me to be related to me in no way at all except by the fact that I am con-
scious of it. But my consciousness of it is related to me in quite a different 
manner from this. Of my consciousness I am not by any means always 
conscious. Its relation to me is simply that it is my consciousness, an act 
of consciousness of mine: and the blue which I see certainly does not seem 
to me to be “mine” in this sense, whatever that sense may be. Hence, I 
cannot accept the view that any of the sense-data of which I am directly 
conscious—either “sense-data” proper or “images”—are related to me 
or to my mind in the manner in which my consciousness of them and my 
other mental acts are related to me. And I wonder that anybody should 
be able to feel sure that they really are so related. The relation which my 
mental acts have to me and to one another—the relation which I indicate 
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by calling them “mine”—seems to me to be a very peculiar relation; and, 
in practice, I can distinguish with the utmost certainty whether a given 
mental act has it or not; I am hardly ever in any danger of confusing an-
other person’s mental act with one of mine; and even, if I should confuse 
them, I should know quite well (though I cannot define) what I meant by 
calling it “mine.” How am I to be assured that the sense-data, of which 
I am conscious, are related to my mental acts in this peculiar manner in 
which my mental acts are related to one another? All I can say is, that they 
do not seem to me to be so; that I can see no trace of their being so. But, 
on the other hand, it does not seem to me to be a question about which it 
is, at present, possible to be certain—to be certain either way. I conclude, 
then, that it is by no means certain that the sense-data or images of which 
I am directly conscious are related to me in this way: I see no reason to 
think they are; but, if they were, then, I think, they certainly would, in a 
perfectly good sense, be “mental” entities. 
But finally it may be contended that these sense-data are “mental” 
on still another ground. It may be contended that absolutely every sense-
datum, of which I am ever directly conscious, is an entity which is only at 
the moment at which I am conscious of it: that when my consciousness of 
it ceases to exist, it also always at once ceases to be; that it is, only when 
and so long as I am conscious of it. And the same in the case of all other 
minds: that all the sense-data of which anybody is ever conscious are enti-
ties which are only so long as that person is conscious of them. This is a 
property which does seem to me to belong to all “images”; and the fact 
that it does so seems to me sufficient to explain why people should be 
inclined to say that “images” are merely in their minds. But whether all 
the sense-data, which are in the strictest sense “given by the senses,” also 
have this property, seems to me a very difficult question. Here, again, there 
seem to me to be good arguments on both sides; but none such as to jus-
tify a certain conclusion either way. And I have not space here to consider 
them as fully as they deserve. What I do wish to consider is, whether, if 
this were so, we should be justified in saying that all sense-data were men-
tal; whether, for instance, supposing that all the images, of which I am di-
rectly conscious, are entities which have being only so long as I am directly 
conscious of them, I should be justified in saying that they were all mental 
and had being only in the mind. It seems to me that we could say this in 
a very good sense. If this view were true, the sense-data of which we are 
directly conscious, would certainly be attached to the minds of each of us 
in a very close and intimate sense; and that they should be attached to our 
minds, in this sense, would be a most important metaphysical property of 
theirs. But nevertheless it seems to me that there would be a great risk of 
confusion in saying that they were “mental,” or “merely in the mind” or 
“part of the mind” on this ground alone. It seems to me that no philoso-
pher does ever, when he talks of an entity being “mental,” mean merely 
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that it has this property. I cannot believe, for instance, that Dr. Wolf, when 
he contended that images were “mental” and “a part of the mind,” meant 
merely to assert that they had this property—merely that they are entities, 
which are only so long as we are conscious of them. It is, I think, when an 
entity is said to be “mental,” without qualification, always implied that it 
is so in some one of the other senses which I have considered; and hence, 
if by calling sense-data “mental,” it is meant merely to assert that they 
have this property, it should always be expressly stated that this and this 
only is meant. 
(b) I pass now to consider the supposition that sense-data may be “in 
the mind” even when we are not directly conscious of them. And my 
reason for considering this supposition separately from the last is that, in 
their case, it obviously cannot be meant merely that they are only so long 
as we are conscious of them; since it is expressly asserted that they are 
when we are not conscious of them at all. All the arguments, therefore, 
directed to show that sense-data, of which we are directly conscious, ex-
ist only when we are conscious of them, cannot be used at all in favour 
of this second hypothesis; and yet it seems to me that these arguments 
are far stronger than any others which can be used to prove that sense-
data are “mental” in any sense at all. If sense-data, of which we are not 
directly conscious, can be in the mind at all, they must be so in some one 
of the other senses which I have considered; and the reasons which I gave 
for doubting whether sense-data, of which we are directly conscious, are 
in the mind in any of those senses, will apply equally to these supposed 
sense-data, of which we are not directly conscious. 
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THE object of the following paper is to consider what it is that we know 
in cases where we know propositions about “the so-and-so” without 
knowing who or what the so-and-so is. For example, I know that the can-
didate who gets most votes will be elected, though I do not know who is 
the candidate who will get most votes. The problem I wish to consider is: 
What do we know in these cases, where the subject is merely described? 
I have considered this problem elsewhere1 from a purely logical point of 
view; but in what follows I wish to consider the question in relation to 
theory of knowledge as well as in relation to logic, and in view of the 
above-mentioned logical discussions, I shall in this paper make the logical 
portion as brief as possible. 
In order to make clear the antithesis between “acquaintance” and “de-
scription,” I shall first of all try to explain what I mean by “acquain-
tance.” I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct 
cognitive relation to that object, i.e. when I am directly aware of the object 
itself. When I speak of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of 
relation which constitutes judgment, but the sort which constitutes pre-
sentation. In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which I call 
acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject 
which constitutes presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance 
with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is presented to S. 
But the associations and natural extensions of the word acquaintance are 
different from those of the word presentation. To begin with, as in most 
cognitive words, it is natural to say that I am acquainted with an object 
even at moments when it is not actually before my mind, provided it has 
been before my mind, and will be again whenever occasion arises. This is 
the same sense in which I am said to know that 2 + 2 = 4 even when I am 
thinking of something else. In the second place, the word acquaintance is 
designed to emphasize, more than the word presentation, the relational 
character of the fact with which we are concerned. There is, to my mind, 
a danger that, in speaking of presentations, we may so emphasize the 
object as to lose sight of the subject. The result of this is either to lead to 
the view that there is no subject, whence we arrive at materialism; or to 
lead to the view that what is presented is part of the subject, whence we 
arrive at idealism, and should arrive at solipsism but for the most desper-
1 See references later. 
381
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2Bertrand Russell
ate contortions. Now I wish to preserve the dualism of subject and object 
in my terminology, because this dualism seems to me a fundamental fact 
concerning cognition. Hence I prefer the word acquaintance, because it 
emphasizes the need of a subject which is acquainted. 
When we ask what are the kinds of objects with which we are ac-
quainted, the first and most obvious example is sense-data. When I see a 
colour or hear a noise, I have direct acquaintance with the colour or the 
noise. The sense-datum with which I am acquainted in these cases is gen-
erally, if not always, complex. This is particularly obvious in the case of 
sight. I do not mean, of course, merely that the supposed physical object is 
complex, but that the direct sensible object is complex and contains parts 
with spatial relations. Whether it is possible to be aware of a complex 
without being aware of its constituents is not an easy question, but on the 
whole it would seem that there is no reason why it should not be possible. 
This question arises in an acute form in connection with self-conscious-
ness, which we must now briefly consider. 
In introspection, we seem to be immediately aware of varying com-
plexes, consisting of objects in various cognitive and conative relations 
to ourselves. When I see the sun, it often happens that I am aware of my 
seeing the sun, in addition to being aware of the sun; and when I desire 
food, it often happens that I am aware of my desire for food. But it is 
hard to discover any state of mind in which I am aware of myself alone, 
as opposed to a complex of which I am a constituent. The question of the 
nature of self-consciousness is too large, and too slightly connected with 
our subject, to be argued at length here. It is, however, very difficult to 
account for plain facts if we assume that we do not have acquaintance 
with ourselves. It is plain that we are not only acquainted with the com-
plex “Self-acquainted-with-A,” but we also know the proposition “I am 
acquainted with A.” Now here the complex has been analysed, and if “I” 
does not stand for something which is a direct object of acquaintance, we 
shall have to suppose that “I” is something known by description. If we 
wished to maintain the view that there is no acquaintance with Self, we 
might argue as follows: We are acquainted with acquaintance, and we 
know that it is a relation. Also we are acquainted with a complex in which 
we perceive that acquaintance is the relating relation. Hence we know that 
this complex must have a constituent which is that which is acquainted, 
i.e. must have a subject-term as well as an object-term. This subject-term 
we define as “I.” Thus “I” means “the subject-term in awarenesses of 
which I am aware.” But as a definition this cannot be regarded as a happy 
effort. It would seem necessary, therefore, to suppose that I am acquainted 
with myself, and that “I,” therefore, requires no definition, being merely 
the proper name of a certain object. Thus self-consciousness cannot be re-
garded as throwing light on the question whether we can know a complex 
without knowing its constituents. This question, however, is not impor-
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tant for our present purposes, and I shall therefore not discuss it further. 
The awarenesses we have considered so far have all been awarenesses 
of particular existents, and might all in a large sense be called sense-data. 
For, from the point of view of theory of knowledge, introspective knowl-
edge is exactly on a level with knowledge derived from sight or hearing. 
But, in addition to awareness of the above kind of objects, which may be 
called awareness of particulars, we have also what may be called aware-
ness of universals. Awareness of universals is called conceiving, and a uni-
versal of which we are aware is called a concept. Not only are we aware 
of particular yellows, but if we have seen a sufficient number of yellows 
and have sufficient intelligence, we are aware of the universal yellow; this 
universal is the subject in such judgments as “yellow differs from blue” 
or “yellow resembles blue less than green does.” And the universal yel-
low is the predicate in such judgments as “this is yellow,” where “this” 
is a particular sense-datum. And universal relations, too, are objects of 
awarenesses; up and down, before and after, resemblance, desire, aware-
ness itself, and so on, would seem to be all of them objects of which we 
can be aware. 
In regard to relations, it might be urged that we are never aware of the 
universal relation itself, but only of complexes in which it is a constituent. 
For example, it may be said that we do not know directly such a relation 
as before, though we understand such a proposition as “this is before 
that,” and may be directly aware of such a complex as “this being before 
that.” This view, however, is difficult to reconcile with the fact that we 
often know propositions in which the relation is the subject, or in which 
the relata are not definite given objects, but “anything.” For example, we 
know that if one thing is before another, and the other before a third, then 
the first is before the third; and here the things concerned are not definite 
things, but “anything.” It is hard to see how we could know such a fact 
about “before” unless we were acquainted with “before,” and not merely 
with actual particular cases of one given object being before another giv-
en object. And more directly: A judgment such as “this is before that,” 
where this judgment is derived from awareness of a complex, constitutes 
an analysis, and we should not understand the analysis if we were not ac-
quainted with the meaning of the terms employed. Thus we must suppose 
that we are acquainted with the meaning of “before,” and not merely with 
instances of it. 
There are thus two sorts of objects of which we are aware, namely, 
particulars and universals. Among particulars I include all existents, and 
all complexes of which one or more constituents are existents, such as 
this-before-that, this-above-that, the-yellowness-of-this. Among univer-
sals I include all objects of which no particular is a constituent. Thus the 
disjunction “universal-particular” is exhaustive. We might also call it the 
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disjunction “abstract-concrete.” It is not quite parallel with the opposi-
tion “concept-percept,” because things remembered or imagined belong 
with particulars, but can hardly be called percepts. (On the other hand, 
universals with which we are acquainted may be identified with concepts.) 
It will be seen that among the objects with which we are acquainted 
are not included physical objects (as opposed to sense-data), nor other 
people’s minds. These things are known to us by what I call “knowledge 
by description,” which we must now consider. 
By a “description” I mean any phrase of the form “a so-and-so” or 
“the so-and-so.” A phrase of the form “a so-and-so” I shall call an “am-
biguous” description; a phrase of the form “the so-and-so” (in the singu-
lar) I shall call a “definite” description. Thus “a man” is an ambiguous 
description, and “the man with the iron mask” is a definite description. 
There are various problems connected with ambiguous descriptions, but 
I pass them by, since they do not directly concern the matter I wish to 
discuss. What I wish to discuss is the nature of our knowledge concern-
ing objects in cases where we know that there is an object answering to a 
definite description, though we are not acquainted with any such object. 
This is a matter which is concerned exclusively with definite descriptions. I 
shall, therefore, in the sequel, speak simply of “descriptions” when I mean 
“definite descriptions.” Thus a description will mean any phrase of the 
form “the so-and-so” in the singular. 
I shall say that an object is “known by description” when we know 
that it is “the so-and-so,” i.e. when we know that there is one object, 
and no more, having a certain property; and it will generally be implied 
that we do not have knowledge of the same object by acquaintance. We 
know that the man with the iron mask existed, and many propositions are 
known about him; but we do not know who he was. We know that the 
candi date who gets most votes will be elected, and in this case we are very 
likely also acquainted (in the only sense in which one can be acquainted 
with some one else) with the man who is, in fact, the candidate who will 
get most votes, but we do not know which of the candidates he is, i.e. we 
do not know any proposition of the form “A is the candidate who will 
get most votes” where A is one of the candidates by name. We shall say 
that we have “merely descriptive knowledge” of the so-and-so when, al-
though we know that the so-and-so exists, and although we may possibly 
be acquainted with the object which is, in fact, the so-and-so, yet we do 
not know any proposition “a is the so-and-so,” where a is something with 
which we are acquainted. 
When we say “the so-and-so exists,” we mean that there is just one 
object which is the so-and-so. The proposition “a is the so-and-so” means 
that a has the property so-and-so, and nothing else has. “Sir Joseph Lar-
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mor is the Unionist candidate” means “Sir Joseph Larmor is a Unionist 
candidate, and no one else is.” “The Unionist candidate exists” means 
“someone is a Unionist candidate, and no one else is.” Thus, when we 
are acquainted with an object which is the so-and-so, we know that the 
so-and-so exists, but we may know that the so-and-so exists when we are 
not acquainted with any object which we know to be the so-and-so, and 
even when we are not acquainted with any object which, in fact, is the 
so-and-so. 
Common words, even proper names, are usually really descriptions. 
That is to say, the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name 
correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the proper 
name by a description. Moreover, the description required to express the 
thought will vary for different people, or for the same person at different 
times. The only thing constant (so long as the name is rightly used) is the 
object to which the name applies. But so long as this remains constant, the 
particular description involved usually makes no difference to the truth or 
falsehood of the proposition in which the name appears. 
Let us take some illustrations. Suppose some statement made about 
Bismarck. Assuming that there is such a thing as direct acquaintance with 
oneself, Bismarck himself might have used his name directly to designate 
the particular person with whom he was acquainted. In this case, if he 
made a judgment about himself, he himself might be a constituent of the 
judgment. Here the proper name has the direct use which it always wishes 
to have, as simply standing for a certain object, and not for a descrip-
tion of the object. But if a person who knew Bismarck made a judgment 
about him, the case is different. What this person was acquainted with 
were certain sense-data which he connected (rightly, we will suppose) with 
Bismarck’s body. His body as a physical object, and still more his mind, 
were only known as the body and the mind connected with these sense-
data That is, they were known by description. It is, of course, very much 
a matter of chance which characteristics of a man’s appearance will come 
into a friend’s mind when he thinks of him; thus the description actually 
in the friend’s mind is accidental. The essential point is that he knows that 
the various descriptions all apply to the same entity, in spite of not being 
acquainted with the entity in question. 
When we, who did not know Bismarck, make a judgment about him, 
the description in our minds will probably be some more or less vague 
mass of historical knowledge—far more, in most cases, than is required to 
identify him. But, for the sake of illustration, let us assume that we think 
of him as “the first Chancellor of the German Empire.” Here all the words 
are abstract except “German.” The word “German” will again have dif-
ferent meanings for different people. To some it will recall travels in Ger-
many, to some the look of Germany on the map, and so on. But if we are 
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to obtain a description which we know to be applicable, we shall be com-
pelled, at some point, to bring in a reference to a particular with which we 
are acquainted. Such reference is involved in any mention of past, pres-
ent, and future (as opposed to definite dates), or of here and there, or of 
what others have told us. Thus it would seem that, in some way or other, 
a description known to be applicable to a particular must involve some 
reference to a particular with which we are acquainted, if our knowledge 
about the thing described is not to be merely what follows logically from 
the description. For example, “the most long-lived of men” is a descrip-
tion which must apply to some man, but we can make no judgments con-
cerning this man which involve knowledge about him beyond what the 
description gives. If, however, we say, “the first Chancellor of the German 
Empire was an astute diplomatist,” we can only be assured of the truth 
of our judgment in virtue of something with which we are acquainted — 
usually a testimony heard or read. Considered psychologically, apart from 
the information we convey to others, apart from the fact about the actual 
Bismarck, which gives importance to our judgment, the thought we really 
have contains the one or more particulars involved, and otherwise consists 
wholly of concepts. All names of places—London, England, Europe, the 
earth, the Solar System—similarly involve, when used, descriptions which 
start from some one or more particulars with which we are acquainted. 
I suspect that even the Universe, as considered by metaphysics, involves 
such a connection with particulars. In logic, on the contrary, where we are 
concerned not merely with what does exist, but with whatever might or 
could exist or be, no reference to actual particulars is involved. 
It would seem that, when we make a statement about something only 
known by description, we often intend to make our statement, not in the 
form involving the description, but about the actual thing described. That 
is to say, when we say anything about Bismarck, we should like, if we 
could, to make the judgment which Bismarck alone can make, namely, the 
judgment of which he himself is a constituent. In this we are necessarily 
defeated, since the actual Bismarck is unknown to us. But we know that 
there is an object B called Bismarck, and that B was an astute diplomatist. 
We can thus describe the proposition we should like to affirm, namely, “B 
was an astute diplomatist,” where B is the object which was Bismarck. 
What enables us to communicate in spite of the varying descriptions we 
employ is that we know there is a true proposition concerning the actual 
Bismarck, and that however we may vary the description (so long as the 
description is correct), the proposition described is still the same. This 
proposition, which is described and is known to be true, is what interests 
us; but we are not acquainted with the proposition itself, and do not know 
it, though we know it is true. 
It will be seen that there are various stages in the removal from ac-
quaintance with particulars: there is Bismarck to people who knew him, 
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Bismarck to those who only know of him through history, the man with 
the iron mask, the longest-lived of men. These are progressively further 
removed from acquaintance with particulars, and there is a similar hier-
archy in the region of universals. Many universals, like many particulars, 
are only known to us by description. But here, as in the case of particulars, 
knowledge concerning what is known by description is ultimately reduc-
ible to knowledge concerning what is known by acquaintance. 
The fundamental epistemological principle in the analysis of proposi-
tions containing descriptions is this: Every proposition which we can un-
derstand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are ac-
quainted. From what has been said already, it will be plain why I advocate 
this principle, and how I propose to meet the case of propositions which 
at first sight contravene it. Let us begin with the reasons for supposing the 
principle true.
The chief reason for supposing the principle true is that it seems 
scarcely possible to believe that we can make a judgment or entertain a 
supposition without knowing what it is that we are judging or supposing 
about. If we make a judgment about (say) Julius Caesar, it is plain that the 
actual person who was Julius Caesar is not a constituent of the judgment. 
But before going further, it may be well to explain what I mean when I 
say that this or that is a constituent of a judgment, or of a proposition 
which we understand. To begin with judgments: a judgment, as an oc-
currence, I take to be a relation of a mind to several entities, namely, the 
entities which compose what is judged. If, e.g., I judge that A love’s B, the 
judgment as an event consists in the existence, at a certain moment, of 
a specific four-term relation, called judging, between me and A and love 
and B. That is to say, at the time when I judge, there is a certain complex 
whose terms are myself and A and love and B, and whose relating relation 
is judging. (The relation love enters as one of the terms of the relation, 
not as a relating relation.) My reasons for this view have been set forth 
elsewhere,2 and I shall not repeat them here. Assuming this view of judg-
ment, the constituents of the judgment are simply the constituents of the 
complex which is the judgment. Thus, in the above case, the constituents 
are myself and A and love and B and judging. But myself and judging are 
constituents shared by all my judgments; thus the distinctive constituents 
of the particular judgment in question are A and love and B. Coming 
now to what is meant by “understanding a proposition,” I should say 
that there is another relation possible between me and A and love and B, 
which is called my supposing that A loves B.3 When we can suppose that 
2 Philosophical Essays, “The Nature of Truth.” 
3 Cf. Meinong, Ueber Annahmen, passim. I formerly supposed, contrary to Meinong’s 
view, that the relationship of supposing might be merely that of presentation. In this view 
I now think I was mistaken, and Meinong is right. But my present view depends upon the 
theory that both in judgment and in assumption there is no single Objective, but the sev-
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A loves B, we “understand the proposition” A loves B. Thus we often 
understand a proposition in cases where we have not enough knowledge 
to make a judgment. Supposing, like judging, is a many-term relation, 
of which a mind is one term. The other terms of the relation are called 
the con stituents of the proposition supposed. Thus the principle which I 
enunciated may be restated as follows: Whenever a relation of supposing 
or judging occurs, the terms to which the supposing or judging mind is 
related by the relation of supposing or judging must be terms with which 
the mind in question is acquainted. This is merely to say that we cannot 
make a judgment or a supposition without knowing what it is that we are 
making our judgment or supposition about. It seems to me that the truth 
of this principle is evident as soon as the principle is understood; I shall, 
therefore, in what follows, assume the principle, and use it as a guide in 
analysing judgments that contain descriptions. 
Returning now to Julius Caesar, I assume that it will be admitted that 
he himself is not a constituent of any judgment which I can make. But at 
this point it is necessary to examine the view that judgments are composed 
of something called “ideas,” and that it is the “idea” of Julius Caesar 
that is a constituent of my judgment. I believe the plausibility of this view 
rests upon a failure to form a right theory of descriptions. We may mean 
by my “idea” of Julius Caesar the things that I know about him, e.g., 
that he conquered Gaul, was assassinated on the Ides of March, and is a 
plague to schoolboys. Now I am admitting, and indeed contending, that 
in order to discover what is actually in my mind when I judge about Julius 
Caesar, we must substitute for the proper name a description made up 
of some of the things I know about him. (A description which will often 
serve to express my thought is “the man whose name was Julius Caesar.” 
For whatever else I may have forgotten about him, it is plain that when I 
mention him I have not forgotten that that was his name.) But although I 
think the theory that judgments consist of ideas may have been suggested 
in some such way, yet I think the theory itself is fundamentally mistaken. 
The view seems to be that there is some mental existent which may be 
called the “idea” of something outside the mind of the person who has the 
idea, and that, since judgment is a mental event, its constituents must be 
constituents of the mind of the person judging. But in this view ideas be-
come a veil between us and outside things—we never really, in knowledge, 
attain to the things we are supposed to be knowing about, but only to the 
ideas of those things. The relation of mind, idea, and object, on this view, 
is utterly obscure, and, so far as I can see, nothing discoverable by inspec-
tion warrants the intrusion of the idea between the mind and the object. 
I suspect that the view is fostered by the dislike of relations, and that it is 
felt the mind could not know objects unless there were something “in” the 
mind which could be called the state of knowing the object. Such a view, 
eral constituents of the judgment or assumption are in a many-term’ relation to the mind. 
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however, leads at once to a vicious endless regress, since the relation of 
idea to object will have to be explained by supposing that the idea itself 
has an idea of the object, and so on ad infinitum. I therefore see no rea-
son to believe that, when we are acquainted with an object, there is in us 
something which can be called the “idea” of the object. On the contrary, 
I hold that acquaintance is wholly a relation, not demanding any such 
constituent of the mind as is supposed by advocates of “ideas.” This is, of 
course a large question, and one which would take us far from our subject 
if it were adequately discussed. I therefore content myself with the above 
indications, and with the corollary that, in judging, the actual objects con-
cerning which we judge, rather than any supposed purely mental entities, 
are constituents of the complex which is the judgment. 
When, therefore, I say that we must substitute for “Julius Caesar” 
some description of Julius Caesar, in order to discover the meaning of a 
judgment nominally about him, I am not saying that we must substitute 
an idea. Suppose our description is “the man whose name was Julius Cae-
sar.” Let our judgment be “Julius Caesar was assassinated.” Then it be-
comes “the man whose name was Julius Caesar was assassinated.” Here 
Julius Caesar is a noise or shape with which we are acquainted, and all the 
other constituents of the judgment (neglecting the tense in “was”) are con-
cepts with which we are acquainted. Thus our judgment is wholly reduced 
to constituents with which we are acquainted, but Julius Caesar himself 
has ceased to be a constituent of our judgment. This, however, requires 
a proviso, to be further explained shortly, namely, that “the man whose 
name was Julius Caesar” must not, as a whole, be a constituent of our 
judgment, that is to say, this phrase must not, as a whole, have a mean-
ing which enters into the judgment. Any right analysis of the judgment, 
therefore, must break up this phrase, and not treat it as a subordinate 
complex which is part of the judgment. The judgment “the man whose 
name was Julius Caesar was assassinated” may be interpreted as meaning 
“One and only one man was called Julius Caesar, and that one was assas-
sinated.” Here it is plain that there is no constituent corresponding to the 
phrase “the man whose name was Julius Caesar.” Thus there is no reason 
to regard this phrase as expressing a constituent of the judgment, and we 
have seen that this phrase must be broken up if we are to be acquainted 
with all the constituents of the judgment. This conclusion, which we have 
reached from considerations concerned with the theory of knowledge, is 
also forced upon us by logical considerations, which must now be briefly 
reviewed. 
It is common to distinguish two aspects, meaning and denotation, in 
such phrases as “the author of Waverley.” The meaning will be a certain 
complex, consisting (at least) of authorship and Waverley with some rela-
tion; the denotation will be Scott. Similarly “featherless bipeds” will have 
a complex meaning, containing as constituents the presence of two feet 
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and the absence of feathers, while its denotation will be the class of men. 
Thus when we say “Scott is the author of Waverley” or “men are the same 
as featherless bipeds,” we are asserting an identity of denotation, and this 
assertion is worth making because of the diversity of meaning.4 I believe 
that the duality of meaning and denotation, though capable of a true in-
terpretation, is misleading if taken as fundamental. The denotation, I be-
lieve, is not a constituent of the proposition, except in the case of proper 
names, i.e. of words which do not assign a property to an object, but 
merely and solely name it. And I should hold further that, in this sense, 
there are only two words which are strictly proper names of particulars, 
namely, “I” and “this.”
One reason for not believing the denotation to be a constituent of the 
proposition is that we may know the proposition even when we are not 
acquainted with the denotation. The proposition “the author of Waverley 
is a novelist” was known to people who did not know that “the author 
of Waverley” denoted Scott. This reason has been already sufficiently em-
phasised. 
A second reason is that propositions concerning “the so-.and-so” are 
possible even when “the so-and-so” has no denotation. Take, e.g., “the 
golden mountain does not exist” or “the round square is self-contradicto-
ry.” If we are to preserve the duality of meaning and denotation, we have 
to say, with Meinong, that there are such objects as the golden mountain 
and the round square, although these objects do not have being. We even 
have to admit that the existent round square is existent, but does not ex-
ist.5 Meinong does not regard this as a contradiction, but I fail to see that 
it is not one. Indeed, it seems to me evident that the judgment “there is no 
such object as the round square” does not presuppose that there is such an 
object. If this is admitted, however, we are led to the conclusion that, by 
parity of form, no judgment concerning “the so-and-so” actually involves 
the so-and-so as a con stituent. 
Miss Jones6 contends that there is no difficulty in admitting contradic-
tory predicates concerning such an object as “the present King of France,” 
on the ground that this object is in itself contradictory. Now it might, of 
course, be argued that this object, unlike the round square, is not self-
contradictory, but merely non-existent. This, however, would not go to 
the root of the matter. The real objection to such an argument is that the 
law of contradiction ought not to be stated in the traditional form “A is 
not both B and not B,” but in the form “no proposition is both true and 
false.” The traditional form only applies to certain propositions, namely, 
4 This view has been recently advocated by Miss E.E.C. Jones, “A New Law of Thought 
and its Implications,” Mind, January, 1911. 
5 Meinong, Ueber Annahmen, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1910, p. 141.
6 Mind, July, 1910, p. 380.
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to those which attribute a predicate to a subject. When the law is stated of 
propositions, instead of being stated concerning subjects and predicates, 
it is at once evident that propositions about the present King of France or 
the round square can form no exception, but are just as incapable of being 
both true and false as other propositions. 
Miss Jones7 argues that “Scott is the author of Waverley” asserts iden-
tity of denotation between Scott and the author of Waverley. But there is 
some difficulty in choosing among alternative meanings of this conten-
tion. In the first place, it should be observed that the author of Waverley is 
not a mere name, like Scott. Scott is merely a noise or shape convention-
ally used to designate a certain person; it gives us no information about 
that person, and has nothing that can be called meaning as opposed to 
denotation. (I neglect the fact, considered above, that even proper names, 
as a rule, really stand for descriptions.) But the author of Waverley is not 
merely conventionally a name for Scott; the element of mere convention 
belongs here to the separate words, the and author and of and Waverley. 
Given what these words stand, for, the author of Waverley is no longer 
arbitrary. When it is said that Scott is the author of Waverley, we are not 
stating that these are two names for one man, as we should be if we said 
“Scott is Sir Walter.” A man’s name is what he is called, but however much 
Scott had been called the author of Waverley, that would not have made 
him be the author; it was necessary for him actually to write Waverley, 
which was a fact having nothing to do with names. 
If, then, we are asserting identity of denotation, we must not mean 
by denotation the mere relation of a name to the thing named. In fact, 
it would be nearer to the truth to say that the meaning of “Scott” is the 
denotation of “the author of Waverley.” The relation of “Scott” to Scott 
is that “Scott” means Scott, just as the relation of “author” to the con-
cept which is so called is that “author” means this concept. Thus if we 
distinguish meaning and denotation in “the author of Waverley,” we shall 
have to say that “Scott” has meaning but not denotation. Also when we 
say “Scott is the author of Waverley,” the meaning of “the author of Wa-
verley” is relevant to our assertion. For if the denotation alone were rel-
evant, any other phrase with the same denotation would give the same 
proposition. Thus “Scott is the author of Marmion” would be the same 
proposition as “Scott is the author of Waverley.” But this is plainly not 
the case, since from the first we learn that Scott wrote Marmion and from 
the second we learn that he wrote Waverley, but the first tells us nothing 
about Waverley and the second nothing about Marmion. Hence the mean-
ing of “the author of Waverley,” as opposed to the denotation, is certainly 
relevant to “Scott is the author of Waverley.” 
We have thus agreed that “the author of Waverley” is not a mere name, 
7 Mind, July, 1910, p. 379. 
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and that its meaning is relevant in propositions in which it occurs. Thus if 
we are to say, as Miss Jones does, that “Scott is the author of Waverley” 
asserts an identity of denotation, we must regard the denotation of “the 
author of Waverley” as the denotation of what is meant by “the author of 
Waverley.” Let us call the meaning of “the author of Waverley” M. Thus 
M is what “the author of Waverley” means. Then we are to suppose that 
“Scott is the author of Waverley” means “Scott is the denotation of M.” 
But here we are explaining our proposition by another of the same form, 
and thus we have made no progress towards a real explanation. “The 
denotation of M,” like “the author of Waverley,” has both meaning and 
denotation, on the theory we are examining. If we call its meaning M’, 
our proposition becomes “Scott is the denotation of M’.” But this leads 
at once to an endless regress. Thus the attempt to regard our proposition 
as asserting identity of denotation breaks down, and it becomes impera-
tive to find some other analysis. When this analysis has been completed, 
we shall be able to reinterpret the phrase “identity of denotation,” which 
remains obscure so long as it is taken as fundamental. 
The first point to observe is that, in any proposition about “the author 
of Waverley,” provided Scott is not explicitly mentioned, the denotation 
itself, i.e. Scott, does not occur, but only the concept of denotation, which 
will be represented by a variable. Suppose we say “the author of Waverley 
was the author of Marmion,” we are certainly not saying that both were 
Scott—we may have forgotten that there was such a person as Scott. We 
are saying that there is some man who was the author of Waverley and the 
author of Marmion. That is to say, there is some one who wrote Waverley 
and Marmion, and no one else wrote them. Thus the identity is that of 
a variable, i.e., of an indefinite subject, “some one.” This is why we can 
understand propositions about “the author of Waverley,” without know-
ing who he was. When we say “the author of Waverley was a poet” we 
mean “one and only one man wrote Waverley, and he was a poet”; when 
we say “the author of Waverley was Scott” we mean “one and only one 
man wrote Waverley, and he was Scott.” Here the identity is between a 
variable, i.e. an indeterminate subject (“he”), and Scott; “the author of 
Waverley” has been analysed away, and no longer appears as a constituent 
of the proposition.8 
The reason why it is imperative to analyse away the phrase “the au-
thor of Waverley” may be stated as follows. It is plain that when we say 
“the author of Waverley is the author of Marmion,” the is expresses iden-
tity. We have seen also that the common denotation, namely Scott, is not a 
constituent of this proposition, while the meanings (if any) of “the author 
of Waverley” and “the author of Marmion” are not identical. We have 
8 The theory which I am advocating is set forth fully, with the logical grounds in its fa-
vour, in Principia Mathematica, Vol. I, Introduction, Chap. III; also, less fully, in Mind, 
October, 1905. 
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seen also that, in any sense in which the meaning of a word is a constitu-
ent of a proposition in whose verbal expression the word occurs, “Scott” 
means the actual man Scott, in the same sense in which “author” means 
a certain universal. Thus, if “the author of Waverley” were a subordinate 
complex in the above proposition, its meaning would have to be what was 
said to be identical with the meaning of “the author of Marmion.” This 
is plainly not the case; and the only escape is to say that “the author of 
Waverley” does not, by itself, have a meaning, though phrases of which it 
is part do have a meaning. That is, in a right analysis of the above propo-
sition, “the author of Waverley” must disappear. This is effected when 
the above proposition is analysed as meaning: “Some one wrote Waverley 
and no one else did, and that some one also wrote Marmion and no one 
else did.” This may be more simply expressed by saying that the proposi-
tional function “x wrote Waverley and Marmion, and no one else did” is 
capable of truth, i.e. some value of x makes it true. Thus the true subject 
of our judgment is a propositional function, i.e. a complex containing an 
undetermined constituent, and becoming a proposition as soon as this 
constituent is determined. 
We may now define the denotation of a phrase. If we know that the 
proposition “a is the so-and-so” is true, i.e. that a is so-and-so and noth-
ing else is, we call a the denotation of the phrase “the so-and-so.” A very 
great many of the propositions we naturally make about “the so-and-so” 
will remain true or remain false if we substitute a for “the so-and-so,” 
where a is the denotation of “the so-and-so.” Such propositions will also 
remain true or remain false if we substitute for “the so-and-so” any other 
phrase having the same denotation. Hence, as practical men, we become 
interested in the denotation more than in the description, since the denota-
tion decides as to the truth or falsehood of so many statements in which 
the description occurs. Moreover, as we saw earlier in considering the 
relations of description and acquaintance, we often wish to reach the de-
notation, and are only hindered by lack of acquaintance: in such cases the 
description is merely the means we employ to get as near as possible to the 
denotation. Hence it naturally comes to be supposed that the denotation is 
part of the proposition in which the description occurs. But we have seen, 
both on logical and on epistemological grounds, that this is an error. The 
actual object (if any) which is the denotation is not. (unless it is explicitly 
mentioned) a constituent of propositions in which descriptions occur; and 
this is the reason why, in order to understand such propositions, we need 
acquaintance with the constituents of the description, but do not need 
acquaintance with its denotation. The first result of analysis, when ap-
plied to propositions whose grammatical subject is “the so-and-so,” is to 
substitute a variable as subject: i.e. we obtain a proposition of the form: 
“There is something which alone is so-and-so, and that something is such-
and-such.” The further analysis of propositions concerning “the so-and-
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so” is thus merged in the problem of the nature of the variable, i.e. of the 
meanings of some, any, and all. This is a difficult problem, concerning 
which I do not intend to say anything at present. 
To sum up our whole discussion: We began by distinguishing two sorts 
of knowledge of objects, namely, knowledge by acquaintance and knowl-
edge by description. Of these it is only the former that brings the object 
itself before the mind. We have acquaintance with sense-data, with many 
universals, and possibly with ourselves, but not with physical objects or 
other minds. We have descriptive knowledge of an object when we know 
that it is the object having some property or properties with which we are 
acquainted; that is to say, when we know that the property or properties in 
question belong to one object and no more, we are said to have knowledge 
of that one object by description, whether or not we are acquainted with 
the object. Our knowledge of physical objects and of other minds is only 
knowledge by description, the descriptions involved being usually such as 
involve sense-data. All propositions intelligible to us, whether or not they 
primarily concern things only known to us by description, are composed 
wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted, for a constituent 
with which we are not acquainted is unintelli gible to us. A judgment, we 
found, is not composed of mental constituents called “ideas,” but consists 
of a complex whose constituents are a mind and certain objects, particu-
lars or universals. (One at least must be a universal.) When a judgment is 
rightly analysed, the objects which are constituents of it must all be objects 
with which the mind which is a constituent of it is acquainted. This con-
clusion forces us to analyse descriptive phrases occurring in propositions, 
and to say that the objects denoted by such phrases are not constituents of 
judgments in which such phrases occur (unless these objects are explicitly 
mentioned). This leads us to the view (recommended also on purely logi-
cal grounds) that when we say “the author of Marmion was the author 
of Waverley,” Scott himself is not a constituent of our judgment, and that 
the judgment cannot be explained by saying that it affirms identity of 
denotation with diversity of connotation. It also, plainly, does not assert 
identity of meaning. Such judgments, therefore, can only be analysed by 
breaking up the descriptive phrases, introducing a variable, and making 
propositional functions the ultimate subjects. In fact, “the so-and-so is 
such-and-such” will mean that “x is so-and-so and nothing else is, and 
x is such-and-such” is capable of truth. The analysis of such judgments 
involves many fresh problems, but the discussion of these problems is not 
undertaken in the present paper. 

G .  D A W E S  H I C K S
A p p e a r a n c e s  a n d 
R e a l  E x i s t e n c e
P R O C E E D I N G S  O F  T H E  A R I S T O T E L I A N  S O C I E T Y
V O L U M E  X I V
1 9 1 4
E D I T O R I A L  N O T E
The following paper by G. Dawes Hicks - “Appearances and Real Exist-
ence” - was originally published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
New Series, Volume XIV (1913-1914), pp. 1-48.
For Hicks’ biography, please scroll up to page 106.
397
X I V. A P P E A R A N C E  A N D  R E A L  E X I S T E N C E
G. DAW E S  H I C K S
WE are being told by many of those who ought to know, that at the 
present time we are passing through a transition stage in philosophical 
thinking, and that there is being manifested, on all sides of us, a grow-
ing discontent with the constructive work of the generations immediately 
preceding our own. I confess that statements of this sort make less impres-
sion upon me than they would do had I not discovered that whenever 
philosophical inquirers endeavour to take stock of the achievements of the 
age in which they live, they are almost invariably to be found lamenting 
over the unsatisfactory condition of philosophical research. The stream of 
disparaging estimates took its rise at least as far back as Heracleitus, who 
discerned only an “art of mischief” (κακοτεχνίη) in the investigation that 
was going on around him. Plato’s reiterated complaints about the status 
of philosophy in his day are too well known to be set down here, and even 
Aristotle, fond as he was of summarising the views of others, rarely does 
so without seeing in them either blurred and hazy anticipations of his own 
or else one-sided and crude misinterpretations of the truth. To Descartes, 
the fundamental conceptions of the contemporary philosophy seemed so 
infirm that the superstructure reared upon them would collapse before the 
slightest attack; Locke felt himself confronted with a “sanctuary of vanity 
and ignorance”; whilst Hume declared that “principles taken upon trust, 
consequences lamely deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, 
and of evidence in the whole” were “everywhere to be met with in the 
systems of the most eminent philosophers,” and were “bringing disgrace 
upon philosophy itself.” I will not pursue the story; from Hume’s day to 
this its course has been consistent with that which preceded it. “The crisis 
of modern speculation” is the title of a well-known essay of Ferrier’s, and 
the truth is, I suppose, that to be perpetually in front of crises is an indica-
tion, so far as philosophy is concerned, not of decrepitude or of impending 
death, but rather of healthy and vigorous life. If philosophical thinking 
is progressive, it must, at every stage of its advance, be creating for itself 
new problems, and in view of their largeness and comprehensiveness, the 
situation can scarcely fail to present a certain aspect of hopelessness to the 
minds that are wrestling with them. 
I do not conceive, then, that to speak of a crisis in the speculation of 
the present day implies any unusual state of affairs. But I have been more 
and more convinced of late that the subject to which I propose on this oc-
casion to invite attention is being forced upon us by the various diverging 
lines of philosophical reflection which, during the last few years, have been 
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occupying our minds. Since the publication of Mr. Bradley’s great work in 
1893, no distinction has been more readily pressed into service as a means 
of making headway in metaphysical construction than the distinction be-
tween appearance and reality. Mr. Bradley explained with much care and 
precision the significance which the distinction had for him. Anything 
which comes short when compared with reality is called by him “appear-
ance,” meaning thereby not that the thing always itself is an appearance, 
but that its character becomes an appearance in any judgment we can make 
concerning it. Reality being conceived as the single Absolute Experience, 
immanent in finite centres of feeling but never wholly included in any one 
finite centre, it follows that the contents of a finite subject’s experience will 
point beyond themselves, and will come to have for knowledge a meaning, 
this meaning being used as an idea, as an adjective qualifying that which 
is other than its own being. Appearance, therefore, will be constituted by 
the looseness of content from existence, by the “what “ becoming alien-
ated from its “that” and passing away towards another “that.” Discursive 
knowledge will thus always be knowledge of appearance, because, on the 
one hand, it will always be knowledge of an adjective of reality, and on the 
other hand the adjective will not in itself be real. Moreover, because every 
such finite fact in order to complete itself must pass beyond itself, noth-
ing in the end will be real except the Absolute, although every finite fact, 
as qualifying the Absolute, will possess a degree of reality, the degree de-
pending upon the amount of supplementation required for its completion. 
How far this mode of interpreting the distinction is coherent and able to 
bear the weight of all that is made to repose upon it has been a well worn 
subject of controversy, but to Mr. Bradley belongs the credit at any rate of 
recognising the necessity of an attempt to formulate as unambiguously as 
possible the import of the distinction and its implications. In later treat-
ments of metaphysical problems, however, I find the term “appearance,” 
or equivalent expressions, freely used, but without any corresponding ef-
fort to make explicit and unmistakable the exact sense in which it is to 
be understood or how what it implies is to be interpreted. When, for ex-
ample, Professor Ward tells us that, according to his system of monadism, 
“material phenomena are only the manifestation of minds,”1 the reflection 
cannot be avoided that the whole crux of the position is contained in the 
perplexing notion of manifestation, employed to characterise the nature 
of the phenomena, and that until that notion is cleared up there are no 
means of testing the strength of the theory. Or, again, when we are told 
that in the metaphysics of Dr. Bosanquet and M. Bergson “there is practi-
cally entire agreement in the way in which the problem is presented,” and 
that “in both theories the world as we know it in our everyday experience 
is appearance, and the reality has to be sought for,”2 one feels, I think, at 
once that the latter statement could only be truly significant if the conno-
1 Realm of Ends, p. 247. 
2 Life and Logic, by Dr. H. W. Carr, in Mind, October, 1913, p. 485.
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tation, at all events, of the term “appearance” were for the two thinkers 
in question substantially similar. But if for the one “appearance is distin-
guished from reality by its selected or partial conditions,” and approaches 
nearer and nearer to reality the more this defect is remedied, whilst for 
the other “appearance” is a fabrication of the intellect which no amount 
of supplementation could ever transform into the reality which has to be 
sought for, then I doubt whether much, or anything, is gained by trying to 
constitute an identity of problem in the two cases. Or, once more, when 
Professor Husserl persists in calling the pure science which he takes to be 
presupposed by empirical psychology on the one hand and by the criticism 
of knowledge on the other “Phänomenologie,” he is availing himself ap-
parently of a use of the term “phenomena” such as is baldly indicated in 
Brentano’s remark that “neither ought natural science to be defined as the 
science of bodies nor psychology as the science of the soul, but the former 
is to be regarded as the science of physical and the latter in like man-
ner as the science of psychical phenomena.” Starting with this more or 
less popular acceptation of the word, Husserl describes the fundamental 
philosophical discipline, the field of which he is concerned to differentiate, 
as a Wesenslehre, a theory not of real but of transcendentally reduced phe-
nomena, and he constitutes straightway, within the sphere of the phenom-
ena as thus conceived, a distinction between Tatsache and Wesen, Reales 
and Nicht-Reales. Moreover, the inquiry into the groups of problems, the 
lines and methods of research, characteristic of the new science, does not 
proceed far until a further distinction, and a distinction of vital moment, 
has to be drawn. In the domain of the psychical there is no difference, he 
contends, between appearance and being; the psychical is experienced not 
as that which appears but as Erlebnis, and an Erlebnis does not present 
itself (stellt sich nicht dar) but is perceptible in immanent perception. In 
the domain of the physical, on the other hand, the case is very different. 
A thing is necessarily given in mere ways of appearance, because it is itself 
always transcendent, and can, therefore, as such never form part of the 
stream of living experience. The spatial thing is, indeed, notwithstanding 
its transcendence, directly given to consciousness; there is in consciousness 
no picture or sign which is immanently apprehended in the place of the 
thing itself. It is given, however, subject to the conditions imposed by the 
circumstance that consciousness is in a state of perpetual change and flux; 
it is given, too, in various settings and in different perspectives. As given, 
it shadows off (sich abschatten) in manifold directions, and it does so in 
consequence of its spatial relations to a vast number of other things. But 
ein Erlebnis schattet sich nicht ab; it is absolutely there, with all its quali-
ties, etc., in immanent inner perception, and to speak of it as appearing, as 
presenting itself through adumbration, is senseless.3 Stimulating and sug-
gestive as Professor Husserl’s analysis undoubtedly is, it suffers, I venture 
3 See Husserl’s article in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und pänomenologische Forschung, Bd. 
i, 1913. 
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to urge, all through from the want of a preliminary determination of the 
precise meaning he intends the terms “phenomenon” and “appearance” 
to bear, and of the position to be assigned in the world of reality to what 
is denoted by these terms. I have taken simply examples that happened to 
be ready at hand. They could be easily multiplied, were it needful, from 
current philosophical literature. 
In fine, it can hardly be gainsaid that in this reference, as in so much 
else in philosophy, we run the danger of allowing ourselves to be satisfied 
with a mere phrase. Certain it is that no metaphysical account of real-
ity is in any way furthered by simply dismissing either some or all the 
features of the world of experience as merely apparent or phenomenal. 
Even though we go to the extent of pronouncing that which is specifically 
appearance to be illusory, still an illusion is none the less an entity that 
calls for explanation, and the ground of its possibility must be rendered 
intelligible if such procedure is to be justified as philosophically valid. 
It does not, indeed, require any great amount of reflective consideration 
to convince ourselves that many of our ordinary views of things are in a 
manner illusory, that they imply in regard to real existence what is wholly 
incompatible with that which we have good reason for thinking must be 
its nature. But, all the same, as given in experience, they must have cor-
responding to them something in the conditions under which experience 
comes about. Wie viel Schein, so viel Hindeutung aufs Sein—this dictum 
of Herbart’s retains its validity, even though we reject entirely his mode of 
representing the constitution of the ultimately real. A conception of reality 
that leaves inexplicable those features of experience which we characterise 
as unreal fails undoubtedly in fulfilling one of the main functions required 
of such a conception. 
i.
The consideration upon which I have just been laying stress can, perhaps, 
best be followed up by reference to the celebrated argument developed 
by Plato in the Sophist. It is one of the outstanding merits of that great 
dialogue that Plato connects with the larger inquiries of metaphysics what 
might at first sight be regarded as no more than a problem of psychology 
or of epistemology. He sees that the feature of unreality attaching to the 
notion of phenomenon cannot be disposed of by the easy device of dis-
missing that feature as a subjective error, incapable of belonging to the 
world of fact. He sees that at the root of the distinction between appear-
ance and reality there lies the fundamental question as to the interpreta-
tion to be put upon negativity as a characteristic of what is known, and it 
would not be untrue to say that he here treats the notion of μὴ ὄν as the 
crucial notion in a system of philosophy. 
“That a thing should appear and seem to be, and yet not be, or that a 
401
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2G. Dawes Hicks
man should assert what is not true—all this,” declares the Eleatic Stranger, 
“is now, as it always has been, a matter of profound difficulty.” And the 
difficulty arises because the Sophistic doctrine that what seems to a man 
real or true is real or true for him, and that consequently there is no such 
thing as falsity, accords, after a fashion, with the dictum of Parmenides 
that only being is and non-being is not. 
By a series of steps, each of them sufficiently obvious, the Eleatic 
Stranger reaches a position from which it becomes clear that the dictum 
of Parmenides will have to be abandoned. In the first place, if non-being 
(μὴ ὄν) be taken to signify pure nought or nothingness, then non-being is 
not predicable of any being, nor of any existing thing (τὶ), for to speak of 
a thing in abstraction from all being is evidently impossible. And, in the 
second place, being is not predicable of non-being, as thus understood, 
and since number possesses being, we cannot speak either of μὴ ὄν or of 
μὴ ὄντα, and this means that to affirm even the unthinkableness or incon-
ceivability of non-being is contradictory, for these terms, no less than the 
copula of the judgment, all imply the conception of number and χωρἱς 
άριθμοῦ non-being cannot be so much as named. To fall back, therefore, 
in arguing against the sophists, upon the notion of appearance or of im-
age (εἴδωλον) would, on the supposition in question, be manifestly futile, 
for the demand would then immediately be made, to say what it is that 
is meant by an appearance or an image. Were it to be defined as a sort of 
other, or counterpart, of the true (τὸ πρὸς τἀληθινὸν ἀϕωμοιωμένον ἕτερον 
τοιοῦτον), it would be requisite to admit that in that case the ἕτερον must 
in some sense be (ἔστι γε μήν πως), for the description of it as ἐοικός would 
otherwise be nonsense. And if being, in any sense, is to be ascribed to it, 
how is such being to be pronounced false or fictitious?
“A strange interweaving (συμπλοκή) of being and non-being is that 
in which we are involved,” exclaims Theaetetus, and in fact the epithet 
συμπλοκή, extracted from him in a moment of bewilderment, affords 
the key to the whole situation. For when the theory of Parmenides is fur-
ther tested, it turns out that the idea of nought, in the sense in which 
Parmenides opposed it to the idea of being, is (to use Bergson’s phrase) a 
pseudo-idea, which, when seriously entertained, envelops the idea of being 
in no less perplexity than that by which it is itself encompassed. Whether 
the universe of reality be conceived as in nature a plurality or a unity, the 
perplexity is equally patent. If as the former, then, in regard to any two 
elements, being must either be regarded as a third element over and above 
the two, or as one of them, or as both, and whichever alternative be cho-
sen, the difficulty will be to explain how the elements can be two and yet 
in another aspect one. If as the latter, then, presuming names stand for 
real characteristics, by describing the real as both being and unity, we are 
forthwith committing ourselves to a plurality. The εἰδῶν ϕίλοι, for exam-
ple, constitute a radical antithesis between οὐσία and γἐνεσις, and contend 
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that the latter is absolutely distinct (χωρίς) from the former. According 
to them we participate in becoming through means of the bodily senses 
and in true being through means of the mind’s rationality (διἁ λογισμοῦ). 
But there arises at once the question, what is implied by this process of 
participation (τὁ κοινωνείν) which is asserted of both? Does it not point to 
a feature which both the contrasted terms, οὐσία and γένεσις, possess in 
common? The thinkers referred to deny that being involves that which the 
phrase “participation” might be thought to indicate,—a certain power, 
namely, of acting and of being acted upon,—and persist in confining this 
power to becoming. Yet, surely νοῦς, the entity by which ex hypothesi true 
being is apprehended, would itself become unintelligible were it conceived 
as devoid of activity and life. In short, do what we will, we shall be forced 
to the admission that κίνησις and στάσις, opposing principles though they 
be, both are, and since it would be absurd to say either that both move or 
that both rest, or that being is a combination of both, there is no course 
left save to recognise that by being, in this connexion, is meant a third 
principle distinguishable from either, but in which both share. 
The outcome of the dialogue, then, so far, has been to show that the 
relation of ὄν to ὄν is no less obscure than the relation of ὄν to μὴ ὄν, and 
to emphasise the importance of the concept of κοινωία in dealing with the 
whole problem which has thus emerged. The next advance consists in es-
tablishing the fact that some entities are in communion with one another 
whilst others are not. Selecting the three εἴδη already referred to, viz., ὄν, 
στάσις, and κίνησις, it is noted that whilst the last two are each in com-
munion with ὄν they are not in communion with one another. Moreover, 
since each of the three is the same with itself and is other than the remain-
ing, there may be added ταὐτόν and θάτερον to this list of the principal or 
leading εἴδη. If now we take any one of the five, say κίνησις, we may say 
that it is other than στάσις and is, therefore, not στάσις; that it participates 
in ὄν and is, therefore, ὄν; that it is other than ταὐτόν and is not, therefore, 
ταὐτόν, although it is the same with itself and is, therefore, ταὐτόν; that it 
is other than θάτερον and is, therefore, both ἕτερον and οὐκ ἕτερον; that it 
is other than ὄν and is, there fore, not ὄν, although in a different sense we 
have seen that it is ὄν. So that κίνησις is at once being and non-being, and a 
like assertion would be true of the other εἴδη mentioned, ὄν itself included. 
A point of view is in this way obtained from which a new interpreta-
tion can be offered of the conception of μὴ ὄν, and a fundamental diffi-
culty can be thus removed from the notion of appearance. By non-being 
we do not, in truth, denote the absolute opposite (ἐναντίον) of being, but 
only that which is the ἕτερον of being, that which is different from it. This 
conclusion becomes, indeed, inevitable so soon as the element of differ-
ence is admitted at all. When being is recognised as that which is common 
to the complex objects of the determina tions of thought, then non-being 
must evince itself as the negative side or aspect of those determinations, 
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and as, therefore, no less οὐσία than ὄν itself. All the εἴδη participate in 
being, for they all are, but each is distinguished from being as itself an 
εἶδος. They are, but they are not it; they exist, in other words, but they 
are not existence. Or, to bring out the point in the reverse way, existence 
as an εἶδος is distinguished from, that is to say, participates in otherness 
in relation to, all the remaining εἴδη. Existence is itself, but it is not the 
indefinite variety of existing entities. The negative particle distinguishes 
between positive existences, and even a negatively determined existence 
“has many predicates,” or positive contents. Accordingly, non-being, in 
the sense of otherness, is the element of connectedness in multiplicity, or 
the conceptual expression for the pervading continuity that permeates the 
realm of difference. The theory of κοινωνία είδῶν, which Plato is here de-
veloping, requires, in short, as its necessary presupposition the principle 
of negativity, in the sense explained. And the conception of the κοινωνία 
subsisting between the εἴδη in the realm of ultimate reality leads at once to 
the conception of a κοινωνία subsisting between the εἴδη and the so-called 
things of sense-perception; indeed, the latter conception is no more than a 
consistent development of the former, for a thing, in so far as it is know-
able, is just a group or system of certain εἴδη. The non-reality or relative 
non-existence attaching to the world of generation means for Plato the 
impossibility of knowing it without reference to something else, and the 
fact of its pointing to something else in whatever knowledge we could be 
said to have of it.
I have used the term “existence” as the equivalent of οὐσία, but Lotze’s 
well-known protest against doing so has not been absent from my mind. 
Lotze urged that the Platonic doctrine had been grotesquely misrepresent-
ed by the notion that Plato had ascribed to the εἴδη a mode of existence 
apart from things and yet of like kind with the existence of things. The 
reality, however, which Plato intended to assert of the ideal world was the 
reality of truth or validity (Geltung), and not the reality of actual existence 
or occurrence. The latter kind of reality accrues no doubt to the ideal ele-
ments in those moments in which they become, as objects of an act of pre-
sentation, members of this changing world of existence and genesis, but 
the recognition or thinking of a truth does not involve its having been then 
and there created for the first time; and Plato was referring to the time-
less validity that truth possessed altogether independent of its ever finding 
manifestation in the world of existence or a place as an object of knowl-
edge.4 So far as Lotze’s contention merely implies that the εἴδη were not 
conceived by Plato after the manner of “things,” and that Aristotle was 
unjust to the Platonic theory when he described the εἴδη as reduplications 
of the particulars of sense, no doubt, I think, can be entertained in respect 
to its soundness. But I question whether the distinction between the true 
and the existent, as it is drawn by Lotze, is correctly attributable to Plato. 
4 Lotze, Metaphysic, § 316 sqq.
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For one thing, the fact that in the very dialogue we have been considering 
(Sophist, 249 A) movement and activity are expressly claimed for the εἴδη 
presents in itself strong evidence to the contrary. And the general tendency 
of Plato’s thought can hardly be said to be reconcilable with the antithesis 
which Lotze supposed to have been explicitly in his mind. Rather would 
one say that quite simply and directly Plato identifies existence and truth, 
objective being and universal validity. The εἴδη constitute, in his view, the 
real objects of knowledge; they are the sources from which the world of 
phenomena derives whatsoever measure of existence it may be said to 
possess. And quite in accordance with this way of regarding Platonism, 
we find Plato taking for granted that a distinction in thought must have 
invariably an exact correlative in the sphere of existence. Always his prob-
lem is to show how existence of the more special, concrete kind is deduc-
ible from existence of a general, abstract kind, and the constant difficulty 
confronting him is that of vindi cating the claim not of the εἴδη, but of the 
particulars of sense, to the predicate of existence. 
Nevertheless, apart from the legitimacy of crediting it to Plato, the 
distinction upon which Lotze insisted is unquestionably of vital moment 
in regard to the problem I am here considering. Lotze’s phrase “the valid-
ity of a truth” may have been badly chosen, and we may be satisfied to 
substitute for it the now current phrase “subsistence of a universal.” But 
the important matter was, at any rate, to make clear that a fundamental 
error is committed when the contents of truth are forthwith identified 
with the contents of existence. Equally important is, however, the further 
question whether the concrete, particular things of the realm of existence 
are rightly described as phenomena or appearances. Lotze held that in the 
act of apprehension, the content apprehended, whether universal or par-
ticular, becomes ipso facto an existent entity, and that it owes its existence 
to a creative function on the part of the mind. It is that assumption, widely 
prevalent in one form or another, that I wish particularly to examine, and 
for that discussion the result of Plato’s inquiry in the Sophist will prove to 
be helpful. 
ii.
I can, I think, best bring to light the bearings of the particular issue I wish 
to raise by first of all briefly examining the modes in which the problem of 
the relation of appearance to reality has been dealt with in certain histori-
cal systems of philosophy. I select for this purpose the systems of Plato, 
Kant, and Hegel respectively, because in large measure they exhaust be-
tween them the solutions which have hitherto been attempted. 
1. In the midst of the conflicting opinions entertained by modern schol-
ars in regard to what is to be accepted as genuine Platonic doctrine, one 
cannot profess to handle with confidence those features of the material 
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with which we are here specially concerned. Plato’s speculation proceeds 
throughout under the influence of a thought which he rarely makes ex-
plicit, the thought, namely, of the ideal or real world as being that which 
is capable of being known by reason (νοῦς). The temptation is strong, 
especially in view of the later Neo-Platonic development, to convert this 
implicit thought into the concrete picture of an infinite mind, the contents 
of whose intelligence are the εἴδη or ideal essences. And then it is easy to 
suppose that, after the fashion of certain modern systems, Plato conceived 
of the infinite mind as differentiating itself into a number of finite minds, 
and of sense phenomena as being ways in which these finite minds, in 
consequence of their finitude, imperfectly represent to themselves the truly 
real. But such a mode of interpretation goes far beyond anything that is to 
be found in the Platonic texts themselves. The implicit thought by which, 
as I have said, we do know Plato was influenced, is never employed by 
him to fulfil the purpose for which the concrete picture serves, namely, to 
explain the existence of the εἴδη. And it is not so employed for the very 
good reason that from Plato’s point of view their existence stood in need 
of no explanation. Bather is it employed by him as the means by which a 
definite relation may be seen to subsist between the world of Ideas and the 
world of phenomena. The implicit thought is developed, no doubt, into 
the conception of the World Soul (ψυχὴ τοῦ κὀσμου), characterised by the 
two functions of knowing and of originating movement. As possessed of 
these two functions, the Soul can produce change in the realm of the mu-
table in accordance with a rule or law derived from its vision of the true 
reality, and its work is represented as bringing about within the region of 
space-extension something having an intelligibility corresponding at least 
to the intelligibility with which it is familiar in the realm of Ideas. This 
trend of reflexion can undoubtedly be traced in the Timaeus especially. 
But to the notion of the World Soul in particular I am persuaded it would 
be an error to attach too literal a significance, and to take Plato to be in-
stituting a mechanical separation between it and the world of Ideas. It is, 
I should say, his figurative way of expressing one aspect of the latter, for, 
after the emphatic declaration in the Sophist (249, A) that παντελῶς ὄν 
cannot be devoid of life and intelligence, one can scarcely be right in re-
garding the ideal world as merely a separate model requiring to be supple-
mented in order to give rise to the concrete particulars of experience. Nor 
does it seem to me consonant with sound exegesis to attribute to Plato the 
doctrine that “‘things’ are not separate entities, external to the mind, but 
sensations existing within it.”5 Neither space nor time are, in Plato’s view, 
subjective, and, as regards even the secondary qualities of bodies, it is hard 
to reconcile his admittedly uncertain utterances in respect to them with 
the assertion that they are merely sensations existing within the mind. 
Whilst, then, not disputing that a certain measure of justification can 
5 Jackson, J. of Philology, vol. xiii, 1885, p. 21. 
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be offered for interpreting the Platonic theory after the manner just in-
dicated, I think one is able to trace in the Platonic writings a mode of 
viewing the world of phenomena which does not throw the burden of ex-
planation upon the constitution of the apprehending mind. I have already 
referred to the way in which in the Sophist the contention is maintained 
that there must be systematic relatedness, κοινωνία, among the εἴδη in or-
der that intelligible apprehension of them should be possible, and to the 
emphasis which, in the attempt to determine which εἴδη are communica-
ble with which others, is laid upon the all-important pair of Ideas, ταὐτόν 
and θάτερον. Each εἶδος is one with itself and shares in the nature of Being 
and the Same; it is also other than all the εἴδη besides itself, and shares, 
therefore, in the nature of Non-being or Difference. I conceive it is to this 
notion of ἕτερον, which, it is true, is not worked out in such a manner as 
to enable us to speak with certainty, that we must look for a means of un-
derstanding the non-being which Plato is wont to regard as characteristic 
of what is phenomenal. With the conception of the entire realm of the 
Ideas as being interpenetrated by the form of otherness, Plato combined 
the position reached by him as the result of his early advance from the So-
cratic doctrine,—the position, namely, that the εἴδη presented an orderly 
arrangement from the more general to the less general, that they formed a 
graduated scheme of existence comprising within itself without breach of 
continuity the sum total of what could lay claim to the title real. Confront-
ing him, in this attempt, was, however, on the one hand, the boundless 
region of indeterminate particulars, and, on the other hand, the form of 
otherness or difference as the inevitable shadow, so to speak, of the ideal 
world itself. If, now, we follow up this conception of θάτερον, it is not, I 
think, difficult to see that the realm of phenomena was for Plato a meta-
physical necessity,—not a merely contingent creation of some external ar-
tificer. He declares, it is true, that the ideal world cannot be the ground 
or cause (ἀιτία) of what is variable and transient. And in the Timaeus we 
find him insisting upon the necessity of some third entity which, whilst af-
fording a place for all that comes into being, should be itself eternal. But 
this third element is not simply an extraneously introduced tertium quid. 
It is described as the receptacle (ὑποδοχή) and nurse of all becoming, 
which is apprehensible by a sort of spurious reason (λογισμῷ τινὶ νόθῷ), 
and is identified by Plato with space (χώρα), which again Aristotle ex-
pressly informs us Plato took to be identical with ὕλη (Phys., 1, 9). Space 
is contemplated by Plato as the very essence of otherness, the pure form 
of difference; and, as regards positive characteristics, if it will admit, with 
any tolerable security, the application to it of the term τοιοῦτον, we ought, 
he thinks, to be content. It is not, indeed, separable from the Ideas. Like 
them, it is identical with itself and is eternal (ταὐτόν ἀυτὴν ἀεἱ προσρητέον), 
and although it is only by a λογισμὸς νόθος that it is apprehended, yet the 
process of apprehension is λογισμός and not αἴσθησις. On the other hand, 
however, it is emphatically distinguished from the Ideas. There clings to it 
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something unfathomable, something incomprehensible. As the content of 
a notion it is something χαλεπὸν καί ἀμυδρόν, and the manner in which 
it participates in the intelligible (νοητόν) is, we are told, most bewildering 
and hard to grasp. For the ύποδοχή is in no way determinable; it is abso-
lutely formless and void. In and for itself, it is not productive of anything; 
it is not that out of which (ἐξ οὗ) but that in which (ἐν ᾧ) things become. 
In short, in relation to the whole realm of Ideas, it is just the element of 
μὴ ὄν which, according to the argument of the Sophist, is inherently in-
volved in the notion of being. This conclusion is almost expressed in the 
Timaeus in so many words, for the γιγνόμενον is described as μεταξύ in 
reference to the Idea on the one hand and the ύποδοχή on the other, and 
it is a familiar Platonic doctrine that a γιγνόμενον stands midway between 
being and non-being. As projected, then, into space, or, if the phrase is 
permissible, as presented under the form of externality, the εἴδη come to 
appear as though they were differentiated into a multiplicity of shapes 
or images (εἰσιόντα καἰ ὲξιόντα); the parts of space being characterised by 
their side-by-sidedness, the self-identity of the ultimate reality assumes, 
under these circumstances, the aspect of innumerable copies or likenesses 
(μιμήματα τῶν ἀεἰ ὄντων). Along this line of reflexion it was natural that 
Plato should have assigned the importance he did to the mathematical as-
pects of phenomena. The material substratum of a thing, as he conceived 
it, was nothing else than figured space, which is capable of expression in 
numerical ratios, and geometrical forms were the ways in which the εἴδη 
found representation in the otherness of spatial extension. In fact, the so-
called μαθηματικά occupy in Plato’s system a sort of intermediary position 
between the εἴδη and αἰσθητά, and serve to bridge the interval between the 
singleness of the former and the multiplicity of the latter. And in the well-
known passage of the Republic (vi, 509 D, sqq.) where the four stages of 
intelligence are discussed, numerical ratios are represented as standing in 
much the same relation to the Ideas as, amongst δοξαστὰ, images (εἰκόνες) 
stand to tangible things. 
For our present purpose the main interest of Plato’s treatment consists 
in the essentially objective attitude which, according to the trend of re-
flexion I have been following, he consistently preserves. Neither ultimate 
realities nor phenomena are regarded by him as depending for their exis-
tence upon mind. As I have said, even the secondary qualities of material 
objects can scarcely be described as in his view subjective in character. 
Rather does he seem to say they arise as the conjoint result of the funda-
mental geometrical properties of things on the one hand and the specific 
nature of the bodily organism on the other. “The general problem with 
which the theory of Ideas is concerned,” says Professor Adamson, in one 
of those profound remarks of his which go to the very root of the systems 
of thought with which he may be dealing, “may be defined as the explana-
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tion of the world of generation.”6 Plato attempted, no doubt, to force his 
way to a solution of the problem along more roads than one, but the direc-
tion of his thought which I have been trying to indicate is, I am convinced, 
that which accords most with the fundamental principles of his philoso-
phy. And what it comes to is, in short, this—that the distinctive features 
of the phenomenal world rest, as thus conceived, upon the peculiarities 
of spatial extension, which is, in its turn, a necessary accompaniment of 
the non-spatial realm of real existence. I dwell not now on the inherent 
difficulties of the Platonic doctrine—difficulties which may be said to con-
front every attempt to apply a purely deductive method in philosophical 
speculation. Whosoever seeks to deduce from the nature of absolute being 
the character and structure of what is relative and particular must find it, 
and invariably does find it, impossible to extract from the former that in 
which the latter specifically differs from it. Plato’s endeavour, strenuous 
though it was, to show that the world of particulars follows necessarily 
from the nature of absolute being is no more successful than later endeav-
ours of a similar kind. Much as he strives, in order to meet the exigencies 
of his theory, to avoid attributing to space positive characteristics, he can-
not help doing so, and it is obvious that such metaphorical expressions 
as μέθεξις and μίμησις throw no real light upon the relation supposed to 
hold between the Ideas and things. Despite every effort, the two worlds 
will fall asunder, and the notion of the systematic unity of real existence 
cannot, on this basis, be sustained. But when so much has been admitted 
it would be absurd to conclude that the value of Plato’s work has disap-
peared. On the contrary, I believe modern research is leading us to see the 
profound significance of much, in the Timaeus especially, that has usually 
been taken to be fantastic imagery. And particularly, so far as the question 
we have before us is concerned, Plato, I think, was certainly on the right 
lines in directing attention to space as an essential consideration in respect 
to the nature of sensible appearance. Whether he was justified in regard-
ing space as the εκμαγεῖον, the plastic material capable of being moulded 
into any form, I have not now to discuss, and it may well be the case that 
upon this doctrine he found it difficult to differentiate between εἰκόνες and 
things. But that space is a condition of the possibility of εἰκόνες is a truth 
which the idealistic tendencies of subsequent philosophy have too often 
obscured from view. 
2. In Kant’s mode of handling the problem, the attitude has profoundly 
changed. As employed by Kant, the term “phenomenon” sums up of itself 
much that is the direct opposite of the course of reflection pursued by 
Plato; it indicates, on the one hand, that which alone in the strict sense 
can be said to be known, and on the other hand, the essentially relative 
character attaching to knowledge in Kant’s view of it. With scarcely less 
unreservedness than Plato, Kant institutes a fundamental severance be-
6 The Development of Greek Philosophy, p. 128.
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tween the functions of sensibility and thought, the one pure receptivity, 
the other pure spontaneity; but thought as he conceives it has no objects 
of its own, and no means of transcending the limits imposed by sense. 
On the other hand, it is Kant’s purpose to show that what constitutes the 
reference, as he expresses it, in the apprehended content to an object can 
never be given, or extracted from the given. The given as such has no mark 
of the orderliness, the uniformity, the connectedness, which points to the 
contrast between subjective impressions and objective fact. Thought, can-
not, therefore, abstract from sense-data the notion of object. Without 
putting to himself the question, how we know that sense-affections are 
produced in us at all, Kant takes for granted that they are, and is satisfied 
to accept as a sufficient criterion of what is not thus produced but is sup-
plied by the mind itself the characteristics of universality and necessity, 
or, in other words, of objectivity. Those elements in the perceptive mate-
rial which we call space and time, and the categories by means of which 
order, uniformity, connectedness, are introduced into that material, must, 
therefore, be regarded as a priori factors in the complex whole of experi-
ence. But inasmuch as these factors are formal only, inasmuch as the entire 
qualitative content of what is apprehended is of the nature of produced 
sense-affection, the object known can only be an appearance in the mind 
and not a reality independent of it. Kant, indeed, was committed to this 
conclusion by the initial assumption with which he started. If sensibility 
and thought be viewed as fundamentally disparate functions, and if the 
object known be regarded as made up of factors contributed by each of 
these functions, then the said object must be held to be of the nature of 
a product or construction, in which the two detached sets of elements 
have been compounded or welded together. In that case, the process of 
synthesis will resolve itself into a process of making, and it will be difficult 
to see how a process which consists in making an object can at the same 
time be a process of knowing it as already made. Moreover, if thought be 
conceived as an instrument whereby the given material of sense is worked 
up into the form of organised experience, the resultant, even admitting it 
could be a content known, will inevitably occupy the position of a tertium 
quid between the cognising mind and the world of reality. That, indeed, 
is precisely the ground of Kant’s contention that things in themselves are 
outside the context of experience and cannot be known. But, then, in that 
case, the difficulty confronts him that it is not reality but appearances 
that appear; and to speak of such appearances as appearances of reality is 
meaningless. 
The difficulty just mentioned did not fail to force itself upon Kant’s 
notice, and along various lines of reflexion he is to be found wrestling with 
it. It will be sufficient to refer to one of these. He had reached the concep-
tion of nature as a complex of phenomena in space and time connected 
together by the general relations summed up in the category of reciprocity. 
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Nature was a whole, each part of which was connected with other parts 
according to general laws. But within that whole a possible object might 
be either an object of inner experience or an object of external percep-
tion. And the question arises how the distinction, which is thus recog-
nised, between what is real as a portion of the inner life and what is real 
as a portion of what is taken to be the external world is to be construed. 
The familiar method of regarding external perception as representative of 
something existing independently of experience and inner perception as 
having no such reference could not be followed by Kant. The difference, 
whatever it was, could only, according to his view, be expressed in terms 
of experience and not in terms of that which ex hypothesi was not and 
could not be within experience. It could not, therefore, be assumed that an 
external perception referred to a thing-in-itself and was, on this account, 
distinguished from an internal perception. Still less could the reality of 
an internal perception be distinguished from that of an external percep-
tion on the ground that in the one case it does and in the other does not 
adequately represent the thing-in-itself, seeing that the thing-in-itself has 
as little relation to inner as to outer perception. Both the material object 
and the self as an object are alike immediately apprehended parts of the 
context of experience. How, then, do we come to determine the one as 
an outer object and the other as an inner object? Kant maintains that the 
distinction is based on the primary and irreducible difference between the 
space-occupying and the non-space-occupying. All the contents of intu-
ition are in time, some are also in space, or have space as their formal 
element. Irreducible, Kant calls this difference, and he steadfastly insists 
that the perplexity in which we are apt to find ourselves when we try to 
conceive how the inner life should be connected with external corporeal 
fact can in the long run be traced back to the error of supposing that an 
answer is possible to the question why our intuitions should take these 
two forms. The difference, then, is ultimate, and on the ground of this 
ultimate difference, he argues, problematic, or Cartesian, idealism calls 
to be rejected. The representatives of problematic idealism had always 
tended to interpret space as being in its own nature excluded from mind, 
as being, in fact, the characteristic mark of material or non-mental reali-
ties. Naturally, therefore, they had taken the judgment which asserts the 
existence of extended, space-occupying, objects to be the result of an in-
ference, based upon premises which were themselves judgments respecting 
the non-extended, non-spatial, facts of the inner life. Such a judgment of 
existence must accordingly be problematic in character. The critical theory 
of space as a form of perception had, however, changed the situation. The 
space-occupying reality could no longer he regarded as lying outside of, or 
as constituting the opposite of, mind. On the contrary, it was part of the 
experience which went to build up the mind. Consequently, argued Kant, 
the apprehension of the space-extended is no less direct and immediate 
than the apprehension of non-spatial inner states. 
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But now, although doubtless it may be made out in this way that the 
space-extended is directly apprehended and not inferred, it is obvious that 
so far Kant has not touched the problem as to what is involved in the judg-
ment that a particular external object exists. Space-extendedness, consid-
ered merely as a characteristic of the content of apprehension, will not in 
itself supply the additional element needed in order to justify the judgment 
of existence, save indeed such existence as may be ascribed to the content 
of perception itself and which would belong to contents of mere phantasy 
no less than to contents of perception. It ought to have been clear to Kant 
from the outset that neither problematic nor any other idealism can be 
refuted by emphasising the characteristic of space-extendedness which is 
possessed by the contents of dreams and illusions no less unmistakably 
than it is possessed by the contents of actual sense-perception. Since the 
judgment that a particular object exists evidently goes beyond the present-
ed content, and implies in its very nature that which is distinct from the 
presented content, it is futile to offer a characteristic of the latter as its jus-
tification. The reference in such judgment is, as Kant himself recognises, 
to a real existing thing as distinct from the Vorstellung of it. Is, then, this 
real existing thing to be conceived as a thing-in-itself? No, replies Kant, 
for it can be characterised in no other terms than terms of experience. It 
is essentially an empirical thing—a thing in space and time, and subject 
to the conditions imposed by the categories. None the less such empirical 
thing must be taken to exist, and to exist as distinct from the content of 
the Vorstellung of it. It exists, that is to say, independently of the sense-
content in and through which it is apprehended. And later Kant is to be 
found defining this empirical thing as the movable in space, and declaring 
it to be the precondition of the awareness, on the part of the conscious 
subject, of his own existence in time. The assumption of the existence of 
empirical things, as distinct, on the one hand, from the mere contents of 
the Vorstellungen of them and, on the other hand, from the hypothetical 
things-in-themselves, is a standing difficulty of the Kantian conception of 
phenomena, and it is a difficulty from which Kant certainly never succeed-
ed in extricating the critical theory. He is constrained, in short, to describe 
both the empirical thing and the content of the Vorstellung of it as equally 
phenomena, although the very reasons he assigns for maintaining the phe-
nomenal character of the latter are precisely those which, according to his 
own analysis, would be absolutely untrue in regard to the former. Kant’s 
difficulty is curiously enough parallel to the difficulty already noted in the 
Platonic theory, according to which both εἰκόνες in the stricter sense and 
tangible objects are grouped together as δοξαστὰ. In fact, corresponding 
with Plato’s phrase εἰκόνες, Kant frequently speaks of phenomena, when 
he is using the term for the contents of Vorstellungen, as images (Bilder).
An impasse of the kind I have been indicating is surely in itself suffi-
cient to induce us to return upon the conception of an object as a complex 
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of sense-impressions unified by means of the relating activity of thought, 
and to ask the question whether that conception is in truth justified. I 
would submit that there is, in fact, no warrant for either of the assump-
tions it involves. As I have tried to show in previous communications to 
this Society, sense-perception and thought do not evince themselves, on 
psychological analysis, as two disparate functions, each complete in itself. 
Bather must we regard their developed forms, in which alone they seem 
to afford ground for thus separating them, as two stages in the evolution 
of the one common process of apprehension, which process is in kind ge-
nerically similar throughout. Now this result carries with it the necessity 
of radically changing our ordinary notions of the nature both of sense-
perception and of thought. On the one hand, the notion of sensibility as 
passive receptivity must be wholly, and not merely partially, discarded. 
What is given to the mind, in other words, is never so much impressed 
material, never an affection, which, in order to be experienced, must be 
incorporated into the mind’s own structure; what is given to the mind, if 
we retain a phrase that has become misleading, is a real existent entity 
which is and remains other than the mind itself Stimulation, impression, 
affection—these appertain to the sense organs and the cerebral mecha-
nism alone; the mental process which occurs in conjunction or correlation 
with these bodily changes is an act of discriminating and discerning—of 
discriminating and discerning not what is in the mind, as its processes are 
in it, but what is presented to the mind, or given to the mind, in the sense 
just explained. On the other hand, whilst in one sense, it is true, an act of 
combining or relating, thought will not be conceived as performing the 
specific kind of synthesis which Kant attributed to it. For whereas sense-
impressions or affections could not be received as connected, what is pre-
sented to the mind for discrimination not only may be, but must be, a 
connected whole. And the act of distinguishing and recognising the given 
relations as such will be explicable as a more elaborate mode of the pro-
cess by which the qualities and features of what is presented are discrimi-
nated and apprehended. These changes involve, no doubt, a considerable 
departure from Kantian doctrine, but they may not unfairly be said to fol-
low from a more rigorous attempt to be faithful to the critical method. So 
soon as they are made, the grounds that weighed with Kant for insisting 
upon the phenomenal character of empirical things vanish. An empirical 
thing is certainly not a thing-in-itself, if by that be meant an unknown and 
unknowable entity. But there is no reason for refusing to recognise it as a 
veritable fact of the real world. It stands on an altogether different level 
from the appearances in and through which it is apprehended. 
3. The line of reflexion pursued by the Post-Kantian idealists, and es-
pecially by Hegel, whilst in certain respects taking the direction I have 
just been indicating, tended in other respects to confuse its true outcome. 
Hegel may certainly be credited with having realised with clearness and 
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distinctness the fundamental identity of nature pervading the apprehend-
ing process throughout the various phases of its evolution. Some of his 
best and most fruitful work was devoted to tracing the way in which cog-
nitive experience progressed, through a continuous and unbroken course 
of development, from its first crude beginning in mere sense immediacy to 
the higher ranges of intellectual comprehension and rational insight. But 
the dominating conception of Hegel’s advance from the Kantian stand-
point consisted in his elaborate attempt to exhibit the world of experience 
as due to the orderly constructive operation of thought or self-conscious-
ness. By thought was certainly not meant, what critics of the system have 
often argued as though it did mean, the subjective activity of the indi-
vidual mind. Extending Kant’s tentative suggestion of an “intuitive un-
derstanding,” an understanding in which the universal produces and de-
termines the particular, Hegel attained to the notion of an absolute mind 
or self-consciousness, that manifests its life or intelligence in the whole 
detailed structure of experience. According to that notion, the products 
of the constructive activity of thought are in no way to be regarded as 
dependent upon the individuality of a concrete subject; relatively thereto 
they are to be described as objective, and the distinction which the finite 
subject recognises between reality and its own procedure is to be taken to 
indicate an inevitable precondition of that conscious subject’s awareness 
of its own finitude. Hegel might have admitted, he did in fact admit, that 
a finite subject may clothe the particular objects of its experience with 
many a character which expresses no more than the relation of such finite 
subject to the real which it apprehends, and that in a manner an addition 
of that kind may be said to be subjective. At the same time, he would have 
argued, we ought not to be oblivious of the consideration that this very 
clothing, this very addition, is itself an incident in the whole process of real 
development, so that the distinction of what we call the objective from 
what we call the subjective features of a thing rests upon no fundamental 
severance in the ultimate nature of reality. But empirical things, although 
independent, in the sense I have indicated, of the mental procedure of the 
individual mind, and although Berkeley’s dictum that their esse consists 
in percipi be in truth wholly inapplicable to them, yet are not, in Hegel’s 
view, to be credited with ultimate independence of being. They are, so he 
would insist, no more than particular ways in which the ultimate nature 
of real existence is exhibited not merely to finite intelligences but in itself. 
Regarded in isolation, no one of them is truly intelligible. Each becomes 
intelligible only in so far as it is related to the whole, only in so far as it is 
seen to be the expression of a universal principle of the absolute thought. 
Looked at from Hegel’s point of view, it is, then, this relation of the 
part to the whole that yields philosophical significance to the term “phe-
nomenon.” Phenomena are not merely appearances to an individual 
mind; they are appearances of that whose reality just consists in making 
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itself manifest. Essence, to use Hegel’s own terminology, is the ground of 
existence; and essence which exists is what is designated a “thing.” Each 
thing is one way in which the essence or the real makes its appearance, 
expresses itself extrinsically, and such measure of unreality as attaches to 
the notion of phenomenon indicates no more than the unreality which be-
longs to a part when taken in abstraction from the whole. The essentially 
real must appear or show itself,—that is the very characteristic by which 
it is distinguished from mere being. So that there is no ultimate antithesis 
to be drawn between a phenomenon and the real of which it is phenom-
enal. That antithesis which continually besets our thinking between things 
as they are and things as they appear is not an antithesis between two 
separate spheres of existence. Things as they appear are not external to or 
independent of things as they are; things as they are do appear, and are, in 
fact, nothing except in so far as they do appear. The contrast falls within 
experience itself and in no way points beyond it. And there is no differ-
ence in kind between the ways of knowing phenomena and the ways of 
knowing the real as such. The world of experience is one world, and any 
portion of that world, if regarded in isolation, carries with it the aspect of 
incompleteness, of contingency, of illusoriness, which forms one of the pe-
culiarities of the ordinary notion of phenomenon or appearance. But this 
peculiarity is not in any special way a peculiarity of our subjective mode 
of apprehending. The absolute whole, just because it is absolute, cannot 
be immediately manifested, and on that very account there is bound to be 
a “beyond “ to what is immediately apprehended. A law, for example, is, 
in a sense, “beyond” its manifestations, but the relation between them is 
not external or fortuitous. They are moments in a single process; the law 
“appears” in the detailed particulars which it is said to control; there is no 
law without particulars, and no law except in particulars. The Absolute, 
then, which forms the ground of finite phenomena, and issues forth, so to 
speak, into them, is not an indefinable other essence to be placed along-
side of these particulars. It can only be interpreted in such a way as shall 
at once conform to the general principle of intelligence and at the same 
time allow of an intelligible connexion between it and the multiplicity of 
appearing particulars. 
Quite apart from the metaphysical system on the basis of which it is 
worked out, there are, unquestionably, sufficient elements of permanent 
value in Hegel’s conception of appearance to entitle it to consideration on 
its own account. To these elements I shall have occasion to refer in what 
follows. I direct attention meanwhile to features of the conception that 
seem to me of dubious stability. It can hardly escape notice that, when the 
ultimate relation of appearance to reality is under discussion, the main 
burden of explanation is thrown by Hegel upon the notion of “manifesta-
tion” or “expression.” The minimum demand which the theory ought to 
satisfy is that it should offer some clear indication of what is to be under-
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stood by the perplexing notion of manifestation. There can, I imagine, be 
little doubt as to the region of experience within which that notion, as or-
dinarily employed, takes its origin. It is that of our own practical activity. 
When a human agent realises an end previously represented to himself in 
idea, that which is accomplished is often said to be a manifestation of the 
mind or character of the agent. But the analogy breaks down hopelessly 
when, as in the philosophy of Hegel, it is applied to an absolute mind or 
to absolute thought. So far as the human agent is concerned, not only is 
the end dependent for its realisation upon a material environment, but the 
idea itself of the end is only formed by him in and through relation to that 
environment. Absolute thought, however, must be conceived as creating 
its own contents and constituting them as such into “manifestations.” 
And that is just exactly what finite thought never does. It must, I think, 
be admitted that neither by Hegel himself nor by any of his followers has 
any serious attempt been made to explicate a notion upon which, as they 
employ it, so much depends. And this leads me further to note that the 
Kantian difficulty upon which I laid stress is only escaped by Hegelian 
thinkers through their simply denying the distinction between the contents 
of apprehension and empirical things. All phenomena—empirical things, 
with the rest,—are, according to their view, contents of apprehension. Or, 
as the doctrine is more familiarly expressed, subject and object mutually 
involve one another; neither can exist except in correlation with the other; 
they are inseparable factors in the unity of experience. The subject is that 
which is for itself through the object; the object, which has no being ex-
cept for a subject, is that which is for the subject in virtue of the activity of 
the subject. As usually stated, the contention is open to the obvious charge 
of assuming what has to be proved. If by object be meant a content of ap-
prehension, then clearly there can be no object without a subject, for, in 
that case, subject and object are correlative terms. But that in no way set-
tles the question whether empirical things are objects in this sense. Even, 
however, though it be maintained on grounds less easily disposed of than 
this, the difficulty of the contention becomes evident when the corollary 
to it is added, that, in dealing with experience, we have to take account of 
both subject and object at once, for the one changes with the other. On the 
contrary, it would seem to be a fundamental postulate of knowledge that 
a fact is in no way changed through the circumstance that an individual 
mind comes to be aware of it. If the object changes with every change in 
the apprehending subject, and if all things are objects, we have the old 
problem upon our hands of finding any intelligible sense in which there 
can be for a community of minds any common world of things at all. In 
short, objective idealism, as thus represented, comes dangerously near to 
the weakest form of subjectivism. 
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iii.
In the three important systems of philosophy to which I have been referring 
very different meanings are attached to what is described as phenomenon 
or appearance, and, as might therefore be expected, the denotation of the 
term as employed by any one of these thinkers does not correspond with 
its denotation as employed by the others. In the Platonic philosophy, the 
nature of phenomena is least of all regarded as dependent upon the minds 
of percipient subjects, but on the other hand Plato is most of all compelled 
to institute a rigid severance between the phenomenal and the real. In the 
critical philosophy, it may be said to be laid down as a cardinal principle 
that whatsoever is claimed to form part of the world of experience must 
be capable of being construed in terms of mind, and Kant tends to inter-
pret this theorem as though it signified that the experience of a conscious 
subject con sisted of Vorstellungen and was on that account phenomenal in 
character, although, as we have seen, he was forced to admit the existence 
of empirical things distinct from Vorstellungen, to allow their knowability, 
and hence to include them, on that account, within the sphere of phenom-
enal reality. Finally, in the Hegelian metaphysic, everything that can be 
objectively apprehended, although not necessarily a Vorstellung in Kant’s 
limited sense of the term, is yet a content of mind and is in no case to be 
conceived as a “thing” existing independently of conscious intelligence. 
With whatever consistency, however, empirical things are assigned in 
all three systems to the realm of phenomena, and it is largely, I think, due 
to this circumstance that the nature of those phenomenal appearances 
which, in any case, are certainly not empirical things has been, as I now 
wish to submit, so persistently misconceived. All the thinkers to whom I 
have been directing attention agree in ascribing the predicate of existence 
to phenomena or appearances. Now, certainly, if by phenomenon or ap-
pearance be meant an empirical thing or a determinate object of percep-
tion, which as apprehended is placed in relation to other empirical things 
or objects of perception and in a relation expressible by a general law or 
notion, then to dispute that phenomena exist would be, as Mr. Bradley 
puts it, “nonsense.” “Successive appearance in space and time is,” says Dr. 
Bosanquet, “what existence means.”7 And he thinks so because he takes 
successive appearance in space and time to consist of the empirical things 
or determinate objects which together constitute the world of our ordinary 
experience. So, too, Mr. Bradley emphatically asserts it to be “absolutely 
certain” that appearances exist. Yet Mr. Bradley himself can hardly be 
said to adhere consistently to that strong assertion. For he is to be found 
arguing in another place against the theory of “external relations “ that 
any object, if taken apart from its place and position in the whole, is not 
an “existence” but a “character,” which character can remain unchanged, 
7 The Value and Destiny of the Individual, p. 15. 
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though the existing thing is altered with its changed existence.8 And since, 
according to his own account, an appearance is always more or less of a 
fragment taken apart from its place or position in the whole, the conse-
quence would seem to follow that an appearance is not an existence, but 
simply a character. I am not, however, concerned to press that criticism 
now. The contradiction, if it be one, points, I think, to the importance of 
the consideration upon which I am anxious to insist. 
Leaving, then, for a moment the question whether empirical things 
are rightly taken to be phenomena, I concentrate attention upon what, in 
ordinary common-sense speech, would be described as the “appearances” 
of such things as distinguished from their reality—in other words, upon 
what I may be permitted to call, for want of a better word, the “contents” 
of our perceptions, when our perceptive activity is directed, as we say, 
upon real objects. An example will serve to illustrate the problem we have 
to face. Let me take one that has recently become sufficiently popular. A 
table of a certain shape, with sheets of paper upon it, I am convinced is 
beside me as I sit writing. This table, or what I take to be this table, ap-
pears to be of slightly different colour from different points of view, and 
although I believe it to be really of the same colour all over, the parts of it 
that reflect the light will look brighter than the parts of it which do not. So 
again, if the opposite sides of the table are “really” of equal length, they 
will look as if the nearer side were longer; if they are “really” parallel, they 
will look as if they converged to a point away from the spectator, and so 
on. The question I wish to raise is, whether these various appearances can 
be said to exist in the same sense in which we unhesitatingly speak of the 
table itself as existing. 
The answer to that question will largely depend upon the way in which 
we conceive these appearances to come about. If it be supposed that they 
arise in some way as an effect or consequence of the operation of the real 
thing upon the mind, or that they are produced through the operation 
of activities occasioned by the real thing upon the nervous mechanism 
of the bodily organism of the percipient, then doubtless the appearances 
must be regarded as existent entities. In that case, the appearances, con-
ceived as distinct and separate from the real thing, will be taken them-
selves to constitute an object, and it will be this object and not the real 
thing that will be held to be immediately known. The produced object will 
thus be regarded as standing between the knower and the real thing, and 
the doubt will inevitably be awakened whether after all we are entitled to 
assume the existence, apart from them, of any real thing at all, which ex 
hypothesi could only in that case be mediately inferred and never directly 
apprehended. This whole mode of accounting for the act of perception 
seems, however, to me to be, for reasons I have urged elsewhere, and 
briefly indicated above, psychologically erroneous and untenable. If, on 
8 Appearance and Reality, 3rd ed., p. 578.
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the other hand, we start from what Professor Alexander would describe as 
the compresence of the mind with the real thing, and if we recognise that 
what is occasioned by that compresence is not a new object, but, through 
the mediation of the bodily mechanism, an act or process of apprehending 
the real thing, then the appearances will not require to have a mode of ex-
istence ascribed to them independent of, and separate from, the reality of 
which they are appearances. They will evince themselves then as ways in 
which the reality itself is apprehended,—as partial, imperfect, incomplete 
ways in which the reality is known. 
Proceeding, then, from the latter standpoint, I lay stress on the con-
tention that appearances are not objects but are ways in which objects 
are apprehended. Now, Kant, as we have seen, when he is engaged in 
emphasising the wholly relative character of what he calls phenomenal 
experience, when he is desirous of distinguishing empirical things from 
things-in-themselves, uses as his most potent argument the consideration 
that empirical things are, in the long run, no more than Vorstellungen, 
presentations to the mind, and implies certainly that they are within the 
mind just as the knowledge of them is within the mind. But, as I have tried 
to show, this argument breaks down the moment the question is pressed 
as to what, in such case, is to be understood by the existence of an empiri-
cal thing. Kant was obliged to recognise that the object, to which, in his 
phraseology, the Vorstellungen referred, is not itself within the mind in the 
sense in which the contents of Vorstellungen may be said to be within the 
mind. If, therefore, in an act of perceiving, the empirical thing is the ob-
ject apprehended, it follows that the contents of the Vorstellungen, in and 
through which the appre hension of this empirical thing is effected, cannot 
as such constitute that object. The notion that do constitute it only seems 
irresistible because we persist in looking upon sensibility as passive recep-
tivity, as the receiving of what is given, in which case, of course, what is 
given can be no other than sense-data, sense appearances, and these must 
make up the object perceived. What, we shall then ask, as Kant asked, can 
empirical things be but phenomenal appearances? 
The crux of the entire situation lies, I am convinced, here. The issue 
can be raised by referring to the assumed mental act it has recently been 
proposed to call “knowledge by acquaintance.” That process is described 
as the direct or immediate awareness we have of anything without the 
intermediary of the process distinguished from it as the process of infer-
ence. Thus, it is argued, in the presence of a table I am acquainted with 
the sense-data making up the appearance of that table,—its colour, shape, 
hardness, smoothness, etc.; these are all things of which I am immediately 
conscious when I am said to be seeing and touching the table. Knowledge 
of the table as a physical object, on the other hand, is, it is maintained, not 
direct know ledge, but is obtained, such as it is, through acquaintance with 
the sense-data making up the appearance of the table, whilst the actual 
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thing which is the table is not, strictly speaking, known to us at all. Now, 
I believe this account of sense-experience to be based on an error similar 
to that which vitiated the Kantian theory. The error consists, I think, in 
supposing that the sensa, or sensibilia, as distinct from the physical object, 
are themselves the entities upon which the act of apprehension is directed. 
I urge, in the first place, that upon this view the “act of apprehension,” 
as it is called, becomes inexplicable. For an “act,” I take it, implies the 
exercise of some function; it cannot consist in a mere relation between 
the mind and a sensibile. And if we are serious with that implication, it 
will be impossible to escape the admission that in knowing the sensibile 
there breaks out again the contrast between what is known and the way in 
which it is known. I can understand, although I do not agree with, the po-
sition that in sense-awareness, there is no distinction to be drawn between 
the sensing and the sensum. But what I do not understand is how there 
can be an act of apprehending a sense factor which is distinct from the 
said act, and yet the “act” itself be simply a mere “relation” between the 
mind and this sense factor. If the mind does nothing, with what propriety 
is it said to “act,” and if it does something, in what can its activity consist 
if not in that process of discriminating, com paring and relating, which, so 
far as psychological analysis can disclose, would seem to be the nature of 
its functioning throughout? Kant’s dictum affirming that in and by itself 
sense would be blind does not lose applicability in this particular context, 
and is certainly not evaded by the easy device of postulating as a fact 
that of which it is required to show the possibility. I urge, in the second 
place, that to suppose sensibilia, as distinguished from physical things, are 
directly apprehended objects is contrary to what can be gathered from a 
careful examination of actual experience. What we are immediately aware 
of in mature sense-perception are certainly not sensibilia understood in 
the way I have indicated. In the presence of the table, I am not immedi-
ately aware of patches of colour, of appearances of shininess, of smooth-
ness, of an oblong shape, and the rest. What I am immediately aware of is 
a single solid object, possessing innumerable characteristics, which, when 
I am challenged, I can enumerate in detail, but which are never presented 
in isolation. It is, for example, only by a deliberate and sustained effort 
of attention, and through the aid of artificial devices, that I apprehend 
patches of colour in and for themselves at all. Our ordinary experience is 
so dominated by what is misleadingly called “the reference to externally 
existing things” that visual presentations, or sensibilia, are not as such 
contemplated by us, but do duty merely as signs. Our interest is centred 
upon what we take to be the real nature and relations of things, which 
are interpreted no doubt by means of visual (and other) presentations, but 
which there is no ground whatever for supposing are themselves groups 
of such presentations. If, then, the term “immediate” be used in reference 
to our mature experience, it is of things that we are immediately aware, 
whilst presentations simply as such are not immediately known by us. 
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Many considerations will serve to illustrate the truth of what I have 
just been urging. For example, it is a well attested psychological fact that 
concentration of attention upon visual presentations reveals a duality or 
duplication of these presentations which in ordinary circumstances passes 
entirely unnoticed. By far the larger number of the visible objects lying 
within the field of vision at any one moment, although usually recognised 
by us as single, do nevertheless simultaneously affect both eyes, and give 
rise to a duplication of presentations of which by an effect of attention we 
may become conscious. This duality of the visual presentations is, how-
ever, altogether overmastered by the teaching of experience that the ob-
jects within the visual field are single and not double; we are immediately 
aware not of the dual sensibilia but of the oneness of the object. Again, 
there can be little question that in ordinary experience the apprehension 
of what is called the distance of an object appears to be no less immedi-
ate and direct than the apprehension of its colour. Yet it is psychologically 
demonstrable that what appears to be the immediate apprehension of dis-
tance is in truth a complex estimate based upon a number of data and is 
essentially of the character of a judgment. But of the data themselves, on 
which the judgment is based, there is no immediate apprehension; their in-
fluence is largely indirect and in the region of obscure consciousness. And 
what is true of the apprehension of distance is true in like manner, though 
with certain qualifications, of the apprehension of form, of magnitude 
and of movement. If, then, all these factors which go to make up what 
seems to be the immediate awareness of an object indicate that processes 
of judging,—that is to say, of discriminating, comparing and relating,—
are throughout operative, it is certainly difficult to resist the conclusion 
that in the apprehension of so-called secondary qualities the like mental 
activities are not involved. 
So far I have been confining attention to mature experience, and it is 
to mature experience that those who defend the theory I am criticising 
invariably appeal. But the case I am trying to represent is strengthened 
and becomes much more convincing when we extend our view to the way 
in which experience develops—a point of view, be it observed, too often 
ignored in discussions of the problem before us. Experience does not ad-
vance by a gradual building up of the concrete objects of perception from 
originally isolated and detached sensibilia. We do not start with the ap-
prehension of innumerable patches of colour, with visual presentations of 
form and of magnitude, with tactual presentations of hardness, smooth-
ness, and the like, and out of such definite appearances construct the com-
plexes which are designated “things.” In the evolution of conscious intel-
ligence nothing of the kind takes place. On the contrary, we start with an 
environment the characteristics of which are but dimly and confusedly 
apprehended, and the parts of which are but crudely and vaguely recog-
nised as distinguishable from one another. And conscious intelligence ad-
421
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2G. Dawes Hicks
vances by a continuously growing capacity of discriminating differences, 
of distinguishing features previously undistinguished, of holding elements 
apart that formerly were confused together. By degrees things come to be 
differentiated from things, and the properties of any one thing to be dif-
ferentiated from one another and from the thing. I do not apprehend the 
brown colour of the table merely on account of its distinction from other 
actual or possible hues, but I can only apprehend it as a distinct content, 
as a single fact of experience, if there are supplied in my inner life suffi-
cient means for discriminating it from all else. In short, at no stage in the 
history of the mental life, and least of all in the earlier stages, can there 
be said to be immediate awareness of detached and isolated sensibilia. 
Such awareness as we have of these is always attained through a process 
of abstraction, and cannot, therefore, be “immediate” in the sense that is 
claimed for it. The conclusion, then, to which the facts I have been dwell-
ing upon lead is this—that sense-appearances presuppose, as the condition 
of their possibility, real existing things which appear, that the appearances 
are dependent upon the realities, and not the realities upon the appearanc-
es. Accordingly, if we are entitled, in regard to knowledge, to speak of an 
immediate relationship, that relationship must subsist between the mind 
and things, whilst the relationship between the mind and the appearances 
of things is secondary and derivative. 
Although in accord with the ordinary common-sense view, which it 
does little else than translate into accurate phraseology, the conclusion just 
expressed will probably be pronounced paradoxical, or worse, by the ad-
herents of many current modes of philosophical thought. The dogma that 
all we can know directly and primitively of the external world consists of 
sense-data, sense-appearances, and that any knowledge we suppose our-
selves to possess of things is inferential and precarious, is constantly re-
asserting itself. I have been maintaining, on the contrary, that there is no 
difference in kind between the ways in which we know appearances and 
the ways in which we know real existing things. Things, it is true, do not 
“wander into our consciousness” but then neither do sense-data “wander 
into our consciousness.” According to the theory I am criticising, “the fac-
ulty of being acquainted with things other than itself is the main charac-
teristic of a mind,” and sense-data should rather be said to be “before the 
mind” than “in the mind.” And in the mind in the sense in which mental 
acts are in the mind I agree they never are. But, on the other hand, in nor-
mal circumstances it is only as properties of things that they are “before 
the mind”; in abstraction from things, as mere presentations, they are not 
usually “before the mind,” and, indeed, the ordinary unsophisticated con-
sciousness is not so much as aware of their presence. To suppose that sen-
sibilia in such abstraction and as the raw material of sense-apprehension 
actually exist and are cognised as objects, and that they are the sole data 
with which observation and experiment can deal, is, I submit, to make an 
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assumption which the facts of experience certainly do not warrant and for 
which, so far as I can see, no justification can be obtained from elsewhere. 
I contend, then, that neither philosophical nor psychological analysis 
does in truth invalidate what certainly seems to be an empirically estab-
lished fact, that a finite mind is a real existing entity in the midst of a 
vast environment of other minds and of physical objects. The physical 
object is, it is true, not to be thought of as consisting merely of impercep-
tible molecules, composed of atoms or, in the last resort, of electrons. Not 
that there is the least occasion for throwing doubt upon the results which 
physical science appears to be establishing. All we need be concerned to 
maintain is that these elements do not exhaust the nature of the physical 
object, that the physical object in its entirety possesses also, in addition, 
the properties which have been described as secondary qualities. And, ex-
cept the ungrounded assumption that the latter are products of mechani-
cal motion, I can find no reason for holding such a conjunction of factors 
to be inconceivable. Upon this object, then, in consequence of the cerebral 
change to which stimuli emanating from it give rise, a mental act is direct-
ed, and the object is apprehended; it is distinguished from other objects, 
and its characteristics are discriminated, but always imperfectly and in 
fragmentary fashion, and in some circumstances much more imperfectly 
and partially than in others. It is precisely in this contrast between the 
imperfect, the partial, and the perfect, the complete, that the significance 
of what is denoted by the term “appearance” is to be discerned. The ob-
ject is apprehended only incompletely, and that incompleteness may often 
amount to positive error. But the incompleteness does not give rise to a new 
object, does not bring into existence a tertium quid which is thenceforth 
there, ready to be apprehended whenever the opportunity occurs. On the 
contrary, it is throughout still the physical object that is being apprehend-
ed, and upon which the act of apprehension is directed; the appearances 
arise only in and through the act of apprehension being directed upon 
the physical object. In conformity with this mode of viewing the facts, we 
find that in numerous cases the continued direction of the apprehending 
act upon the object results in increased discrimination of the properties of 
the object,—in a gradual lessening, that is to say, of the incompleteness of 
its apprehension. Fresh characteristics of it are noted; characteristics of it 
previously noted are more clearly and distinctly discerned. 
When we pursue the matter further, a number of other considerations 
require to be taken into account, but with the general interpretation I have 
been trying to explain the ascertained facts will, I am persuaded, be found 
to accord. For instance, the importance of space as a determining factor in 
the character of appearances becomes, on careful scrutiny, more and more 
manifest. To take the simplest illustration, it is a notorious circumstance 
that near objects are visually apprehended more clearly and accurately 
than distant objects. A table which from one point of view appears rect-
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angular may from a more distant point of view appear to have two acute 
and two obtuse angles. There is, however, absolutely no need to resort to 
the violent and impossible assumption that the table really possesses both 
shapes, or that these different shapes, as distinct from the real table, both 
exist, ready to be seen by observers in suitable positions for seeing them. 
For, given the existence of the table and its particular shape (whatever it 
may be), the apparent shape of the table is explicable as a conse quence of 
the real shape and of the known characteristics of space. In other words, 
owing to the conditions of perspective, to which visual perception is nec-
essarily subject, the spatial relations of a material object can never, as a 
matter of fact, visually appear precisely as they are. So that here, and in all 
such cases, the distinction between appearance and reality is necessitated 
by the very nature of space itself. Consider, again, the time-honoured in-
stance of a straight stick partially immersed in water. The stick in water is, 
it is true, not really the same thing as it was out of the water, but all the 
same, there are good and sufficient reasons for asserting that it is not re-
ally bent as it appears to be. The laws of refraction being, however, what 
they are, that the stick, under such circumstances, should appear visually 
as bent is an inevitable consequence of the actual state of things. Here, as 
in the previous instance, the distinction between appearance and reality is 
necessitated by objective conditions. If, however, we persist in saying, as 
some writers do, that the visual appearance is bent, we are going far be-
yond what the facts warrant. We are assuming that it is upon a bent entity 
of some sort that the act of perception is directed. And that is precisely 
what strict adherence to the facts gives us no ground for assuming. On the 
contrary, what the facts entitle us to say is that, when the act of percep tion 
is directed upon a straight stick partially immersed in water, then the stick 
in question appears bent, and that no such appearance would arise unless 
the act of perception were, or had been, so directed. The appearance, that 
is to say, does not subsist at all apart from the physical object of which it 
is an appearance. Once more, I believe an argument of similar purport is 
applicable in regard to the secondary qualities of physical things. Take the 
case of colour, and let our example be that already used of the table. It is 
contended that there is no one colour which pre-eminently appears to be 
the colour of the table, or even of any one particular part of it. I think this 
assertion open to well-founded objection, but meanwhile let it pass. The 
table appears to be of different colours from different points of view, and 
there is, it is maintained, no reason for regarding one of these colours as 
more really its colour than the others. Further, even from a given point of 
view the colour will seem different by artificial light, or to a colour-blind 
man, or to a man wearing blue spectacles, while in the dark there will be 
no colour at all, though to touch and hearing the table will be unchanged. 
Therefore, so the argument runs, colour is not something which is inher-
ent in the table, but something depending upon the table and the spectator 
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and the way in which the light falls on the table.9 It is obvious, I think, that 
this argument is fallacious, and that the conclusion does not follow from 
the premisses. For, in order to test it, suppose that colour of some kind is 
inherent in the table, that the table has a specific colour. Then, surely, there 
would be nothing to conflict with this supposition in the circumstances 
that such real colour will present a different aspect if another colour be 
reflected upon it, or if a blue pair of spectacles intervene between it and 
the eyes of the observer, or if it be enveloped in darkness rather than in 
daylight. The reasoning would only be valid on the assumption that if the 
table is really coloured, the real colour must appear the same in darkness 
and in daylight, through a pair of blue spectacles and without them, in 
artificial light and in the sun’s light—an assumption which, on the view I 
am taking, is at once to be dismissed as untenable. If the colour did appear 
to be the same in these varying circumstances, then certainly there would 
be reason, and sufficient reason, for doubting the reliability of visual ap-
prehension. For obviously the conditions mentioned—real, objective con-
ditions, as I take them to be—cannot be without influence upon any real 
colour the table may be said to possess. With reference to colour blindness 
a different set of factors come into play, but the principle is the same. As-
sume for the moment that the table really is brown, and that by normal 
vision it is apprehended as brown, then there is nothing extraordinary in 
the fact that it should appear different to the man whose vision is not nor-
mal. It would, indeed, be extraordinary if it did not. If normal vision is the 
way in which the real colours of objects are more or less accurately appre-
hended, is it not a strange demand to make that abnormal vision must also 
like wise be a way of more or less accurately apprehending them? Finally, 
the specious argument that turns upon the difficulty of determining what 
the actual colour, if there be one, of a physical object is seems to me utterly 
irrelevant. Granted that the difficulty is insuperable—and I should be very 
far from admitting the insuperability—still the difficulty of determining 
the actual colour of an object is no more a reason for supposing it has not 
got one than the insuperable difficulty of determining the character of the 
other side of the moon is a reason for supposing that the other side of the 
moon is not hemispherical. 
I have been purposely emphasising the objective conditions of phe-
nomena or appearances, because these are too often over looked. I have 
done so, however, with no intention of minimising the subjective factors 
also involved. The facts of revival and of memory are sufficient in them-
selves to indicate, not indeed that sense-data are retained and preserved 
as entities in the mind, but that, by means of a process of the nature of 
which we know little, the characteristics of what has once been perceived 
can be recalled. And it is obvious that in imagination and thought the 
mind is capable of exercising a certain constructive power in regard to the 
9 B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 13. 
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contents thus at its disposal. Nor is such constructive activity confined to 
efforts of a deliberate and purposive kind. Throughout the life of mind 
there is involved the working of what Lotze designated “psychical mecha-
nism,” and of what Kant partly had in view when he spoke of “a blind 
but indispensable function of the soul.” In dreaming, for example, what 
appear to the dreamer to be real existing objects are apprehended by him, 
although we know that, as a matter of fact, no such objects are present. 
And it is no doubt considerations such as these that seem to contradict 
the position that appearances arise through the direction of apprehending 
activity upon real existing things. But I do not believe there is in truth any 
such contradiction. We are concerned here with the processes of revival or 
memory, and scanty though our psychological knowledge of the nature of 
these processes certainly is, there are certain general propositions one can 
lay down respecting them, and which are of significance in this connexion. 
In the first place, imagination and memory are dependent upon perception 
and would be, in the case of any mental life with which we are familiar, 
impossible without it. They do not produce new characteristics; such con-
struction as there is consists in manipulating what is revived of character-
istics previously perceived. In the second place, the contents revived are 
never isolated sense-data. As Professor Ward puts it, “what are revived 
in memory and imagination are percepts, not unlocalised sensations and 
movements.”10 Now, even those who regard sense-data as in themselves 
given objects can scarcely maintain that images, if one may use that term 
for revived contents of the character indicated, are also there, ready to 
be apprehended, prior to the act of imagination coming into operation. 
One can hardly suppose, for example, that dream-apparitions are actu-
ally given in their entirety, and that the dreamer has simply to discern and 
contemplate them. In the third place, it would seem likely that in imagina-
tion, and particularly in dreaming, some amount of actual perception is 
taking place,—that the mind, in other words, is even then directed upon 
an external object, and that this object, which under the circum stances is 
barely discriminated, becomes the centre of reference for masses of sug-
gested imagery. 
Neither the facts of perception nor those of imagination and memory 
lend countenance, then, to the view that appearances are objects. Nor do 
they in any way tend to show that appearances are mental entities, or, 
more specifically, reactions of the mind on stimulation. As a reaction of 
the mind, an appearance would not be the appearance of what was other 
than the mind, but, if the term “appearance” had in that case significance, 
an appearance of the mind itself. But the mental life, so far as its nature is 
psychologically known, consists of a stream of conscious process, evinc-
ing itself in the various modes which it is customary to describe as those 
of perceiving, imagining, thinking, feeling, willing, and so forth. In what 
10 Encyclopaedia Britannica, ix ed., vol. xx, p. 57. 
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conceivable way can this stream of process be supposed to give rise to co-
lours and sounds, tastes and smells, and the other data of sense? To speak 
of sense-data as products of conscious process is, in truth, as meaning-
less as to speak of sense-data as products of mechanical movement. Sense 
qualities are sui generis and to attempt to explain their mode of origin 
is as fruitless as to attempt to explain the mode of origin of matter or of 
mind. Not to produce them, but to become aware of them, is the function 
of conscious process, and it is that awareness which is capable of being 
revived and reproduced when the object is no longer present. If, then, 
sense-data are mental entities, it can only be because the mind, in addition 
to being a stream of conscious process, is also a storehouse of sensuous 
material. I do not envy the task of him who tries to be serious with such 
a conception as that. What intelligible notion could we frame of a mental 
life which, besides fulfilling the functions indicated by the term “men-
tal,” was at the same time a repository of huge supplies of the ingredients 
required for the construction of objects, such ingredients being massed 
somewhere in the regions of sub-consciousness, where also the mysterious 
operation of construction must be supposed to be going on? The assump-
tion would be less readily made if the question of what it implies were not 
so lightly passed over. 
In the light of the considerations upon which I have been insisting, the 
significance of the contention that appearances, as ways in which existent 
reality is apprehended, are not themselves existences will be sufficiently 
manifest. To some extent, at least, this is but a re-statement of Aristotelian 
doctrine. Sense-perception was characterised by Aristotle as a power of 
apprehending the forms or essences of sensible objects without their mat-
ter—that is to say, he did not conceive the content of the perceiving act to 
be an existing entity, because to constitute an existing entity both matter 
and form were, in his view, necessary. Aristotle, it is true, maintained that 
the sentient soul was passively affected (πάσχει τι), but such passive af-
fection was, in his view, only one side of the whole process, which besides 
being in its more important aspect the actualisation of what the sentient 
soul is potentially was also essentially in nature an act of discriminating. 
Much more certainly does the non-existential character of the contents of 
apprehending activity, or as we may now say of appearances, follow from 
the nature of perception, if the notion of passive receptivity be entirely 
relinquished. The external object itself is, so far as can be discovered, in 
no way altered or affected through the fact of being apprehended— none 
of its constituents are abstracted from it and transferred into the appre-
hending act—but in and through the apprehending act there is awareness 
of certain of its features, and it is this awareness of a group of its features 
that constitutes that group, as the content of the act of apprehension, an 
appearance as contrasted with the real existing thing. The apprehending 
act exists, the external object exists, but there is no ground at all for re-
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garding the appearance as a third existent. On the contrary, there is every 
ground for not so regarding it. Appearances, as distinct from the things of 
which they are appearances, do not occupy any part of the common space 
in which physical objects exist. They do not set other things in motion, 
and they are not set in motion by other things. They do not act and react 
upon one another; they do not obey the law of gravitation or of chemical 
affinity; they do not exert force, nor are they modes of energy. They do 
not perceive or think or feel or will. They do not, in short, form part of 
what we describe as the inter-connected system of concrete existing facts. 
Now to define an ultimate term, such as the term existence, is, of course, 
impossible. We can only point to instances of it, just as we can only point 
to instances of red, in order to make clear what we mean by redness. And 
there can, I take it, be little question that in ordinary usage we should 
not speak of that as existing of which all the characteristics I have just 
specified have to be denied. It is but expressing, in a different form, Plato’s 
argument in the Sophist to emphasise the necessity of drawing a distinc-
tion between existence and being. The distinction is, as Mr. Russell says, 
essential, if we are ever to deny the existence of anything. “For what does 
not exist must be something, or it would be meaningless to deny its exis-
tence; and hence we need the concept of being, as that which belongs even 
to the non-existent.”11 In refusing, then, to ascribe existence to phenom-
ena or appearances, we are not dismissing them to that fictitious realm of 
nothingness, of which Plato tried to demonstrate the impossibility. Ap-
pearances most indubitably are, but their mode of being is not the mode of 
being which is exhibited by existing things. “We shall find it convenient,” 
writes Mr. Russell, “only to speak of things existing when they are in time, 
that is to say, when we can point to some time at which they exist (not 
excluding the possibility of their existing at all times),”12 I venture to sub-
mit, although he will not have it so, that, according to this criterion also, 
a sensible appearance must be said, no less than a universal, to “subsist or 
have being, where being is opposed to ‘existence’ as being timeless.” As an 
abstraction, of the kind I have been attempting to explain, from the exist-
ing object, the sensible appearance is, in truth, no less than a universal, 
unchangeable, rigid, eternally the same with itself. Nothing can alter it, 
for the simple reason that it is not an entity which can be operated upon, 
acted on, or affected in any way whatsoever. The process of apprehending 
the object, from which, in the manner described, it is abstracted, is doubt-
less dependent upon temporal conditions, and is in time, but the sensible 
appearance itself differs not at all, so far as timelessness is concerned, 
from a universal.
Reverting now, in conclusion, to the three historical conceptions of 
phenomena which we have had before us, we are, I think, in a position 
11 The Principles of Mathematics, vol. i, p. 450. 
12 The Problems of Philosophy, p. 155. 
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to assert that a fundamental error is committed in all of them,—the error, 
namely, of placing empirical things and the ways in which empirical things 
are apprehended upon the same level, as both of them phenomenal in 
character. One of the main grounds, if not the main ground, upon which, 
in these three systems of thought, empirical things were taken to be phe-
nomena turns out to be that empirical things (if, for the moment, we do 
not include mental lives under that heading) are in space. According to 
the Platonic theory, space offered the strongest antithesis imaginable to 
the reality of the Ideas, and things in space could not but share in the un-
reality, the shadowy character, attaching to space itself. According to the 
Kantian theory, space was essentially a form of perception, and things in 
space could not but participate in the subjectivity which must be assigned 
to a form of perception. According to the Hegelian theory, space is a par-
tial and imperfect manifestation of what in truth is non-spatial, and things 
in space could not but exhibit a like incompleteness and imperfection. 
Now, the fact that things are in space has, as I have tried to show, a very 
important bearing upon the ways in which those things appear. But when 
once the view of the unreality of space, in any of the senses men tioned, 
has been discarded, when once it is recognised,—as, of course, I should 
be prepared to argue must be recognised,—that space has a being and 
reality of its own, the plausibility of the doctrine that empirical things are 
phenomena, or groups of appearances, vanishes. For it is possible, then, 
both to conceive of the existence of real things in space, and to understand 
how those real things may be apprehended in a variety of ways by minds 
that are subject not only to the manifold conditions of mental growth and 
development but subject also to the conditions which space imposes, even 
where apprehension has attained its highest degree of accuracy.
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THE term “sense-data” is ambiguous; and therefore I think I had better 
begin by trying to explain what the class of entities is whose status I pro-
pose to discuss. 
There are several different classes of mental events, all of which, owing 
to their intrinsic resemblance to one another in certain respects, may, in a 
wide sense, be called “sensory experiences,” although only some among 
them would usually be called “sensations.” There are (1) those events, 
happening in our minds while we are awake, which consist in the experi-
encing of one of those entities, which are usually called “images,” in the 
narrowest sense of the term. Everybody distinguishes these events from 
sensations proper; and yet everybody admits that “images” intrinsically 
resemble the entities which are experienced in sensations proper in some 
very important respect. There are (2) the sensory experiences we have in 
dreams, some of which would certainly be said to be experiences of im-
ages, while others might be said to be sensations. There are (3) hallucina-
tions, and certain classes of illusory sensory experiences. There are (4) 
those experiences, which used to be called the having of “after-images,” 
but which psychologists now say ought rather to be called “after-sensa-
tions.” And there are, finally, (5) that class of sensory experiences, which 
are immensely commoner than any of the above, and which may be called 
sensations proper, if we agree to use this term in such a way as to exclude 
experiences of my first four sorts. 
Every event, of any one of these five classes, consists in the fact that 
an entity, of some kind or other, is experienced. The entity which is expe-
rienced may be of many different kinds; it may, for instance, be a patch 
of colour, or a sound, or a smell, or a taste, etc.; or it may be an image of 
a patch of colour, an image of a sound, an image of a smell, an image of 
a taste, etc. But, whatever be its nature, the entity which is experienced 
must in all cases be distinguished from the fact or event which consists in 
its being experienced; since by saying that it is experienced we mean that 
it has a relation of a certain kind to something else. We can, therefore, 
speak not only of experiences of these five kinds, but also of the entities 
which are experienced in experiences of these kinds; and the entity which 
is experienced in such an experience is never identical with the experi-
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ence which consists in its being experienced. But we can speak not only 
of the entities which are experienced in experiences of this kind, but also 
of the sort of entities which are experienced in experiences of this kind; 
and these two classes may again be different. For a patch of colour, even 
if it were not actually experienced, would be an entity of the same sort 
as some which are experienced in experiences of this kind: and there is 
no contradiction in supposing that there are patches of colour, which yet 
are not experienced; since by calling a thing a patch of colour we merely 
make a statement about its intrinsic quality, and in no way assert that it 
has to anything else any of the relations which may be meant by saying 
that it is experienced. In speaking, therefore, of the sort of entities which 
are experienced in experiences of the five kinds I have mentioned, we do 
not necessarily confine ourselves to those which actually are experienced 
in some such experience: we leave it an open question whether the two 
classes are identical or not. And the class of entities, whose status I wish to 
discuss, consists precisely of all those, whether experienced or not, which 
are of the same sort as those which are experienced in experiences of these 
five kinds. 
I intend to call this class of entities the class of sensibles; so that the 
question I am to discuss can be expressed in the form: What is the status 
of sensibles? And it must be remembered that images and after-images are 
just as much “sensibles,” in my sense of the term, as the entities which are 
experienced in sensations proper; and so, too, are any patches of colour, 
or sounds, or smells, etc. (if such there be), which are not experienced at 
all. 
In speaking of sensibles as the sort of entities which are experienced 
in sensory experiences, I seem to imply that all the entities which are ex-
perienced in sensory experiences have some common characteristic other 
than that which consists in their being so experienced. And I cannot help 
thinking that this is the case, in spite of the fact that it is difficult to see 
what intrinsic character can be shared in common by entities so different 
from one another as are patches of colour, sounds, smells, tastes, etc. For, 
so far as I can see, some non-sensory experiences may be exactly similar 
to sensory ones, in all intrinsic respects, except that what is experienced in 
them is different in kind from what is experienced in any sensory experi-
ence: the relation meant by saying that in them something is experienced 
may be exactly the same in kind, and so may the experient. And, if this 
be so, it seems to compel us to admit that the distinction between sensory 
and non-sensory experiences is derived from that between sensibles and 
non-sensibles, and not vice versa. I am inclined, therefore, to think that all 
sensibles, in spite of the great differences between them, have some com-
mon intrinsic property, which we recognise, but which is unanalysable; 
and that, when we call an experience sensory, what we mean is not only 
that in it something is experienced in a particular way, but also that this 
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something has this unanalysable property. If this be so, the ultimate defini-
tion of “sensibles” would be merely all entities which have this unanalys-
able property. 
It seems to me that the term “sense-data” is often used, and may be 
correctly used, simply as a synonym for “sensibles”; and everybody, I 
think, would expect me, in discussing the status of sense-data, to discuss, 
among other things, the question whether there are any sensibles which 
are not “given.” It is true that the etymology of the term “sense-data” 
suggests that nothing should be called a sense-datum, but what is given; 
so that to talk of a non-given sense-datum would be a contradiction in 
terms. But, of course, etymology is no safe guide either as to the actual or 
the correct use of terms; and it seems to me that the term “sense-data” is 
often, and quite properly, used merely for the sort of entities that are given 
in sense, and not in any way limited to those which are actually given. But 
though I think I might thus have used “sense-data” quite correctly instead 
of “sensibles,” I think the latter term is perhaps more convenient; because, 
though nobody ought to be misled by etymologies, so many people in 
fact are so. Moreover the term “sense-data” is sometimes limited in yet 
another way, viz., to the sort of sensibles which are experienced in sensa-
tions proper; so that in this sense “images” would not be “sense-data.” 
For both these reasons, I think it is perhaps better to drop the term “sense-
data” altogether, and to speak only of “sensibles.” 
My discussion of the status of sensibles will be divided into two parts. 
I shall first consider how, in certain respects, they are related to our minds; 
and then I shall consider how, in certain respects, they are related to physi-
cal objects. 
i.
(1) We can, I think, distinguish pretty clearly at least one kind of relation 
which sensibles, of all the kinds I have mentioned, do undoubtedly some-
times have to our minds. 
I do now see certain blackish marks on a whitish ground, and I hear 
certain sounds which I attribute to the ticking of my clock. In both cases 
I have to certain sensibles—certain blackish marks, in the one case, and 
certain sounds, in the other—a kind of relation with which we are all per-
fectly familiar, and which may be expressed, in the one case, by saying that 
I actually see the marks, and in the other, by saying that I actually hear the 
sounds. It seems to me quite evident that the relation to the marks which I 
express by saying that I see them, is not different in kind from the relation 
to the sounds which I express by saying that I hear them. “Seeing” and 
“hearing,” when thus used as names for a relation which we may have to 
sensibles, are not names for different relations, but merely express the fact 
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that, in the one case, the kind of sensible to which I have a certain kind of 
relation is a patch of colour, while, in the other case, the kind of sensible 
to which I have the same kind of relation is a sound. And similarly when 
I say that I feel warm or smell a smell, these different verbs do not express 
the fact that I have a different kind of relation to the sensibles concerned, 
but only that I have the same kind of relation to a different kind of sen-
sible. Even when I call up a visual image of a sensible I saw yesterday, or 
an auditory image of a sound I heard yesterday, I have to those images 
exactly the same kind of relation which I have to the patches of colour I 
now see and which I had yesterday to those I saw then. 
But this kind of relation, which I sometimes have to sensibles of all 
sorts of different kinds, images as well as others, is evidently quite differ-
ent in kind from another relation which I may also have to sensibles. After 
looking at this black mark, I may turn away my head or close my eyes, 
and then I no longer actually see the mark I saw just now. I may, indeed, 
have (I myself actually do have at this moment) a visual image of the mark 
before my mind; and to this image I do now have exactly the same kind 
of relation which I had just now to the mark itself. But the image is not 
identical with the mark of which it is an image; and to the mark itself it is 
quite certain that I have not now got the same kind of relation as I had just 
now, when I was actually seeing it. And yet I certainly may now have to 
that mark itself a kind of relation, which may be expressed by saying that 
I am thinking of it or remembering it. I can now make judgments about it 
itself—the very sensible which I did see just now and am no longer seeing: 
as, for instance, that I did then see it and that it was different from the im-
age of it which I am now seeing. It is, therefore, quite certain that there is 
a most important difference between the relation I have to a sensible when 
I am actually seeing or hearing it, and any relation (for there may be sev-
eral) which I may have to the same sensible when I am only thinking of or 
remembering it. And I want to express this difference by using a particular 
term for the former relation. I shall express this relation, which I certainly 
do have to a sensible when I actually see or hear it, and most certainly do 
not have to it, when I only think of or remember it, by saying that there 
is in my mind a direct apprehension of it. I have expressly chosen this 
term because, so far as I know, it has not been used hitherto as a technical 
term; whereas all the terms which have been so used, such as “presented,” 
“given,” “perceived,” seem to me to have been spoilt by ambiguity. People 
sometimes, no doubt, use these terms as names for the kind of relation I 
am concerned with. But you can never be sure, when an entity is said to be 
“given” or “presented” or “perceived,” that what is meant is simply and 
solely that it has to someone that relation which sensibles do undoubtedly 
have to me when I actually see or hear them, and which they do not have 
to me when I only think of or remember them. 
I have used the rather awkward expression “There is in my mind a 
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direct apprehension of this black mark,” because I want to insist that 
though, when I see the mark, the mark certainly has to something the 
fundamental relation which I wish to express by saying that it is directly 
apprehended, and though the event which consists in its being directly ap-
prehended by that something is certainly a mental act of mine or which 
occurs in my mind, yet the something which directly apprehends it may 
quite possibly not be anything which deserves to be called “I” or “me.” It 
is quite possible, I think, that there is no entity whatever which deserves 
to be called “I” or “me” or “my mind”; and hence that nothing whatever 
is ever directly apprehended by me. Whether this is so or not, depends on 
the nature of that relation which certainly does hold between all those 
mental acts which are mine, and does not hold between any of mine and 
any of yours; and which holds again between all those mental acts which 
are yours, but does not hold between any of yours and any of mine. And 
I do not feel at all sure what the correct analysis of this relation is. It may 
be the case that the relation which unites all those acts of direct apprehen-
sion which are mine, and which is what we mean to say that they have to 
one another when we say they all are mine, really does consist in the fact 
that one and the same entity is what directly apprehends in each of them: 
in which case this entity could properly be called “me,” and it would be 
true to say that, when I see this black mark, I directly apprehend it. But it 
is also quite possible (and this seems to me to be the view which is com-
monest among psychologists) that the entity which directly apprehends, 
in those acts of direct apprehension which are mine, is numerically dif-
ferent in every different act; and that what I mean by calling all these dif-
ferent acts mine is either merely that they have some kind of relation to 
one another or that they all have a common relation to some other entity, 
external to them, which may or may not be something which deserves to 
be called “me.” On any such view, what I assert to be true of this black 
mark, when I say that it is seen by me, would not be simply that it is di-
rectly apprehended by me, but something more complex in which, besides 
direct apprehension, some other quite different relation was also involved. 
I should be asserting both (1) that the black mark is being directly ap-
prehended by something, and (2) that this act of direct apprehension has 
to something else, external to it, a quite different relation, which is what 
makes it an act of mine. I do not know how to decide between these views, 
and that is why I wished to explain that the fundamental relation, which 
I wish to call direct apprehension, is one which quite possibly never holds 
between me and any sensible. But, once this has been explained, I think 
no harm can result from using the expression “I directly apprehend A” as 
a synonym for “A direct apprehension of A occurs in my mind.” And in 
future I shall so speak, because it is much more convenient. 
The only other point, which seems to me to need explanation, in or-
der to make it quite clear what the relation I call “direct apprehension” 
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is, concerns its relation to attention; and as to this I must confess I don’t 
feel clear. In every case, where it is quite clear to me that I am directly ap-
prehending a given entity, it seems also clear to me that I am, more or less, 
attending to it; and it seems to me possible that what I mean by “direct ap-
prehension” may be simply identical with what is meant by “attention,” 
in one of the senses in which that word can be used. That it can, at most, 
only be identical with one of the relations meant by attention seems to me 
clear, because I certainly can be said to attend, in some sense or other, to 
entities, which I am not directly apprehending: I may, for instance, think, 
with attention, of a sensible, which I saw yesterday, and am certainly not 
seeing now. It is, therefore, clear that to say I am attending to a thing and 
yet am not directly apprehending it, is not a contradiction in terms: and 
this fact alone is sufficient to justify the use of the special term “direct ap-
prehension.” But whether to say that I am directly apprehending a given 
thing and yet am not attending to it, in any degree at all, is or is not a 
contradiction in terms, I admit I don’t feel clear. 
However that may be, one relation, in which sensibles of all sorts do 
sometimes stand to our minds, is the relation constituted by the fact that 
we directly apprehend them: or, to speak more accurately, by the fact that 
events which consist in their being directly apprehended are in our minds, 
in the sense in which to say that an event is in our minds means merely 
that it is a mental act of ours —that it has to our other mental acts that 
relation (whatever it may be) which we mean by saying that they are all 
mental acts of the same individual. And it is clear that to say of a sensible 
that it is directly apprehended by me, is to say of it something quite differ-
ent from what I say of a mental act of mine, when I say that this mental 
act is in my mind: for nothing is more certain than that an act of direct 
apprehension or belief may be in my mind, without being itself directly 
apprehended by me. If, therefore, by saying that a sensible is in our minds 
or is ours, we mean merely that it is directly apprehended by us, we must 
recognise that we are here using the phrases “in our minds” or “ours” in 
quite a different sense from that in which we use them when we talk of 
our mental acts being “in our minds” or “ours.” And why I say this is be-
cause I think that these two relations are very apt to be confused. When, 
for instance, we say of a given entity that it is “experienced,” or when the 
Germans say that it is “erlebt,” it is sometimes meant, I think, merely that 
it is directly apprehended, but sometimes that it is in my mind, in the sense 
in which, when I entertain a belief, this act of belief is in my mind. 
But (2) it seems to me to be commonly held that sensibles are often 
in our minds in some sense quite other than that of being directly ap-
prehended by us or that of being thought of by us. This seems to me 
to be often what is meant when people say that they are “immediately 
experienced” or are “subjective modifications”; though, of course, both 
expressions are so ambiguous, that when people say that a given entity is 
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immediately experienced or is a subjective modification, they may mean 
merely that it is directly apprehended. And since I think this view is held, 
I want to explain that I see no reason whatever for thinking that sensibles 
ever are experienced by us in any other sense than that of being directly 
apprehended by us. 
Two kinds of argument, I think, are sometimes used to show that they 
are.
(a) It is a familiar fact that, when, for instance, we are in a room with 
a ticking clock, we may seem suddenly to become aware of the ticks, 
whereas, so far as we can tell, we had previously not heard them at all. 
And it may be urged that in these cases, since the same kind of stimulus 
was acting on our ears all the time, we must have experienced the same 
kind of sensible sounds, although we did not directly apprehend them. 
But I think most psychologists are now agreed that this argument is 
quite worthless. There seem to me to be two possible alternatives to the 
conclusion drawn. It may, I think, possibly be the case that we did directly 
apprehend the ticks all the time, but that we cannot afterwards remember 
that we did, because the degree of attention (if any) with which we heard 
them was so small, that in ordinary life we should say that we did not at-
tend to them at all. But what, I think, is much more likely is that, though 
the same stimulus was acting on our ears, it failed to produce any mental 
effect whatever, because our attention was otherwise engaged. 
(b) It is said that sometimes when we suddenly become aware, say, 
of the eighth stroke of a striking clock, we can remember earlier strokes, 
although we seem to ourselves not to have directly apprehended them. I 
cannot say that I have ever noticed this experience in myself, but I have no 
doubt that it is possible. And people seem inclined to argue that, since we 
can remember the earlier strokes, we must have experienced them, though 
we did not directly apprehend them. 
But here again, the argument does not seem to me at all conclusive. I 
should say, again, that it is possible that we did directly apprehend them, 
but only with a very slight degree of attention (if any). And, as an alterna-
tive, I should urge that there is no reason why we should not be able to 
remember a thing, which we never experienced at all. 
I do not know what other arguments can be used to show that we 
sometimes experience sensibles in a sense quite other than that of directly 
apprehending them. But I do not know how to show that we do not; and 
since people, whose judgment I respect, seem to hold that we do, I think it 
is worth while to say something as to what this sense of “experience” can 
be, in case it does occur. 
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I have said that sometimes when people say that a given entity is “ex-
perienced” they seem to mean that it belongs to some individual, in the 
sense in which my acts of belief belong to me. To say that sensibles were 
experienced by me in this sense would, therefore, be to say that they some-
times have to my acts of belief and acts of direct apprehension the same 
relation which these have to one another—the relation which constitutes 
them mine. But that sensibles ever have this kind of relation to my men-
tal acts, is a thing which I cannot believe. Those who hold that they are 
ever experienced at all, in some sense other than that of being directly 
apprehended, always hold, I think, that, whenever they are directly ap-
prehended by us, they also, at the same time, have to us this other relation 
as well. And it seems to me pretty clear that when I do directly apprehend 
a sensible, it does not have to me the same relation which my direct ap-
prehension of it has. 
If, therefore, sensibles are ever experienced by us at all, in any sense 
other than that of being directly apprehended by us, we must, I think, hold 
that they are so in an entirely new sense, quite different both from that 
in which to be experienced means to be directly apprehended, and from 
that in which to be experienced means to occur in some individual’s mind. 
And I can only say that I see no reason to think that they ever are experi-
enced in any such sense. If they are, the fact that they are so is presumably 
open to the inspection of us all; but I cannot distinguish any such fact 
as occurring in myself, as I can distinguish the fact that they are directly 
apprehended. On the other hand, I see no way of showing that they are 
not experienced in some such sense; and perhaps somebody will be able 
to point it out to me. I do not wish to assume, therefore, that there is no 
such sense; and hence, though I am inclined to think that the only sense in 
which they are experienced is that of being directly appre hended, I shall, 
in what follows, use the phrase “experienced” to mean either directly ap-
prehended or having to something this supposed different relation, if such 
a relation there be. 
(3) We may now, therefore, raise the question: Do sensibles ever exist 
at times when they are not being experienced at all? 
To this question it is usual to give a negative answer, and two different 
a priori reasons may be urged in favour of that answer. 
The first is what should be meant by Berkeley’s dictum that the esse of 
sensibles is percipi. This should mean, whatever else it may mean, at least 
this: that to suppose a sensible to exist and yet not to be experienced is 
self-contradictory. And this at least seems to me to be clearly false. Any-
thing which was a patch of colour would be a sensible; and to suppose 
that there are patches of colour which are not being experienced is clearly 
not self-contradictory, however false it may be. 
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It may, however, be urged (and this is the second argument) that, 
though to suppose a thing to be a sensible and yet not experienced is not 
self-contradictory, yet we can clearly see that nothing can have the one 
property without having the other. And I do not see my way to deny that 
we may be able to know, a priori, that such a connection holds between 
two such properties. In the present case, however, I cannot see that it does 
hold, and therefore, so far as a priori reasons go, I conclude that there is 
no reason why sensibles should not exist at times when they are not ex-
perienced. 
It may, however, be asked: Is there any reason to suppose that they ever 
do? And the reason, which weighs with me most, is one which applies, I 
think, to a certain class of sensibles only; a class which I will try to define 
by saying that it consists of those which would (under certain conditions 
which actually exist) be experienced in a sensation proper, if only a liv-
ing body, having a certain constitution, existed under those conditions 
in a position in which no such body does actually exist. I think it is very 
probable that this definition does not define at all accurately the kind of 
sensibles I mean; but I think that what the definition aims at will become 
clearer when I proceed to give my reasons for supposing that sensibles, of 
a kind to be defined in some such way, do exist unexperienced. The reason 
is simply that, in Hume’s phrase, I have “a strong propensity to believe” 
that, e.g., the visual sensibles which I directly apprehend in looking at this 
paper, still exist unchanged when I merely alter the position of my body by 
turning away my head or closing my eyes, provided that the physical con-
ditions outside my body remain unchanged. In such a case it is certainly 
true in some sense that I should see sensibles like what I saw the moment 
before, if only my head were still in the position it was at that moment 
or my eyes unclosed. But if, in such a case, there is reason to think that 
sensibles which I should see, if the position of my body were altered, exist 
in spite of the fact that I do not experience them, there is, I think, an equal 
reason to suppose it in other cases. We must, for instance, suppose that the 
sensibles which I should see now, if I were at the other end of the room, 
or if I were looking under the table, exist at this moment, though they are 
not being experienced. And similarly we must suppose that the sensibles 
which you would see, if you were in the position in which I am now, exist 
at this moment, in spite of the fact that they may be more or less different 
from those which I see, owing to the different constitution of your bodies. 
All this implies, of course, that a vast number of sensibles exist at any mo-
ment, which are not being experienced at all. But still it implies this only 
with regard to sensibles of a strictly limited class, namely sensibles which 
would be experienced in a sensation proper, if a body, having a certain 
constitution, were in a position in which it is not, under the given physi-
cal conditions. It does not, for instance, imply that any images, of which 
it may be true that I should have them, under present physical conditions, 
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if the position of my body were altered, exist now; nor does it imply that 
sensibles which would be experienced by me now in a sensation proper, 
if the physical conditions external to my body were different from what 
they are, exist now. 
I feel, of course, that I have only succeeded in defining miserably vague-
ly the kind of sensibles I mean; and I do not know whether the fact that I 
have a strong propensity to believe that sensibles of a kind to be defined in 
some such way, do exist unexperienced, is any good reason for supposing 
that they actually do. The belief may, of course, be a mere prejudice. But I 
do not know of any certain test by which prejudices can be distinguished 
from reasonable beliefs. And I cannot help thinking that there may be a 
class of sensibles, capable of definition in some such way, which there re-
ally is reason to think exist unexperienced. 
But, if I am not mistaken, there is an empirical argument which, though, 
even if it were sound, it would have no tendency whatever to show that 
no sensibles exist unexperienced, would, if it were sound, show that this 
very class of sensibles, to which alone my argument for unexperienced 
existence applies, certainly do not so exist. This, it seems to me, is the 
most weighty argument which can be used upon the subject; and I want, 
therefore, to give my reasons for thinking that it is fallacious. 
The argument is one which asserts that there is abundant empirical 
evidence in favour of the view that the existence of the sensibles which we 
experience at any time, always depends upon the condition of our nervous 
system; so that, even where it also depends upon external physical condi-
tions, we can safely say that sensibles, which we should have experienced, 
if only our nervous system had been in a different condition, certainly do 
not exist, when it is not in that condition. And the fallacy of this argument 
seems to me to lie in the fact that it does not distinguish between the exis-
tence of the sensibles which we experience and the fact that we experience 
them. What there is evidence for is that our experience of sensibles always 
depends upon the condition of our nervous system; that, according as the 
condition of the nervous system changes, different sensibles are experi-
enced, even where other conditions are the same. But obviously the fact 
that our experience of a given sensible depends upon the condition of our 
nervous system does not directly show that the existence of the sensible 
experienced always also so depends. The fact that I am now experiencing 
this black mark is certainly a different fact from the fact that this black 
mark now exists. And hence the evidence which does tend to show that 
the former fact would not have been a fact, if my nervous system had been 
in a different condition, has no tendency to show that the latter would 
not have been so either. I am sure that this distinction ought to be made; 
and hence, though I think there may be other reasons for thinking that the 
very existence of the sensibles, which we experience, and not merely the 
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fact that we experience them, does always depend upon the condition of 
our nervous systems, it seems to me certain that this particular argument 
constitutes no such reason. 
And I think that those who suppose that it does are apt to be influenced 
by an assumption, for which also, so far as I can see, there is no reason. I 
have admitted that the only reason I can see for supposing that sensibles 
which we experience ever exist unexperienced, seems to lead to the con-
clusion that the sensibles which would be seen by a colour-blind man, if 
he occupied exactly the position which I, who am not colour-blind, now 
occupy, exist now, just as much as those which I now see. And it may be 
thought that this implies that the sensibles, which he would see, and which 
would certainly be very different from those which I see, are nevertheless, 
at this moment, in exactly the same place as those which I see. Now, for 
my part, I am not prepared to admit that it is impossible they should be 
in the same place. But the assumption against which I wish to protest, is 
the assumption that, if they exist at all, they must be in the same place. I 
can see no reason whatever for this assumption. And hence any difficul-
ties there may be in the way of supposing that they could be in the same 
place at the same time as the sensibles which I see, do not at all apply to 
my hypothesis, which is only that they exist now, not that they exist in the 
same place in which mine do. 
On this question, therefore, as to whether sensibles ever exist at times 
when they are not experienced, I have only to say (1) that I think there is 
certainly no good reason whatever for asserting that no sensibles do; and 
(2) that I think perhaps a certain amount of weight ought to be attached 
to our instinctive belief that certain kinds of sensibles do; and that here 
again any special arguments which may be brought forward to show that, 
whether some sensibles exist unexperienced or not, this kind certainly do 
not, are, so far as I can see, wholly inconclusive. 
ii. 
I now pass to the question how sensibles are related to physical objects. 
And here I want to say, to begin with, that I feel extremely puzzled about 
the whole subject. I find it extremely difficult to distinguish clearly from 
one another the different considerations which ought to be distinguished; 
and all I can do is to raise, more or less vaguely, certain questions as to 
how certain particular sensibles are related to certain particular physical 
objects, and to give the reasons which seem to me to have most weight for 
answering these questions in one way rather than another. I feel that all 
that I can say is very tentative. 
To begin with, I do not know how “physical object” is to be defined, 
and I shall not try to define it. I shall, instead, consider certain proposi-
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tions, which everybody will admit to be propositions about physical ob-
jects, and which I shall assume that I know to be true. And the question I 
shall raise is as to how these propositions are to be interpreted—in what 
sense they are true; in considering which, we shall at the same time con-
sider how they are related to certain sensibles. 
I am looking at two coins, one of which is a half-crown, the other a 
florin. Both are lying on the ground; and they are situated obliquely to 
my line of sight, so that the visual sensibles which I directly apprehend in 
looking at them are visibly elliptical, and not even approximately circular. 
Moreover, the half-crown is so much farther from me than the florin that 
its visual sensible is visibly smaller than that of the florin. 
In these circumstances I am going to assume that I know the following 
propositions to be true; and no one, I think, will deny that we can know 
such propositions to be true, though as we shall see, extremely different 
views may be taken as to what they mean. I know (a) that, in the ordinary 
sense of the word “see,” I am really seeing two coins; an assertion which 
includes, if it is not identical with, the assertion that the visual experienc-
es, which consist in my direct apprehension of those two elliptical patches 
of colour, are sensations proper, and are not either hallucinations nor mere 
experiences of “images”; (b) that the upper sides of the coins are really 
approximately circular, and not merely elliptical like the visual sensibles; 
(c) that the coins have another side, and an inside, though I don’t see it; 
(d) that the upper side of the half-crown is really larger than that of the 
florin, though its visual sensible is smaller than the visual sensible of the 
upper side of the florin: (e) that both coins continue to exist, even when I 
turn away my head or shut my eyes: but in saying this, I do not, of course, 
mean to say that there is absolutely no change in them; I daresay there 
must be some change, and I do not know how to define exactly what I do 
mean. But we can, I think, say at least this: viz., that propositions (b), (c), 
and (d) will still be true, although proposition (a) has ceased to be true. 
Now all these propositions are, I think, typical propositions of the 
sort which we call propositions about physical objects; and the two coins 
themselves are physical objects, if anything is. My question is: In what 
sense are these propositions true? 
And in considering this question, there are, I think, two principles 
which we can lay down as certain to begin with; though they do not carry 
us very far. 
The one is (α) that the upper side of the coin, which I am said to see, 
is not simply identical with the visual sensible which I directly apprehend 
in seeing it. That this is so might be thought to follow absolutely from 
each of the two facts which I have called (b) and (d); but I am not quite 
sure that it does follow from either of these or from both together: for it 
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seems to me just possible that the two sensibles in question, though not 
circular in my private space, may yet be circular in physical space; and 
similarly that though the sensible of the half-crown is smaller than that of 
the florin in my private space, it may be larger in physical space. But what 
I think it does follow from is the fact that another person may be seeing 
the upper side of the coin in exactly the same sense in which I am seeing it, 
and yet his sensible be certainly different from mine. From this it follows 
absolutely that the upper side of the coin cannot be identical with both 
sensibles, since they are not identical with one another. And though it does 
not follow absolutely that it may not be identical with one of the two, yet 
it does follow that we can get a case in which it is not identical with mine; 
and I need only assume that the case I am taking is such a case. 
From this it follows that we must distinguish that sense of the word 
“see” in which we can be said to “see” a physical object, from that sense 
of the word in which “see” means merely to directly apprehend a visual 
sensible. In a proposition of the form “I see A,” where A is a name or de-
scription of some physical object, though, if this proposition is to be true, 
there must be some visual sensible, B, which I am directly apprehending, 
yet the proposition “I see A” is certainly not always, and probably never, 
identical in meaning with the proposition “I directly apprehend B.” In 
asserting “I see A” we are asserting not only that we directly apprehend 
some sensible but also something else about this sensible—it may be only 
some proposition of the form “and this sensible has certain other proper-
ties,” or it may be some proposition of the form “and I know this sensible 
to have certain other properties.” Indeed we have not only to distinguish 
that sense of the word “perceive” in which it is equivalent to “directly ap-
prehend,” from one sense in which we can be said to perceive a physical 
object; we have also to distinguish at least two different senses in which we 
can be said to perceive physical objects, different both from one another 
and from “directly apprehend.” For it is obvious that though I should be 
said to be now seeing the half-crown, there is a narrower, and more proper 
sense, in which I can only be said to see one side of it—not its lower side 
or its inside, and not therefore the whole half-crown. 
The other principle, which we can lay down to start with is (β) that my 
knowledge of all the five propositions (a) to (e), is based, in the last resort, 
on experiences of mine consisting in the direct apprehension of sensibles 
and in the perception of relations between directly apprehended sensibles. 
It is based on these, in at least this sense, that I should never have known 
any of these propositions if had never directly apprehended any sensibles 
nor perceived any relations between them. 
What, in view of these two principles, can be the sense in which my 
five propositions are true? 
445
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2G. E. Moore 
(1) It seems to me possible that the only true interpretation which can 
be given to any of them is an interpretation of a kind which I can only 
indicate rather vaguely as follows: Namely, that all of them express only 
a kind of fact which we should naturally express by saying that, if certain 
conditions were fulfilled, I, or some other person, should directly appre-
hend certain other sensibles. For instance, the only true thing that can be 
meant by saying that I really see coins may be some such thing as that, 
if I were to move my body in certain ways, I should directly apprehend 
other sensibles, e.g. tactual ones, which I should not directly apprehend, 
as a consequence of these movements, if these present visual experiences 
of mine were mere hallucinations or experiences of “images.” Again, the 
only true thing that can be meant by saying that the upper sides of the 
coins are really approximately circular, may be some such thing as that, if 
I were looking straight at them, I should directly apprehend circular sen-
sibles. And similarly, the only true interpretation of (c) may be some such 
fact as that, if I were to turn the coins over, or break them up, I should 
have certain sensations, of a sort I can imagine very well; of (d) that, if I 
were at an equal distance from the half-crown and the florin, the sensible, 
I should then see corresponding to the half-crown, would be bigger than 
that corresponding to the florin, whereas it is now smaller; of (e) that, if, 
when my eyes were closed, they had been open instead, I should have now 
certain sensibles. 
It is obvious, indeed, that if any interpretation on these lines is the only 
true interpretation of our five propositions, none of those which I have 
vaguely suggested comes anywhere near to expressing it in its ultimate 
form. They cannot do so for the simple reason that, in them, the condi-
tions under which I should experience certain other sensibles are them-
selves expressed in terms of physical objects, and not in terms of sensibles 
and our experience of them. The conditions are expressed in such terms 
as “if I were to move my body,” “if I were to look straight at the coins,” 
“if I were to turn the coins over,” etc.; and all these are obviously proposi-
tions, which must themselves again be interpreted in terms of sensibles, if 
our original five propositions need to be so. It is obvious, therefore, that 
any ultimate interpretation of our five propositions, on these lines, would 
be immensely complicated; and I cannot come anywhere near to stating 
exactly what it would be. But it seems to me possible that some such inter-
pretation could be found, and that it is the only true one. 
The great recommendation of this view seems to me to be that it en-
ables us to see, more clearly than any other view can, how our knowledge 
of physical propositions can be based on our experience of sensibles, in 
the way in which principle (β) asserts it to be. If, when I know that the 
coins are round, all that I know is some such thing as that if, after experi-
encing the sensibles I do now experience, I were to experience still others, 
I should finally experience a third set, we can understand, as clearly as we 
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can understand how any knowledge can be obtained by induction at all, 
how such a knowledge could be based on our previous experience of sen-
sibles, and how it could be verified by our subsequent experience. 
On the other hand, apart from the difficulty of actually giving any in-
terpretation on these lines, which will meet the requirements, the great ob-
jection to it seems to me to be this. It is obvious that, on this view, though 
we shall still be allowed to say that the coins existed before I saw them, 
are circular etc., all these expressions, if they are to be true, will have to 
be understood in a Pickwickian sense. When I know that the coins existed 
before I saw them, what I know will not be that anything whatever existed 
at that time, in the sense in which those elliptical patches of colour exist 
now. All that I know will be simply that, since the elliptical patches exist 
now, it is true, that, if certain unrealised conditions had been realised, I 
should have had certain sensations that I have not had; or, if certain con-
ditions, which may or may not be realised in the future, were to be so, I 
should have certain experiences. Some thing like this will actually be the 
only true thing that can be meant by saying that the coins existed before 
I saw them. In other words, to say of a physical object that it existed at a 
given time will always consist merely in saying of some sensible, not that 
it existed at the time in question, but something quite different and im-
mensely complicated. And thus, though, when I know that the coins exist, 
what I know will be merely some proposition about these sensibles which 
I am directly apprehending, yet this view will not contradict principle (α) 
by identifying the coins with the sensibles. For it will say that to assert a 
given thing of the coins is not equivalent to asserting the same thing of the 
sensibles, but only to asserting of them something quite different. 
The fact that these assertions that the coins exist, are round, etc., will, 
on this view, only be true in this outrageously Pickwickian sense, seems 
to me to constitute the great objection to it. But it seems to me to be an 
objection, only, so far as I can see, because I have a “strong propensity to 
believe” that, when I know that the coins existed before I saw them, what 
I know is that something existed at that time, in the very same sense in 
which those elliptical patches now exist. And, of course, this belief may 
be a mere prejudice. It may be that when I believe that I now have, in my 
body, blood and nerves and brain, what I believe is only true, if it does not 
assert, in the proper sense of the word “existence,” the present existence 
of anything whatever, other than sensibles which I directly apprehend, but 
only makes assertions as to the kind of experiences a doctor would have, 
if he dissected me. But I cannot feel at all sure that my belief, that, when I 
know of the present existence of these things (as I think I do), I am know-
ing of the present existence (in the proper sense) of things other than any 
sensibles which I or any one else am now directly apprehending, is a mere 
prejudice. And therefore I think it is worth while to consider what, if it is 
not, these things, of whose existence I know, can be. 
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(2) It is certain that if, when I know that that half-crown existed before 
I saw it, I am knowing that something existed at that time in other than 
a Pickwickian sense, I only know this something by description; and it 
seems pretty clear that the description by which I know it is as the thing 
which has a certain connection with this sensible which I am now directly 
apprehending. But what connection? We cannot simply say, as many peo-
ple have said, that by “that half-crown “I mean the thing which caused 
my experience of this sensible; because events which happened between 
the half-crown and my eyes, and events in my eyes, and optic nerves, and 
brains are just as much causes of my experience as the half-crown itself. 
But it may perhaps be the case that the half-crown has some particular 
kind of causal relation to my experience, which these other events have 
not got—a kind which may be expressed, perhaps, by saying that it is its 
“source.” And hence, when I know that that half-crown is circular, I may 
perhaps be knowing that the source of this experience is circular. 
But what sort of a thing can this “source” be? 
One kind of view, which I think is very commonly held, is that it is 
something “spiritual” in its nature, or something whose nature is utterly 
unknown to us. And those who hold this view are apt to add, that it is not 
really “circular,” in any sense at all; nor is the “source” of my half-crown 
experience, in any sense at all, “bigger” than that of my florin experience. 
But if this addition were seriously meant, it would, of course, amount to 
saying that propositions (b) and (d) are not true, in any sense at all; and I 
do not think that those who make it, really mean to say this. I think that 
what they mean is only that the only sense in which those “sources” are 
circular, and one bigger than the other, is one in which to say this merely 
amounts to saying that the sensibles, which they would cause us to experi-
ence, under certain conditions, would be circular, and one bigger than the 
other. In other words, in order to give a true interpretation to the propo-
sitions that the coins are circular and one bigger than the other, they say 
that we must interpret them in the same kind of way in which view (1) 
interpreted them; and the only difference between their view and view (1), 
is that, whereas that said that you must give a Pickwickian interpretation 
both to the assertion that the coins exist, and to the assertion that they 
are circular, they say that you must not give it to the former assertion, and 
must to the latter. 
To this view my objection is only that any reason there may be for say-
ing that the “sources” exist in other than a Pickwickian sense, seems to 
me to be also a reason for saying that they are “circular “ in a sense that 
is not Pickwickian. I have just as strong a propensity to believe that they 
are really circular, in a simple and natural sense, as that they exist in such 
a sense: and I know of no better reason for believing either. 
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(3) It may be suggested, next, that these “sources,” instead of being 
something spiritual in their nature or something of a nature utterly un-
known, consist simply of sensibles, of a kind which I have previously tried 
to define; namely of all those sensibles, which anybody would, under the 
actual physical conditions, experience in sensations proper of which the 
half-crown and the florin were the source, if their bodies were in any of 
the positions relatively to those coins, in which they would get sensations 
from them at all. We saw before that it seems possible that all these sensi-
bles do really exist at times when they are not experienced, and that some 
people, at all events, seem to have a strong propensity to believe that they 
do. And in favour of the view that some such huge collection of sensibles 
is the upper side of the half-crown, is the fact that we do seem to have a 
strong propensity to believe that any particular sensible, which we directly 
apprehend in looking at the upper side of the half-crown, and of our direct 
apprehension of which the upper side is the source, is in the place in which 
the upper side is. And that some sense might be given to the expression 
“in the same place as,” in which it could be true that sensibles of all sorts 
of different shapes and sizes, and of all sorts of different colours, were in 
the same place at the same time, seems to me to be possible. But the objec-
tion to this view seems to me to be the same as to the last; namely that if 
the upper side of the half-crown were identical with such a collection of 
sensibles, then the only sense in which it could be said to be “circular,” or 
bigger than that of the florin, would certainly be very Pickwickian, though 
not the same as on that view. 
(4) If, for the reasons given, we reject both (1), (2), and (3) as inter-
pretations of our five propositions, the only alternative I can think of that 
remains, is one which is roughly identical, so far as I can see, with Locke’s 
view. It is a view which asserts that the half-crown and the florin really did 
exist (in the natural sense) before I saw them; that they really are approxi-
mately circular (again in the natural sense); that, therefore, they are not 
composed of sensibles which I or others should directly apprehend under 
other conditions; and that therefore also neither these sensibles (even if 
such do now exist) nor those which I am now directly apprehending are 
in the place in which the coins are. It holds, therefore, that the coins do 
really resemble some sensibles, in respect of the “primary” qualities which 
these have; that they really are round, and one larger than the other, in 
much the same sense in which some sensibles are round and some larger 
than others. But it holds also that no sensibles which we ever do directly 
apprehend, or should directly apprehend, if at a given time we were in 
other positions, are parts of those coins; and that, therefore, there is no 
reason to suppose that any parts of the coins have any of the “secondary 
qualities”—colour, etc.— which any of these sensibles have. 
On this view, it is plain, there is nothing to prevent us from holding 
that, as suggested in I (3), all sorts of unexperienced sensibles do exist. 
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We are only prevented from holding that, if they do, those which have the 
same source all exist in the same place as their source. And the natural 
view to take as to the status of sensibles generally, relatively to physical 
objects, would be that none of them, whether experienced or not, were 
ever in the same place as any physical object. That none, therefore, exist 
“anywhere” in physical space; while, at the same time, we can also say, 
as argued in I (2), that none exist “in the mind,” except in the sense that 
some are directly apprehended by some minds. And the only thing that 
would need to be added, is that some, and some only, resemble the physi-
cal objects which are their source in respect of their shape. 
To this view I can see no objection except the serious one that it is dif-
ficult to answer the questions: How can I ever come to know that these 
sensibles have a “source” at all? And how do I know that these “sources” 
are circular? It would seem that, if I do know these things at all, I must 
know immediately, in the case of some sensibles, both that they have a 
source and what the shape of this source is. And to this it may be objected 
that this is a kind of thing which I certainly cannot know immediately. 
The argument in favour of an interpretation of type (1) seems to me to rest 
wholly on the assumption that there are only certain kinds of facts which 
I can know immediately; and hence that if I believe I know a fact, which is 
not of this kind, and which also I cannot have learnt mediately, my belief 
must be a mere prejudice. But I do not know how it can be shown that 
an assertion of the form: Facts of certain kinds are the only ones you can 
know immediately; is itself not a prejudice. I do not think, therefore, that 
the fact that, if this last view were true, we should have to admit that we 
know immediately facts of a kind which many people think we cannot 
know immediately, is a conclusive objection to it. 
I I .  G .  F.  S T O U T
BOTH Mr. Moore and I have for many years spent much time and labour 
on the group of problems which is now to be discussed between us. We 
initially set out with views so divergent as apparently to exclude all hope 
of reaching agreement. This is no longer so to nearly the same degree as in 
the past. We are now in essential agreement on some points on which we 
once essentially differed. In some other respects there is still fundamental 
divergence. But as far as regards one great question, our agreement is suf-
ficient to yield a good basis for further discussion. We can proceed on the 
basis of common presupposition in dealing with the nature of the knowl-
edge of physical objects by way of sense-perception. I shall therefore, in 
what follows, mainly confine myself to this topic, referring to other ques-
tions only in so far as they seem relevant to it. 
On pp. 372 and 373 of his paper, Mr. Moore lays down two principles 
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which I accept without reservation. He states both with special reference 
to a particular example. But it is obvious that he intends them to be taken 
universally. The first may be stated as follows:—”The sensibles which we 
directly apprehend in perceiving a physical object are never simply identi-
cal with the physical object itself or with any physical part of it or with 
any quality belonging to it.”1 The second principle is that what we know 
through sense-perception of a physical object is based in the last resort 
on the direct apprehension of sensibles and the perception of relations 
between directly apprehended sensibles. 
Under the guidance of these two fundamental principles, Mr. Moore 
proceeds to discuss various typical theories of the knowledge we have by 
way of sense-perception of the physical objects perceived. One of these 
theories seems virtually identical with Mill’s well known doctrine of mat-
ter as constituted by a fixed and systematic order of actual and possible 
sensations. It is distinctively characterised by the consistent attempt to dis-
pense with any reference in sense-perception to anything distinct from and 
independent of the possible and actual sense-experiences of the percipient 
subject. Mr. Moore thinks it possible that this view may be true. But he 
admits that neither he himself nor anyone else has been able to state it in a 
consistent way. He also finds in it other serious difficulties which lead him 
not indeed to reject it absolutely, but to regard it only as a last resource on 
which he may fall back if no better alternative can be found. Here, I differ 
from Mr. Moore only in being more decidedly negative. I cannot admit 
that the permanent possibility theory is tenable in any form. Without go-
ing so far as this, it is plain that Mr. Moore is strongly inclined to look in 
another direction for a satisfactory interpretation of the facts. The type 
of theory which he seems to prefer is that according to which each sense 
apparition is, from the outset, connected with an immediate knowledge of 
it as related to its source in an existence beyond itself. Here also I agree. 
Mr. Moore next discusses three special forms which the source theory 
may assume. One of these he distinctly prefers to the others, and here 
again I find myself at one with him on the most vital points. I agree with 
him as concerns the following essential positions. (1) What is primary in 
our knowledge of physical objects through sense-experience is not merely 
“direct apprehension” of sensibles, but also direct knowledge that these 
sensibles are connected with existence beyond themselves. (2) Our prima-
ry knowledge of the relation of sensibles to their source includes a knowl-
edge of the nature of the source as in some respects akin to the sensibles; 
this implies that the source is complex and that there are relations within 
it corresponding to relations between the sensibles which are referred to it. 
In Mr. Moore’s special development of this general doctrine I find 
much to disagree with. The main points at issue may be provisionally stat-
1 I am not perfectly sure that Mr. Moore intends to assert that the sensibles are never 
identical with any quality of the thing. But I think that he must mean this. 
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ed as follows. (1) According to Mr. Moore, the correspondence in nature 
between sensibles and their source is restricted to certain sensibles and is 
not found in the case of others essentially akin to these. I, on the contrary, 
hold that the correspondence exists for all sensibles in accordance with 
one uniform principle. (2) For Mr. Moore, the original reference of sen-
sibles to a source does not include the whole source but only that part of 
it which enters into the constitution of what we call, in ordinary language, 
the perceived object—the thing said to be seen, felt, tasted or smelled. I, 
on the other hand, hold that the original reference is to the whole source 
indiscriminately and that it is only by a further process that we come to 
distinguish that part of it which belongs to the particular thing perceived 
from other parts. My third divergence from Mr. Moore concerns (3) the 
definition of what is ordinarily meant by a physical object. As I under-
stand him, he simply identifies the physical object with the source and the 
nature of the physical object with the nature of the source. On this view 
the sensibles with which we are directly acquainted, though they are es-
sential conditions of our knowing a physical thing in no way enter into its 
constitution. I say, on the contrary, that the physical object as perceived 
or imagined includes not only the source but the nature of the sensibles so 
far as the sensibles express the nature of the source—so far as they stand 
to the source in the relation of being its sensible appearances, actual or 
possible. I thus include in my conception of the physical object all that the 
permanent possibility theory of Mill or Berkeley can say of it. This may be 
expressed by saying that for me the physical object, as such, is essentially 
a phenomenon. In what follows I have to develop the source theory, as 
thus defined, so as to show that it is tenable. I cannot, of course, within 
my limits, do this in full detail. It will be sufficient if I attempt to meet 
certain difficulties on which Mr. Moore lays stress. Mr. Moore finds it dif-
ficult to answer two questions. (1) How can we know that sensibles have 
a source at all? (2) How can we know that the source is akin in nature to 
the sensibles, or at least to some of them? Such knowledge must ultimately 
be immediate. But “this seems to be a kind of thing which I certainly can-
not know immediately.” The precise nature of the difficulty Mr. Moore 
does not attempt to define. I take it that there are two stumbling blocks in 
his way. First, he finds it hard to understand how the knowledge of sen-
sibles, in general, can involve knowledge of a correlated existence other 
than their own—how the scratch can be aware of the thorn. In the second 
place, he probably finds a special difficulty in this knowledge being, as he 
supposes, limited only to certain sensibles and not extended to others es-
sentially similar in nature and mode of occurrence. 
Beginning with the first problem, we have to inquire how it is pos-
sible to know that any directly apprehended sensible is correlated with 
an existence beyond its own. Let us commence by considering a parallel 
case. Mr. Moore, in explaining the distinction between thought and what 
G. F. Stout
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he calls direct apprehension, refers to the relation of an image to the pri-
mary sensible of which it is an image. To take his own illustration, when 
I look at a black mark, there is actually present to my mind a certain 
visual apparition, so that I directly apprehend it. If I now turn my head 
away the original visual apparition is no longer actually present. Its place 
is now filled by what is called a mental image. It is this image that I now 
directly apprehend and not the primary sensible. Yet I am still, in a certain 
way, cognisant of the original apparition. In the very act of directly appre-
hending the image, I think of or remember the primary sensible. I am not 
merely cognisant of the image, but cognisant of it as standing in a peculiar 
relation to the previous existence of the primary sensible. I am aware of 
the image as in a peculiar fashion conditioned by and derived from the 
primary sensible. I am aware of it as more or less like and as more or less 
unlike the primary sensible in quality, in intensity and in the relations of 
its component parts. All this implies that I am in some manner aware of 
the primary sensible when it is no longer actually present as it was when 
it first existed. Following the usage of ordinary language, we may describe 
this mode of awareness by saying that we are not merely thinking of the 
image, but are, in Mr. Moore’s phrase, directly apprehending it. 
There seems to me to be a very important analogy between our knowl-
edge of the connexion of image and primary sensible and our knowledge 
of the connexion of a primary sensible and its source. In the first place, 
there is in both cases the thought of a particular existence other than that 
of the sensible which we directly apprehend, and this other existence is 
not, at the moment, directly apprehended. In both cases the thought of 
this existence is specified and determined by the nature and existence of 
the actually present sensible. It is in both cases thought of as connected, 
in certain respects, with the actually present sensible. In particular, it is 
in both cases thought of as the source of this sensible, though in differ-
ent ways. Here it may be objected that there is a vital difference which 
destroys the analogy in its most fundamental point. It may be urged that 
whereas, in the case of the image, we have already apprehended directly 
the corresponding primary sensible in previous experience, in the case of 
the supposed source of the primary sensible itself, we have had no such 
previous experience. I reply that in the present moment in which we di-
rectly apprehend only the image, our direct apprehension of the primary 
sensible is entirely gone. It is no longer a factor actually forming part of 
the present situation. It operates only indirectly, inasmuch as it conditions 
the direct apprehension of the present image or of some equivalent present 
existence. It is only this present existent which supplies a cue to thought 
in referring to the existence of the primary sensible and in determining its 
nature, just as it is only the primary sensible itself which supplies a cue to 
thought in referring to the existence of its source and in determining the 
nature of its source. 
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Note next, that both the knowledge of the image in relation to its 
primary sensible and the knowledge of the primary sensible in relation 
to its source are immediate. In both cases, if we were initially without 
such knowledge, there seems to be no process of inference by which we 
could acquire it. At this point, I must take note of a serious inconvenience 
besetting Mr. Moore’s phrase “direct apprehension.” It is natural to use 
the term “apprehension” in a very wide sense, so as to cover all kinds of 
cognition. Hence, when “direct apprehension” is contrasted with mere 
thought, it seems to be implied that thought, as such, is indirect. But this 
is not so, if we mean by “indirect” anything which would ordinarily be 
called inference, or if we take it to involve uncertainty. There is only one 
sense in which thought, as such, need be indirect.2 In thinking of a particu-
lar existent, we may know directly that it exists, that it is such and such 
and so and so related, though the particular existent itself is not, at the 
moment, an actual apparition in consciousness. Our knowledge of it may 
be called indirect, in the sense that we know it only inasmuch as we know 
propositions about it—inasmuch as we know “that it exists and is such 
and such.” But the propositions about it may themselves be known im-
mediately and, so far as this is the case, our knowledge of it is in another 
sense direct. Thus when I have just felt a pang of toothache, I may know 
immediately that I have felt it, and so far my knowledge of it is immedi-
ate. But the pang is not itself actually present to consciousness in the way 
in which it was present when it was actually being felt. The kind of pres-
ence which it has in actually being felt I have been in the habit of calling 
“existential presence to consciousness.” Existential presence may be either 
simply identified with Mr. Moore’s “direct apprehension” or regarded as 
an essential condition of it. If we choose the second alternative, direct ap-
prehension may be defined as “that kind of apprehension which depends 
on existential presence.”3 
A third point of analogy between the reference of image to primary 
sensible and the reference of primary sensibles to a source is to be found 
in the initial absence, in both cases, of anything in the nature of reflective 
analysis, separately marking off from each other the various factors in-
volved In ordinary experience, apart from special motives, the mind does 
not, explicitly and separately, set before itself the propositions that the 
image is distinct from the primary sensible and stands in certain relations 
to it. It is true that it knows the primary sensible only as this is related to 
the image But it does not know that it knows the primary sensible only 
in relation to the image. What is before it is, for the most part, only the 
unanalysed complex including image and primary experience and their 
connexion, without separate discrimination of these factors. Analysis is 
2 I should myself maintain that there is only one sense in which thought can be indirect. 
3 It is the second alternative which I take to be the true one. Here I differ from Mr. 
Moore. But it would take too long to discuss the question, important as it is, within the 
limits of the present paper. 
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fully and adequately carried out only on critical reflexion, the sort of re-
flexion which Mr. Moore and I are now attempting. The same holds good 
for the reference of primary sensibles to a source. Here, too, what the 
mind is aware of is initially an unanalysed complex including sensible and 
source and their connexion. It does not separately formulate to itself the 
propositions that the source is an existence distinct from the sensible and 
that they are related in a certain way. 
This original and habitual tendency to think the whole complex con-
fusedly, without analysis into its constituent factors, is apt more or less to 
influence us even when we do attempt to analyse. We may be tempted, for 
example, in the case of the image, to suppose not only that we can distin-
guish it from the primary sensible, but also that we can isolate it so as to 
be able to think of it as existing by itself, entirely stripped of all relation to 
primary sense-experience. So far as I can discover, this is quite erroneous. 
We are never able to apprehend an image without regarding it as the im-
age of something.4 The reason why we may ignore this is that the reference 
to the primary experience is so familiar and so much a matter of course 
that we fail expressly to take separate notice of it. If we then proceed to 
put the question to ourselves whether the image, as such, necessarily in-
volves the thought of the primary sensible, we are bound to get a negative 
answer. For the reference to the primary sensible has already been unwit-
tingly included by us in the image as we conceive it, and cannot therefore 
be found beyond it. We shall be in the position of a man who is looking 
for his spectacles while, all the time, he has them on. He cannot find them 
so long as, in looking for them, he is looking through them. If, after this 
fallacious mental experiment, we remind ourselves that as a matter of fact 
the image must in some way carry with it the immediate knowledge of a 
primary sensible, this fact will appear strange. The connexion of the im-
age with the primary sensible will appear not to be the kind of fact which 
we can know immediately. This sort of fallacy is, I think, more commonly 
committed in the treatment of other questions. For instance, it seems to 
me to pervade Hume’s discussion of causal connexion. Above all, it is 
likely to be a source of confusion in the attempt to examine the connex-
ion of a primary sensible and its source. If this connexion is not, initially 
and in ordinary experience, implicitly presupposed rather than explicitly 
dis tinguished, we may easily, even in the act of seeking to distinguish, be 
all the time unwittingly assuming it, in such a way that we shall really be 
endeavouring to distinguish it from itself. The attempt must fail. What we 
take to be merely the primary sensible will seem to be something relatively 
loose and separate, having nothing in its own nature and existence to 
connect it with an existence beyond itself. I would suggest that this may 
be part of the reason why Mr. Moore has difficulty in admitting that the 
4 Even when the image is freely constructed by the imagination, we still are aware of it 
as reproducing primary experience in a modified form, and we still think of a possible 
primary experience as corresponding to it. 
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connexion of primary sensible and source belongs to the class of things 
which we can know immediately. It is not, however, in any case, the whole 
reason. As I shall point out later on, there is also another very important 
reason which certainly does influence Mr. Moore. 
So far, I have attempted to meet the supposed difficulty of our having 
an immediate knowledge of primary sensibles, as correlated with a source, 
only by referring to an analogous case which seems clearer and less open 
to doubt. But both cases fall under the general head of what Hume would 
call knowledge of matter of fact which anticipates experience, and what 
Kant would call knowledge of synthetic propositions a priori. Can all such 
knowledge be brought under a common principle? In my opinion it can. 
Here Mr. Moore and I have common ground to start from. We both, I 
believe, agree that a mere appeal to the constitution of the knowing mind 
can supply no explanation except in so far as it is the nature of the mind to 
know what has being, in relative independence of its coming or ceasing to 
be known. We both agree in denying mere being for thought as contrasted 
with what has being apart from thought. From this common postulate, it 
seems to follow that no more ultimate reason can be given for the possibil-
ity of anything being known than that it has being and that a mind is there 
to know it. But this principle is by itself insufficient to account for the 
actual development of our knowledge. For, by itself, it does not explain 
why we are not omniscient—why we do not know, in detail, all that is. To 
answer this question, we must take account also of the fundamental prin-
ciple of empirical philosophy, the principle that knowledge is throughout 
limited by experience. This means that we have cognisance of the rest of 
the Universe only in so far as we are cognisant of its connexion, however 
indirect this may be, with those particular existents which, in my phrase, 
are existentially present to consciousness, or, in Mr. Moore’s language, are 
directly apprehended. If, now, these particular existents were in their own 
nature self-complete and self-contained, so as to imply nothing beyond 
themselves, if each were a universe in itself, we could not through know-
ing them have knowledge of anything beyond them. We should thus be 
cognisant only of the particular existents which happened at any moment 
to be existentially present. We should be confined to an infinitesimally 
small portion of what we come to know as the real world.5 But if we find 
a difficulty here, it is entirely of our own making. It arises from a perfectly 
arbitrary assumption—the assumption that the existentially present data 
are in their own nature self-complete and self-contained. If, in their own 
nature, they are in various ways and respects incomplete existences, we 
need no further reason why we should know them as, in various ways and 
respects, incomplete, and, therefore, as connected in various ways and re-
spects with existence beyond their own. It may be objected that reflective 
analysis apparently fails to discover the incompleteness. I reply that, so 
5 Whether even this could be known, under the assumed conditions, is a further question, 
which I should answer in the negative. 
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far as this may be so, the fault lies in the inadequacy or confusion of the 
reflective analyses. If, in critical reflexion, we are expecting a fresh revela-
tion of something unknown before, we are bound to be disappointed. The 
original unreflective act of referring an existentially present sensible to a 
correlated existence beyond it, is itself the immediate knowledge of the 
sensible as incomplete. On the other hand, in the attempt to rediscover 
distinctly what we thus already know indistinctly, we are prone to fall 
into the fallacy which I have already discussed. We are prone to assume, 
unwittingly, what we are trying to find and then to look for it elsewhere, 
as if we had not already presupposed it. We are then, as I have said, in the 
position of a man who is looking through his spectacles for his spectacles. 
There remains a special difficulty, which requires separate treatment, 
in dealing with the reference of primary sensibles to a source. The dif-
ficulty is that the relation to a source does not seem to be uniform for 
all primary sensibles or even for all of the same class. Consider, for ex-
ample, visual experience. We may, in dreams and hallucinations, directly 
apprehend a visual apparition, which is not, in any ordinary sense, the 
visual appearance of a perceived physical object, present to the senses. 
We are always, under such conditions, impelled to think of the presence 
of a perceived object, and it is true that, apart from special reasons to the 
contrary, we believe that it actually exists. But what is important is that 
the object which we seem to perceive may not exist; that we may become 
convinced for sound reasons that it does not exist, and that when we 
are so convinced we have no insuperable difficulty in accounting for the 
primary sensible in other ways, e.g., by tracing it to physiological condi-
tions not involving the existence of a perceived object of which it is the 
sensible appearance. The primary sensible, in such instances, seems to be 
recognised as “loose and separate” from the existence of a source in any 
object perceived by means of it. Prima facie, this seems to be a very serious 
objection to any theory which asserts an immediate knowledge of primary 
sensibles as having their source in objects which need not be otherwise 
known to us. Another form of the same difficulty is clearly brought out by 
Mr. Moore. Even when a physical object really is seen, its visual appear-
ance is variable, and some of its variable appearances yield a much more 
adequate and accurate knowledge of their source than others. How are we 
to account for this difference between primary sensibles, fundamentally 
alike in their own nature, on the view that the knowledge of their connex-
ion with a source is original and immediate? 
It seems to me that difficulties of this kind can be satis factorily met. 
They are due to an over hasty assumption. They arise from the precipitate 
assumption that the reference of primary sensibles to a source is confined 
only to that part of the source which may be contained in the particular 
physical object which is perceived by means of them, the particular ob-
ject of which they are the sensible appearance, the particular tree, stone, 
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or animal which is said to be seen or touched or heard. As against this, 
I would maintain a radically different view. My position is that what is 
ordinarily called the perception of this or that particular thing forms only 
one special development due to special conditions of the original reference 
to a source. To explain this, it is necessary to begin by pointing out that 
our knowledge of a physical world is not, in any case, constituted merely 
by apprehending a multiplicity of separate sensibles, each in relation to 
an existence beyond itself. It also involves the gradual discovery of the 
connexion of these items with each other. If we agree to call a particular 
primary sensible, together with whatever information it may convey con-
cerning the existence and nature of its source, a primary datum of sense, 
then we may say that the development of our knowledge of external ob-
jects involves, from the outset, the discovery of interconnexion of such 
primary data. 
For our present purpose it is of chief importance to distinguish the 
ways in which this takes place. The first is essential to what we ordinarily 
call perceiving this or that particular thing. The same piece of sugar may 
be perceived in many distinct perceptual acts, each involving a different 
and more or less dissimilar primary sensible, I may see it, touch it, or taste 
it; and in seeing or touching it I may, on different occasions, have an in-
definite variety of visual or tactual sensations. None the less I take myself 
to be perceiving, throughout, only one and the same piece of sugar. Now, 
since the primary sensibles involved in my varying perceptions are not the 
same or similar, it must be the source which is taken to be identical. The 
primary data of sense are correlated with each other inasmuch as they are 
regarded as having a source in common though the primary sensibles are 
distinct and different. This is expressed, in ordinary language, by saying 
that in all of them the same thing is perceived, though it is perceived under 
varying sensible appearances. Of course the thing, and consequently the 
source, is not taken to be simple and indivisible. It has different qualities 
and distinguishable parts. Some of its varying sensible appearances may 
be appearances of the same quality of the same part, as when we first 
perceive the same extension by sight and then by touch. Some may be ap-
pearances of different qualities, as when we first touch the sugar and then 
taste it. Some may be appearances of different parts, as when we first look 
at one side of a thing and then, going behind it, look at the opposite side. 
I have said this reference of primary sensibles to a common source is 
essential to what we ordinarily mean by perceiving a particular thing. In 
ordinary usage, when I say that I myself or that someone else perceives 
a piece of sugar, this is most naturally taken to imply that the sugar is 
perceived as being sugar. But this, of course, presupposes that the present 
sensible appearance is recognised as connected with many other possible 
appearances of the same object. We may, however, also speak of perceiv-
ing a thing where there is no recognition of it as belonging to a special 
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class or kind. We then usually add an explanation. We say, for instance, 
“I saw a bird, but without knowing it to be a bird.” In such instances as 
well as in definite recognition there is still correlation of the present da-
tum of sense with other data, on the basis of past experience, though this 
correlation is of a vaguer and more general kind. We are at least aware 
that the thing has other distinctive characters ascertainable by further ob-
servation, though we cannot specify in advance what these are. Further, 
there is a certain general scheme or plan, broadly similar for all perceived 
things, in accordance with which their various perceptible qualities and 
parts are connected with each other, and in accordance with which we 
can pass from one sensible appearance of the same thing to others. This, 
of course, presupposes that the primary sensible which we directly ap-
prehend has a meaning acquired in the course of past experience. Let us 
now retrace the course of mental development and consider the position 
of a mind which has not yet learned to correlate its sense-data by referring 
different sensibles to a common source. Can we properly say, taking the 
term perception in its ordinary sense, that such a mind perceives this or 
that particular object? So far as primary sensibles are locally distinct and 
separable by relative change of position, it will refer them to relatively 
different sources. It will, however, have no means of connecting different 
sensibles with the same source. But, inasmuch as this is part of what we 
ordinarily mean by perceiving, it seems plain that if we choose to use the 
term in such a case, it will be by a more or less arbitrary extension of its 
usual meaning. If we consider the position of the undeveloped mind from 
the basis of our own developed knowledge, we shall be tempted to speak 
of it as perceiving this or that. It directly apprehends, as we presume, a 
certain primary sensible, and it refers this to a source. This source we 
ourselves know to be a certain piece of sugar. Hence we may say that 
there is here a case, however rudimentary, of the perception of a piece of 
sugar. But we must be on our guard against the psychologist’s fallacy of 
attributing to the primitive mind knowledge which we possess, but which 
it does not possess. We must put ourselves at the point of view of the un-
developed mind and enquire whether it really refers the primary sensible 
to its source in the sugar, in the same way as we do when we perceive a 
particular physical object. Now there seems to me to be a fundamental 
difference here which leads us to the heart of our problem. The primitive 
mind, we suppose, directly apprehends a primary sensible, and in so doing 
refers it to a source. But there are no motives or conditions which could 
lead it to make any distinction or reservation in this reference to a source. 
In particular, there is nothing which could lead it to single out one part of 
the source from others and refer distinctively to this. The reference will be 
to the source in general. But in ordinary perception the reference is only 
to part of the source; it is limited to this by the way in which different 
sensibles are correlated with each other as having a common source. It is 
only a part of the source of each sensible which can be common to it and 
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the others; and even this part is only an indirect source, inasmuch as its 
connexion with sense-experience is mediated through a series of interven-
ing conditions. 
We find cogent evidence for both these statements in our developed 
knowledge of the physical and physiological conditions of sense-percep-
tion. From this point of view, we can see that the perceptual correlation 
of different sense-data is possible only under one condition. It is possible 
only if the sense-organs are freely movable relatively to the thing perceived 
and therefore spatially external to it. We know that the primary sensibles 
through which an object is perceived are experienced only when and so far 
as the object, directly or indirectly, acts on the sense-organ and there gives 
rise to a series of processes ending in a certain change in a certain portion 
of the nervous system. We know that the primary sensible constantly var-
ies according to the varying character of the processes in the sense-organ 
and nervous system by what ever condition such variations may be pro-
duced. We know that when there actually is no perceived object, similar 
sense-experiences may arise in the way of dreams and hallucinations and 
recurrent sensations, conditioned only by the state of our bodies. Further, 
our general knowledge of the executive order of nature shows us that 
when the primary sensible is the appearance of a perceived object, this ob-
ject operates only through a chain of processes which do not, in giving rise 
to the sense-experience, produce any corresponding change in the object 
itself. They no more affect the perceived physical thing than the breaking 
of a window affects the body of the man who throws a stone at it. None 
the less, as I have said, the primary sensible, which we directly apprehend, 
is conditioned in its nature by the varying character of such processes. 
From such considerations taken in their interconnexion, it seems to me 
to follow irresistibly,6 first, that only part of the source of the primary 
sensible through which we perceive a thing belongs to the separate consti-
tution of the thing itself; and, secondly, that even this part is not directly 
but more or less remotely connected with the relevant sense-experiences. 
These propositions may be maintained on the basis of our acquired 
knowledge of the order of the physical world. But we have still to consider 
how the interval between our present point of view and that of a more 
primitive consciousness comes to be crossed through a gradual develop-
ment. In dealing with this problem, I cannot stir a step without presup-
posing the reference of primary sensibles to a source and without also 
presupposing that the reference is initially to the whole source and that 
to the end it includes a reference to the whole source. I have to show how 
this total source becomes more or less definitely distinguished into parts, 
and how one part is taken to belong to the thing perceived, while the other 
parts are taken to belong to the constitution of objects perceptible by 
6 Perhaps the conclusion is not absolutely necessary; but it could only be evaded, so far 
as I can see, by a series of complicated, arbitrary, and perfectly unverifiable hypotheses. 
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means of other primary sensibles. The principle on which I proceed is that 
all such distinctions arise in the process of correlating primary sense-data 
with each other. This assumes various forms. One of these is correlation 
by reference to one source. This depends, in part, on the experience of 
continuous change in what is recognisable as the same sensible in different 
phases of its existence, as contrasted with the simultaneous or successive 
occurrence of different sensibles. We may illustrate by the difference be-
tween variation in the intensity of a sound or the brightness of a colour 
as contrasted with the transition from one sound or colour to another, or 
from a colour to a sound. But by far the most important case, under this 
head, is that of continuous change of place, as when a visual apparition 
shifts its place in the field of visual sensation or a tactual apparition shifts 
its place in the field of tactual sensation, when, for example, a bird flies 
across the field of view or a fly creeps over the skin. Under such conditions 
the varying phases of the same sensible are referred to the same source. 
This, however, is only an initial step, and it is by itself far from accounting 
for that correlation of sensory data which is involved in what we ordinar-
ily call the perception of a thing. Further advance is conditioned by the 
discovery of a certain uniform and systematic concomitance and co-varia-
tion of different sensibles, such that change in one entails change in others. 
We may take, as a typical and most important case, the correspondence 
and co-variation of the extension, shape, relative position, and motion of 
tactual and visual sensibles when the same thing is both seen and touched. 
My position is that such correspondence is the original motive and evi-
dence for referring different sensibles to a common source. In contrast to 
this, there is a fundamentally different group of motives which leads to the 
correlation of sense-data by reference to causal relations between distinct 
things, each of which is constituted by its own sense-appearance as con-
nected with others by their common source. The cue for this is still afford-
ed by regular conjunctions discoverable in the order of primary sensibles. 
But the order is of a different kind. It is an order connecting sensibles 
locally external to and separable from each other, and it is conditioned 
by variable local relations. The sense-apparition of a flame in continuous 
proximity to that of a sheet of white paper is followed by the apparition 
of the burning paper. But this does not follow, in the same way or with 
the same immediacy, if the apparition of the paper and that of the flame 
are separated by intervening sensibles. If the sequence of sense-experiences 
were due to their having a common source, it would not be contingent in 
this way on variable local relations. Change in the common source would 
always be attended by correlated changes in its sensible appearances, in-
dependently of such conditions. Where such conditions are indispensable 
the only mode of interpretation open either to ourselves or to the primi-
tive mind is that which presupposes interaction between distinct things. 
Our knowledge of the causal order progresses in detail; it brings with it a 
further development of the knowledge of the union of different qualities 
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in the same thing. These qualities come to include an increasing number 
of what Locke calls “active and passive powers,” i.e., characteristic modes 
in which a thing affects and is affected by other locally distinct things in 
variable local relations. There thus arise further motives for referring a 
group of sensibles to the same source. Change in part of the group not 
only involves change in other parts; it also involves change of active and 
passive powers. 
The original reference of primary sensibles to a source is developed in 
detail in these two ways, partly by reference of different sensibles to one 
source, partly by reference to distinct sources in interaction with each oth-
er. But there still remains a certain class of regular and systematic varia-
tions in our sense-experience which is not accounted for in either of these 
two ways. I refer, of course, to variations in the primary sensibles which 
do not involve and are not taken to involve any corresponding change 
or difference in the thing which we perceive by means of these primary 
sensibles—which do not and are not taken to involve change or differ-
ence in the source so far as the source belongs to the constitution of the 
particular thing perceived. Here two questions confront us: (1) How does 
the primitive mind come to be aware of variations in the sense-appearance 
as occurring independently of change or difference in the perceived ob-
ject? (2) How does it account for these variations by reference to a corre-
spondingly variable source? The answer to the first question is that these 
variations are not found to be correlated with corresponding variations 
in other primary sensibles in such a way as to suggest reference to the 
same source; also that they are found to make no difference to the way 
in which a perceived thing acts on or is acted on by others,—to its active 
and passive powers. The answer to the second question is that they are 
referred to corresponding variations in the body of the percipient and in 
its variable relations to the perceived object. The motives for this are pres-
ent and obvious from the outset. From one point of view, the body of the 
percipient is a member of the general causal order, so that it interacts with 
things outside it, as these interact with each other. But, besides this, it is 
also, from the outset, found to occasion, in a regular way, another class 
of sensible changes which cannot be thus interpreted. Movements of the 
body or its parts which are not such as to produce any relevant change in 
things outside it are none the less constantly and regularly accompanied 
by obvious and impressive changes in sense-experience. The simplest case 
is that in which we successively bring within the range of sense-perception 
different things or different parts or qualities of the same thing. This hap-
pens, for instance, when I turn my eyes from the paper before me to a 
book on my shelves, or when I first see the paper and then touch it with 
my hand. The transition from one primary sensible to another does not 
in such cases involve any discoverable change or transition in the things 
perceived. The same holds good for the coming and going of primary sen-
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sibles in such instances as that of opening or closing the eyes. It may be 
admitted that evidence of this kind, though it certainly shows the depen-
dence of the direct apprehension of primary sensibles on the body and its 
movements, is not of itself sufficient to indicate unambiguously that the 
primary sensibles have part of their source in the body. There are, how-
ever, manifold other experiences which make the inference unambiguous. 
The primary sensibles, through which a thing is perceived, are constantly 
found to vary in manifold ways, where, on the one hand, the variation 
cannot be referred to any variation in the thing perceived or in any transi-
tion from the appearance of its parts or qualities to others, and where, on 
the other hand, it obviously can be referred to correspondingly variable 
move ments of the percipient›s body and organs of sense. At a somewhat 
later stage the influence of conditions intervening between the body and 
the thing perceived will be taken account of. It will be longer before the 
part played by the varying state and constitution of the body itself will be 
definitely recognised. The final stage is represented by the physiological 
treatment of the conditions of sensation, as exemplified in such doctrines 
as that of specific energies or in the explanation of hallucinations. 
What I have endeavoured to show in the above discussion is that the 
perception of particular physical objects is only one special development 
of the general reference of primary sensibles to a source. The source in 
the perceived object is not the whole source or the most immediate part 
of it. The distinction of this part of the source is not an original datum, 
but acquired in connexion with certain special experiences, and in the 
same process there arises the distinction between mere variation in the 
sensible appearance and variation in the thing perceived. It follows that 
we have no need to assume an immediate and original knowledge of this 
distinction and of the fact that some appearances express the nature of the 
object more adequately and accurately than others. What is original is the 
reference to the whole source. But there is no reason to suppose that, in 
this respect, there is any difference between one sensible and another. The 
principle, throughout, is that all directly apprehended relations of primary 
sensibles are correlated with corresponding relations in their source. For 
the secondary qualities, it is only qualitative relations of resemblance and 
difference which are involved. For the primary it is also local and temporal 
relations. Finally, there is nothing, in the further development of knowl-
edge, to show that this initial postulate is false or inaccurate. So far as we 
can discover, the correlate of a primary sensible, inasmuch as it is not to be 
found in the perceived object, is capable of being found elsewhere in some 
other part of the source. There is nothing, therefore, to raise a doubt as to 
the immediacy or the certainty of the knowledge that all differences and 
relations of primary sensibles are matched by differences and relations in 
their source. 
I have now stated, in broad outline, my own positive view of the na-
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ture of our knowledge of physical objects. But there is one relevant point 
of disagreement between Mr. Moore and me which I have not yet men-
tioned. He says that he feels a strong propensity to believe that certain 
experienced sensibles continue to exist when they are not experienced. 
“I have,” he says, “a strong propensity to believe that, e.g., the visual 
sensibles which I directly apprehend in looking at this piece of paper still 
exist unchanged when I merely alter the position of my body by turning 
away my head and closing my eyes, provided that the physical condi-
tions outside my body remain unchanged.” The importance, for me, of the 
question here raised, lies in its bearing on my view that part of the source 
of these sensibles, and the most immediate part, is in the body of the per-
cipient and not in the perceived thing. This view seems incompatible with 
the belief that the sensibles continue to exist independently of the body. 
No doubt if such an instinctive belief existed and if it were universal, 
we should have to attach great weight to it. But, so far as I can see, it does 
not exist, and in any case it is not common to all mankind. I am sure that 
I myself do not share it, and it is clear that Berkeley, and those to whom 
Berkeleyanism seems plausible at first sight, do not share it. In my own 
case, I do indeed feel a strong tendency to believe that after I have seen a 
thing and then ceased to see it, the thing continues to exist with the char-
acteristics which I perceived as belonging to it, provided that the physical 
conditions outside my body remain unchanged. But, as Mr. Moore himself 
points out, what I see is, according to the usage of ordinary language, not 
the visual sensible directly apprehended, but the physical object. Besides 
this physical object with its perceptible qualities, there is certainly noth-
ing else which I strongly tend to regard as persisting after the perception 
has ceased. The same holds good, so far as I can discover, for mankind 
in general. If it is admitted that the thing seen with its perceptible quali-
ties persists, they do not ask for more than this. The only question which 
remains, therefore, is whether there is a strong propensity to believe that 
the directly apprehended sensible is itself a quality of the thing. From what 
Mr. Moore says (p. 372), I gather that he would deny that the sensible, 
as such, can be simply identified with a quality of the thing. Either, then, 
his instinctive belief contradicts one of his fundamental principles, or he 
believes that the sensible persists without believing it to be a quality of 
the perceived object. In the latter case, his propensity to believe seems so 
exceptional that we can hardly attach much importance to it. 
I would suggest that Mr. Moore does not really feel a propensity to 
the belief which he himself defines. I am therefore bound to offer some 
explanation of the fact that he supposes himself to feel it. I think that what 
he really feels is a strong tendency to reject what he wrongly takes to be 
the only alternative to the belief that the sensibles themselves persist when 
they are not directly apprehended. He seems to take it for granted that if 
we do not believe that the sensibles actually continue to exist, then our 
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belief that the physical object continues to exist is merely a belief in the 
continued existence of the source considered in complete abstraction from 
the nature of the sensibles as expressing the nature of the source. This 
seems to be clearly wrong. What we mean by a physical thing includes not 
only the source, but also the kind of sensible which expresses the nature 
of the source. It does not follow at all that when the thing is not perceived 
the primary sensible through which it is perceptible must actually persist. 
It is sufficient as well as necessary that possible sensibles standing in the 
required relation to the source should be included in what we mean when 
we think of the physical object. The possibility must be of such a nature 
that its realisation does not affect the existence or nature of the source, 
but depends on other conditions—the conditions which we recognise as 
making a difference to the sensible appearance and not to the thing itself. 
This being presupposed, we may and must, if we are to represent the 
physical thing to ourselves at all, represent it as it would appear under 
such conditions, and include in our conception of it the whole range of its 
possible appearances under varying conditions. If we entirely leave out of 
count such relation to sense-experience, what is left is not a physical ob-
ject at all. If we undertake the mental experiment of abstracting from sen-
sible appearance, we find ourselves confronted with the problem of what 
things may be in themselves, apart from their relation to our sensibility, 
a problem which does not trouble common sense or science. For science 
and common sense things are phenomena, and a phenomenon is an object 
such as it appears to the senses. If a difficulty is still felt in understanding 
how the nature of primary sensibles, inasmuch as they express the nature 
of the source, is included in what we mean by the continued existence of 
an unperceived object, this may, perhaps, be made clearer by considering 
a case which is partly analogous. We think of a book as continuing to 
exist when no one is reading it. What we take to persist does not merely 
consist in certain marks on paper. These persisting marks are regarded 
as still forming words, sentences, paragraphs, etc., even when no one is 
reading the book. The marks are thought of as still having a meaning even 
when they are not actually conveying their meaning to any mind. Other-
wise what we regard as persisting would not be a book. Similarly, physi-
cal things are still thought of as they appear to the senses, even though 
they are not supposed to be actually perceived by anyone. Further, if we 
thought of them other wise, we should not be thinking of physical things 
as such at all. 
Is this explanation sufficient; or must we go farther and say that there 
is a strong propensity to believe that primary sensibles themselves persist 
when they are not experienced? As I have already said, if such a tendency 
exists, I must identify it with a tendency to believe that the primary sen-
sible endures as a part or quality of the thing. Otherwise, I have no clue 
to what is meant, and can only say that if some minds feel this tendency, 
G. F. Stout
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I, at least, do not either feel it or anything which could be mistaken for it. 
The only question, for me, then, is whether there is a strong tendency to 
regard the immediately apprehended sensibles as persistent qualities of the 
things perceived. I find that if and so far as I use all means at my disposal 
for securing that the precise nature of the question is sharply defined and 
clearly kept in view, the answer is negative. We are all prepared to recog-
nise that the same thing in the same aspect of its nature may have vari-
able appearances to the senses without itself undergoing corresponding 
changes. But if we ask ourselves whether we strongly tend to believe that 
the varying primary sensibles exist and persist as qualities of the thing, we 
are bound, I think, to come to the conclusion that we do not. Is there a 
strong propensity to believe that all, or even more than one, of the varying 
primary sensibles persist in this way? Whether this is intrinsically possible 
or not we need not here enquire. We may, however, assert positively that 
there is no natural tendency to believe it. There is no natural tendency to 
believe that a thing possesses simultaneously and persistently all the vari-
ous shapes and sizes which belong to its various visual appearances. Yet 
all these appearances may be possible without any change in the physical 
condition outside the body of the percipient; and hence the strong pro-
pensity to believe ought to cover all of them. It may seem more plausible 
to maintain that we are naturally prone to identify some one of such a 
series of primary sensibles with a persisting character of the thing. But this 
position also owes its plausibility to a fallacy of confusion. Some of the 
appearances express the nature of the thing more adequately than others; 
at the same time, they are especially convenient for purposes of reference 
both in thinking of the thing ourselves and in communicating with oth-
ers. There thus arises a tendency to regard certain modes of appearing as 
standard modes of appearing, and to prefer these to the others in think-
ing about the thing. I cannot also detect a strong and stubborn tendency 
simply to identify the primary sensibles involved in such appearances with 
persistent characters of the external object. Let us put to ourselves some 
test questions. For the ordinary purposes of daily life, we, for the most 
part, select as the standard appearance of a thing to the eye, that which 
it presents for normal eyesight, when we look straight at it from a certain 
convenient distance. Are we therefore strongly impelled to identify this 
appearance in distinction from all others with the persistent quality of the 
thing? Are we, for instance, impelled to prefer it in this way to the appear-
ance which would be presented under the microscope or to eyesight of su-
perhuman keenness? The standard appearance itself is by no means fixed 
with absolute precision. It really includes a series of more or less variable 
appearances, due to relatively small differences in the position and dis-
tance of the observer, in the organ of vision and in the illumination. Have 
we then a strong tendency to identify some one of these rather than the 
others with the persistent size, shape, and colour of the thing? Consider, 
next, the relation of sight and touch. There is undoubtedly a strong natu-
G. F. Stout
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ral tendency to identify the extension of a thing as seen with its extension 
as touched. But the tactual and the visual sensible differ so greatly and 
obviously that they cannot be simply identified with each other. Hence 
it follows that neither of them can be identified with the extension of the 
thing seen and touched. So soon as the question is clearly and distinctly 
put, we become aware that we do not identify either with the extension 
of the thing, but regard both as sensible appearance distinct from what 
appears. In the case of touch there is another point which deserves notice. 
When I touch a thing, I perceive at least two surfaces, the surface of the 
thing touched and that of my own skin in contact with it. But there are 
not two but only one extensive tactual sensible. I cannot identify this with 
both surfaces and I do not identify it with one rather than the other. I do 
not really identify it with either. The case becomes further complicated in 
such instances as that of the blind man groping with his stick. Here, there 
are three surfaces perceived, that of the hand, that of the stick in contact 
with the band, and that which is explored by the other end of the stick. 
But there is only one extensive tactual sensible. 
G. F. Stout
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X V I .  S E N S E - DATA  A N D  P H Y S I C A L  O B J E C T S 1
T. P E R C Y  N U N N
THE question of the relation between sense-data and physical objects has, 
during the last 15 years, frequently engaged the attention of this Society. 
It has also received much consideration elsewhere, Mr. Bertrand Russell’s 
Lowell lectures on Our Knowledge of the External World and Mr. C. D. 
Broad’s Physics, Perception and Reality being recent as well as very im-
portant instances. In raising the question once more I beg leave to refer 
to my contribution to a discussion2 with Dr. Schiller under the title Are 
Secondary Qualities Independent of Perception? In this I argued, in op-
position to the idealism of Locke and Berkeley, and more particularly in 
opposition to Professor Stout’s doctrine of the “representative” character 
of sense-data, that colours, sounds, hotnesses and coldnesses may all ex-
ist although no one is perceiving them. A careful reader will observe that 
the main purpose of the argument was not to prove that they do so exist 
but to support the view that in any case they are non-mental entities. The 
philosophers I have named had all assumed it as obvious that sense-data 
cannot exist except in being perceived, and drew the conclusion that they 
are therefore psychical. My central aim was to destroy the force of this 
conclusion by disproving the necessity of the assumption upon which it is 
based. In other words, I wished not so much to preach a positive doctrine 
as to demonstrate the tenability of an hypothesis long deemed by the or-
thodox to be absurd. In that way I hoped to help in clearing the way for 
any “realist” doctrine of the physical world. 
At the same time I should be lacking in candour if I did not admit that 
I was (and remain) considerably impressed by the positive value of my ar-
guments as well as by their destructive force! I am aware that they covered 
only part of the field and left many vitally important parts untouched. 
Still they have convinced their author, if no one else, that the hypoth-
esis of the existence of unperceived sense-data is not only tenable but, on 
the whole, the most satisfactory theory of perception hitherto advanced; 
and this conviction, though I am prepared to abandon it for good cause 
shown, has not been seriously disturbed by later reflexion or by the results 
of other investigators. 
The paper to which I refer has received a certain amount of notice. (I 
do not allude to Professor Alexander’s much too generous acknowledg-
1 The substance of this paper was given as an address to the Oxford Philosophical Society 
on November 30, 1914. 
2 Proc. Arist. Soc, 1909-10, pp. 191-231.
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ment of my services to the cause which is so justly identified with his phil-
osophic activity.) One of the six American realists, Professor E. B. Holt, 
has sought, in a careful study3 to elaborate and substantiate the position 
that my theory of perception is not incompatible with the facts of illusory 
experience. His colleague, Professor E. B. Perry, has supplied an important 
defect in my case by giving, in reply to Dr. Schiller’s challenge, a welcome 
analysis4 of the notion of “independence.” Mr. Russell, in his paper5 on 
“The Relation of Sense-data to Physics,” seems to indicate that my views 
had some influence in leading him to adopt his theory of “perspectives.” 
But, although Mr. Russell prefers not to assume the hypothesis of unper-
ceived sense-data, neither he nor, so far as I know, any other writer has 
directly criticised my arguments in its favour. On the other hand, Dr. G. 
E. Moore and Professor Stout, in the Durham symposium6 on “The Sta-
tus of Sense-data,” though they do not actually refer to these arguments, 
probably had them in mind. In any case their papers may be regarded as 
important re-statements of views I had sought to oppose. For this reason 
I intend to offer some criticisms of them from the-standpoint of my paper 
of 1910. 
i.
The points to which I shall restrict my observations concern the doctrine 
that physical objects must not be identified, either wholly or in part, with 
sense-data, but are revealed in perception as existences of which we have 
immediate knowledge that they are the “source” of our sense-data. Dr. 
Moore and Professor Stout both hold this doctrine, but assert it with im-
portant differences in detail, for different reasons and (apparently) with 
different degrees of conviction. It will be convenient, therefore, to exam-
ine their opinions separately. 
In the case of Dr. Moore the task is facilitated not only by the extreme 
clearness of his conceptions and his exposition, but also by the frankness 
with which he explains his attitude towards the various theories of percep-
tion which seem to him, prima facie, admissible. His method of procedure 
is, in brief, as follows: He supposes himself to be confronted with a florin 
and a half-crown, so placed that both coins are “visibly elliptical,” while 
the florin is “visibly larger” than the half-crown. He then lays down five 
propositions about the coins, which in some sense must be taken to be 
certainly true. These are: (a) that he is really seeing them “in the ordinary 
3 The New Realism, pp. 303-373.
4 Op. cit., pp. 99-151.
5 Scientia, July, 1914, pp. 1-27.
6 Proc. Arist. Soc., 1913-14, pp. 355-380, and 381-406. It should be noted that I follow 
Dr. Moore in using the term “ sense-data” as a synonym for “the sort of entities given in 
sense,” and in not limiting its application “to those which are actually given.” 
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sense of the word ‘see’”; (b) that their upper sides are “really circular”; 
(c) that each has another unseen side; (d) that the upper side of the half-
crown is “really larger” than that of the florin; (e) that both coins continue 
to exist when he ceases to see them. In addition, he states two principles 
which must be borne in mind in any attempt to determine in what sense 
these fundamental propositions are true; they are (1) that the upper sides 
of the coins are not simply identical with the sense-data he is directly ap-
prehending—for another person, directly apprehending different sense-
data, may yet be said to be “seeing” the coins in the same sense as he is; 
(2) that knowledge of the five fundamental propositions is based, in the 
last resort, entirely on direct apprehension of sense-data and perception of 
the relations between them. He then asks what truths, in view of these two 
principles, the five propositions can be held to express. 
To this question there are, he thinks, four plausible answers. The first 
is intended (I believe) to be the theory that physical objects are “perma-
nent possibilities of sensations” in the form which Mr. Russell has given it. 
Dr. Moore treats this view with obvious respect, but finds in it a difficulty 
which compels him to reject it, namely, that, if we accept it, the proposi-
tions that the coins continue to exist when unperceived, that they are re-
ally circular, and that the half-crown is really larger than the florin, can 
only be interpreted in a sense “outrageously Pickwickian.” 
The second answer would assert that the coins he “sees” are to be 
identified each with a permanent “source” which has some particular 
causal relation to experience, and is either “spiritual” or of some nature 
utterly unknown. Upon this view the statement that the coins exist when 
unperceived would cease to be “Pickwickian,” but the statements that 
they are circular, and that one is larger than the other, would require the 
same forced interpretation as before. It must therefore, be regarded as 
equally unacceptable. 
The third answer is, so far as it goes, identical with the one I should 
myself offer, namely, that the “source” is not an “existence beyond” the 
visual sense-data, but includes the whole collection of such “sensibles” 
as could be directly apprehended by perceiving subjects under different 
conditions. Against this view Dr. Moore raises only his former objection, 
that it makes the assertion of the circularity of the coins and of the larger 
size of the half-crown “very Pickwickian,” though, as he observes, the 
difficulty in understanding these attributes of the “source” is not now the 
same as in the case when the source is regarded as of a spiritual or other 
unknown nature. 
If, for the reasons given, the first three answers are rejected, there re-
mains only one, “which is roughly identical . . . with Locke’s view.” This 
answer is not without its own difficulties, but it is the one to which Dr. 
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Moore is inclined to adhere. It asserts that the physical object apprehend-
ed when we “see” a certain coin is a “source” which is not to be identi-
fied either with all or with any of the sense-data connected with it, and 
exists “in the natural sense” when none of these is actually the object of 
direct apprehension. But (and here is the Lockean touch) it is also circular 
“in the natural sense,” so that it must resemble some of the sense-data in 
respect of their “primary” qualities. Finally, the experiences in which the 
various sense-data are directly apprehended are the ground not for medi-
ate deduction, but for immediate knowledge that the source exists, and 
that it is really circular. 
I need scarcely add that the foregoing paragraphs give only a bald sum-
mary of Dr. Moore’s arguments, which the reader who would do justice 
to them must study in extenso. Moreover, I have, for the sake of clearness, 
deliberately omitted reference to one point of much importance, namely, 
that Dr. Moore, like myself, shares with Hume a “strong propensity to be-
lieve” that, under certain conditions, sense-data exist with all their quali-
ties even when nobody is directly apprehending them. The assumption 
that they do so exist is, of course, the differentia between the first answer 
and the third. But for Dr. Moore, as for me, it is more than an hypoth-
esis put forward as the basis of a theory; it is a strong prejudice, which 
necessarily affects his attitude towards all views of perception. He finds 
in it a powerful contributory reason against the acceptance of the first of 
the four theories, and he feels at least strongly urged to import it into the 
Lockean theory to which he ultimately gives his preference. Thus, in his 
view, what I know immediately as the result of my observations of a half-
crown is not only that there is a “really existent” source, “really circular,” 
but also that the sense-data, which somehow derive from this source, are 
themselves (so long as the physical conditions remain unchanged) “really 
existent” in the same sense. Nevertheless, the sense-data form no part of 
the source or physical object; for the precedent argument has shown that 
they cannot exist together with the source in “physical space,” but must 
be supposed to have their home in “private spaces” accessible only to in-
dividual apprehenders. 
Now I should like to say at once that I have no objection to the no-
tion of “private spaces” (or “perspectives”); on the contrary, I regard it as 
probably in some form a necessary completion of my own theory of per-
ception. I did not bring it into my paper of 1910 partly because the scope 
of the paper was perforce limited, but chiefly because I had not the wit 
to conceive it as Mr. Russell has since done. The doctrine of relativity has 
shown that our ideas of space and time must be made much less rigid and 
much richer than we used to suppose; and Mr. Russell has proved that we 
may think of private spaces and times as so co-ordinated with one another 
as to yield all the properties that were formerly attributed to the two great 
“common receptacles” of our experiences and their objects. But it seems 
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obvious that to add to a properly conceived scheme of private spaces (Dr. 
Moore does not deal with the question of time) a “physical” space not 
identified with, but standing in mysterious relations to, the former is a 
complication only to be justified by extreme theoretical necessity. What 
are the motives that have led Dr. Moore to load his universe with such an 
embarras de richesse? So far as I can see there is one and one only: namely, 
his determination that a half-crown shall be “circular” in what he calls 
the “natural” sense. This, as we have seen, is, at bottom, the reason why 
he rejects the “possibilities of sensation” theory and the theory that sense-
data spring from a source of “spiritual” or some unknown nature. It also 
appears to be the sole reason why he adds to what I may, for brevity, call 
my theory the Lockean notion of a “really circular” physical object. It is 
evident that a motive which wields such power over Dr. Moore’s thought 
deserves careful scrutiny. 
I agree that Dr. Moore’s five fundamental propositions are straightfor-
ward expressions of the plain man’s immediate knowledge about physical 
objects; and I agree that, whatever happens, they must be regarded as 
true. The question is whether a given re-statement of one of these is to 
be rejected merely because the plain man would be surprised if told that 
it is equivalent to his own way of putting the matter. (That is what Dr. 
Moore appears to mean by calling it “Pickwickian.”) My belief is that 
the plain man easily recovers from such shocks, provided the re-statement 
does not ignore the facts nor attempt to explain them away. Let me give a 
simple illustration. Observation of the sky for a couple of hours on a clear 
night will give anybody immediate knowledge that the stars are constantly 
moving from their places. When I recommend young teachers—men and 
women properly brought up in secondary schools and universities—to 
exhibit this truth to their future pupils they are almost invariably puzzled 
and confused. They do not, of course, doubt the facts, but they resent my 
“outrageously Pickwickian” way of stating them. When everybody knows 
that the stars are “really” at rest and the earth “really” revolving, is it not 
(they ask) almost immoral to allow a child to say that the stars move? Yet 
it is clear that the statement, as they prefer to make it, is really the “Pick-
wickian” rendering of the facts, and that they have ceased to feel it to be 
so merely because it accords with a view of the stellar universe which they 
have been led by instruction to adopt. 
It is a trite remark that science is full of such “Pickwickian” transfor-
mations of truths of observation and that progress is effected largely by 
means of them. Dr. Moore’s paper does not fail to afford a remarkable 
illustration of this. Consider his statement that, when a dozen people are 
looking at a half-crown lying on the floor before them, each is, at one 
and the same moment, contemplating a “really elliptical” sensible situ-
ated in a “private space” and a “really circular” source which lies in a 
totally distinct “physical” space. Could any proposition be more startling 
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to common sense? It has been known to throw even seasoned members of 
this Society into a state of unphilosophic astonishment. Yet it is simply Dr. 
Moore’s way of rendering truths that he regards as obvious to everybody’s 
inspection. 
I urge, then, that Dr. Moore would have no right to reject the “pos-
sibilities of sensation” theory if it merely gave a “Pickwickian” interpre-
tation to the truth that a half-crown exists when unperceived. The valid 
ground for rejecting it (or at least for regarding it with great suspicion) is 
that it ignores our strong propensity to believe that sense-data exist when 
unperceived; in other words, that it does not simply paraphrase the origi-
nal truth but offers a substitute in which the original is not contained and 
from which it cannot be deduced. 
Similarly, I do not think that either the second or the third of the four 
theories is to be rejected simply because it gives a “Pickwickian” form to 
the truth that the half-crown is “really circular”; the theories are to be 
condemned (so far as concerns this point) only if the proffered form is 
not merely “Pickwickian” but does actual violence to the original facts. 
The critical question is, therefore, whether this logical crime may justly be 
charged against the modes of interpretation which Dr. Moore has in view. 
It would be easier to discuss this question if Dr. Moore had told us pre-
cisely what is the “simple and natural sense” in which he believes a half-
crown to be “really” circular and “really” larger than a florin. To deal 
with the second attribute first: Can it consist in anything more “simple 
and natural” than the fact that whenever the two coins are placed so that 
the centres of their faces coincide the florin leaves part of the half-crown 
uncovered? If this explanation of the meaning of the attribute—or its 
equivalent in terms of sense-data—is too “Pickwickian” for acceptance, I 
am utterly at a loss to know what to substitute for it; and I am confident 
that the plain man would share my perplexity. Can it be that Dr. Moore 
requires a reason why the florin fails to hide the half-crown? And does he 
consider the statement that the half-crown is “really” larger than the flo-
rin to be that reason, and not merely an alternative statement of the fact 
itself? If so, I can only suppose that by declaring the half-crown to be “re-
ally” larger than the florin he means (i) that when the two really circular 
surfaces of the coins occupy to the greatest extent possible the same place 
in physical space, there are parts of the surface of the half-crown which 
are not in the same physical place as any part of the surface of the florin, 
and (ii) that the converse of this statement is not true. Now this account 
of the greater size of the half-crown certainly differs materially from the 
former, for it contains no reference to sense-data; nevertheless it seems evi-
dent that the two accounts are formally identical. But, for one who holds 
Dr. Moore’s views, to eliminate reference to sense-data can hardly be in 
itself desirable; for he still has the sense-data on his hands as extra-mental 
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existences which must be accommodated in some sort of space. Assum-
ing, then, that I have guessed his meaning correctly, I cannot see what he 
gains in “simplicity and naturalness” by invoking admittedly hypothetical 
“sources” in order to say about them something formally identical with 
what must in any case be said about indubitable sense-data.
Next with regard to the attribute of circularity. I can myself discern no 
departure from the “simple and natural” in the statement that by calling 
a half-crown (which appears at the moment elliptical) “really circular” I 
mean that it would appear circular if held in any one of a certain specifi-
able series of positions. (This statement is capable of expansion in terms 
of sense-data, but it does not seem necessary for my purpose actually to 
expand it.) In order that I may know that it is really circular it is certainly 
sufficient to know that it appears so when held in one of these positions. 
Moreover, the condition is also necessary. For, considered by itself, no one 
sensible appearance can tell us any more about the “reality” of the coin 
than any other. Unless I know, directly or indirectly, that the coin looks 
circular when placed in one of the standard positions. I cannot possibly 
know that it really is circular. Here, as in the former instance, I cannot see 
why Dr. Moore should be dissatisfied with an account of the matter which 
would, I believe, be accepted by the plain man as clear and sufficient. And 
again his invocation of a source to carry the attribute of “real” circularity 
appears to me a piece of superfluous ingenuity, creating more embarrass-
ment than it can possibly remove. For while, from the assumption that the 
source resembles the circular sense-data in shape, we can certainly draw 
the conclusion that some of the sense-data are circular, it is equally certain 
we cannot deduce that others will be elliptical. If we must have a source 
at all I suggest that one (such as the spiritual source Dr. Moore rejects) 
which makes no pretence to explain the shapes of any of the sense-data is 
preferable to one which, by explaining some of the shapes, only makes us 
more acutely conscious of its failure to explain the rest. 
To this objection Dr. Moore may retort that he invokes the source not 
to explain why the sense-data have certain shapes, but to explain why one 
of those shapes is believed to be “really” the shape of the coin; and that 
his theory is not to be discredited because it does not do what it was never 
intended to do. To such a defence I should reply that, if the assumed cir-
cularity of the source can explain nothing except our belief that the coin 
is “really” circular, then it is a hypothesis deserving of extremely little 
respect. For the chief claim that a hypothesis invoked to explain a fact can 
make upon our confidence is that it brings into relation with this and with 
one another facts whose connexion was previously unknown or obscure; 
and persistent failure to do so generally justifies suspicion of its validity. I 
urge, then, that Dr. Moore should not ask us to accept his hypothesis until 
he has either found some further useful work for it to do or has at least 
demolished the view referred to in the preceding paragraph. 
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Finally, it is, I think, pertinent to ask why Dr. Moore applies his meth-
od of explanation only to the belief that the coin is “really circular.” To 
my mind it is no more certain that it is, in some sense, “really circular,” 
though it often appears to be elliptical, than that it is, in some sense, also 
“really silver-white,” though it often appears to be of another colour. If 
“Pickwickian” expressions are, in the former case, to be ruled out, why 
should they be admitted in the latter? Unless a satisfactory answer can be 
given to this question we seem bound to suppose that the source is not 
only “really circular” but also “really silver-white,” and the whole group 
of sense-data which have other colours is at once added to our embarrass-
ing collection of inexplicables. 
In the face of these difficulties the hypothesis that all the appearances 
of the coin are parts or aspects of the coin—some revealed under certain 
conditions, some under others—seems to me refreshingly straightforward 
and simple. I do not pretend that it has no difficulties of its own; but these 
seem to me to be due to the complexity of the problem; they are not intro-
duced into the situation by the very form of the proffered solution. Again, 
I do not claim that it is a complete theory of the nature of physical objects. 
For example, in addition to a vast collection of sense-data directly appre-
hensible by supra-human, human, and infra-human subjects and in addi-
tion to the perceivable relations between these, a half-crown may, for all I 
know, contain elements “spiritual” in their nature or of a nature “utterly 
unknown to us.” It may be that such elements are essential to its character 
as a “thing,” and it may be that they, or some of them, are actually “ex-
istentially present to consciousness” at times when sense-data are being 
directly apprehended. On the other hand, I can find no reason to suppose 
that these elements (if they exist) are the “source” of the sense-data, if by 
that is meant that the sense-data are not as truly parts of the thing as they 
are. And my consideration of Dr. Moore’s belief in sources of this kind has 
only strengthened my scepticism. 
ii.
I turn to the consideration of Professor Stout’s paper. As I have already 
said, he agrees with Dr. Moore in holding that sense-data are not to be 
regarded as identical with a physical object “or with any physical part 
of it,” but are to be regarded, when directly apprehended, as giving im-
mediate knowledge that they have their source in an “existence beyond 
themselves.” Further, he shares Dr. Moore’s view that our knowledge of 
their connexion with the source includes a knowledge of the nature of the 
source as being “in some respects akin” to the sense-data. 
An examination of Professor Stout’s position shows that it is not 
nearly so close to Dr. Moore’s as the statement of these points of resem-
blance would suggest. The differences between them appear, indeed, to 
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be profoundly significant and to indicate a gulf between Professor Stout’s 
views and my own much wider than the one which separates me from 
Dr. Moore. Nevertheless Professor Stout’s doctrine presents, I venture to 
think, a greater degree of logical coherence than Dr. Moore’s, being free 
from the arbitrary complications to which I have called attention in the 
previous section. For example, Professor Stout does not regard the cor-
respondence between the nature of the sense-data and the nature of their 
source as restricted to certain sense-data only, but as extended, in accor-
dance with a uniform principle, to all. Again, though he disclaims any 
propensity to believe that sense-data exist when unperceived, he brings 
such being as he allows them into close relations with the nature of the 
source. For him they are not (as they seem to be for Dr. Moore) unintel-
ligible satellites of the physical object, tied to it by undiscoverable bonds. 
They are, so to speak, the means by which, from time to time, the source 
expresses its permanent nature to a percipient. The source may, therefore, 
be thought of as always including the nature of the sense-data in its own 
nature, somewhat as the printed marks in a book may be thought of as 
always forming words and sentences even when no one is reading them. 
In this analogy the permanency of the source answers to the perma-
nency of the printed symbols, while the fleeting sense-data correspond 
to the meaning—always potentially present but emerging into actual ex-
istence only when the book is read. In general, as readers of Professor 
Stout are well aware, his conception of the relation between sense-data 
and physical object inverts this comparison: the sense-data are fleeting 
and variable symbols; the physical object or source is their permanent and 
constant meaning. It is probably not rash to suggest that the idea of the 
relation between symbol and meaning has for years played a dominating 
part in Professor Stout’s thought. He has used it (if I may say so without 
impertinence) in a masterly manner and with results of permanent impor-
tance. In the paper before us he has, I think, made some novel applications 
of it; but I am bound to add that these seem to me of very questionable 
validity. I gather that, in his view, sense-data are, from the first moments of 
experience, vehicles of meaning—meaning which consists, from the outset 
and all through, in reference to a source. But we must not think that in the 
beginnings of experience the reference of sense-data to a source is a refer-
ence to what the experient will ultimately come to recognise as distinct 
things—people, furniture, trees, etc. It is initially a reference to the whole 
source of sensational experience. Only as experience develops does this 
total source, first glimpsed as what James called “a big, buzzing, bloom-
ing confusion,” become more or less definitely distinguished into parts in 
more or less definite relations with one another. The work of progressive 
differentiation and integration within the total source goes forward for 
a considerable distance under the stimulus of the conditions of ordinary 
life. It is carried on immensely farther by the systematic activities of the 
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sciences. Its goal is an ideal situation in which all physical reality (includ-
ing the parts that are vehicles of life and consciousness) would be known 
as a perfectly articulated whole, and every element of sensory experience 
referred to its special source in the nature of some distinguished part or 
aspect of that whole. But, even then, the reference of sensory experience 
to its source would still include that reference to the whole source from 
which its development started. 
This is, I think, a fair paraphrase of an argument which Professor 
Stout develops at some length and in a very impressive and instructive 
manner. I shall have to inquire later whether the process he describes is 
correctly represented as giving a knowledge of sense-data as having their 
source in “existence beyond themselves.” For the present I wish to raise 
the narrower question whether his doctrine is self-consistent. For the sake 
of argument let us grant the assumption that when a new-born child first 
apprehends a certain succession of circular and elliptical brightnesses his 
mental activity includes a reference of his experience to a total source 
which is only later to be differentiated, inter alia, into a physical half-
crown in varying spatial relations to his own physical body. My difficulty 
is in seeing that there is any real parity in the development of the reference 
in so far as it concerns the two terms— the coin and the body—respec-
tively. For, though the direct apprehension of the varying sense-data and 
their relations gives the child eventually, as Professor Stout claims, his 
knowledge of the real nature of the half-crown as a thing, it cannot be said 
to afford him any immediate acquaintance with the nature of his body. He 
gains from it nothing but the bare perception that the state of his body and 
its spatial relations to the half-crown somehow play a part in determining 
what appearances the coin shall present. Thus it cannot (for example) be 
contended that the blurred character of the visual sensibles of a short-
sighted person “express the nature” of the myopic eye in the same sense as 
their forms and colour express (upon Professor Stout’s theory) the nature 
of the half-crown. If it were so, then the physical coin must be a thing-in-
itself whose nature is eternally inaccessible to direct experience. It would 
be still more clearly absurd to contend that the development of the child’s 
reference of his sense-data to a source leads to any direct knowledge of 
the nature of the neural mechanism which functions in his body in the act 
of seeing. 
This objection is so obvious that it is incredible that Professor Stout 
should have left his theory open to it (as I think he does) except for some 
very strong reason. He makes it abundantly clear what that reason is. As 
I pointed out in the 1910 paper, illusions and hallucinations are at least 
as great an obstacle to Professor Stout’s theory of the repre sentative func-
tion of sense-data (as he formerly stated it) as they are to my own realistic 
theory. Upon either theory (as I then said) “the differentia of sensational 
experience is that it presents me with data from which I may infer imme-
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diately the presence of an extra-mental existent or physical body. But how 
can this account be true if sometimes (as in hallucination) when sense-data 
are given the inference is incorrect? . . . Either the immediate inference 
must always hold good or else there is no inference at all, but merely such 
a coefficient of correlation between the presence of certain sensations in 
my mind and the spatial presence of certain physical things, that in most 
cases, when I have the sensations, it is a safe shot to guess that the physical 
thing is at hand. But if there is merely this external relation between sensa-
tion and thing, we are obviously brought back to the old puzzle of how 
we know anything about the thing at all.” The feature of Professor Stout’s 
later exposition, which I am now discussing, is intended, as he himself 
indicates, to meet objections of this kind. It must be understood that he 
contends not only that sense-data always include a reference to the whole 
source, but, in addition (to quote his words), “first, that only part of the 
primary sensible through which we perceive a thing belongs to the thing 
itself; and, secondly, that even this part is not directly but more or less 
remotely connected with the relevant sense-experience.” These positions 
granted, the difficulties presented by dreams and hallucinations can, he 
thinks, be satisfactorily met. For though in such cases we are impelled to 
believe that a perceived object exists and is present which, as a matter of 
fact, does not exist or is not present, yet the reference to a source beyond 
the sense-data has not failed. There are “physiological conditions” in the 
brain and sense-organ, and in any case there is the total source, and the 
reference may be taken to be directed to these. 
I find it hard to believe that this explanation does not put a very se-
vere strain upon Professor Stout’s theory. However he may qualify it, the 
essence of his thesis is that sense-data are neither substantial entities nor 
epiphenomena, but genuine appearances or expressions of the nature of 
physical reality, and that, as sensational experience develops, we achieve 
through them genuine knowledge of the detailed structure or character 
of their source. How can his explanation of hallucination be regarded as 
compatible with this thesis? Macbeth is directly apprehending sense-data 
whose reference is, by hypothesis, partly to the total source, partly to the 
part of the source which we call his body, partly to a part of the source 
which we call a dagger. But there proves to be no dagger there. Thereupon 
Professor Stout hastens to restore our confidence—rather badly shaken 
by this contretemps. It is true, he admits, that the sense-data which give 
its specific character to Macbeth’s present experience are sensibles whose 
special business is to “refer” to daggers. They express the nature of the 
part of the total source which we call daggers, and are the only means by 
which we can know that nature. It is also true that on this occasion the 
reference has gone astray. It is a little provoking, but there is no reason for 
perturbation. The sense-data are there, the reference to the source is there, 
the specific part of the source to which the reference is specially directed is 
481
The Aristotelian Society Virtual Issue No. 2T. Percy Nunn
there. It simply happens that the last of these, instead of being a dagger, is, 
pro hac vice, the abnormal condition of Macbeth’s perceptual apparatus! 
Professor Stout is a thinker whose views one must always reject with 
caution, fearing lest the Johnsonian breadth of his common sense has giv-
en due weight to considerations which one has underestimated or over-
looked. In the present instance, however, I must confess to an uneasy feel-
ing that, despairing of a solution of the problem of error really consonant 
with his own methods, he has surreptitiously adopted those of another 
eminent philosopher. 
“He thought he saw an albatross that fluttered round a lamp; 
He looked again and saw it was a penny postage stamp.” 
But such an incident gives no ground for doubting that perception is 
veridical. Were we not warned at the beginning that the reference of sense-
data was always to the whole source, and are not albatrosses and postage 
stamps equally parts of that source? 
I am bound, then, to register my opinion that Professor Stout has nei-
ther given a satisfactory solution of the epistemological problem of hal-
lucinations nor strengthened his general position by his attempt to do so. I 
now pass to examine the relation between his theory of the source and the 
facts upon which he bases it. 
It seems clear that the theory derives its plausibility from its connexion 
(1) with psychological theories of individual experience, (2) with physi-
co-physiological theories of the mechanism of sensation and the physi-
cist’s general view of the material world. From the first of these Professor 
Stout draws his cardinal idea that sense-data are symbols pointing to ex-
istence beyond themselves; from the second the idea that this existence is 
a “source” consisting in an organised totality of elements which are (or 
may be) all involved in determining the content of any given moment of 
sensational experience. 
That the content of perceptual experience includes a reference to 
something beyond the actual sense-data is without doubt true from a very 
early stage in the individual’s life. It may be true of his very earliest ex-
periences. Mr. MacDougall finds the phenomena of instinct inexplicable 
unless the sense-data which set the instinctive mechanisms in motion are 
already charged with meaning. Even Professor Lloyd Morgan, whose cau-
tion in matters of this kind is so well known, grants that such sense-data, 
upon their first emergence in consciousness, may carry, as it were, a faint 
aura of meaning. If this view is well founded, at least if Mr. MacDougall’s 
form of it is true, it must have a very important bearing upon our theory 
of perception. Upon my principles it would seem to show that even the 
first appearance of a “thing” to a percipient may reveal more of the thing 
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than is contained in the sense-data which form the core of the experience. 
This supplementary content may be of the nature of a form or schema 
to be filled up by subsequent sensational experience. If the thing has a 
special relevance to fundamental instinctive dispositions in the percipient, 
the schema may even have a specific (though necessarily vague) charac-
ter. But I see no reason to suppose that it would have the character of a 
“source.” By that I mean that it would be experienced as coming together 
with the sense-data, as a kind of framework into which they fit, but not 
as their cause or origin. But if (as I think Professor Lloyd Morgan is in-
clined to hold) the meaning of the first appearance of the thing consists 
entirely in felt relevance to conational elements in the instinctive disposi-
tion, then this result would not follow. There would still be a schema, 
but it could not be said to belong specifically to the thing; the schema of 
the thing would be an a posteriori result of manifold sensory experience. 
Upon either view the relevance of sense-data to conational dispositions in 
the percipient is the condition which starts and maintains the process by 
which the schemata of the body and the thing become more or less clearly 
separated from one another, and become filled with detail in the manner 
which Professor Stout has described. At every stage in the process per-
ceptual experience does indubitably contain reference, beyond the actual 
sense-data, to these schemata and the concrete details of their filling. But I 
can find no evidence in my own experience of a duplicated reference, that 
is, of a reference to a “source” in addition to the filled schemata. And it 
seems perfectly evident that the filled schemata which register the results 
of previous sensory experience cannot possibly be regarded as the source 
(in Professor Stout’s sense) of my present sense-data. 
I conclude that the argument from psychological observation and 
analysis leads to the notion not that the thing is a source or part of a 
source but that it is a scheme of necessarily connected sensibles. In what 
other quarter, then, can support be found for the theory of a source? The 
answer would seem to be: physical science, wherein the notion of a perma-
nent “material substratum of phenomena” has achieved such triumphs. 
It will be necessary, therefore, to glance in this direction, however briefly. 
Speaking broadly, the most impressive achievements of physical science 
fall under one of two types or else under a third type which is a combina-
tion of these two. In the first the varying appearances of things and their 
behaviour as manifested through those appearances are shown to be ex-
plicable as the result of changes in the spatial configuration of permanent 
entities which do not appear directly at all. The explanation of chemical 
phenomena in terms of atoms and molecules is an obvious instance of 
this type. In the second, appearances observed here are connected with 
appearances observed there by the postulation of a “continuous medium” 
connected with the “substratum” of both sets of appearances. The theory 
of the transmission of light will occur to every one as an example. Let us 
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consider this type first. Examination of the use made of such hypothetical 
entities as “ether” and “electricity” shows, I think, conclusively that they 
are simply derivates from the familiar things of common-sense thought 
into a context in which sensory experience cannot or at least does not 
actually disclose them.7 If this is the ease, then they must be conceived, 
upon my principles, as schemes of necessarily connected but unperceived 
sensibles—and so, I believe, they are. It is true that nobody inquires what 
is the colour of ether. This is partly because things, even as we know them, 
do not always have colour, but chiefly because the colour of ether, if it had 
any, would be irrelevant: unperceived sensibles which are not needed for 
the purposes of a theory may be ignored. On the other hand, certain kinds 
of sensibles are essential for the theoretical work which the hypothesis is 
to do, and those most assuredly are thought to be present. Similar consid-
erations hold good with regard to the first type of scientific explanation. 
Take as an instance the experiments on Brownian movement which M. 
Perrin showed us a year or so ago at King’s College. In these, microscopic 
particles of gamboge of uniform size were suspended in water and were 
observed to be constantly moving as if bombarded irregularly by invisible 
particles around them. It was shown that the distribution of the particles 
of gamboge was precisely what would follow from Avogadro’s famous 
principle that the number of molecules in a given volume of a gas is inde-
pendent of the gas’s chemical composition, and we were asked to accept 
the deduction not only that water probably consists of discrete particles 
capable of relatively independent movement, but also that the kinetic the-
ory of gases may be regarded as giving a true account of the nature of that 
form of matter. 
Now I am not concerned either to affirm or to deny that “matter” re-
ally is composed of “ultimate particles,” as these experiments and other 
recent ones so strongly suggest. My point is that, even if it is so, molecules 
(and atoms) are simply the molar bodies of everyday experience concep-
tually reduced in size. Whatever belongs to the latter may belong to the 
former also. The whole force, for instance, of the argument based upon 
the Perrin experiments depends upon the idea of continuity between the 
Brownian phenomenon and the molecular movements in gases. At what 
point in the reduction of the gamboge-particles to ultimate molecules are 
we to locate the tremendously important transition from things manifest-
ed through sensibles to things-in-themselves, incapable, not only in fact 
but actually in principle, of being revealed to any kind of perceptive fac-
ulty? The question is equally relevant when we consider the modern view 
of the atom as being itself a complicated system of electrons in relative 
movement. Here, again, physical speculation assumes complete continuity 
between the behaviour of molar bodies and of these ultimate constituents 
of matter. The once unitary atom becomes simply a solar system in small, 
7 Cf. my papers in Proc. Arist. Soc. for 1905-6, 1906-7, 1911-12. 
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and its theory a planetary theory, modified, it is true, yet based funda-
mentally upon the same conceptions as the old one. It will be objected 
that planets have qualities which no one has ever attributed either to the 
ancient atom or to the modern electron. That objection is easily met. Plan-
ets have these additional qualities because we encounter them in direct 
sensational experience, and not merely (as we encounter electrons) in the 
world of theory. In the planetary theory they have just the same kind of 
qualities as electrons and no more: namely, those they must have if they 
are to serve as subjects of the mathematician’s equations. If other quali-
ties followed necessarily from the qualities assigned to electrons in theory, 
those qualities they would assuredly have—however inconvenient it might 
be to admit them. 
I am, of course, aware of the common belief that physical theory has 
“accounted for” the appearances called secondary qualities by showing 
that they are consequences from the structure and behaviour of entities 
which are devoid of such qualities. My view is that this belief is unfound-
ed. Given the facts (i) that the number of people killed in railway accidents 
in these islands is proportionately very small, and (ii) that the number in 
the year 1912 was 119, a statistician can deduce that (things remaining 
as they are) the annual death-roll from this cause would exceed 160 only 
about once in each period of 3000 years. He achieves this remarkable 
prediction without needing to attribute any specifically human qualities to 
the agents whose actions must combine to make it true. Has he therefore 
proved that they have none? If not, then neither has the physicist proved 
that his ultimate material elements have no other qualities than those pos-
tulated in the reasonings that “explain” the production of the conditions 
which appear to our perceptive faculty in the guise of secondary qualities. 
As a matter of fact I do not believe that physical theory seeks the result 
which is erroneously attributed to it. Its aim is (I submit) simply to carry 
as far as possible the work that common sense begins but lays down at the 
point where it ceases to be interested in it—namely, the work of analysing 
the history of the material world into the behaviour of “things” acting 
and reacting upon one another in definite ways. The hope which guides 
its efforts is that the analysis will terminate in the discovery of things so 
simple in their nature that further analysis is unnecessary, and governed in 
their behaviour by principles that apply to all and are never contravened. 
It has found that the most profitable clue to the solution of its problem 
is to ignore some of the aspects presented by the things of common sense 
and to confine its attention to others. This is, no doubt, a fact of great 
significance, but it does not imply that physical analysis has ever reached 
an ontological plane different from the one upon which it began. In other 
words, it gives no support to the notion of a source of sensibles in the form 
in which Dr. Moore and Professor Stout hold that notion.  
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